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The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the origins,
conduct and implementation of Britain's 1981 defence review.
Detailed analysis of both the substance of defence policy and
decision-making within the Ministry of Defence make this a
unique study. No such in-depth analysis of a contemporary
decision in British defence has been written, largely due to
the culture of secrecy in British government. However,
documentation of the 1981 review through interviews with
virtually all the participants demonstrates what can now be
accomplished in the field of contemporary history, even in the
sensitive area of defence.
The 1981 review took place during a major shift of
influence within the ministry away from the Service
Departments and toward the central staffs. Previously the
Chiefs of Staff had assessed Britain's strategic priorities,
but in 1981 this was done by the central staffs. This informal
shift in responsibility took place due to growing economic
constraints which created pressure for deep cuts in the
defence budget. The Chiefs of Staff Committee, prone to
compromise, was unable to agree which area of the programme
should be cut. Conducting a 'strategic' review, in which cuts
reflected defence priorities rather than the principle of
'equal misery' among the services, required that the grip of
the Chiefs of Staff on defence planning be broken.
The implications for the review were significant.
Economic and international political considerations were
paramount. Existing priorities were reaffirmed but current
trends were accelerated, leading to radical cuts in the Royal
Navy. The Navy was vulnerable for a variety of reasons: its
programme was overloaded, there were powerful arguments
against its prevailing operational concept, and its approach
to the review was perceived as unhelpful. In contrast, Army
and Royal Air Force programmes were closely linked to NATO'S
Central Region and thereby shielded from radical cuts due to
the international political importance of British Forces
Germany.
The 1982 Falklands War reopened the debate over defence
priorities and led to modification of the 1981 review.
Financial pressures on the defence programme remained great
throughout the 1980s, but the 1981 review had been a painful
exercise and the government proved unwilling to undertake
another fundamental assessment of British defence. The 1981
White Paper, as amended in 1982, remained the basic statement
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
Broad strategic concepts have rarely been at the heart
of defence planning in postwar Britain. Their absence has
been due, at least in part, to the structure and nature of
influence within the Ministry of Defence. The need to
balance commitments and priorities has prompted numerous
long-range planning exercises, defence reviews, but
conflicting political, economic, and strategic imperatives
have consistently constrained defence plans. Despite
undergoing what amounts to perpetual review, Britain's
defence effort has evolved incrementally, not radically,
and without the detailed articulation of an overarching
national strategy.
In 1981 reshaping Britain's defence posture hinged on
fundamental changes in civil-military relations. The
Salisbury report of 1920 had formally given the Service
Chiefs, working together as the Chiefs of Staff Committee,
authority for developing strategic concepts) Despite the
creation of the Ministry of Defence in 1946 and subsequent
centralisation of authority in the hands of the Secretary
of State for Defence, the Service Departments continued to
play the vital role in defence planning.
	 None of the
subsequent reorganisations of the ministry diminished this
Cmnd 2029, Report of the Sub-Committee of the Committee
of ImDerial Defence on National and Imperial Defence, 1924,
(The Salisbury Report), para 51 (1).
2authority. However, the difficulty of arriving at
strategic concepts acceptable to all three services
inhibited the emergence of a unified 'defence view' of
priorities, in contrast to a three-way compromise
accommodating each service's interests. Such a 'defence
view', or 'defence solution', was declared an explicit
ob:jective of the 1963 defence reorganisation, yet in
practice service planning continued as before.2
The 1981 review was a watershed in the establishment
of a defence view. In analysing how this particular
defence view emerged, this thesis identifies 1981 as the
point when, due to informal shifts of influence, the
central civilian and military staffs supplanted the Service
Departments as the principal source of advice about the
future size and shape of the defence programme. The growth
of central influence within the Ministry of Defence has
been thoroughly explored elsewhere and placed in the
context of the ministry's evolution. 3
	However, the
2 Cmnd 2097, Central Orpanisation for Defence, (July 1963),
para 32.
See, for example, Adrian Smith, 'Command and Control in
Postwar Britain: Defence Decision-making in the United
Kingdom, 1945-1984,' Twentieth Centur y
 British History, Vol
2. No. 3 (1991); Sir Ewen Broadbent, The Military
 and
Goverrnnent: From Macmillan to Heseltine (London:
Macmillan, 1988); Martin Edmonds, 'The Higher Organisation
of Defence in Britain, 1945-85: The Federal Unification
Debate,' in M. Edmonds, (ed), The Defence Eauation:
British Military
 Systems -- Policy. Planning
 and
Performance Since 1945 (London: Brassey's, 1986); John
Sweetman, 'A Process of Evolution: Command and Control in
Peacetime,' in John Sweetman, (ed), Sword and Mace:
Twentieth Century
 Civil-Military
 Relations in Britain
(London: Brassey's, 1986); Franklyn A. Johnson, Defence By
Ministry (London: Duckworth, 1980); Michael Howard,
Central Oraanisation for Defence (London: RUSI, 1970).
3tendency has been to explore this evolution as reflected in
formal organisational change or the conduct of military
operations.'	 While clearly demonstrating the growth in
central influence, and explaining how reorganisations
codified the enhanced authority, existing analyses do not
fully explore the impact of defence reviews, in particular
the 1981 review, on the evolution of the ministry or
British defence policy. This thesis identifies the
character and timing of the shift in influence which
enabled the central staffs to assume responsibility for
peacetime strategic planning, and explores the impact of
this shift on policy.
The principle underlying the redrafting of defence
plans in 1981 was NATO orthodoxy, the central staff's core
consensus on defence priorities. Emphasis on Britain's
NATO roles did not represent a departure in British policy,
which since the 1960s had focused increasingly on NATO
capabilities. However, in 1981 Britain accepted for the
first time the specialisation of its armed forces this
orthodoxy implied. Due to the importance of the central
front in NATO strategy Britain planned radically to reduce
the size of the Royal Navy's surface fleet, Britain's
traditional instrument of military power. Growth in
central influence was critical to the government's adoption
of NATO priorities as British priorities.
Ibid and Cohn Seymour-Ure, 'British "War Cabinets" in
Limited Wars: Korea, Suez and the Falkiands,' Public
Administration Vol. 62 (Summer 1984); Alex Danchev, 'The
Central Direction of War, 1940-41,' in Sweetman, (ed),
Sword and Mace.
4Although the 1963 reorganisation strengthened
ministerial control and central civilian influence it did
not strengthen the central defence staff, which remained
dependent on the Service Departments. With powerful
Admiral Lord Mountbatten as Chief of Defence Staff the
other Chiefs of Staff were loath to enhance his already
considerable personal authority and vetoed all such
proposals. The formal authority necessary for the Chief of
Defence Staff to push the Service Chiefs towards a shared
defence view consequently remained limited. The process of
arriving at tn-service defence concepts thus depended on
inter-service compromise, which, difficult to achieve in
the best of times, could prove impossible during periods of
budgetary retrenchment.
In the 1970s, ongoing economic problems inclined
ministers to rely more heavily on their civilian advisers,
whose role as interlocutor between departments and as the
source of financial advice endowed their recommendations to
the Secretary of State with economic as well as political
rationality. Undoubtedly, the cumulative experience gained
by civilian staff following the 1964 adoption of a policy
of cross-posting between the services, and the streamlined
nature of civilian reporting procedures, further enhanced
their influence. During the same period inter-service
bargaining diminished the credibility of the Service
Chiefs. But, with ministry civilians lacking the
experience and training to formulate defence plans and the
central defence staffs dependent on the services, 'defence
5solutions' did not emerge without tn-service approval.
Conducting a defence review on this basis, as in 1974,
proved painful and, ultimately, ineffective.
Postwar British defence policy has been characterised
by relative decline and this thesis does not challenge the
assumption that economic constraints have brought about
the gradual contraction of Britain's defence commitments
despite the existence of political and strategic incentives
to maintain them. 5
 Indeed, it accepts this assumption and
elaborates on how defence planners have coped with
conflicting economic, political, and strategic constraints.
The effect of coping with the tension between economic and
strategic imperatives is evident in the structure of the
Ministry of Defence, reaffirming the link between
organisationa]. adaptation and policy reappraisals.'
Writing in the wake of the Healey defence reviews of
the late l960s, the former Navy Minister, Christopher (now
Lord) Mayhew wrote
The big reform of defence organisation is needed
elsewhere -- not inside the MoD but in the
triangular relationship between the Ministry, the
economic departments and the overseas
departments. It was here -- and not in the
relationship between the Navy and the RAP -- that
the Government's Defence Review arrangements
broke down. There was a plain conflict between
On the link between defence spending and economic decline
see L.W. Martin, 'British Defence Policy: The Long
Recessional,' Adelphi Paper No. 61 (November 1969); C.J.
Bartlett, The Lona Retreat (London: Macmillan, 1977);
Christopher Coker, A Nation in Retreat? (London: Brassey's,
1986); and Malcolm Chalmers, Pavina For Defence: Military
SDendina and British Decline (London: Pluto Press, 1985).
6 See Baylis, British Defence, esp. p. 18, on
organisational change and the evolution of defence policy.
6the tasks recommended by the overseas
departments, the budget recommended by the
economic departments and the defence structure
recommended by the Ministry of Defence; and there
was no effective authority, standing apart from
the interested Ministers and Departments, which
was capable of working out and imposing a
rational decision.7
Yet organisational changes affecting defence policy
formation continued to be introspective, a 'constant
search,' according to Sir Ewen Broadbent, 'for better
internal ways of determining the broad parameters of
defence policy.'8
Not surprisingly, one of the main 'Whitehall' defence
debates of the 1980s was whether civilians had assumed an
'unreasonable' degree of influence over plans. 9
 Analysis
of the 1981 review provides one means of assessing the
concentration of power within British decision-making for
defence, although the question of central input is
sensitive to a variety of assumptions about what
constitutes 'unreasonable' influence. One objective
criterion for assessing central influence could be the
coherence of defence plans prepared by central staffs,
compared to alternative plans prepared elsewhere. The
absence of alternative plans in 1981 precludes the
application of this criterion, but nevertheless highlights
the dependence of policy formation on the balance of
influence within the ministry. This thesis argues that the
? Christopher Mayhew, Britain's Role Tomorrow (London:
Hutchinson, 1967), p. 163
8 Broadbent, The Military
 and Government, p. 197.
Broadbent, The Military
 and Government, p. 189.
7growth in civilian influence was not 'unreasonable' for two
reasons. First, the strengthened centre filled a necessary
gap in the decision-making process. Second, this
strengthening resulted in a mutually dependent civil-
military centre, rather than civilian predominance.
From within the framework established by the 1963
reorganisation, the central staffs, working together,
emerged as the most likely source of a coherent defence
view. In the second half of the 1970s a disparity emerged
between the formal distribution of authority within the
Ministry of Defence and the practical exercise of
influence. While the Service Chiefs remained formally
responsible for defence plans, their propensity to
compromise and resulting inability to establish clear
priorities, even in a period of severe economic constraint,
eroded their credibility. Gradually, key members of the
central staff, initially civilian but ultimately military
as well, developed more prominent roles in defence
planning. While the Chiefs of Staff Committee remained the
forum for decisions about forward plans in 1974, by 1980
central civilian staffs, working closely with central
military staffs, had assumed the primary role. Thus, the
central defence staffs ultimately benefitted from the
accrual of central civilian influence. Together, the
central staffs as a whole possessed the necessary
political, financial and military expertise to conduct a
defence review, and the necessary influence and access to
ensure a sympathetic hearing with the Secretary of State.
8The outcome of the 1981 defence review was to a large
extent a result of this shift in influence.
The basic consensus among key central officials over
the appropriate direction of defence policy, NATO
orthodoxy, hinged on two assumptions. First, that British
security depended, above all, on alliance. Second, that
alliance cohesion was best served by a strong British
military presence in central Europe. Political logic thus
implied cutting the Royal Navy. As in the 1960s, this
political logic was bolstered by operational research,
which also played an important part in ministry debate over
alternative force structures. The argument for naval cuts
incorporated the conclusions of several studies conducted
by the Defence Operational Analysis Establishment. These
studies, subject to considerable dispute within the
ministry, suggested that large, highly capable surface
ships, particularly carriers, were not cost effective. The
analysis underlying these studies complemented the
political rationale for cutting the Navy and critically
influenced the thinking of central military and civilian
staff, as well as the Secretary of State. On this basis, in
1981, central officials produced a coherent defence plan
with specified priorities. This was not a plan, however,
that all three services could approve.
The fundamental nature of the proposals under
consideration limited the role of the Chiefs of Staff
Committee, which depended on consensus. Lack of agreement,
and an inability to work out a compromise once the Chiefs
9of Staff had lost the initiative in the review, highlighted
the disparity in outlook between central and service
staffs. Tasked with developing a 'purple' or defence-wide
set of overall priorities, the central defence staffs were
better placed to set aside service loyalties. However,
continued dependence on the Service Chiefs inhibited their
ability to perform this role, which led in 1982 to the
formal strengthening of the Chief of Defence Staff, who
shared their 'purple' mandate. Concern over elevating the
Chief of Defence Staff above the other Chiefs of Staff
remained, with some arguing that this would diminish the
military voice in government since the opinions of the CDS
could be seen as those of one man from one service. An
overriding concern, however, was that a CDS unable to speak
about defence priorities with the full support of the
Service Chiefs, had inadequate authority to participate in
the development of policy and plans.
One reason why developing a defence view and outlining
priorities has been so difficult is the nature of the
policy choices Britain has faced and their expression in
terms of dichotomies: continental versus maritime power,
European versus global defence, Europe versus the 'special
relationship', nuclear weapons versus conventional forces,
alliance commitments versus national independence. The
need to preserve a wide range of options often resulted in
decisions motivated more by necessity than adherence to
10
strategic concepts. 1° Lack of attention to such concepts,
as a means both of defining Britain's role in the world and
of identifying the appropriate means to uphold it has
engendered considerable criticism. 11
 The chief failing of
the system, the primacy of compromise over reason, led
resource allocation to proceed 'more on the basis of "fair
shares" than a coherent overall strategic plan.'12
Writing in 1967, Laurence Martin argued that the
system for determining the size and shape of Britain's
defence effort encouraged
uncritical attachment to the existing shape of
defence policy, uncertainties about the future of
Europe and NATO notwithstanding...Too passive an
acceptance of the lines of policy that have
resulted, somewhat arbitrarily, from the events
of recent years, would run a serious risk of
emasculating defence policy as an instrument of
national purpose.'3
According to Martin, the history of British defence policy
after 1951 was
one of attempting to perform a crushing dual task
(Europe and overseas] without paying the
necessary price. It is a history marked by a
series of efforts to make ends meet by bold
doctrinal innovations, none of which was pursued
to its logical conclusion.1'
° John Baylis, British Defence:
	 Strikina the Riaht
Balance (London:, Macmillan, 1989), p. 9
See, for example, Coker, A Nation in Retreat?; Michael
Chichester and John Wilkinson, The Uncertain All y : British
Defence Policy . 1960-1990 (Aldershot: Gower, 1982).
12 Laurence W. Martin, 'The Market for Strategic Ideas in
Britain: The "Sandys Era",' American Political Science
Review (March 1962), p. 24.
13 L.W.Martin, 'British Defence Policy:
	 The Long
Recessional,' Adelphi Paper No. 61 (November 1969), p. 21.
' Martin, 'British Defence Policy,' p. 2.
11
Although written in 1967, this observation accurately
describes subsequent defence reviews. The innovation of
the review conducted in 1974 by Secretary of State for
Defence Roy Mason was to plan on the assumption that all
non-NATO commitments would be relinquished. The assumption
was flawed, however, as it proved politically impossible to
end all overseas commitments. As a result, the size and
distribution of defence budget cuts, necessary for economic
reasons, was ultimately dictated by financial, rather than
strategic logic.15
Innovations in 1981 included reducing Britain's
planned role in the protection of NATO'S transatlantic
reinforcements, and shifting the balance of assets required
for anti-submarine warfare to favour submarines and
aircraft. These doctrinal changes reduced the need for
surface ships, and in turn allowed for savings in naval
support infrastructure. However, as previously, these
planned changes were not pursued to their logical
conclusion, in this case due to the outbreak of the
Falklands War in 1982.
The Royal Navy's operational concept had been
repeatedly challenged since the Second World War, in which
it had played an undoubtedly vital role. The importance of
air power for all military operations led to significant
debate over the relative merit of land-based versus
carrier-based aircraft, and generated considerable inter-
15 General Sir William Jackson, Britain's Defence Dilemma:
An Inside View (London: B.T. Batsford, 1990), p. 139.
12
service rivalry. When Defence Secretary Denis Healey
removed aircraft carriers from the forward defence
programme in 1966 it appeared that the Navy might lose this
capability forever. However, careful management of the
naval programme and development of the through-deck cruiser
-- in effect a mini aircraft carrier -- enabled the fleet
to preserve a degree of organic air power. In the South
Atlantic in 1982 this capability proved essential to the
conduct of the Falklands campaign.
The Falklands campaign, however, was not foreseeable,
at least not in the late 1970s when rapid advancement in
missile and satellite technologies heightened ship
vulnerability, leaving the Navy exposed to criticism that
fleet air defences were both inadequate and too costly.
Growth in Soviet anti-ship capabilities through the 1970s
raised doubts about the survivability of surface vessels,
including carriers, in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. At the very
least, the need for carriers to protect themselves appeared
likely to infringe on their ability to fulfil their
mission. The Soviet threat, and the high cost of sea-based
air power made it increasingly difficult to conform the
Navy's operational concept to NATO strategy. To the extent
that British defence priorities equated with NATO
priorities, in 1981 strategic, as well as economic and
political logic, also suggested cutting the Royal Navy.
Conduct of the review by central staff, where there was
consensus approval of NATO orthodoxy, was thus critical to
the policy outcome.
13
A second critical factor was that in 1980-81 defence
became part of the battleground between rival Conservative
philosophies represented in Cabinet. Defence choices were
painful for the Conservative Government, which had been
elected both to improve the economy and strengthen defence.
When these goals proved irreconcilable economic health took
precedence and John Nott, as Secretary of State for
Defence, determined that hard defence choices would be
confronted. Nott built on the existing consensus,
accelerating the planned shift of emphasis in the defence
programme, despite vociferous Navy protest. With the strong
support of the Prime Minister Nott successfully overcame
political obstacles to the review, which as result,
reflected not only the growing influence of the central
staffs, but the enhancement of prime ministerial authority.
In the course of the review primary consideration was
given to international rather than domestic political
concerns. Indeed, the principal policy challenge emanated
from within the Conservative Party, many of whom believed
strongly in the importance of the Royal Navy's surface
fleet. Divisions within the Conservative Party illustrated
the tension between what were perceived as competing
priorities within the defence programme. Navy critics
believed the surface fleet was being sacrificed to finance
the purchase of the Trident Submarine-Launched Ballistic
Missile, which was to become Britain's third generation
strategic nuclear deterrent. The timing of the Trident
decision, the launch of the review, and the review's scope,
14
bolstered this belief. Nevertheless this view
underestimated the significance of existing incentives for
reducing and reallocating Navy resources. Moreover, the
incidence of expenditure on Trident, which peaked in the
late 1980s, does not satisfactorily account for the need in
1981 for short and medium-term savings in the defence
programme. This need derived from larger budgetary
pressures at work inhibiting the achievement of
governments' financial objectives, and undermining planning
assumptions.
The easing of short-term budgetary pressures in the
wake of the Falklands War resulted in the modification of
the 1981 review, and the Navy did not suffer as greatly as
feared. However, the policy underlying the review did not
change, and the 1981 white paper remained the basic
statement on British defence priorities throughout the
decade. Only after transformation of the political and
strategic environment led in 1990-91 to the Options for
Change exercise did basic policy begin to shift.
Despite being a critical episode in British defence
little has been written specifically about the 1981 defence
review. This may be partly because it was yet another in
the series of postwar defence reviews undertaken as a
result of economic constraints and did not depart from
current policy trends. Accordingly, the most detailed
analyses of the 1981 defence review have focused primarily
on the white paper's immediate impact on the defence
15
programme and its implications for the Royal Navy.16
In the early 1980s there were also other important
events underway in British defence. Britain was in the
midst of a growing public debate over the role of nuclear
weapons in Europe generally and the UK in
particular.' 7
 Due to this concern the 1981 defence review
was remote from the focal point of Britain's public defence
debate. Indeed, much of the comment on the review focused
on Trident's alleged role in bringing it about. Public
interest in the review itself might have risen in 1982,
when it began to take effect, but even the scale of planned
cuts in the Royal Navy was not as emotive as the nuclear
threat. Due to changes in technology, politics and the
strategic environment, 1981 was a far cry from 1909 when
the popular slogan in the debate over the Naval Estimates
exhorted the government to build more Dreadnought-class
warships: 'We want eight, and we won't wait."8
16 David Greenwood, Reshaina Britain's Defences: An
Evaluation of Mr Nptt's Way
 Forward for the United Kingdom
Aberdeen Studies in Defence Economics, No. 19 summer 1981;
Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 1987); Derek Wood, 'Stormy Passage Ahead: the
future of the Royal Navy,' International Defense Review
12/1981; Christopher Coker analyses its policy implications
in A Nation in Retreat?: Britain's Defence Commitment
(London: Brassey's, 1986).
See Philip A.G. Sabin, The Third World War Scare in
Britain (London: Macmillan, 1986); William K. Domke, R.C.
Eichenberg, and C. Kelleher, 'Consensus Lost? Domestic
Politics and the "Crisis" in NATO,' World Politics (April
1987) Robbin Laird and David Robertson, '"Grenades from the
Candy Store": British Defence Policy in the l990s?' Orbis
(summer 1987).
Arthur J. I'larder, From the Dreadnou ght to Scaa Flow:
The Royal Navy
 in the Fisher Era. Dart one (London: Oxford
University Press, 1961), p. 167.
16
After the review's conclusions were announced comment
was largely confined to a small group of committed
critics. 19
 With the Falklands War the salience of the
review declined further. It remained a topic of debate in
as much as the war led to its modification, but analyses of
the war quickly overtook most other defence topics.
Traditional constraints on attributable source
material have significantly affected the literature on
British defence. To date there have been no in-depth
analyses of both the policy and process behind contemporary
decisions. Most major studies focus on the substance of
defence policy or the defence debate. 2° Analyses of
decision-making generally approach policy and process in
one of two ways. Some focus on organisation, tracing the
evolution of the Ministry of Defence. 2' Others focus on
process in general terms not relating it in detail to
specific decisions. 22
 In-depth analyses of both policy and
19 Greenwich Forum, The Navy 's Essential Roles in Peace and
war and Britain's Unchanging
 Maritime Interests Worldwide:
Report of a Meeting
 at the House of Lords 22nd June 1981
(Greenwich: Royal Navy College, July 1981); James Cable,
Britain's Naval Future (London: Macmillan, 1982);
Chichester and Wilkinson, The Uncertain All y ; Desmond
Wettern, '"The Way Forward" -- Implications for NATO, • NavY
International (October 1981).
See, for example, Peter Byrd, (ed), British Defence
Policy : Thatcher and Beyond (London: Phillip Alan, 1991);
John Baylis, (ed), Alternative Atroaches to British
Defence (London: Macmillan, 1988); Sabin, The Third World
War Scare in Britain; Chichester and Wilkinson, g
Uncertain Ally.
21 see note 4 above.
Malcolm McIntosh, Manaina Britain's Defence (London:
Macmillan, 1990); Michael Hobkirk, The Politics of Defence
Budgeting (Washington, DC: National Defense University,
17
the decision-making process have largely been confined to
decisions taking place over thirty years earlier, once
official records have become publicly available. The few
contemporary studies closely integrating analysis of policy
with the decision process have done so mainly on the basis
of published sources, though not infrequently they have
also been informed by interviews, largely unattributable.2'
Occasionally retired defence planners themselves write
about British defence, but even inside accounts face many
of the same source limitations.
Historical analysis of the 1981 defence review, which
established policy contours for the decade and had a strong
impact on the ministry, helps to span this gap in British
defence literature. Moreover, as a contemporary decision,
it offers the opportunity to explore key aspects of civil-
1983); Michael Dillon, 'Recurring Dilemmas and Decision-
Making for Defence,' in John Baylis, (ed), British Defence
Policy in a Changing
 World (London: Croom Helm, 1977);
Laurence Martin, (ed), The Manaaement of Defence (London:
Macmillan, 1976).
See, for example, Martin S. Navias, Nuclear Wea pons and
British Strategic Planning. 1955-58 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1991); Julian Lewis, Changing Direction: British
Military
 Plannina for Postwar Strategic Defence. 1942-47
(London: The Sherwood Press, 1988).
24 Lawrence Freedman, Britain and Nuclear WeaDons (London:
Macmillan, 1980); Baylis, British Defence; G.M. Dillon,
Falklands. Politics and War (London: Macmillan, 1989);
Margaret Blunden and Owen Greene, (eds), Science and
Mvtholov in the Makin of Defence Policy
 (London:
Brassey's, 1989).
Bill Jackson and Dwin Bramall, The Chiefs: The Stor y
 of
the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff (London: Brassey's,
1992); Michael Carver, Tiahtroe Walkin g : British Defence
Policy
 Since 1945 (London: Hutchinson, 1992); Jackson,
Britain's Defence Dilemma.
18
military relations while those involved are still alive to
talk about them. The principal primary sources for this
thesis are interviews with ministers, civil servants,
military officers, and scientific staffs involved in
defence planning. Where relevant and possible interviews
have also been conducted with former officials in NATO and
in the United States.
There are recognisable drawbacks to relying on
individual recollections about past events. Memories can
be fallible and a lack of supporting documentation can
limit the opportunities for independently verifying what
one is told. However, due largely to the greater amount of
information on defence available in the 1980s it has been
possible to corroborate much of the interview material with
official publications, mainly parliamentary papers, and
with secondary sources. Such opportunities offer the best
means of verifying the validity of the information provided
and enable the history of the 1981 review to be fully
integrated with existing literature on British defence.
The majority of those involved in the 1981 review are
still alive, thus making corroboration of oral testimony
more feasible. The extent to which those interviewed for
this study have corroborated each other's recollections
provides a high degree of confidence about their accuracy.
On the few occasions when important points made in one
interview could not be confirmed by at least one other
source the remaining uncertainty about the accuracy of
this information is noted in the text.
19
One potentially significant drawback in relying primarily
on interviews is an understandable reluctance among some of
those interviewed to allow their remarks to be attributed. The
officials interviewed for this study distinguish themselves.
More than half of the over 70 officials interviewed agreed to
have their remarks attributed by name. Many interviews were
conducted on a wholly attributable basis. Others were
conducted on an unattributable basis but with the understanding
that requests to attribute specific remarks would be favourably
considered. Some of those involved were prepared to be
attributed by a code shared only with the thesis examiners, and
others preferred to remain anonymous. In all instances the
wishes of those interviewed have been respected.
Only the names of those who gave permission to attribute
their remarks are cited in the bibliography, which is also
selective in its inclusion of secondary material. Much of the
corroboration of interview material was provided by those
officials who remained unattributable, but every attribution
in this thesis appears with the permission of the person cited.
In no instance was permission to attribute contingent on
agreement with the argument of this thesis and in no way does
its appearance here imply such agreement. Nor at any time has
access to classified information been sought or knowingly
provided. On this basis it has been possible to analyze in
detail the origins, conduct and implementation of the 1981
defence review. One fundamental conclusion must be that, after
a decent interval, it is possible thoroughly to document
contemporary decisions of the British government even in the
sensitive area of defence.
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Outline of the Study
Chaptir two discusses the role of defence reviews in
postwar Britain, highlighting the difficulties in achieving
an agreed view of defence priorities and using it to
develop long-term plans. Coordinating economic, foreign
and defence policy proved extremely difficult and the
strength of financial considerations prompted efforts to
tighten central control over service budgets. In the
second half of the 19605 Defence Secretary Denis Healey
imposed large defence cuts, which fell particularly hard on
the Royal Navy. The review, however, led directly to
improved coordination between the services, helping them to
mitigate defence cuts in the 1970$.
Chapt.r thre. examines the shift in relative
priorities away from defence between 1974 and 1980 and
illustrates the background against which civil service
influence increased within the Ministry of Defence, as
elsewhere, due to the importance of financial and budgeting
expertise. The tendency of Chiefs of Staff to allocate
resources on the basis of compromise threatened their
credibility and influence within the ministry, and
government. Britain's international role, its consequently
broad range of defence priorities, and declining economic
growth led defence cuts to be more determined by finance
and politics than strategic objectives.
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Chapter four considers the political and strategic
considerations underpinning conventional defences in the
five years prior to the 1981 review. Internationally,
Britain was under considerable pressure to strengthen its
defences, particularly on the continent. At the same time,
technical change and some Soviet force improvements
increasingly raised questions about key NATO roles of the
Royal Navy. With medium-to long-range plans (five to ten
years) unattainable due to poor economic growth pressure on
the defence programme increased.
Chapter f iv. examines the implications of the
government's decision to replace the Polaris missile. The
decision reflected the importance the government placed on
maintaining the independent strategic deterrent, and how,
on the basis of this priority, financial considerations
were paramount at all levels of decision-making. Nuclear
force modernisation was not viewed in isolation from
conventional defence spending, however, Trident did not
bring about the 1981 defence review. The link between
nuclear and conventional defence spending highlighted,
above all, the continued political importance of Britain's
continental commitment.
Chapter six discusses defence management in the first
two years of the Thatcher Government, arguing that the 1981
review was brought about by overall budgetary factors, and
international political priorities. The MoD's difficulty
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remaining within 1980-81 cash limits reduced the
willingness of ministers to increase defence spending while
other departments suffered across-the-board cuts. When the
clash between the conflicting priorities of economic
expansion and improved defences was resolved in favour of
the economy a major defence review was the logical
consequence. The priorities on which interim short-term
savings in 1980 had been achieved became the basis for
consensus agreement on the basic direction of the defence
programme, signalling a shift of priorities away from the
Royal Navy.
Chapter seven analyses the conduct of the 1981 review,
paying particular attention to relationships between
various groups within the Ministry of Defence and their
effect on the review's outcome. The Chiefs of Staff and
Service Departments played a limited role in determining
strategic priorities, inhibited by the fundamental nature
of the review and the structure of the ministry. In a
radical departure from previous practice the defence
priorities shared by key members of the central staffs,
rather than the services, guided the review.
Chapter eight analyses the review's implementation and
impact on the ministry as well as the defence debate prior
to the Falklands War. Gradual implementation of the review
increased the prospect that it could be modified, if not
reversed. Moreover, considerable political capital had
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already been expended supporting the review when the
Falklands War broke out in April 1982, fortifying arguments
that the Navy had been cut back too severely.
Chapter nm. considers the effect of the Falklands War
on the defence review. The Royal Navy played a vital role
in the operation and its professional and political
standing was considerably enhanced. While the war provided
a rationale for modifying the review this would have been
impossible without additional resources. Nott fought hard
to secure Treasury funding for the war, which ultimately
made it possible to modify the review. As a result, many
of the most severe naval cuts were rescinded, and pressures
on the Navy were relaxed, but the government's basic policy
remained unchanged.
Chapter ten concludes that the 1981 review was a
watershed in civil-military relations, in which informal
influence had a decisive impact on policy formation. The
review highlighted the disparity between formal authority
and practical influence, prompting significant changes in
the structure of the Ministry of Defence. The policy
underlying the review was a product of the ascendancy of
central staff within the ministry. While the detail of
this policy was modified after the Falkiands War the
transformation in civil-military relations was an enduring
legacy of the 1981 review.
CHAPTER TWO
The Defence Review in Postwar Britain
The phrase 'defence review' first became familiar in
the 1960s when Secretary of State for Defence Denis Healey
used it to describe his efforts to achieve a new balance
between defence commitments and resources. 1
 Healey's
decisions caused considerable anguish among the services,
endowing the concept of a 'defence review' with an
unpleasant connotation. According to Secretary of State for
Defence Tom King in 1990:
The word 'defence review' has been given a bad
name. That is the way it started out -- as just
a way of saving money and how one could slash
money out of the whole programme. That is
precisely what we are not doing. So that's why
we are not having a defence review. That is why
we are looking at options for change.2
Yet defence reviews have been a regular feature of
British strategic planning. In 1975 the MoD's Permanent
Under Secretary estimated that as many as seventeen reviews
had been conducted since 1949, including 'mini-reviews.'3
A more selective count, including only the most
comprehensive reviews, totals six by 1975, with the 1981
review and the 1990/91 Options for Change exercise bringing
1 Cmnd 2901, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1966: oart
I. The Defence Review (February 1966).
2 Defence Committee, Session 1989-90, Information for UK
Defence Policy
 of Recent Events in Europe, Minutes of
Evidence, 28 March 1990, (HC 320-i), Q. 43.
Sir Michael Cary, 'Britain's Armed Forces After the
Cuts,' RUSI Journal (March 1976), p. 1.
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the total number to eight.' Due to the regularity and
difficulty of defence reviews it has not been uncommon for
Defence Ministers since the 1960s to ban official reference
to the phrase during significant planning exercises, as Tom
King effectively did in 1990 and George Younger and Michael
Heseltine had done before him. Nevertheless, the phrase
defence review has continued to be used unofficially as the
most accurate description of a recurrent phenomenon in
British defence.
Defence reviews, particularly fundamental ones
undertaken to reconsider the overall size and shape of the
armed forces, can help clarify policy objectives and
allocate resources accordingly. However, as a decision-
making process they do not reduce frictions within
government. On the contrary, because they require the
coordination of diverse areas of policy -- economics,
politics, and strategy -- defence reviews tend to
exacerbate political divisions. Their conduct reflects the
tensions between ministers with conflicting roles, between
Service Departments competing for a share of limited
resources, and between basic groups within the ministry on
whom coherent policy depends: ministers, central
civilians, the services, the central military, and the
scientists. Fundamental policy decisions have a strong
impact on these relationships, and vice-versa. Indeed,
adjustments to policy and organisation have been closely related.
Peter Hennessy, 'Permanent Government: Waiting for
Defence Review No. 8,' New Statesman (17 July 1987).
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CONNITI4ENTS AND PRIORITIES
British governments following the Second World War
faced challenges in all areas of policy. On those
occasions when the armed forces could not be isolated from
economic pressures, defence reviews became the forum in
which policies were developed to preserve as wide a range
of military capabilities as possible. Although devastated
economically, Britain emerged from the war with the
responsibilities of a victorious power and the overseas
commitments of an empire. 5
 Establishing priorities between
newly-acquired roles in Europe, where Britain had only
reluctantly committed itself, and traditional affiliations,
proved exceedingly difficult, not least because British
governments sought to preserve as much international
influence as possible. Eliminating commitments and
accepting a loss of influence, even if achieved quickly and
simply, was not an easy alternative, as commitments brought
with them important political and economic benefits.
Enhancing British security interests through alliance
entailed close participation in the security arrangements
of the late 1940s which led in 1954 to the permanent
commitment of British troops to the continent as part of
Throughout 1946 to 1948 British troops carried out
occupation duties in Germany, Japan, Italy, Austria and
Venezia Giulia. They were also performing duties in
Indonesia, Palestine, Greece (until 1947) and remained
responsible for defence of the Empire. William J. Crowe,
The Policy
 Roots of the Modern Royal Navy. 1946-1963
(Unpublished PhD Thesis, Princeton, 1966), p. 163; See also




 Despite growing nationalism and the resulting
dissolution of the Empire -- beginning with India in 1947 -
- Britain retained strong links with its former colonies,
with the Commonwealth, which sheltered for many years under
the protection of Britain's security guarantee. These
commitments gave Britain a prominent international role,
commensurate with the status of a 'Great Power'.
Preserving this role and consequently this status was a
basic objective of postwar governments.
International status was not pursued for its own sake.
As a great power Britain was desired as an ally both among
the advanced industrial countries of Europe and North
America and developing countries in Africa, the Middle and
Far East, with the obvious exception of Nasser's Egypt.
These ties, though symbolised by Britain's military
commitment, offered significant economic and trade
benef its. 7
 Overseas trade had long been vital to
Britain's economic health, but during the war Britain's
export market had virtually collapsed. Continued dependence
on imported food and raw materials represented a balance of
payments nightmare. Sterling's rapid return to
convertibility in 1947 -- a precondition for postwar US
loans -- depleted Britain's gold-dollar reserves and
6 For the historical roots of this decision see Michael
Howard, The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British
Defence Policy
 in Two World Wars (London: Temple Smith,
1972).
See especially CAB 129/53 C (52)202, British Overseas
Obligations: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, 18 June 1952.
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contributed directly to the gradual liquidation of the
sterling bloc of trading countries to which Britain's
economy had been linked for many years. 8
 Arriving at a
balance between economic and strategic constraints was thus
more complicated than choosing between defence spending and
economic health. Policy depended on sophisticated
judgemerits based on a wide range of factors.
Tension between economic and political imperatives was
also manifest in relations between the Treasury, on the one
hand, and the Ministry of Defence and Foreign Office on the
other. Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Dalton and Labour
Minister Aneurin Bevan, for example, viewed the continued
devotion of resources to defence as an unnecessary
distraction to the civil economy and favoured rapid postwar
demobilisation and large defence cuts, while Foreign
Secretary Ernest Bevin used his authority to moderate their
influence on policy. 9
 One basic problem then, and often
since, was the extent of disagreement within Cabinet over
the relative political and military value of defence
spending increases compared to the civil economy and social
programmes.
Disputes over the balance between defence and social
expenditure made it considerably more difficult to arrive
at a unified strategic concept as the basis for tn-service
8 Gardner, Sterlina-Dollar Diplomacy, pp. 325-330.
Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreian SecretarY. 1945-51,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 127; See also
Hugh Dalton, Hiab Tide and After: Memoirs. 1945-60 (London:
Muller, 1962), pp. 193-98.
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planning, particularly as the services were already
overstretched. Government haggling over budget levels
often became linked to fundamental assumptions underlying
planning proposals. When the Chiefs of Staff Committee
produced the 1952 Global Strategy Paper Cabinet split
again, though not along the same lines as the Attlee
Government. In 1952, the Chancellor, R.A.Butler, believed
the provisional figures of the Global Strategy Costing
portrayed a 'frightening picture' and that current defence
expenditure was 'certainly as much as, if not more than, we
can afford. The Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden,
emphasised that rigorous maintenance of current policies
was 'placing a burden on the country's economy which it is
beyond the resources of the country to meet' and that
'shedding or sharing' overseas obligations was the only way
to make economies. 11
 The Minister of Defence, Earl
Alexander of Tunis, believed that the government had to
choose between rearmament or economies. To impose drastic
reductions in the second year of rearmament, he argued,
'dislocates the whole programme and ensures that the
results will be inefficient and dangerously incomplete."2
Despite Britain's dependence on NATO for its security,
10 CAB 130/77, GEN 411/20, The Cost of Defence in Global
Strategy: Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
19 July 1952.
CAB 129/53 C (52) 202, British Overseas Obligations:
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
18 June 1952.
12 CAB 129/54 C (52) 253, The Defence Programme:
Memorandum by the Minister of Defence, 22 July 1952.
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eliminating overseas commitments proved politically
difficult. While British forces in Europe had been almost
completely withdrawn by the end of 1947, overseas
commitments outside Europe had not contracted to the same
degree. 13
 As late as 1960 British troops were stationed in
the Bahamas, Jamaica, British Honduras, British Guiana,
Gibraltar, Libya, Malta, Cyprus, East Africa, Aden, the
Persian Gulf, Singapore, Malaya, and Hong Kong. In terms
of formal alliance commitments Britain was, in addition to
NATO, a member of the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO)
and South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO).
Shedding these commitments was complicated by the fact
that, unlike the United States, Britain's involvement in
these areas was conditioned by long historical association
rather than the Cold War. In some areas a sense of
obligation to former colonies was as responsible for
Britain's continued involvement as formal treaty
commitments. For over a century the role of the British
Army had been defined by the task of imperial policing and
it was a role Britain understood. 14
 Britain's initial
involvement in Europe was thus in addition to its pre-
existing involvement overseas.
	 As long as overseas
commitments were essential to Britain's international role,
13 General Sir Hugh Beach, 'British Forces in Germany,
1945-85,' in Martin Edmonds, (ed), The Defence Eauation
(London: Brassey's, 1986), p. 158; Cmnd 6743, Statement
Relatina to Defence Policy, (February 1946), p. 1; Bullock,
Ernest Bevin, p. 127.
14 Michael Howard, 'Britain's Defenses: Commitments and
Capabilities,' Foreign Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 1 (October
1960), p. 83.
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and benefitted trade, governments sought to maintain
adequate military capabilities to meet contingencies in
which they could conceivably become involved.
Problematically, European and overseas defence
commitments had different military requirements, giving
rise to strategic constraints on defence plans. The
European commitment required a modern war fighting
capability emphasising mobility, firepower, and highly-
trained troops. The overseas commitment was essentially to
perform a colonial police function, requiring large numbers
of troops capable of a variety of tasks but also prepared
to respond to military escalation. 15
 The armed forces --
especially the Army -- were unable to specialise without
compromising their ability to fulfil commitments. Service
Chiefs, in particular, could not honourably take the risk
of personal responsibility for plans which professional
advisers told them were unworkable with existing resources.
The ability to meet existing commitments required large
numbers of troops well-equipped with modern weapons,
increasingly expensive due to rapid technological advances.
In addition to Britain's European and overseas defence
commitments the Attlee Government's 1948 decision to
develop a viable nuclear force also required considerable
resources. Successive British governments remained
committed to building and maintaining a sophisticated
15 Brigadier C.N. Barclay, 'Historical Background, General
Policy and Tasks of the Army,' Brassev's Annual. 1950
(London: Brassey's, 1950), p. 14; and Neville Brown,
'Disengaging in Southeast Asia,' Survival, Vol. 8, No. 8
(August 1966), p. 256.
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nuclear armoury. Nuclear weapons were desirable not only
for their military potential but also because possession of
the world's most powerful weapon was a potent status
symbol. Moreover, they strengthened Britain's voice as an
ally, thereby offering an important avenue of influence
over US policy while enhancing the Anglo-American special
relationship. 16
The natural reluctance of British policy makers to act
hastily, though not unique to postwar defence policy,
assumed greater intellectual credibility in the l950s.17
Incrementalism, rather than radical change, appeared a more
responsible way of proceeding in a complex political,
strategic and economic environment. Uncertainty about the
context from which defence plans had to emerge complicated
the task of easing the economic burden of a large defence
establishment without undermining Britain's ability to meet
its commitments. To their frustration the armed forces were
consistently asked to perform a wide range of tasks with
inadequate resources. As a result, even comprehensive
defence reviews tended not to result in fundamental
decisions. Instead, they usually involved incremental
16 See John Bay]is, Anglo-American Defence Relations. 1939-
1984 (London: Macmillan, 1984); Lawrence Freedman, Martin
Navias, Nicholas Wheeler, Independence in Concert: The
-- --------- --. --p
Nuclear History Program Occasional Paper 5, (University of
Maryland, 1989), p. 11.
See, for example, Charles Lindblom, 'The Science of
"Muddling Through,"' Public Administration Review Vol. 19
(1959); See also John Baylis, British Defence Policy:
Striking
 the Riaht Balance (London: Macmillan, 1989),
especially pp. 1-18.
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cuts in the defence programme, such as the postponement of
equipment deliveries, reliance on existing weapons stocks,
and reductions in training. Defence reviews thus tended to
have a corrosive effect on military capabilities.
DEFENCE REVIEWS: THE PLANNING HORIZON
To the extent that reviews curtailed expenditure
without reducing commitments they constituted civilian
interventions into military affairs, where strategic issues
are paramount. Indeed, government decision-making, the
environment in which strategic planning took place,
hampered efforts to establish coordinated long-term defence
plans by making anything other than short-term decisions
extremely difficult to take.
Long-range defence planning had traditionally been a
strength of the Royal Navy. Due to the great expense of
capital warships even before the First World War forward
estimates of the capital costs of major ship construction
projects had to be submitted before programmes were
approved. Known as 'battleship programming' because
battleships were the most expensive items in the budget,
this system was the precursor to the 'forward look' which
emerged in the 1950s. 18
 With the forward look, 'a self
consistent Navy/Army/Air Force series of programmes within
a given total,' the practice of submitting forward cost
Frank Cooper, 'Long-Range Defence Planning in the U.K.,'
Lona Ranae Plannina Vol. 3, No. 2 (December 1970), p. 20.
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estimates was extended to cover all defence programmes,
with plans being submitted on a three-year basis.19
Innovations in budgetary planning stemmed from the
importance to defence of forward planning for both economic
and military reasons. The Service Chiefs had to draft
contingency plans for the future and procure the necessary
equipment to carry them out. Since equipment procurement
decisions were often required up to ten years in advance
the Service Departments on occasion worked to longer
timescales than the Foreign Office, even in the same policy
areas.2°
The need for forward planning was also driven by the
MoD's performance of research and development, testing, and
production on a wider scale than any other ministry. 2' In
the words of (now Sir) Frank Cooper,
the sum of human knowledge and the extent of
human aspirations is now so great, the timescale
of scientific and technological applications of
knowledge so extensive, and the consumption of
resources so formidable, that planning against a
long time scale is one of the principal means we
have of achieving a comprehensive and credible
defence environment.
19 Sir Richard Clarke, Public Extenditure. Management and
Control: The DeveloDment of the Public Expenditure
Committee (London: Macmillan, 1978), p. 8. For a general
discussion of the forward look see Maurice Wright, 'Looking
Back at Looking Forward,' in B. Chapman and A. Potter,
(eds), W.J.M.M.: Political Ouestions (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1974).
John Baylis, 'Defence Decision-Making in Britain and the
Determinants of Defence Policy,' RUSI Journal, Vol. 120,
No. 1 (March 1975), p. 44.
21 David Greenwood, Budetin for Defence, (London: RUSI,
1972), p. 34.
22 Cooper, 'Long Range Defence Planning,' p. 18.
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Other ministries placed less emphasis on forward planning
because, though useful, it was not essential. The Ministry
of Transport made traffic projections and the Ministry of
Education assessed demographic trends, but these did not
result in detailed internal budgetary plans. While the
MoD improved at long-term planning other departments
continued to budget on a strictly annual basis. 2' As a
result, the Treasury shared the MoD's interest in future
plans. According to David Serpell, Head of the Treasury
Defence Material Division in 1958, 'since so much money is
committed years in advance, we are bound to be intimately
concerned with long-term (defence] planning.'25
Successive Ministers of Defence endorsed the idea of
budgets covering five or more years. According to A.V.
Alexander, Minister of Defence from December 1946 to
February 1950, proposals covering a three-year period did
little to ease the planning burden: 'from the point of
view of long-term planning and forward estimating it was,
however, very desirable that present forward programmes
should be approved in principle.' 26
 From 1950 to 1952 Earl
Alexander of Tunis hoped that, whatever the level of
funding, it would be firm and cover at least three years
Interview with Sir Leo Pliatzky, 26 November 1991.
24 Greenwood, Budgetina for Defence, pp. 28-9.
Sixth Report of the Estimates Committee, 1957-58,
TreasurY Control of Extenditure, (HC 254), July 1958. Q.
2238.
A.V. Alexander in CAB 131/8 D.O. (50) 1, Service
Production Programmes 1950-51, 9 Jan 1950.
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because, he believed, the government could not 'afford to
dig the programme up by the roots every year.' 27
 Selwyn
Lloyd, who took over from Macmillan as Minister of Defence
in May 1955, reasoned that 'it would be of great advantage
if ministers were to have before them, after the General
Election, a forecast of probable total costs of Defence
over a period of five or seven years.'
The key to relating defence plans to overall budget
plans was avoiding a disruption in funding. As with other
spending departments, 'being secure means they can go ahead
with large, long-term schemes, confident that the money
will not suddenly be yanked away.' In defence, ongoing
funding was necessary to hold together the highly-skilled
teams established by defence contractors to perform
essential tasks. Once dispersed these teams could be
difficult to re-establish, resulting in a serious
discontinuity in work. Such a disruption would not only
impose economic costs, but could also damage the
credibility of a government's commitment to defence.
Gradually the planning horizon was extended. The 1957
defence review revealed the inadequacies of existing
budgetary management: the policy decisions made by Defence
27 CAB 129/55, C. (52) 316, The Defence Programme:
Memorandum by the Minister of Defence, 3 October 1952;
quote from DEFE 7/677, document 13, Memorandum from
Alexander to J.P.L. Thomas, 6 August 1952.
Extract from SM(55)4, 4 May 1955, in DEFE 13/72.
Hugh Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky, The Private Government
of Public MoneY (London: Macmillan, 1974), second edition,
p. 87.
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Minister Duncan Sandys between January and March 1957 were
not costed until July. 3° To overcome this discrepancy the
MoD expanded the forward look to analyze programmes five
years in advance.31
Royal Navy ambitions at this time were grander still.
In 1958 a planning cell was established within the Navy and
charged with developing a ten-year costing. By 1959 the
Naval Staff was producing a ten year forward look each
March. 32
 Similarly, the Foreign Office, formally
responsible for long-term thinking, adopted a ten-year
horizon in a 1959 exercise appraising defence and foreign
policy options for the next decade, but this exercise
involved considerably less budgetary detail than defence
plans.33
Defence budgeting techniques were continually refined.
Ten-year forward looks had certain disadvantages. In the
near term planners tended to be over-optimistic. Equipment
projects were rarely completed on schedule because defence
contractors often proved unable to proceed as rapidly as
hoped. Sometimes they overestimated their ability to
devote existing resources to new projects. Frequently new
Martin S. Navias, The Sandvs White Paper of 1957 and the
Move to the British New Look (King's College London, PhD
Thesis, 1989), p. 352; Martin S. Navias, Nuclear WeaDons
and British Strateaic Planning. 1955-1958 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1991).
31 For the first formal five-year costing see DEFE 13/110
Five Year Costing: 1959.
32 Interview with Alan Pritchard, 18 June 1991.
See CAB 134/1935 Study of Future Policy for 1960-1970.
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technologies or threat assessments would emerge and need to
be included or projects would otherwise require more work
than anticipated. Weapons could take up to ten years to
develop and remain in service up to twenty years. The
difficulty of foreseeing thirty years inclined planners
toward the most advanced equipment possible. Such hedging
against technological change often led to the modification
of equipment specifications after development had begun.
Costs thus escalated not only because newer technologies
cost more, but also due to delays in accommodating new
specifications.34
These pressures often meant that less money was spent
in a project's early years than planned. Conversely, in
the latter years costs often rose faster and beyond
expectations. To cope with these conflicting tendencies
two techniques developed for the 'block adjustment' of
programme expenditure: 'shadow cutting' and 'wedging'.
Shadow cuts applied to the early years of a programme.
These years would intentionally be underfunded in the
knowledge that work would not progress as rapidly as
planned. Likewise, a wedge of additional money would be
allocated to the latter years of a project when cash
outflow ordinarily increased. The size of the block
adjustments depended on previous experience in specific
areas of the programme and were thus based on highly
David Greenwood, 'Economic Constraints and Political
Preferences, in John Baylis, (ed), Alternative Aroaches
to British Defence Policy
 (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp.
41-42.
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specialised knowledge and the largely subjective judgeinent
of budget experts. Refinement of these techniques enabled
the planning horizon to be gradually extended. By 1964 the
forward look had evolved into the Long-Term Costing (LTC),
a ten-year projection of future spending covering the
entire defence budget.35
ELUSIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPTS
Efforts comprehensively to review Britain's defences
not only revealed the difficulty of forward planning, but
also of developing strategic concepts capable of providing
coherence to those plans. Coherent plans could not readily
emerge in the absence of unified strategic concepts, since
services sometimes planned according to their own needs in
isolation from the other services. In 1947, in an issue
relating to the burden on the Army as the most manpower-
intensive of the services, the Service Chiefs were unable
to agree on the appropriate parameters for a defence
review, a recurrent problem. The Royal Navy and RAF
submitted plans covering a 12-year period and 'designed to
produce a peacetime deterrent force as well as a minimum
nucleus to meet war requirements.' The Army, on the other
hand, submitted a five year plan 'primarily directed to
meeting current commitments. '
	 Remaining within the
Times (7 May 1964).
CAB 131/5 D.O. (48) 2, Size and Shape of the Armed
Forces, 8 January 1948.
40
spending limits agreed by Cabinet hinged on the Chiefs of
Staff agreeing coordinated long-term plans. 37 Bargaining
and compromise were an inherent part of even the earliest
efforts at postwar defence planning.
In addition to divergent service concerns, Britain had
to consider the implications of its plans on allied
relations. British governments initially expressed hope
that defence burdens would be distributed among NATO
allies, largely because they anticipated savings. Early
on, however, the British recognized that the ambitious
plans for balanced collective forces instead of balanced
national forces agreed by the North Atlantic Council in
April 1950 would be difficult to implement. Unable at
this point to adopt NATO defence priorities as the guide
for strategic planning the principal concept underlying
British rearmament was service equality, and the full range
of military capabilities was pursued.
The plan was to prepare Britain for a major war.
Soviet intentions were difficult to assess, but the Berlin
Blockade of 1948 and North Korea's invasion of South Korea
in 1950 suggested that they were aggressive. Alexander's
successor as Minister of Defence, Emanuel Shinwell,
expressed a belief widely held in the West when he said
'the Soviet Government had incited the North Korean
CAB 131/5 D.O. (48) 3, Size and Shape of the Armed
Forces, 14 January 1948.
CAB 131/8 D.O. (50) 19, Size and Shape of the Armed
Forces, 16 October 1950; On NATO's decision see Colonel the
Honourable E.H. Wyndham, 'The Atlantic Treaty and Western
Defence,' Brassey 's Annual. 1950, p. 45.
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Government to invade South Korea in the knowledge that this
might unleash a train of events leading to general war.'39
This assessment of Soviet intentions and growth in Soviet
military capabilities gave rise to increased concern about
European security and third world stability. Nevertheless,
there was little effort to coordinate the 1950 rearmament
programme with NATO.'0
The incoming Conservative Government was committed to
the rearmament programme but nevertheless promptly set out
to reduce its impact on the economy, due to serious
economic problems.'1
 To achieve this goal a defence
review, the so-called Radical Review, was conducted. 42
 In
accordance with current practice the basis of the review
was a strategic analysis by the Chiefs of Staff. This
analysis demonstrated the difficulty even on a strictly
national level of incorporating into defence plans
strategic concepts allowing for the establishment of
priorities within the defence programme.
The Chiefs' report on Defence Policy and Global
CAB 128/19 CM 7 (51), 25 January 1951.
40 Air Vice Marshal W.X.Yool, 'The Structure of Defence,'
Brassev's Annual. 1951 (London: Brassey's, 1951), pp. 6-7.
See DEFE 7/676, Defence Programmes to 1953-56, document
2, 23 July 1952.
42 For a detailed discussion of the Radical Review,
especially as it related to the Royal Navy, see Eric
Grove, Vanquard to Trident: British Naval Policy Since
World War Two (Annapolis: US Naval Institute, 1987),
chapter three.
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Strategy was a classic example of inter-service
compromise.'3
 The original report was written in June
1950 and was brought up to date in May 1951 'by certain
factual amendments only.' These exercises were undertaken
largely at the initiative of Sir John Slessor who, when he
became Chief of Air Staff in 1950, was 'rather astonished'
that there had been no general defence review since the
war."
The Chiefs were asked to re-submit the report by 1
March 1952 and the drafting was done during a two week
retreat to the Royal Naval College at Greenwich attended by
the Chiefs of Staff and the Chief Staff Officer to the MoD,
General Sir Ian Jacob. 45
 The Chiefs each personally
drafted portions of the paper, which was then re-worked by
Sir Ian.'6
 The paper, which drew heavily on the earlier
strategic exercises of 1950 and 195l,' concluded that to
exploit the most advanced technologies and save the cost of
maintaining large standing conventional forces there should
be greater reliance on nuclear weapons at both the
The report on Defence Policy and Global Strategy remains
classified but some of its contents are included in
available documents. For a thorough published account see
Bill Jackson and Dwin Bramall, The Chiefs: The Story
 of
the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff (London: Brassey's,
1992), chapter nine.
Slessor quoted in Anthony F. Seldon, The Churchill
Government of 1951-55: A Study
 of Personalities and
Policy-Making (Unpublished PhD thesis, LSE, 1981), p. 613.
' The Chiefs of Staff were General Sir William Slim, Chief
of the General Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Chief of the Air Staff, and Admiral Sir Rhoderick McGrigor,
Chief of the Naval Staff.
46 Seldon, The Churchill Government of 1951-55, p. 613.
DEFE 6/20, DP (52) 17.
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strategic and tactical levels.
However, strong emphasis on nuclear weapons posed a
significant threat to the operational concept of the Royal
Navy. The RAF was responsible for Britain's nuclear
deterrent force of V-bombers and the Army's presence on the
continent of Europe was essential both as a symbol of
Britain's alliance commitment and as a contribution to
conventional deterrence. The Royal Navy's role in a NATO-
Warsaw Pact war would have been to protect the sea lanes
and to enable the transatlantic reinforcement of Europe.
Neither task would be necessary in a short, cataclysmic
war, which would be won or lost with forces in being in
Europe. Thus, to secure the First Sea Lord's support the
concept of broken-backed warfare, where war would continue
after the use of nuclear weapons, had to be incorporated.
The objectives of the defence programme outlined by
the Chiefs were presented as defence priorities, but they
actually required the full range of military capabilities.
The objectives were: 1. protecting Britain's world-wide
interest in the Cold War; 2. building up, with NATO, forces
capable of deterring Soviet attack; and 3. preparing for
the possibility of a hot war." 8
 Assuming that deterrence
could be maintained by nuclear forces, the Chiefs called
for cuts only in tasks two and three, thereby placing cold
war tasks at the top of MoD priorities. The report
emphasized that war preparations 'should be primarily
CAB 131/12 D. (52) 41, The Defence Programme: Report by
the Chiefs of Staff, 29 September 1952.
44
directed to the requirements of the first few intense
weeks, little provision being made for more long-term
requirements."9
 On this basis the Chiefs concluded that
the 1950 rearmament programme could be slowed to the point
that the forces would reach a 'reasonably satisfactory'
level of preparation by 1958.°
By mandating a change in key assumptions about the
length and intensity of likely conflict the Cabinet prodded
the Service Chiefs into narrowing defence priorities.
However, as government pressure to modify the rearmament
programme increased so did the unity of the Chiefs of Staff
in resisting this effort, foreshadowing inter-service
relations of the 1970s. When Cabinet bargaining produced a
proposal prolonging completion of rearmament until 1961,
the Chiefs of Staff clearly stated their shared belief that
this option was militarily unsound: 'the reductions in
defence expenditure to the figures we were instructed to
consider are unacceptable on military grounds, and involve
the taking of risks which we cannot believe to be justified
in the present state of international relations. ,51
The central role of the services in the review process
was a source of irritation to some ministers.
Consequently, as efforts to narrow British defence
priorities continued, ministers became more assertive with





Defence Policy Committee requested the Chiefs of Staff to
submit further analyses of the effects of certain
reductions in the defence programme. To make the hard
decisions easier to take the Chiefs of Staff were told to
'provide the conseauences, both strategic and economic, of
adopting such a change of policy without in any way
commenting on the advisability
 of such a course.'52
The conceptual framework on which to conduct the
review originated not with the services, but with the
minister. With Churchill's support, Alexander outlined
three categories of defence priorities in descending order.
Category I forces were the minimum required to carry out
essential peacetime Commonwealth conunitments. Category II
forces were those required for survival in the earliest
phase of a war in Europe. Category III forces were for
broken-backed warfare. 53
 On the basis of these priorities
the services were asked to cut £308 million from the total
£1,830 million 1955-56 budget plans.
Among the Parliamentary Secretaries of State for the
services there was scepticism that resources and
commitments could be balanced 'by once more paring the size
and cost of existing forces.' According to Secretary of
State for War Sir Antony Head, (who subsequently became
Minister of Defence), the MoD had
tried that for the last 3 1/2 years and it has
not worked. All that has happened is that
production votes have been cut by postponing
52 DEFE 4/59 C.O.S. (53) 11th meeting, 23 Jan 1953.
Grove, Vanauard to Trident, p. 91.
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expenditure to a later year and in other respects
the services have tended to be cut beyond
economical methods in matters of maintenance,
works, etc.'
Similarly, Nigel Birch, who had been
	 Parliamentary
Secretary of State for Air and a member of the Committee on
Defence Policy, lacked confidence in the review process:
The truth is that the defence programme has been
bursting from the seams ever since we got into
power. There are a number of reasons for this.
The Service Departments are never willing to give
up any cherished plan until well after the
twelfth hour. Their technique is to put of f the
evil day. They rely on the inefficiency of our
manufacturers and ordnance factories and on the
capacity for muddle and delay in their own Works
Departments and take a gamble on not too many
bills coming in during the current year. The
whole art and process is euphemistically
described as 'shortfall'.55
In contrast, the services saw government pressure to define
priorities as an obstacle to sound defence plans. This
argument was put most clearly by Field Marshal Sir William
Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to a July 1955
meeting of the Chiefs of Staff:
Lord Mountbatten said that priorities tended to
destroy balance, and balance in our defence
effort was essential against an enemy who had the
initiative and could attack where he had been
left weak through rigid conformity to our
priority. A system of priorities, if applied
absolutely, would soon make more problems than it
solved. Balance was essential in order to obtain
the best value for money.
The fundamental nature of the disagreement between
' DEFE 13/72 Personal Letter from the Secretary of State
for War to the Minister of Defence, 7 July 1955.
DEFE 13/72 Personal Letter to Selwyn Lloyd from Nigel
Birch, 19 July 1955.
DEFE 13/72 COS(55)60, Long Term Defence Programme, 22
July 1955.
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ministers and the military may have been responsible in
large part for the failure of successive defence reviews to
achieve lasting results. Nevertheless, it was clearly
understood by the mid-l950s that to achieve defence cuts
the basic decisions had to be taken by ministers and
imposed on the Service Chiefs.57
ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE
Following the 1946 Ministry of Defence Act the
Minister of Defence had the formal authority to direct
British defence policy. The ministry had an 'overlord'
status; with a small central staff it oversaw the Service
Departments, each of whom had their own minister and
maintained direct access to Cabinet. The Minister of
Defence had great difficulty exercising his authority
against entrenched service interests, leading to a power
struggle between the MOD and Service Departments. The
Minister of Defence and his staff wanted decisions to be
based on a 'defence view' of Britain's military needs
rather than on narrower 'service views'. However, this
remained virtually impossible as long as the Chiefs of
Staff remained united in the face of government pressure
and produced consensus reports on defence priorities
accommodating each service's individual interests.
Prime Minister Anthony Eden's 1955 attempt to
eliminate the conflict by creating the position of Chairman
Jackson and Bramall, The Chiefs, pp. 314-15.
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of the Chief of Staff failed, prompting subsequent efforts
to focus on the enhancement of ministerial authority. As
Minister of Defence between October 1954 and April 1955
Harold Macmillan understood the frustrations of that
position. As Prime Minister, Macmillan enhanced the powers
of the Minister of Defence by issuing a directive to the
military outlining the minister's authority. The main
point was that the minister was responsible for designing
a new policy reducing total expenditure and manpower. In
the future all service proposals on the shape, size and
organization of the armed forces would normally be
submitted to the Minister of Defence rather than directly
to Cabinet or the Cabinet Defence Committee. 59
 Macmillan
also extended his personal support for his Defence
Minister, Duncan Sandys, in the House of Commons.60
Like previous reviews the Sandys white paper did not
alter the pattern of Britain's defence commitments. Unlike
previous reviews it sought to redefine how these
commitments could be met. The government's primary foreign
policy objective in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis was,
in contrast to France, to repair its relationship with the
Franklyn A. Johnson, Defence By
 Ministry : The British
Ministrv of Defence. 1944-1974 (London: Duckworth, 1980),
p. 45; The Chiefs blocked the proposal to call the new
position Chief Military Adviser to the Government. Jackson
and Bramall, The Chiefs, p. 296.
Cmnd 476, Central Oraanisation for Defence (July, 1958),
para 11.
60 Harold Macmillan, Hansard, Vol. 563 (24 Jan 1957), col.
396.
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United States." The basic assumption was that allied
cooperation, especially that of the United States, would be
necessary in the event of future conflicts. Accordingly,
'Sandys was willing to abandon the concept of nationally
balanced forces and seek collectively balanced forces which
would facilitate cuts in expenditure. ' The stated
purpose of the 1957 review was to modify 'not merely the
size but the whole character of the defence plan. ' The
Sandys review thus represented a ministerial attempt to lay
down the strategic guidelines for defence plans.
The need for change stemmed from recognisable
transformations in the strategic and economic environment.
The strategic transformation was the growth of atomic
weapons stockpiles, and the development of thermonuclear
weapons and missile technologies. The economic
transformation was primarily the growing expense of
stationing troops overseas. The effect on the balance of
payments was serious. The BAOR alone cost £50 million in
1957-58, not including the £40 million German
contribution. M
 Moreover, between 1959 and 1961 the German
61 Richard Rosecrance, Defense of the Realm: British
Stratecw in the Nuclear EDoch, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1968), pp. 235-6.
Wyn Rees, 'The 1957 Sandys White Paper: New Priorities
in British Defence Policy?' Journal of Strateaic Studies,
Vol. 12, No. 2 (June 1989), pp. 225-6.
Cmnd 124, Defence: Outline of Future Policy (April
1957), p. 1, para 3.
Phillip Darby, British Defence Policy: East of Suez.
1947 to 1968 (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p.
162.
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Government did not plan to contribute more than £12 million
annually.
Sandys' goal in responding to these transformations
was 'to establish a broad framework within which long-term
planning can proceed. ,65 Nonetheless, Sandys was not at
liberty to change the defence programme in ways
contradicting broader foreign policy objectives for which
defence policy was a central pillar. Sandys openly
affirmed that his review would not narrow Britain's
commitments. The close link between foreign and defence
policy was evident in Sandys' definition of Britain's two
primary defence responsibilities: First, to contribute to
allied defence and second, to defend British overseas
colonies and dependents.67
Political and military considerations were closely
intertwined and placed limits on Sandys ability to organise
the armed forces to reflect his strategic priorities.
Britain's responsibilities required that it maintain the
capabilities to fight a global war, to intervene overseas,
and to contribute (in conjunction with allies) to fighting
a limited war overseas. Of these tasks, declared the white
paper, 'the overriding consideration in all military
planning must be to prevent war rather than to prepare for
65 Cmnd 124, Outline of Future Policy, para 9.
'We are not contracting out of our obligations.' Duncan
Sandys, Hansard, Vol. 568, (16 April 1957), col. 1769.
67 Cmnd 124, Outline of Future Polic y, para 8.
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To enhance deterrence Sandys advocated increased
emphasis on nuclear weapons and scheduled the abolition of
conscription for 1960. Increased reliance on nuclear
weapons had been part of policy since 1952 but had not been
implemented since it was only in 1956-57 that the necessary
weapons began entering service. Britain's growing nuclear
weapons potential was used to justify manpower reductions
in all the services and in Britain's contribution to NATO
in particular. The strength of the BAOR was reduced from
77,000 to 64,000 in the 12 months following the review and
it was agreed that allied consultation would precede
subsequent reductions thereafter. By 1958 Britain's NATO
troop commitment had been reduced to 55,000. To
compensate, the BAOR was reorganized to increase the number
of combat units and to incorporate nuclear artillery.
Likewise, the Second Tactical Air Force in Germany was
halved, but according to the white paper, this reduction
was 'offset by the fact that some of the squadrons will be
provided with atomic bombs.'69
The emphasis on nuclear weapons did not preclude
reductions in the planned size of the V-force strategic
bomber programme. 7° To hedge against the possibility that
Cmnd 124, Outline of Future Policy, para 13.
Cmnd 124, Outline of Future Policy, para 23.
70 See Martin Navias, 'Strengthening the Deterrent? The
British Medium Bomber Force Debate, 1955-56,' Journal of
Strategic Studies Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 1988); and Rees,
'The 1957 Sandys White Paper,' p. 218.
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a nuclear exchange would not be decisive, and to support
Britain's limited war capability, naval forces were
maintained to protect the sea lines of communication
(SLOCS), though they were reduced from previous levels and
their future was described as 'somewhat uncertain. .71 The
key element of limited war capability was to be a mobile
Strategic Reserve able to be deployed on short notice to
world trouble spots. However, air transport proved
troublesome because of the need to obtain overflight
rights.
The conduct of the Sandys Review was significant.
Sandys was the prime mover in the review, very much
involved in all stages. Previous reviews had been under
the direction of the Minister of Defence with the
involvement of the Parliamentary Secretaries of State and
input from other ministers, but had remained highly
dependent on the services. The Chiefs of Staff had
regularly presented their conclusions directly to the
Cabinet Defence Committee accompanied by a memorandum from
the Minister of Defence outlining his views. The 1957
White Paper was written by Sandys himself, making it the
first truly 'ministerial review' of Britain's defences. In
large part this was due to Macmillan's and Sandys'
recognition that the services were incapable of providing
the desired savings in defence. The review was thus a
watershed in consolidating ministerial control over the
Cmnd 124, Outline of Future Policy, para 24.
n Rosecrance, Defense of the Realm, pp. 198, 209, and 267.
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military.
The subsequent decisions to emphasize nuclear weapons,
abolish National Service, and cutback the British Army of
the Rhine were the most radical since the war. Yet even
these decisions proved inadequate to align commitments arid
resources. Focusing on equipment and force structure
rather than reducing commitments precluded the
establishment of an affordable long-term defence programme.
Sandys overrode many service objections to cutting
capabilities but did not attempt to overcome political
support for Britain's prominent international role.
International and domestic political pressures defined
the boundaries of what could be achieved. If top NATO
officials had not intervened in 1959 Britain would have
made further formal reductions in Britain's troop
commitments (to 45,000). Due to this intervention the
formal commitment of four divisions (a minimum of 55,000
troops) remained intact. However, on the basis of Article
VI of the Protocol on Forces of Western European Union
agreed in Paris in 1954 Britain could withdraw forces
temporarily for uses elsewhere and as a result the BAOR was
left two battalions short and with many of the remaining
units under strength. In the event the Berlin Crisis of
1958 and the 1961 construction of the Berlin Wall made the
planned reductions politically and militarily
inappropriate.
Darby, British Defence Polic y, p. 162; F.W. Mulley Th
Politics of Western Defence (London: Thames and Hudson,
1962), p. 133.
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The next major defence review took place within a
transformed Ministry of Defence. In 1963 the Service
Departments were formally subordinated to the Ministry of
Defence thereafter headed by a Secretary of State for
Defence. The Service Ministers were downgraded to
Parliamentary Under Secretaries of State and the senior
civil servants in the Service Departments, formerly
Permanent Under Secretaries, became second Permanent
Secretaries subordinate to the Permanent Under Secretary of
the MoD. In 1970 they were further downgraded to the rank
of Deputy Under Secretary. The Service Boards, through
which the Service Chiefs exercised much of their influence,
were more formally subordinated to the Secretary of State
by making them subcommittees of a Defence Council. In
theory the Defence Council delegated to the Service Boards
only the day-to-day management of the services.
	 In
practice it proved too large and cumbersome to act as a
decision-making body. 7' The hallmark of these
changes, both facilitating and symbolising them, was the
co-location of the services and central organs within the
same building at Storey's Gate. With ministerial and
central influence increasing, the services faced a starker
choice than ever before. The Service Chiefs could attempt
to resist and minimize defence cuts by standing together,
or attempt to mitigate the effect of the cuts on their own
service by criticising other service's programmes.
' It included the Secretary of State, Ministers of State,
the Chief of Defence Staff, the Chiefs of Staff, the Chief
Scientific Adviser and the Permanent Under Secretary.
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COMPROMISE VERSUS DISUNITY
When Labour was elected in 1964 reductions in overseas
commitments were not desired from a strategic perspective
either by Secretary of State for Defence Denis Healey or
Prime Minister Harold Wilson. Consequently, there were no
obvious indications that the Service Chiefs faced stark
planning choices. The Labour leadership's emphasis on East
of Suez commitments reflected a vision of Britain's role as
a great power, second only to the superpowers. The basis
of this status was to be Britain's conventional forces and
global presence, where history, recent experience with
limited operations, and the political confidence of former
dependencies gave Britain a unique role. Fulfilling this
role, according to the Labour Government, required
diverting money from nuclear to conventional defences by
abandoning the fifth Polaris submarine. Th
 This cut was
also a concession to the left-wing of the party, which
favoured major reductions in defence.
Healey believed Britain's contribution to stability in
the Middle and Far East was 'more useful to world peace
than our contribution to NATO in Europe.'
	 Similarly, in
Cmnd 2592, Defence Estimates 1965; see also Denis
Healey, Hansard (3 March 1965), cols. 1337-9.
76 P.C. Gordon Walker, 'The Labour Party's Defence and
Foreign Policy,' Foreign Affairs Vol. 42, No. 3 (April
1964), pp. 393, 395-96.
Denis Healey, The Time of Mv Life (London: Michael
Joseph, 1989), p. 279; see also his comments in
Guardian (4 Jan 1964).
56
December 1964 Wilson announced that 'whatever we may do in
the field of cost-effectiveness, value for money, and a
stringent review of expenditure, we cannot afford to
relinquish our world role -- our role which, for shorthand
purposes is sometimes called our 'East of Suez' role.1Th
By 1965, however, economic pressures had brought Britain's
ability to meet all of its commitments in doubt, raising
the prospect of another defence review.
The defence review, when it did take place, was
notable for its financial motivation and lack of strategic
coherence, particularly given the government's interest in
Britain's East of Suez role. In Cabinet, it was discussed
primarily in terms of how much money could be saved, rather
than what policy adjustments were necessary. Due to tension
between its policy objectives, the government was initially
reluctant to undertake the fundamental review which
ultimately became necessary. As a result, the 'continuing
review', as it became known, only addressed defence policy
after many significant equipment decisions had already been
taken. A more strategic approach, had there been fewer
constraints, would have been to reconsider policy first
then make the necessary adjustments in the programme. The
rationale for the peculiar sequence to what ultimately
became a fundamental defence review, implicit in the White
Wilson, Mansard (16 Dec 1964), cols. 423-4; see Major
General J.L. Moulton 'Middle East Base: An Exercise in
Hindsight,' RTJSI Journal (June 1970) for a collection of
government declarations of the importance of Middle East
outposts and on the question of the interdependence of sea,
air and land power in maintaining overseas commitments.
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Paper, was that Healey had first 'to clean up the mess left
by his predecessor,' before he could develop his own
policy.
During his first week as Chancellor James Callaghan
learned that Treasury officials were concerned about
existing plans for substantial defence budget increases.
Indeed, they 'argued for a reappraisal of the whole of
Britain's overseas strategic commitments. '° Subsequently
Callaghan argued, with George Brown, Minister of Economic
Affairs, that by reducing defence spending from over seven
per cent of the GNP to six per cent by 1969-70 the strain
placed on the economy by the inherited defence plans could
be relaxed. The decision for a major defence review was
taken by the Cabinet in November 1964. 81
 The agreed limit
on defence spending was £2 billion by 1969-70, requiring
savings of £400 million. According to Secretary of the
Navy Christopher Mayhew, this figure was derived simply by
projecting the 1964 defence spending level to l969-70.
Michael Carver, Ti ghtrope Walking :	 British Defence
Policy
 Since 1945 (London: Hutchinson, 1992), p. 75.
° James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Collins, 1987)
p. 169.
81 Christopher Mayhew, Britain's Role Tomorrow, (London:
Hutchinson, 1967), p. 131.
Sir Richard Clarke, Public Expenditure. Manaaement and
Control (London: Macmillan, 1978), p. 114; see also Cmnd
2901. Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1966. part I. The
Defence Review, p. 1, para 1.
Mayhew believes that this figure was initially a
provisional target but that it became an 'immovable
ceiling' as the National Economic Plan for 1969-70 became
more fixed. Mayhew, Britain's Role Tomorrow, pp. 133-4.
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The decisions came in two stages, the first focusing
on pruning weapons programmes, as had been done numerous
times before. Decisions reached early in 1965 included
cancelling the TSR-2 aircraft programme, the Anglo-French
variable geometry aircraft, and cancelling the fifth
Polaris submarine. Savings totalled £220 million. The
second wave of reductions began in June 1965 when Cabinet
was told that additional cuts, unlike the previous ones,
would have to include reductions in capabilities reducing
Britain's ability to perform certain cominitments.'
Preserving existing capabilities was straining the budget.
The choices were reducing the size of the Army, sacrificing
the RAF's long-range strike and reconnaissance role (to be
fulfilled by F-ills purchased from the US following the
TSR-2 cancellation), or abandoning plans to run a carrier
force in the 1970s and 1980s.85
Britain's allies worried about the implications of
British defence cuts. The US emphatically did not want
Britain to reduce its overseas capabilities and US
Secretary of State Dean Rusk watched the defence review
'very closely and seriously.' 86
 American concern stemmed
from its lack of forces East of Suez and recognition that
increasing them would require major restructuring of US
David Greenwood, The Economics of 'The East of Suez
Decision', ASIDES No. 2 (October 1973), p. 8.
85 Ibid.
86 Interview with Dean Rusk, 16 February 1990.
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commitments. 87
 Appealing to the US to support sterling
during the financial crisis of 1965, Britain discovered one
of the conditions for assistance was a pledge to maintain
overseas defence commitments. 0
 The overriding fear in
the State Department was that the British contraction would
continue:
US officials talked very firmly with the British,
but with no effect due to the budgetary reasons
(for the review]. A proposal was considered
(within the State Department] to pick up the tab
for the Royal Navy, but it didn't get very far.
Resistance to reducing commitments East of Suez, bolstered
by allied concerns, prolonged the initial defence review
process to February 1966, when Hea]ey decided to eliminate
the Navy's carrier programme.
However, to meet the new spending limit established in
1966 one brigade was withdrawn from the BAOR, and the
character and size of the forces stationed in Malaysia and
Singapore was altered. 9° But the balance of payments
worsened and inadequate growth continued. In 1967 the
government revised plans for defence spending to reach £2
billion by 1969-70 and set a new limit at £1.85 billion
(also in 1964 prices). In addition, Cabinet asked the MOD
to cut £75 million in overseas spending specifically to
8? Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 187.
88 dive Ponting, Breach of Promise (London: Hamish
Hamilton, 1989), pp. 52-55.
Interview with Dean Rusk, 16 Feb 1990.
Cmnd 3357, SuDP].ementarv Statement on Defence Policy
(July 1967).
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help the balance of payments. 91
 The resulting programme was
estimated to cost £1.9 billion by 1970-71. This
represented a shortfall of £50 million against the target,
which had been relaxed in early 1967 as a result of
Callaghan and Wilson's confidence that there would be a
balance of payments surplus in 1967 and l968. Healey
clearly believed there would be no further adjustments in
defence spending as the white paper announcing the 1967
cuts declared the end of the three-year process of
reviewing Britain's defences.
Nevertheless, due to rapid deterioration in the
balance of payments culminating in the devaluation of
sterling in November 1967 another review was necessary in
1968, by which time options for the piecemeal reduction of
capabilities had been exhausted, forcing the government to
cut commitments. Following devaluation Healey accelerated
the withdrawal from East of Suez, virtually eliminated
Britain's overseas intervention capabilities, and
cancelled the RAP's order of F-ills. 9' The defence cuts
were explicitly linked to overall economic factors by their
announcement in the Government's Public Expenditure White
91 Greenwood, The Economics of 'East of Suez', p. 10.
n Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 210.
Cmrd 3357, Su1ementarv Statement on Defence Policy,
chapter VI, para 1.
' David Greenwood, 'The 1974 Defence Review in
Perspective,' Survival Vol • 17, No. 5, (September/October
1975), p. 224.
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Paper rather than the 1968 Defence White Paper.
INTER-SERVICE RIVALRY
Relations between the RAP and the Royal Navy had
reached a nadir in the fierce competition for funds and,
more importantly, the future of those services. There had
been few savings to be made from cutting the Army, where
manpower was the greatest expense and target manpower
requirements were only met with difficulty. The cuts
therefore had mainly to be distributed between the other
two services, who attempted to mitigate the effects of the
review on their own programme by arguing against each
other's capabilities. The RAP argued that land-based air
could provide all of Britain's air defence requirements,
including the fleet. The Royal Navy argued that the case
for carrier-based air power was overwhelming, and refused
even to reduce the size of its proposed CVA-01 carrier.
According to Admiral (now Lord) Hill-Norton, who became
Chief of the Naval Staff in 1970, Healey divided and ruled,
picking up the pieces once the arguments, and their
proponents, were exhausted.
A new element in the review process stemmed from
developments in the application of science to technical and
operational problems. In the 1963 reorganisation the post
Greenwood, East of Suez, p. 13; See Wilson, Hansard (16
Jan 1968) Vol. 756, cols. 1580-5.
% Interview with Lord Hill-Norton, 18 July 1991; See also
Healey, Time and Chance, pp. 275-6.
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of Chief Scientific Adviser had been created, primarily to
scrutinize the cost-effectiveness of the defence programme.
As the chairman of both the Defence Research Committee and
the Weapons Development Committee the Chief Scientific
Adviser was responsible for overseeing all basic research
unrelated to specific weapons programmes, advising on which
major weapons should be developed, comparing alternative
weapons on the basis of cost and capability and relating
them to defence and operational requirements. 97
 As an
alternative source of advice, with direct influence over
defence plans in areas of vital interest to the services,
the CSA posed a potential threat to the Service Chiefs.
In 1968, however, the CSA was not the main source of
the scientific analysis of the review options. Other
sources of scientific advice were the Defence Operational
Analysis Establishment, formed in 1965 by consolidating
the three operational research establishments under a
civilian director responsible to the CSA, and the Programme
Evaluation Group (PEG), set up by Healey in 1967
specifically to assist with his defence review. According
to former Chief of Defence Staff Lord Cameron, who served
on the PEG, its purpose was 'to give [Healey] independent
advice on Services' proposals and to provide more reliable
data on which to base his decisions.'
	 It reflected
Sir Ewen Broadbent, The Military
 and Government: From
Macmillan to Heseltine (London: Macmillan, 1988), p. 153.
Lord Cameron, In the Midst of ThincTs (London: Hodder
and Stoughton, 1986), p. 147; See also Healey, Time of My
Life, p. 269.
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Healey's awareness, according to Cameron, that he needed
'an apparatus at the centre. . . strong enough and
sufficiently well-informed to pester, cajole and browbeat
the vested interests which are always ready to resist
change. '
Healey's decision to abolish the carrier programme,
however, could not have resulted in anything less than a
fierce controversy over the Navy's role, which had been
linked more directly to overseas than European commitments.
Both the Minister for the Navy, (now Lord) Christopher
Mayhew, and the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir David Luce,
resigned in protest.'°° The tensions between the Navy and
RAF prompted Hill-Norton and Chief of the Air Staff Air
Chief Marshal Sir John Grandy to sign the Hill-
Norton/Grandy Concordat, which 'forbid anyone from
mentioning the problem again and imposed draconian measures
if they did. .101 By the time Hill-Norton became CDS in
1971 the rift was healing and the two services resumed
their normal pattern of good working relations, but the
collective attitude of the Chiefs had been transformed.
Divided during a period of budgetary retrenchment, the
Chiefs had to reassess inter-service relations for the next
Lord Cameron, In the Midst of Things, p. 153.
See W.S. Johnson, 'Defense Budgetary Constraints and the
Fate of the Carrier in the Royal Navy,' Naval War College
Review (June 1973); and Major General J.L. Moulton, 'The
1966 Defence White Paper and Debate,' Brassev's 1966
(London: Brassey's, 1966).
101 Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Hill-Norton,
18 July 1991.
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decade, during which they 'found themselves without a truly
British strategy. .102
Disagreements remained, especially over the RAF's
responsibility for providing land-based air cover for the
fleet operating near the home base. Some in the Navy
remained concerned that in their moment of need the RAF's
priorities might lay elsewhere and these concerns never
entirely dissipated, but in some respects they were
philosophical rather than operational difficulties and did
not impede an improvement in working relations.
Above all, the rift between the Royal Navy and the
RAF demonstrated the disadvantages of arguing out inter-
service rifts before defence ministers. These rifts could
be exploited -- not necessarily cynically but as a means of
fully exposing alternative argwnents -- to reveal
vulnerable areas of the programme. The enhanced role of
scientific analysis increased the likelihood that such
vulnerabilities would be pursued. One attendant risk was
that ministerial decisions taken in the wake of fierce
inter-service disputes could fall heavily on one service,
damaging its ability to perform its commitments. Even at
the height of serious disputes about resource allocation
the Services did not want to see whole areas of capability
eliminated. The advantages to the services of remaining
united had been demonstrated, on the whole, in the l950s,
when close cooperation during defence reviews hindered the
imposition of radical cuts. Even a Prime Minister as
102 Jackson and Bramall, The Chiefs, p. 375.
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strong-minded and as confident of his understanding of
defence as Churchill did not overrule a united Chiefs of
Staff Committee.
The Healey review was thus a turning point in
relations between the Chiefs of Staff, encouraging
compromise if that was necessary to keep the services
united: 'It has never been necessary for the CDS to fudge
it but there was a lot of arguing during Healey's time and
the legacy has been a desire not to reveal difference
between the Chiefs of Staff.' 103
 The virtue of the
Chiefs of Staff Committee was as a forum in which the most
experienced soldiers, the professional heads of their
services, could coordinate advice to the Secretary of
State. They could express their views, drawing on the full
expertise of their Service Department. In the event of a
disagreement the matter could be put before ministers.
However, in the wake of the Healey review the
understandable interest in remaining united weakened one of
the most valuable qualities of the Committee. Overcoming
this difficulty required that the Chiefs of Staff establish
a coherent and credible strategic view of priorities, yet
the structure of the Committee virtually precluded such a
view from emerging, especially during periods of budgetary
retrenchment.
The Chief of Defence Staff's terms of reference made
him the principal military adviser to the government and he
'° Interview with Marshal of the RAF Sir Michael Beetham,
21 October 1991.
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was rimus inter pares with respect to the other Chiefs of
Staff. Following the 1963 reorganisation of the ministry he
gained the authority to submit an independent point of
view, while remaining bound also to report the consensus
views of the Chiefs of Staff and any dissenting views.
However, there was a risk, acknowledged by senior military
officers, that ministerial reliance on the CDS, inevitably
someone with professional mastery of only one branch of
the military, would result in decisions based on a narrower
conception of strategic requirements than the Chiefs of
Staff as a whole. On the other hand, presenting
alternative views to ministers -- particularly if
disagreements led to acrimony -- potentially made the
services vulnerable to more radical cuts.
The experience of the Royal Navy and the RAF under
Healey revealed the devastating effect that inter-service
rivalry could have on the future of a service. However, in
a decade of serious economic conditions, a proclivity to
present compromise solutions to ministers seeking defence
economies risked undermining the credibility of the Chiefs
of Staff Committee and ultimately its influence within the
MoD. The Chiefs of Staff Committee entered the 1970s
facing a dilemma which threatened its effectiveness as the
forum for developing defence plans.
CHAPTER THREE
Def.nc. and National Prioriti.s, 1974-1979
Throughout the 1970s ongoing economic weakness placed
considerable pressure on public spending, intensifying debate
over social priorities and precipitating a shift away from
defence. In 1973 the Conservative Government of Edward Heath
initiated a process intended to result in lower defence
expenditure. The Labour Party, more committed to cutting
defence, promptly accelerated this process following the
election of a fragile Labour Government in February 1974.
Secretary of State for Defence Roy Mason conducted a major
defence review, in which the Chiefs of Staff played an
important role. Preserving tn-service unity was difficult
but made possible by the development of a common concept
guiding overall size and shape: preservation of the 'minimal
critical level' of capability necessary to meet existing
political commitments.
Economic and domestic political pressures on the defence
budget remained great and in the years following the review
further cuts were imposed on the defence programme, in
violation of the minimal critical level. By 1980 even three
per cent annual increases in defence spending were
insufficient to sustain defence plans, let alone the
improvements planned by the incoming Conservative Government.
Whereas in 1974 the Chiefs of Staff Committee remained central
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to defence planning, in the years after the Mason review their
salience declined, With the shift in overall priorities away
from defence, so too the government began to rely more on the
advice of central civilian and scientific staffs.
ThE MASON REVIEW
For the most part the Heath Government accepted the
Labour Government's reordering of Britain's defence
priorities. Secretary of State for Defence Lord Carrington
believed there was no question of setting the clock back on
British defence policy, though he did undertake 'to restore
Britain's security to the high place it must take among
national priorities, and to make good as far as possible the
damage of successive defence reviews." The resulting
modifications in the programme were intended to preserve
Britain's global influence, but at a reduced level
commensurate with the primary importance placed on NATO.2
Thus Carrington negotiated the Australia-New Zealand-UK Five
Power Agreement on the defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
renewed the 1955 Anglo-South African Agreement (the Simonstown
1 Quote from Cmnd 4521, SuDtlementarv Statement on Defence
Policy . 1970 (October 1970), para 2; See also Lord
Carrington, Reflect On Thinas Past (London: Collins, 1988),
p. 218; Lord Carrington, 'British Defence Policy,' RUSI
Journal (December 1970).
Cmnd 4521, Defence Policy . 1970, para 4; Cmnd 5178, Public
Expenditure to 1976-77 (December 1972), p. 20.
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Agreement) governing maritime passage around the Cape of Good
Hope, and decided to retain the aircraft carrier Ark Royal
through the 1970s for out-of-area flexibility. The government
also reversed the 1964 embargo on arms sales to South Africa.3
Finally, in April 1973 a decision was made to purchase a mini-
aircraft carrier which the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral
Hill-Norton, had renamed a 'through deck cruiser."
Carrington believed that after a period of turmoil he
should attempt to provide stability. 5
 However, he also
thought that 'in terms of getting value for money role
specialization within the Alliance could go further' and that
there should be more movement toward a NATO defended on the
Central Front by Germany and in the East Atlantic by the Royal
Navy ,6
Government interest in preserving Britain's global role
could not offset the country's economic weakness and
associated pressures on the defence budget. Despite Lord
Carrington's predilection for a strong Navy, in May 1973 he
deferred the purchase of twenty-five maritime Harrier
aircraft, thereby saving £60 million. The plan was to
See Cmnd 4521, Defence Policy. 1970, and Michael Chichester
and John Wilkinson. The Uncertain All y: British Defence
Policy. 1960-1990 (Aldershot: Gower, 1982), p.36.
Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Hill-Norton, 18
July 1991.
Carrington, Reflect on Things Past, pp. 227-28.
6 Carrington, Reflect on Thinas Past, p. 229.
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reinstate the purchase following the fall 1973 public
expenditure survey. 7
 However, by the time the survey was
conducted the oil crisis brought about as a result of the
Arab-Israeli War had gathered momentum and complicated
recovery of the purchase. There were strong strategic and
political incentives for purchasing the Harriers. According
to the Navy Minister, then Antony Buck, 'At one stage it
looked as if we wouldn't go for a maritime Harrier, but I
believed that carriers needed an indigenous air power -- VSTOL
-- so I sent a note to Cabinet saying that I would resign on
principle if the purchase was not made.' 8
 Ultimately, the
programme was recovered (in 1974) but only after the overall
consequences of the oil crisis -- larger budget deficits,
larger balance of payments deficits and increased foreign
borrowing -- had prompted the Treasury to impose an additional
£178 million cut in 1974-75 defence expenditure.9
Pressures to conduct another fundamental defence review
had begun to peak in summer 1973 when Chancellor Anthony
Barber demanded reductions in defence from 5.5 per cent to 4.5
per cent of the Gross Domestic Product within four years.
Carrington resisted the imposition of such extensive short-
Chichester and Wilkinson, The Uncertain Ally, p. 41.
8 Interview with Sir Antony Buck, 14 January 1992.
'Memorandum by the Ministry of Defence: The £178 M and £50
N Defence Cuts in 1974/75,' in the Fifth Report from the
Expenditure Committee, 1974, Defence Cuts (HC 308), 24 July
1974, p. 1.
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term cuts and with Heath's support he prevailed in the
argument, 'but only on the undertaking that an
interdepartmental working group would be established from
officials of the Ministry of Defence, the Treasury, Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, the Central Policy Review Staff and
the Cabinet Office.' 1° The Chief of Defence Staff did not
object to establishing a working party, which he 'didn't think
was going to make any difference one way or another. '
The interdepartmental structure of the committee
increased the likelihood of compromise with the Treasury. The
presence of representatives from departments other than the
Treasury and the Ministry of Defence diminished the impact of
Treasury demands to lower spending. The Defence Studies
Working Party included (as they were then) Arthur Hockaday,
Deputy Under Secretary (Policy), as chairman, Leo Pliatzky,
Second Permanent Under Secretary at the Treasury, who acted as
alternate chairman, Admiral Anthony Morton, Assistant Chief
of Defence (Policy), as the principal military nieinber, John
Thompson, First Secretary at the Foreign Office Central Policy
Review Staff, James Cable, Head of the Foreign Office Planning
Staff, Alan Urwick, Assistant Secretary at the Cabinet Office,
Central Policy Review Staff, and John Roberts from the Cabinet
Office. The principal civilian asS/S!a-" was John Mayne; on the
10 Interview A.
11 Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Hill-Norton, 18
July 1991.
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military side Air Commodore Peter Harding. The main financial
work on the review was done by Defence Secretariat 22, which
handled security policy studies and was headed by John Mayne,
but Defence Secretariat 1 was also brought in.12
A defence review was thus initiated under the
Conservative Government but never publicly announced. The DSWP
spent the first few months preparing and discussing papers on
the longer-term programme. In January 1974 Ian Gilmour, who
succeeded Carrington, put in hand a study of overseas
commitments. However, in February Heath called a snap
election which the Conservatives lost. Labour was able to
muster enough support from the Liberal Party to form a
government under Harold Wilson and shortly after taking office
it publicly announced that it had 'initiated a review of
current defence commitments and capabilities against the
resources that, given the economic prospects of the country,
we can afford to devote to defence. .13 The announcement did
not refer to the previous arrangements but in practice it
continued them:
The Labour Government took office with a commitment
to reduce the percentage of GDP going to defence
expenditure. The achievement of this reduced
percentage was now written into the terms of
reference of the defence review. The assumption to
be made about future GDP therefore became
critical 14
12 Interview A.
13 Roy Mason, Hansard (21 March 1974), col. 154.
14 Interview with Sir Leo Pliatzky, 26 November 1991.
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The Labour Government's desired goal was to reduce the defence
budget to four percent of GDP. In framing the terms of
reference for the DPWP, however, 'a series of percentages of
GDP were given for study.
Secretary of State for Defence Roy Mason came from the
right wing of the Labour Party and did not favour deep
reductions in defence. The economic situation, however, was
one of serious weakness. In early 1974 there were no signs
of improvement over the £1.5 billion balance of payments
deficit of the year before. In January the deficit was £300
million, and by March had grown to £371 million. Moreover,
the trade deficit during the first quarter of 1974 totalled
£1.2 billion and by May the three-day week, which had been
declared by the Heath Government to conserve national power
supplies,	 had caused losses of £1 billion in the
manufacturing sector alone. 16
 To help cope with these
pressures the government cut £50 million from 1974-75 defence
spending, less than a week after formally initiating the
review."'
The Conservative Government's defence cuts and the
initial Labour cut significantly affected the review's
conduct. Most of the combined £300 million (1973 prices) cuts
focused on buildings, equipment and supplies. The Expenditure
15 Interview B.
16 Roy Mason, Hansard (13 May 1974), col. 910.
17 Denis Healey, Hansard (26 March 1974), col. 302.
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Committee investigating their effect criticised the way they
were imposed, declaring the short-term cancellation or
deferral of programmes and proj ects to be 'expensive and
disruptive.' The committee rejected the practice of asking
the MOD to make short-term savings of a predetermined amount,
since this was inevitably arbitrary in as much as it had no
bearing on strategic requirements or defence priorities. The
basic conclusion was that
further major defence cuts cannot sensibly be made
without some reduction in the roles, major
equipment, activities or commitments of the armed
forces, and that if short-term defence cuts have to
be made for economic reasons, consideration should
be given to concentrating them in limited areas
rather than spreading them widely.18
Mason took these criticisms seriously and subsequently
conducted a cautious review in which the Chiefs of Staff
played an important role.
The Labour Party's 1974 election manifesto stated that a
main defence goal was to 'progressively reduce the burden of
Britain's defence spending to bring our costs into line with
those carried by our main European allies.' 9
 Actually,
British defence spending was lower than that of France and
Germany in absolute figures and on a per caDita basis. The
18 HC 308, Defence Cuts, p. xi, para 9.
19 Labour Party, 'Let Us Work Together,' in The Times Guide
to the House of Commons. 1974 (London: Times Newspapers,
1974), p. 311.
20 On a capita basis the major NATO countries spent the
following: US £152; Germany £81; France £76; and the UK £63.
Peter Walker, Hansard (16 Dec 1974), col. 1166.
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same was not true of Britain's defence spending as a
percentage of Gross National Product; only by this measure did
Britain spend more on defence than the other main European
NATO countries. 21
 More precisely, therefore, Labour's
electoral pledge meant reducing the roortion of Britain's
GDP devoted to defence to a level commensurate with that of
other European NATO countries. 22 This pledge, to which
several Cabinet members were strongly committed, including the
Secretary of State for Employment, Michael Foot, and Social
Services Secretary Barbara Castle, gave rise to the decision
to reduce defence spending from 5.5 per cent to 4 per cent of
the GDP.
The government's rationale for defence reductions was
clear: economic weakness dictated the transfer of resources
from defence to other sectors of the economy. The decision
signalled an important shift in British foreign policy. Mason
was the first Secretary of State for Defence prepared to
weaken the link between foreign and defence policy, mainly
because detente reduced the likelihood of a Soviet invasion of
21 Until 1977 NATO calculations looked at GNP rather than GDP.
They indicated that defence spending as a percentage of GNP
broke down as follows: UK 5.8 per cent GNP; Germany 4.1 per
cent (4.9 per cent including Berlin Aid): France 3.8 per cent;
NATO European average 4.1 per cent. Second Report from the
Expenditure Committee, 1974-75, The Defence Review Proosa1s
(HC 259), 6 March 1975, p. 22, para 2.
Roy Mason, Hansard (21 March 1974), cols. 153-4.
Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries (London: Weidenfield
and Nicholson, 1980), p. 596.
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West Europe and because the prevailing balance of forces made
it likely that any invasion, were it to come, would fail.2'
According to Mason, foreign policy
has become, in relation to our economic resources,
far too great a determinant of defence policy, and
this increasingly unrealistic balance in defence
objectives has progressively distorted our defence
efforts and programmes.
As a result, the nature of Britain's contribution to the
alliance could be redefined. De-emphasising political aspects
of British defence capabilities, the government argued that
restoring Britain's economic health would strengthen NATO and
that the MOD therefore had to play its part in the economic
recovery.
Mason's main goal was to avoid short-term cuts which
would degrade operational capability. To avoid such cuts he
decided the review should cover the defence programme for the
ten years leading up to 1983-84. This was not a popular
decision among the Labour Left who wanted large cuts
immediately. However, conducting a long-term review had the
added advantage of enabling the simultaneous restructuring of
front line forces, support services, manpower, and the
equipment budget. Nor did economic assumptions underlying the
review suggest that large short-term cuts would be necessary.
The Treasury's Medium Term Assessment was not yet
24 See Cmnd 5976, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1975,
pp. 26-38.
Roy Mason, 'Britain's Security Interests,' Survival
(September/October 1975), p. 217.
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prepared when the review got underway in earnest but,
in the immediate aftermath of the oil crisis and
the three-day week the prevailing economic advice
in the Treasury was that, though there would be no
growth at all for one year, over the medium term
the trend growth rate of something like 3 per cent
would be achieved.26
Although this growth rate did not materialize it was one of
the more cautious estimates. At a meeting of Permanent Under
Secretaries chaired by Sir John Hunt, Secretary to the
Cabinet, shortly after the DSWP had made its recommendations,
the Central Policy Review Staff were forecasting growth of six
per cent.27
Most importantly for Mason's arguments in Cabinet, large
short-term defence cuts would have severe consequences,
notably in the North of England and Scotland where naval
shipyards were located. Due to the recession merchant
shipbuilding was declining and shipbuilders were increasingly
dependent on orders from the MOD. The government, especially
those members most interested in defence cuts, was committed
to maintaining employment. This conflict gave Mason the
political room to manoeuvre that he required to conduct a
thorough review considering a range of options.
The review began with the definition of four alternative
force structures, each corresponding to a given percentage of
Leo Pliatzky, Gettina and S pending (London: Basil
Blackwell, 1982), p. 123.
27 Interview with Sir Leo Pliatzky, 26 November 1991.
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the defence budget. 28
 In the first stage, the Service
Departments studied the implications of reductions to the
levels of GDP quoted. 'This produced long lists of pain and
grief, which were put together and considered by the Defence
Studies Working Party.' As a basis for a sensible new
defence posture this process was flawed and to provide a means
of integrating economic and strategic considerations in a
coherent fashion the concept of a 'critical level of
capability' was floated in the DSWP. The proposed guidelines
of the review were the need to provide the forces to meet
direct threats to the UK treaty obligations, medical
commitments overseas and Labour's policy in white papers when
last in office. Although the concept of the critical level of
forces appears to have emerged within the working party, it
required the approval of the Chiefs of Staff, who maintained
the sole authority to approve strategic concepts. 3° Once the
DSWP and the Chiefs of Staff had both agreed the concept work
on the review could proceed.
The Chief of the Defence Staff, Field Marshal Lord
Carver, thus played a particularly important role in the
review. Both his formal and personal authority were necessary
to preserve unity among the Chiefs of Staff. The proposals
28 Lord Carver, Out of Step : The Memoirs of Field Marshal Lord
Carver (London: Hutchinson, 1989), pp. 439-40.
Interview B.
° Lord Carver, however, suggests that the concept originated
with the Chiefs of Staff. Carver, Out of Ste p , p. 448.
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expected by the government had to reflect the reduced
importance of defence in overall government priorities. Due to
the sensitivity of the services to such a cuts exercise and
the vital importance of preserving inter-service unity Carver
is rumoured to have banned the phrase 'resource allocation'
from the Chiefs of Staff Committee because it was too emotive.
The services were concerned that the critical force level
concept would weaken their resistance to financial pressure
from the Treasury which could be expected to insist on
reductions to the critical level. However the Service Chiefs
had little alternative but to accept the concept if the review
exercise was to be credible.
The Chiefs of Staff Committee could only disagree
among themselves if they had military arguments
with credibility otherwise they would be pushed
down, The Chiefs of Staff could hang together or
hang separately. They knew they had a government
which wanted a credible policy and one that could
be sustained.31
In the tense bureaucratic atmosphere any comprehensive
report on resource allocation prepared by the Defence
Operational Analysis Establishment was bound to arouse
controversy. Among the conclusions of the study which arrived
in London while the review was underway were that investment
in anti-tank weapons paid of f much better than expensive
supersonic aircraft. The services saw early drafts of the
report which had been submitted to the Operational
Requirements Committee. As a result, they tried to influence
31 Interview B.
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the drafting of the final copy, insisting that if any
 changes
were made to the draft text that ll of the report had to be
submitted to the Service Departments as well. The services
had already fought and lost a similar bureaucratic battle with
the DOAE in the early 1970 g . At that time the Director of
DOAE, with the support of the Chief Scientific Adviser Sir
Herinann Bondi, had established that the professional standard
of DOAE analyses was to be determined by the Director and not
by service approval.
The services were thus acutely aware of the pressures
they faced from different quarters, and of the history of
previous defence reviews. 'The Chiefs under Carver's
forthright leadership would not tolerate another Treasury
dominated and resource-led review, and they insisted that
reduction of commitments and revision of strategy should be
undertaken first. ,32 However, a representative from the
Treasury Defence and Material Division sat on the Operational
Requirements Committee and was therefore on the DOAE's
circulation list. Such reports proved invaluable to the
Treasury in its probe for detailed justifications of every
military capability.
The Chiefs of Staff took several weeks to agree on the
terms of reference for the review. Whether this constituted
a delay or a proper stage in the defence review depended on
Bill Jackson and Dwin Bramall, The Chiefs: The Story
 of
the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff (London: Brassey's, 1992),
p. 378.
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one's position in the ministry. Civil servants, accustomed to
producing reports quickly and effectively, were inclined to
regard the Mason review as a demonstration of the weaknesses
of existing methods for determining defence priorities. The
service staffs were inclined to regard the review as yet
another example of the government asking them to perform a
wide range of commitments with a narrowing range of
capabilities. In response to the Treasury's demand for cuts,
'the Chiefs retaliated, first, with an agreed statement of
priorities; and then, based on it, an assessment of the
"critical level of forces" to meet them.
The consensus which ultimately emerged over the critical
level of forces was 'the level below which the resultant
reduction in our contribution to NATO would call into question
our support of the alliance, and thus put at risk the cohesion
of the alliance itself.' The key strategic priority
guiding the review was preserving front line capabilities, the
'teeth' of the armed forces, as much as possible.35
According to the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, the
Michael Carver, Tiahtroi,e Walkinci: British Defence Policy
Since 1945 (London: Hutchinson, 1992), p. 106.
Carver, Out of Step, p. 448.
To ensure that front-line capabilities were preserved as
much as possible any reduction in the teeth had to be balanced
by at least an equivalent reduction in the support
infrastructure, or 'tail'. The size of cuts in support
functions were thus determined by the size of cuts in front
line forces. Sir Michael Cary, 'Britain's Armed Forces After
the Defence Cuts,' RUSI Journal (March 1976), p. 2.
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guidelines for determining Army force levels were threefold:
firstly, the defence of the UK depends on NATO, in
support of which there is a minimum level of forces
below which the alliance solidarity would be at
risk;
secondly, this level of forces plus those required
to maintain the defence of the remaining colonies
and dependent territories, such as Hong Kong and
Gibraltar, represent the Critical level; and
thirdly, the worsening balance of "teeth-to-tail"
must be changed to improve cost-effectiveness.
Within the MoD the principal work on the defence review was
done by the central Defence Policy Staff which set up four
study groups, one each on budgets, NATO, out-of-area,
disarmament and civil service and operational requirements.
U_let
'Each military policy director had a team of colonelsjthem who
in turn had a team of commanders working on the problems. '
The numerous reports submitted to the working party by
the Defence Policy Staff and appearances by the service vice
chiefs and other senior officers explained the proposed force
levels. In this way the interdepartmental structure of the
committee strengthened the MoD's position vis-a-vis the
Treasury.
The Treasury naturally had the inquisitorial role,
to which Pliatzky, their representative, brought
both persistence and forensic skill. His approach
was quantitative: pressing the Service
Representatives to quantify the threat; to explain
why the existing force levels were needed to deter
or contain the threat and how they would do it; and
why or how a reduction would jeopardise the
objective. These were questions to which Service
Sir William Scotter, 'The British Army Today,' RUSI Journal
(January 1976), p. 17.
7 Interview B.
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representatives, who had to rely on assumptions and
who believed existing levels to be inadequate,
found it hard to give clear-cut and convincing
answers. Attempts to counter this line of
questioning by asking Pliatzky to be equally
specific about the economic benefits he expected
defence cuts to bring drew strong objection from
him.
Giving NATO commitments overriding priority among the main
pillars of British defence was the most effective way of
securing Treasury approval for the resulting force levels.
According to Pliatzky, 'my problem was reconciling my
acceptance of defence commitments with the need to reduce
defence expenditure. Focusing on NATO and the minimum
capability seemed like the best way to do this. We couldn't
say we were staying in the alliance and then not provide the
minimum critical capability. ' Likewise, the Chiefs of
Staff had in mind, when assessing priorities, the approximate
target of 'achieving a reduction to 4 1/2 per cent of GNP
within ten years on the Treasury assumption of an average
increase in GNP of 3 per cent per annum. .40
The decisions taken most confidently were those reducing
Britain's global capabilities. The second Wilson Goverrunent
reaffirmed the decisions taken by the first Wilson Government
in 1968 about withdrawal from British commitments East of
Suez.	 This reaffirmation led to the conclusion that
Interview b.
Interview with Sir Leo Pliatzky, 26 November 1991.
40 Carver, Tightroi,e Walking , p. 106.
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'substantial reductions in our forces and defence facilities
can be made. The Working Party took the government at its
word that no deployments larger than a brigade would be
required outside of the NATO area. Consequently, planned cuts
included cutting British forces in Hong Kong and asking the
Hong Kong government to pay for a higher percentage of their
cost after the expiration of the existing cost-sharing
agreement in 1976. Forces stationed in Malaysia and Singapore
as part of the Five-Power arrangements were to be withdrawn,
except for 'a small group which we will continue to
contribute to the integrated air defence system.' 42
 The
battalion of Gurkhas in Brunei would also be withdrawn.
Commitments along the route to the Far East would be
cultack , namely Gan and Mauritius. To maintain a residual
presence in the Indian Ocean, which was of increasing interest
to the US due to a growing Soviet naval presence there, there
would be 'a modest expansion' of military facilities on Diego
Garcia. The expansion would be undertaken jointly with the
US, which also had access to the facilities.'3
 No changes
were planned in the arrangements for maintaining British
forces in the Sultanate of Oman, but plans were underway to
terminate the Simonstown agreement with South Africa. In the
Mediterranean, the forces on Cyprus would be reduced,
' Roy Mason, Mansard (3 Dec 1974), col. 1353.
42 Roy Mason, Mansard (3 Dec 1974), col. 1354.
' Roy Mason, Mansard (3 Dec 1974), col. 1354.
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including Vulcan Strike aircraft assigned to CENTO, as veil as
Lightning and Hercules aircraft, some of which would be
replaced by smaller detachments.
	 Military facilities on
Malta would be maintained, but only until the 1979 expiration
of the 1972 basing agreement.
Once established, the budget figures for the critical
force levels were matched against the government's desire for
a reduction of approximately £3,750 million over the ten-year
period covered by the review. It was recognised early on that
some 'addbacks' would be necessary because Britain would have
political difficulty in withdrawing from some of these
commitments. Ultimately, however, the Treasury insisted on
some cuts being made in the Central Region as well. Complete
withdrawal from non-NATO commitments would have saved a total
of only £150 million.'5
 It emerged from this analysis that
the MoD 'had to try to save about £100 million out of the £150
million a year that our non-NATO commitment costs us.
In deciding how to cut the NATO contribution British
strategic interests were considered as a whole. The basic
decision was that 'Britain's forces had to be concentrated on
those areas in which a British contribution to collective
defence would be most effective in ensuring Britain's security
' 'Memorandum by the Ministry of Defence,' in HC 259, Defence
Review Proposals, p.24, para 12.
' 'Memorandum by the MOD,' in HC 259, Defence Review
Proposals, p. 23, para 7.
Roy Mason, Hansard (3 Dec 1974), col. 1363.
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and that of her NATO allies." 7
 The conclusions naturally
had to be sensitive to NATO'S needs, both military and
political. The Chiefs of Staff, however, successfully
resisted Treasury pressure to establish a hierarchy of
priorities. Equal priority was assigned to the nuclear
deterrent, UK defences (undefined), and the maritime and land
contribution to NATO.'8
When forced to look at priorities within NATO, the Chiefs
of Staff determined that the least important contribution was
on the flanks, especially the Southern Flank.'9
 According to
Carver, Britain's Mediterranean commitments were acquired in
1968, when the Chiefs of Staff had been casting about for a
role for the forces being withdrawn from East of Suez. The
availability of the forces and the capability to transport
them fortuitously coincided with the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia and Healey was able to offer reinforcements in
the Mediterranean as part of the NATO response. But by 1974
the Chiefs of Staff believed the strategic importance of these
troops had declined. 50
 For this reason it was proposed that
Britain no longer include a naval presence in the
Cmnd 5976, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1975 (March
1975), p. 7, para 17.
48 Carver, T1htroe Walking , p. 106; Roy Mason, Hansard (3
Dec 1974), cols. 1352-3.
' 'Memorandum by the MoD,' in HC 259, Defence Review
Proposals, p. 24, para 13.
50 Carver, Out of Step , p. 446.
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Mediterranean among its NATO force declarations though British
ships would continue to visit there and to take part in NATO
exercises.
In addition, the government proposed reductions of
approximately one-third in the size of the specialist
reinforcement forces declared to NATO. 51
 Amphibious forces
were to be reduced essentially to one commando group trained
in arctic warfare for the reinforcement of Norway, the UK
Joint Airborne Task Force's commitment to drop two parachute
battalions would be abandoned, and the UK Mobile Force would
be reduced from three air portable brigades to one, with an
improved level of support equipment.52
As reinforcements, these forces were not subject to
Britain's formal treaty commitment to maintain 55,000 troops
on the continent, nor would they be included in the Mutual
Balanced Force Reduction talks then underway in Vienna.
Britain could not therefore be accused of damaging these
negotiations by encouraging the Soviet Union to wait for the
western powers to disarm themselves unilaterally. These
factors played an important role in the identification of
these forces as Britain's least significant contribution to
NATO. The withdrawal had the additional appeal of offering
considerable savings since specialist reinforcements required
51 Roy Mason, Hansard (16 Dec 1974), col. 1154.
52 'Memorandum by the MOD,' fl HC 259, Defence Review
Proposals, pp. 25-6.
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sophisticated	 equipment	 and	 substantial	 transport
capabilities. These reductions, coupled with diminished
overseas responsibilities, enabled the air transport fleet to
be cut by fifty per cent.53
On the day the Chiefs of Staff considered the working
party's recommendations they were joined by the Permanent
Under Secretary, Sir Michael Cary. The critical level came
out £100 million above the 4 per cent target the government
wanted to reach. However, 'the problem was much more
difficult than taking out £100 million up front; you must have
a large wedge at the end.' 54
 The additional cut would have
had a cascading effect on long-range plans. In the end this
argument proved irrefutable. But to the extent that the
Chiefs could 'derive some satisfaction from having held the
overall reduction in resources to about 4 per cent spread over
ten years, and from having kept Britain's contribution to NATO
virtually unscathed,' the review contributed to the belief
within the Treasury Defence and Material Division that more
could have been cut from the defence programme. 55
 This
disparity in outlook had two consequences. The Treasury was
unwilling to make exceptions for the MOD when further economic
pressures subsequently led the Chancellor to argue for across-
the-board budget cuts, and the Chiefs of Staff were again
Roy Mason, Hansard (16 Dec 1974), col. 1157.
Interview B.
Quote from Jackson and Bramall, The Chiefs, p. 380.
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viewed, with increasing suspicion, as obstacles to defence
budget savings.
Among the services the Royal Navy emerged from the review
with the least damage to its programme. Cuts in out-of-area
capabilities had reduced the RAF's Transport Fleet by half.
Cuts in the Army fell mainly on support and command
infrastructure, over which the Army had taken the
initiative. The Army also suffered a reduction in the
strategic reserve but no infantry units were disbanded because
of the demands of policing Northern Ireland.
The Navy had been partly protected by the fact that it
had a major re-equipment programme underway and much of it was
heavily committed to production. There would have been
considerable penalties for cutting back on ongoing ship
construction projects, particularly as the recession meant
that shipbuilders were starved of orders and such cuts would
result in the loss of jobs. The Navy thus benefitted from the
Labour Government's reluctance to create unemployment among
skilled and unskilled labour. Nine frigate construction
projects were removed from Naval plans but these were far
enough forward in the programme to do little short-term damage
to the Navy's operational capabilities. Moreover, cuts in
planned expenditure insulated much of the rest of the naval
programme from further cuts.
Other cuts in the Navy programme included the decisions
Scotter, 'The British Army Today,' p. 17.
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to keep only one amphibious assault ship, Intrepid or
Fearless, operational at a given time, as already mentioned,
and a reduction in personnel. The bulk of the equipment
programme was preserved. The Mason review thus represented a
success for the Royal Navy, which had effectively recovered
from the cuts of the late l960s when its future role appeared
uncertain. Indeed, the Royal Navy's share of the defence
budget increased from 25 to 28 per cent. 57
 During Treasury
questioning on the DSWP
Royal Navy spokesmen were at a disadvantage because
the Royal Navy had no convincing naval strategy. At
that time it was reinforcement which was weak due
to the time it would take for them to arrive. By
the time convoys would have been launched the
central front would have collapsed.58
Quality staff work and a high degree of coordination between
uniformed and civilian naval staffs, and the economic
arguments against cuts in shipbuilding, enabled the Navy to
fend of f ongoing pressures for cuts despite the continued
weaknesses in its operational concept. The Navy's success
was later acknowledged by Secretary of State for Defence John
Nott, who believed 'The Navy was in those days in my view much
the most professional at playing the Ministry of Defence
' For a detailed description of Royal Navy force improvements
see Cmnd 5976, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1975, pp.
41-43; percentage figures from Grove, Van quard to Trident:
British Naval Policy
 Since World War Two (Annapolis: US Naval
Institute Press, 1987), p. 322.
Interview with Sir James Cable, 3 December 1992.
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game. 159
An important element of this game meant securing NATO
support for service programmes. Ministers approved and were
therefore politically committed to NATO Force Declarations.
Each December they submitted their Force Declarations for the
following year. Any change had to be defended in NATO
councils. The process was bureaucratic and politically
difficult for the government concerned and particularly the
Defence Minister. First, cuts had to be explained to the
Defence Review Committee, composed of the member countries'
defence counsellors and chaired by the Assistant Secretary
General for Defence Planning and Policy. In 1977-78 this post
was held by a British official, Cohn Humphrey. Military
consultations took place within the Military Committee,
composed of NATO5 international military staff. The Defence
Review Committee reported to the Defence Planning Committee
which regularly met in Ambassadorial sessions including all
NATO Ambassadors except the French. Finally, Ministers
imposing cuts had to defend their decisions in a ministerial
session of the Defence Planning Committee, which had the full
authority of the North Atlantic Council.
Interview With Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
Interview with Cohn Humphrey, 13 June 1991.; see also
Thomas Kennedy, Jr., NATO Politico-Military
 Consultation,
National Security Affairs Monograph Series 84-3, (Washington:
National Defense University Press, 1984); Sir dive Rose,
'Political Consultation in the Alliance' NATO Review Vol. 31,
No. 1 (April 1983); Roger Hill, Political Consultation in NATO
Wellesley Papers 6/1978, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of
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The NATO allies were very concerned about the effect of
the Mason review on NATO security. As a major preoccupation of
the British Government was to avoid disrupting alliance
cohesion by moving too quickly in reducing its NATO
contribution it initiated thorough consultation with the
alliance. 61
 The consultations took place on the basis that
the need for cuts was not negotiable, but that discussions
could focus on where they were made.' 2
 The first
consultations began on 3 December 1974 with presentations by
Field Marshal Carver and Sir Arthur Hockaday to the NATO
Military Committee and NATO Defence Planning Conunittee.
These were followed up with ministerial sessions in Brussels
the following week. The allies were given a total of eight
weeks to consider the proposals. M
 NATO countries did make
suggestions, and were especially concerned about the cuts in
Britain's presence in the Mediterranean. 65
 Britain had been
the only European Community power to maintain a significant
naval presence there. The British response was to agree to
reassess the decision to withdraw forces intended to reinforce
the Southern Flank, but only on the basis that alternative
International Affairs, 1978).
61 Roy Mason, Hansard (16 Dec 1974), col. 1149.
62 Cary, 'Britain's Armed Forces After the Cuts,' p. 5
'3 Interview with Cohn Humphrey, 13 June 1991.
64 Roy Mason, Hansard (16 Dec 1974), cols. 1162-3.
65 Cary, 'Britain's Armed Forces After the Cuts,' p. 5.
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options would not cost anything.'6
 In the end the Royal Navy
benefitted from the agreedadjustments, the most important of
which were accelerating the conversion of the mini-carrier
Hermes to the ASW role, participation in Naval on-Call Force
Mediterranean and the earmarking of Enciadine, a Royal Fleet
Auxiliary-manned helicopter ship, for NATO'S Channel Command.
The government's decision to avoid short-term cuts meant
that actual 1974-75 defence spending rose from the previous
year. However, interruptions in production resulting from the
energy shortages and industrial action raised doubts about
whether the money could possibly be spent and uncertainty held
final decisions in abeyance until the full effect of this
slippage could be assessed.' 7
 The knock-on effect of
slippage in spending was greater than the underspending which
characterized recent normal years: in 1970-71 there was a £10
million underspend; in 1971-72 there was an overspend of £80
million; and in 1972-73 there was an underspend of £8 million
(all in constant prices) .' Early estimates of the
anticipated underspend indicated that additional cutbacks in
1974-75 spending could be made without affecting the amount of
money actually spent.
A basic obstacle in implementing the review as planned
was the assumption of three per cent annual growth. Previous
66 Scotter, 'The British Army Today,' p. 19.
67 HC 308, Defence Cuts, p. 1, para 5.
HC 308, Defence Cuts, Qs. 25-27.
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growth rates had been subject to substantial fluctuations and
recent overall increases had not reached three per cent.
If the three per cent growth were not sustained, on average,
over the ten years covered by the review, then spending in the
inid-1980s would be higher than the planned 4.5 per cent.
Alternatively, there could be more short-term cuts. In the
event three per cent growth failed to materialize because of
slippage in industrial productivity. The sterling crisis of
1976 also created pressures for across-the-board budget cuts.
Some in the Treasury, particularly the Chief Secretary, Joel
Barnett, had not been satisfied by the cuts imposed in the
Mason review and thus had no interest in exempting the
Ministry of Defence from subsequent budget cuts. As a result,
a series of short-term defence cuts was imposed in the years
leading up to 1979.
THE STERLING CRISIS
The 1974 review was described by the government as the
'most extensive and thorough review of our system of defence
ever undertaken by a British Government in peacetime. .71 By
implication the government believed another review would not
be necessary, at least in the short term. Narrowing Britain's
HC 259, Defence Review ProDosals, p. viii, para 6.
'° HC 259, Defence Review Pro posals, p. 37, Q. 44.
71 Roy Mason, Hansard (3 Dec 1974), col. 1351.
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defence commitments may have enabled savings of about £4,700
million in the ten years leading up to 1983-84, but in the
years following the review the defence budget continued to be
cut, despite the objections of Mason and the Chiefs of Staff.
The basic reason for continued cuts was that successive
economic crises had fundamentally shifted government
priorities away from defence.Th
The financial pressures which gave rise to the 1974
defence review continued after it had been completed. In the
1974 budget the Chancellor, Denis Healey, chose not to
eliminate immediately the trade deficit caused by rapid rises
in oil prices. In not do/o he was following the advice of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) who warned that
eliminating the deficit too quickly would exacerbate western
recession. Instead, Britain, along with Italy, maintained its
spending. The unintended effect was to worsen Britain's
balance of payments and, consequently, to weaken the pound.Th
The economic situation was not improved by trade union success
in achieving a 1975 wage increase of thirty per cent.
Economic weakness was generating downward pressure on sterling
relative to other currencies. In addition to the negative
Ibid.
David Greenwood, 'Why Fewer Resources for Defence?--
Economics, Priorities and Threats,' Ro yal Air Forces Ouarterly
Vol. 14, No. 4 (Winter 1974), p. 274.
' Denis Healey, The Time of Mv Life, p. 393.
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effects on sterling's status as a reserve currency the poor
exchange rate increased the cost of overseas commitments,
especially the BAOR.
Renewed Treasury pressure on defence, as on the rest of
the budget, began in 1975. In July defence equipment
programmes were cut by an additional £110 mil1ion. By
November 1975 the Treasury was asking the MOD to cut defence
spending by £500 million as part of a £3.75 billion across-
the-board spending cut. 76
 The Cabinet was narrowly divided
over the decision to approve an across-the-board cut. Tony
Crosland, Secretary of State for the Environment, and other
left-leaning members insisted that the cuts should be
distributed on the basis of social priorities. Mason,
supported by Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, argued that
further defence cuts would undermine Britain's contribution to
NATO and result in thousands of job 1ossesJ
Mason forthrightly defended the outcome of his defence
review. In a speech to the service staff colleges in
Camberley, Surrey, he described his achievements in the
following way:
I managed to release resources over the next 10
years to help improve our balance of payments and
economic growth. I did so in the main by switching
the direction of British defence strategy from a
worldwide role and back to concentrating on our
W.F.K.Thompson, Dail y
 Telearaph (11 July 1975).
76 M.Rutherford, Financial Times (26 Nov 1975).
Ibid.
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essential security interests in NATO.Th
In private Mason reportedly informed Barnett that an
additional cut of even £250 million would undermine the
defence progrannne. He was, however, unable to prevent a
cut of £534 million in the three years from 1976-77. The
basis of Mason's assessment of defence needs remained the
concept of the 'critical level of forces,' which had been
defined by the Chiefs of Staff.
Having established the critical level of forces in 1974
it was extremely difficult for the services to carry out the
additional cut of £534 million so soon after the review.
Short-term savings came from reductions in training, fuel
allocations, ammunition usage and the purchase of spare parts.
Longer term cuts were the result of 'salami-slicing' tactics:
cutting support costs, maintenance, prolonging equipment
production runs and generally devoting less money to lower
priority programmes. The Quartermaster-General, William
Jackson, recalls 'slowing activity and trimming lower-priority
expenditure, but ensuring that no major project was cancelled
because, once dropped from the Costings, a project cannot be
reinstated. ' There was no way to prevent such cuts from
Mason quoted in W.F.K.Thompson, Daily
 Telegraph (28 Nov
1975).
M.Rutherford, Financial Times (26 Nov 1975).
William Jackson, Britain's Defence Dilemma: An Inside View
(London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1990), p. 140.
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having a cumulative effect on front-line forces.81
The financial pressures which prompted these cuts
continued and even worsened in 1976. Britain suffered another
serious economic shock with the collapse in the price of
sterling and the depletion of Bank of England foreign currency
reserves defending sterling in the exchange markets. As a
result Britain had to borrow a £3.5 billion 'standby credit'
from other OECD countries and ultimately to borrow from the
International Monetary Fund.
The implications were dramatic for Britain's
international economic and political commitments. In the wake
of the IMF loan agreement sterling dropped five cents and
Callaghan appeared on the BBC documentary Panorama to discuss
the financial crisis. He requested assistance from other
countries to ease the burden of Britain's reserve currency
role:
I should very much like to see us get into a
situation where these liabilities on ourselves
which we have taken as a reserve currency were
taken over in some form or other. Germany, America
and perhaps Japan has some responsibility there.
According to Callaghan if the IMF required tight preconditions
for the loan other countries and the IMF would have to 'accept
the political consequences.' 	 Germany's large reserve
81 Lawrence Freedman, 'Britain's Defence Policy' in Edwin H.
Fedder, (ed), Defence Policies of the Atlantic Alliance (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), p. 57.
Callaghan quoted in C.Seton, Times (26 Oct 1990).
Ibid.
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holdings (between $35 to $40 billion) and the presence of the
British Army on the Rhine prompted Callaghan to say that he
did not want to choose between solving Britain's short-term
economic crisis and preserving Britain's contribution to NATO:
If we are to be equal partners in trying to keep
the political stability of central Europe then
there is something which can be done. .84
Between 1964 and 1971 the Federal Republic of Germany had
repeatedly extended financial aid to Britain in order to
offset the foreign exchange cost of the BAOR.85
However, the West German Government gradually became more
reluctant to continue these agreements. Following the October
1976 expiry of the agreement signed in 1971 the British
Government had great difficulty securing Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt's consent to negotiate a new one and Callaghan's
statements linking the BAOR to Britain's balance of payments
must be seen in that context.
The basic obstacle to renewed negotiations over a new
offset agreement was different German and British views on
Britain's continental commitment. The British argued that
because the BAOR was a major contribution to the alliance the
Ibid.
85 For the texts of these agreements see: Treaty Series No.
58, Cmnd 2490 (1964); Treaty Series No.63, Cinnd 2731 (1965);
Treaty Series No.52, Cmnd 3293 (1967); Treaty Series No.65,
Cmnd 1968); Treaty Series No.116, Cmnd 4199 (1969); Treaty
Series No.108, Cmnd 4550 (1970); Treaty Series No.41, Cmnd
4690 (1971). See also Lawrence Freedman, 'Britain's
Contribution to NATO,' International Affairs Vol. 54, No. 1
(January 1978).
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foreign exchange costs of maintaining it were separate from
Britain's overall balance of payments difficulties. The
German Government recognised the BAOR as a contribution to
NATO but believed Britain maintained it in her own interest.
Underlying German reluctance was concern that an ongoing
subsidy of the BAOR, as with US troops, was a hangover from
the days of allied occupation. The British decision to
maintain the BAOR was considered by Germany to be a feature of
foreign and defence policy that other governments were not
obligated to sustain. The issue could not, therefore, be
separated from Britain's overall balance of payments
difficulties. As a close ally Germany was already helping to
ease these difficulties by supporting the British Government's
application to the International Monetary Fund and by
providing a £200 million annual subsidy of the 'green
pound. '
Callaghan ultimately secured Schmidt's agreement to open
negotiations for further financial assistance by explicitly
accepting that it would be the final such agreement.
Following the Anglo-German Summit of January 1977 Callaghan
declared that such agreements could not 'continue in
perpetuity in their present form.' 87
 This concession was
included in precise terms in the first paragraph of the new
agreement:
D.Shears, Daily
 TeleraDh (14 Oct 1976).
87 R.Dale, Financial Times (25 Jan 1977).
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In view of the close relations which now exist
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the
United Kingdom as partners in the European
Communities and of the longstanding ties in the
North Atlantic Alliance, bilateral offset
arrangements shall be terminated after the expiry
of the present Agreement.0
The agreement, which obligated the FRG to pay DM475 million
toward BAOR construction projects, expired on 31 March 1980.
According to the 1977 Defence Estimates, the short-term
defence cuts in planned expenditure between 1977-78 and 1978-
79 following the 1975 review reflected 'solely the national
economic outlook. ' However, competition between defence
and social spending contributed to political pressure to carry
out Labour's 1974 manifesto pledge to reduce spending to a
level commensurate with that of the European NATO allies.
Consequently the Labour Government was pressured to impose
additional defence cuts not only by the Treasury but also by
the left wing of the Labour party.
DEFENCE AND PARTY POLICY
Throughout 1976 the Labour Government had resisted
pressure from the left to reduce defence spending by as much
as £1 billion by 1980. In May the Defence Expenditure Study
Cmnd 6970, Exchai
of Germany (October 1977), p. 6.
Cmnd 6735, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1977
(February 1977), para 107.
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Group, a subcommittee of Labour's International Committee
chaired by Labour MP Ian Mikardo, proposed £1 billion defence
cuts before the National Executive Committee. Their purpose
was to fulfil Labour's 1974 Manifesto pledge to reduce defence
spending. The Study Group outlined three alternative ways of
achieving the desired level of spending:
1. paying of f large surface ships and reducing new ship
construction, including ASW cruisers;
2. cutting forces in Europe, including an almost 50 per
cent reduction in the BAOR by 25,000 to 30,000.
3. cutting back on the RAF role by reducing the range of
tactical air missions and eliminating the Tornado Multi-
Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA)
One proposal included in each alternative was running down the
Polaris nuclear deterrent system.
Roy Mason remained the principal opponent of further
defence cuts, supported by his junior ministers, including
John Gilbert. Mason wrote Ron Hayward, General Secretary of
the Labour Party, arguing that cutting defence by £1 billion
would 'place at risk the whole security of Europe.' His
letter outlined the negative effects each of the three
alternatives would have on western security:
(If the cuts focused on the Navy,] the supply lines
for Britain's food and raw materials would be at
the mercy of the Russian submarine fleet. The
shipbuilding industry would be gravely hit and
nearly 25,000 jobs put in jeopardy...(if the cuts
focused on the Army arms control would be
undermined because] the Soviet Union would know
that it would only have to wait for other NATO
M.Adeney, Guardian (12 May 1976); See also The Labour
Party Defence Study Group, Sense About Defence in Mary Kaldor,
Dan Smith and Steve Vines, (eds), Democratic Socialism and the
Cost of Defence (London: Croom Helm, 1979).
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nations to follow Britain's exainple...(and if the
cuts focused on the RAF,] effective air defence of
the United Kingdom would have to be abandoned.91
Despite Mason's intervention the policy paper was approved
during a special session of the National Executive Committee,
at which no ministers were present. Moreover, the Committee
decided to submit the proposal to the Labour Party conference
in October.92
The Committee's decisions prompted several MPs to resign
from the study group. One who resigned, Labour MP Alan Lee
Williams, publicly distanced himself from the Group's chairman
and produced papers revealing that he disagreed with the
report's conclusions and had made his objections lear in
writing. The nature of his objections supported Mason's claim
that the proposed cuts would have serious effects on British
defence. Williams concluded that: cutting the Navy would be
catastrophic for Swan Hunter and would hurt Vickers, Yarrows
and Vosper Thorneycroft, abandoning the Multi-Role Combat
Aircraft (MRCA) would hurt the newly nationalized aerospace
industry and render the RAF unable to 'operate effectively in
bad weather and at night,' abandoning Polaris would leave the
French the only nuclear power in Europe, and reducing the
BAOR could disturb the balance of power in Europe.
91 Quoted in M.Adeney, Guardian (14 May 1976).
n K.Harpek, Guardian (20 May 1976).
At its peak the MRCA (Tornado) would directly employ 24,000
people and indirectly employ an additional 12,000. D.Fairhall,
Guardian (21 May 1976).
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Nevertheless, the government proved unable to resist the
combined pressure from the Labour left and the Treasury for
further defence cuts. The 1976-77 budget was cut by an
additional £90 million and following Roy Mason's succession by
Fred Mulley £150 million was cut from 1977-78 and £220 million
from l978-79.	 The cumulative total of cuts imposed on the
1977-78 defence budget alone equalled £953 mil1ion. This
figure fell just short of the £1 billion cut demanded by the
left wing of the Labour Party at the 1976 Party Conference.
Even before the largest of these post-review cuts was
announced the Sub-Committee on Defence and External Affairs
concluded that 'the force reductions resulting from the
defence review may over-stretch the services in the fulfilment
of their remaining commitments, and may leave an inadequate
margin for dealing with unforeseen tasks. .96
Several significant events helped pull the armed forces
through these lean years. Domestically, their standing was
enhanced by their performance of essential duties during the
nation-wide firemen's strike between November 1977 and January
' Joel Barnett, Inside The Treasury
 (London: Deutsch, 1982),
pp. 103 and 105. According to the Defence Committee in 1985,
once adjusted the cuts in July 1976 totalled £100 million and
those in December 1976 totalled £330 million. See Third Report
from the Defence Committee, 1984-85, Defence Commitments and
Resources and the Defence Estimates. 1985-8 6 (HC 37-i), 23 May
1985, para 50.
H.Stanhope, Times (16 Dec 1976).
Second Report from the Expenditure Committee, 1975-76,
Defence (MC 155), 24 Jan 1976, p. lix, para 142.
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1978. The number of military personnel involved peaked at
20,000 and the total number of incidents attended during the
strike was 39,612. The government thus acquired an
important political debt. The Chiefs of Staff subsequently
insisted with Secretary of State for Defence Fred Mulley, that
the government could not offer a pay settlement to the firemen
without increasing the pay of the armed forces by the amount
recommended by the Armed Forces Pay Review Body. The Armed
Forces Pay Review Body had been established in 1970 to provide
an impartial mechanism for ensuring pay comparability between
the armed services and the civilian sector. The government
agreed to implement the recommendations, however, it was only
willing to do so in stages.
In the latter part of the Labour Government's
tenure of office, its attitude to defence spending
softened, partly because of the useful role of the
forces in keeping public services going during
industrial disputes, and partly because of the
importance of defence contracts in providing
employment. It was against this background that the
commitment to a 3 per cent a year real increase was
accepted.
This three per cent pledge became a key spending commitment
accepted by the leadership of both parties.
Internationally, the government was under considerable
pressure from NATO to keep defence spending up and it was in
Cmnd 7099, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1978, p. 23
para 229.
Jackson, Britain's Defence Dilemma, p. 142.
Interview with Sir Leo Pliatzky, 26 November 1991.
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this context that the government ultimately agreed to increase
defence spending. By 1977 the cumulative effect of defence
cuts had weakened all British defences, including the BAOR.
The BAOR was 'well short' of the 55,000 troops Britain was
expected to inaintain. 1°° This shortage was not the result of
defence cuts alone, Ongoing violence in Northern Ireland led
to the growing involvement of British troops. By October of
1976 14,500 troops were deployed in the province.10'
The political repercussions of the shortfall in Britain's
contribution to the continent were serious. In December 1976
NATO defence ministers had pledged to increase defence
spending and raise national force contributions to the
alliance. 102
 Howeve1 not only did British defence spending
not increase, it decreased. In a September 1977 letter to
Secretary of State for Defence Fred Mulley NATO Secretary
General Joseph Luns criticised the defence cuts following the
1974 review. The allies calculated that UK defence cuts
between 1975 and 1977 amounted to 'more than one-sixth of the
expenditure which was planned before the United Kingdom
Defence Review.' Luns wrote that 'while part of these
reductions was related to non-NATO commitments, this part was
relatively small.' As a result, he believed that 'the present
100 Tenth Report from the Expenditure Committee, 1977-78,
British Forces Germany
 (HC 563-Il), p. xxiii, para 38.
101 J.Wightman, Daily
 Te1eraDh (29 Oct 1976).
Defence Planning Committee, Final Communictue 8 December
1976, para 17. See NATO Review (February 1977).
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reduction cannot but be detrimental to the effectiveness of
the United Kingdom's forces.' Moreover, it was 'particularly
disturbing' that the additional cuts came at a time of
increasing awareness of enhanced Warsaw Pact capabilities. It
was 'a disappointment' to NATO that the British Government
felt obliged to make cuts at that time. 103
 Luns also
expressed hope that some of the anticipated bonanza of North
Sea oil reserves would enable Britain to augment its defence
budget.
The government defended the defence cuts by expressing
satisfaction that Britain's defence effort remained high
compared to that of other European NATO allies. The British
response demonstrated the political nature of the debate. It
highlighted political rather than strategic aspects of the
NATO contribution. According to John Bourn, Assistant Under-
Secretary of State (Programmes and Budget):
The Government has been concerned about the letter
that Dr Luns sent and, while recognising the points
that he made on his side, have drawn attention to
the fact that the UK'S contribution to the forces
of the Alliance still remains at a very high and
substantial level, the UK being the only European
member of the Alliance making a major contribution
in all the fields of the Alliance effort, and the
UK'S percentage of gross domestic product devoted
to defence being the highest among the European
103 Letter from Dr Joseph Luns to Mr. Fred Mulley reproduced
in NATO Defence Planning Committee, Pro posed Reduction of
United Kingdom Defence Expenditure for 1978/79 Press Release
(77) 13, (16 Sept 1977).
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menibers.10'
Highlighting Britain's continued political commitment to NATO,
while legitimate, did not address the basic concern that cuts
in capability were taking place at a time of increased Soviet
threat; nor that the cuts followed an alliance agreement to
strengthen its military capability.
Much of the British debate over the NATO contribution
focused on its political and highly symbolic aspects, as in
other NATO countries. For instance, the percentage of GNP
spent on defence, the balanced nature of British forces, and
the professionalism of Britain's all-volunteer armed services
were emphasised by the government. These features of British
defence should not be underestimated. However, the alliance
had unanimously agreed that expansion and improvement of
Warsaw Pact forces required improvements in specific alliance
capabilities. In 1978, as Britain's economic prospects
appeared to be improving further pledges were made as part of
the alliance's Long-Term Defence Programme (LTDP).
The three per cent pledge came to be seen as a critical
element of British defence policy. It not only helped to
ensure that the armed forces could be adequately paid, and
that Britain's NATO commitment would be fully adhered to, but
it also acquired a symbolic importance. The fact that it was
made by a Labour Government, particularly one which had
104 J.B. Bourn in Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee,
1977-78, Minutes of Evidence, 8 November 1977, (HC 24-i), p.
12, Q. 59.
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repeatedly undertaken to cut defence spending in recent years,
suggested a renewed British commitment to alliance objectives
and to defence generally. Certainly this pledge marked the
end of current attempts to reduce the proportion of Britain's
GNP devoted to defence to a level commensurate with that of
the other major European powers. It thus constituted a change
in basic defence policy. Yet the government's commitment to
three per cent annual defence increases clearly linked defence
policy to economic objectives and this link proved crucial.
Naturally, it was assumed that any incoming Conservative
government would be at least equally committed to three
percent increases as the Callaghan Government. T h e
Conservative Party strongly supported British force
improvements; one of Margaret Thatcher's early objectives as
leader of the Conservative Party was promoting the cause of
defence, which she considered the first duty of
government.' 05
 Thatcher had implicitly accepted the 1975
defence review but persistently criticized subsequent
cuts. 1 °6
 When it became evident by 1977 that cumulative
defence cuts were damaging Britain's defences the
Conservatives were already strong advocates of major
See Julian Critchley, 'The Conservative Party and
Defence,' NATO Review (June 1976), p. 25; see also Thatcher's
speech on defence at Kensington Town Hall, London, January
1976.
106 Critchley, 'The Conservative Party and Defence,' p. 24;
see also Thatcher interview with Robin Day, Panorama, BBC1,
(February 1976).
110
improvements in defence. According to Sir Frank Cooper,
Permanent Under Secretary at the MOD, 'defence was at a very
low ebb in 1977-78 in particular and in 1979 there was a high
expectation that defence would do a great deal better because
of statements made by the incoming Tory Government. 1107
The Conservative Government elected in 1979 had a clear
commitment to increase the strength and pay of the security
services and the incoming Secretary of State for Defence,
Francis Pym, placed a high priority on this pledge. Low
Service pay relative to comparable jobs in the civilian sector
had been a major reason why defence was at a low ebb in the
late l970s, when the services experienced a large drop in
recruitment and an increase in the numbers of personnel taking
premature retirement. One of the Conservative Government's
first actions was to implement in full the advice of the Armed
Forces Pay Review Body, which meant granting the Armed Forces
a 'catch-up' pay rise of 32 per cent.'° 8
 Restoration of
comparability with the civilian sector staunched the outflow
of valuable personnel, trained at great expense, and confirmed
the Conservative Government's strong interest in robust
defences.
Existing defence plans continued to be based on the
107 Interview with Sir Frank Cooper, 24 April 1991.
101 The increase cost £111.5 million in fiscal year 1979
alone. John Biffen, Hansard (12 June 1979), col. 186.
'° Interview with Alistair Jaf fray, 14 June 1991.
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expectation of three per cent annual growth, and while there
had been no specific commitment to three per cent defence
increases in the Conservative Manifesto few doubted that they
would be forthcoming. Ultimately, however, the absence of a
detailed electoral commitment proved significant. It both
provided the government with flexibility in meeting its
commitment to strengthen defences and gave the Treasury
greater opportunity to assert economic imperatives. When
economic pressures built up in the early l980s the
Conservative Government still had recourse to a major defence
review.
CHAPTER FOUR
Conventional Defence Priorities 1975-1980
Following the Mason review the armed forces struggled to
maintain their still wide range of defence capabilities. The
1970s witnessed major growth in all Soviet military
capabilities. By the late 1970s they were widely seen to pose
an increased threat not only to the Central Region of Europe,
but also to the Third World, as demonstrated by the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The difficulty of
implementing the defence cuts of the late l970s reflected
military concerns about the changing strategic environment, as
well as the elevated status of the armed forces following
their role in providing essential services during the
nationwide fireman's strike of 1978-79. Internationally, just
as in Britain itself, strategic debates could not be viewed in
isolation from their political context. Increasingly, as
economic pressure on the defence budget persisted, Britain
placed more influence on collective security through NATO.
Britain did not, however, specialise on high priority NATO
roles for which it was particularly suited. Rather it
maintained a wide range of capabilities, just as it had done
previously in service of a more strictly national strategy.
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HOME DEFENCE
Despite the importance of home defence both in itself and
in the context of NATO strategy it was long neglected in
British defence. 1
 With international politics and domestic
economic problems imposing conflicting constraints on the
defence plans of a state whose security depended, above all,
on alliance, it was not surprising that the vital task of home
defence received a lower priority than spending on tasks
abroad which had higher political profiles. However, until
the late 1970s home defence was neglected primarily due to the
nature of assumptions about a future war. After 1957 the
prevailing assumption was that hostilities in Europe (the only
likely scenario for an attack on the UK) would rapidly
escalate to nuclear war and that any direct attack on the
British homeland would therefore be nuclear. With little
chance that Britain could defend against a strategic nuclear
attack there was little reason to try. 2
 As a result,
'Fighter Command was decimated. All RAF resources had been
1 For a thorough analysis of home defence see Michael Dewar,
Defence of the Nation (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1989).
2 Cmnd 7826-I, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1980,
(April 1980), p. 34, para 341; On the origins of this decision
see Martin S. Navias, Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic
Planning . 1955-1958 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), esp. pp
125-30, 172-7; See also Cmnd 124, Defence: Outline of Future
Policy, (April 1957), para 12.
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placed in Strategic Command. s
The intellectual basis of Sandy's assumption that air
defence of the UK was not viable had begun to erode with NATO5
adoption of the policy of flexible response. According to Sir
Michael Beetham, who became Chief of the Air Staff in 1977,
'These things take a long time to turn around. It was only in
the l970s that flexible response became NATO strategy and that
air defence could play a greater role." Air defence had a
vital role to play in flexible response, which emphasised the
need to deter Soviet attack at all levels. There was thus a
strategic basis for enhancing Britain's Fighter Command.
According to Beetham
When I took over we were recovering from massive
cuts and the Sandys review of 1957 in which
fighters were given only a policing role....What we
were trying to do in the RAF, and were largely
successful, was to develop a size and shape placing
more emphasis on fighters. Control of the air is
absolutely vital to air defence.5
Air defence of the UK is the responsibility of RAF Strike
Command. Due to Britain's importance as a forward staging
area RAF Strike Command reports to the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR). Responsibility for the UK Air
Defence Region is thus a NATO command, though the senior
Interview with Marshal of the RAF Sir Michael Beethain, 21
October 1991.
' Interview with Marshal of the RAF Sir Michael Beetham, 21
October 1991.
Interview with Marshal of the RAF Sir Michael Beetham, 21
October 1991.
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Strike Command post is reserved for a British officer. In the
late 19705 Britain's air defence system consisted of three
elements. A system of ground radars and Shackleton Airborne
Early Warning (AEW) aircraft detected aircraft penetrating the
Air Defence Region. Nimrod Maritime Patrol Aircraft surveyed
the coastal regions and maritime areas. Information from the
detection system relayed through a network of voice and data
links to airfields in strategic locations. Second, Phantom
and Lighting aircraft intercepted aircraft violating the Air
Defence Region. Finally, Bloodhound and Rapier surface-to-air
missiles provided a second line of defence.6
For financial reasons, the new strategic logic for
increasing air defence was not immediately incorporated into
British plans. However, once the re-equipment of the Soviet
Air Force in the 1970s increased Britain's vulnerability to
air attack the government accepted Air Staff arguments that
defence of the UK home base should cease to be adjunct to NATO
defence of the Central Region and become a top priority.
Conceivable scenarios for attack against the UK home base
included a conventional air attack on Britain without prior
hostilities along the central front. The goal of such an
attack would have been to disrupt supplies and lines of
communication and thereby weaken alliance resolve. Bypassing
6 G.Lee and J.Meacham, 'A Survey of the RAF' The Economist
(17 Dec 1977); Cmnd 6735, Statement on the Defence Estimates.
1977, (February 1977), paras 220-227; Cmnd 7826-I, Statement
on the Defence Estimates. 1980, paras 337-343.
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the 'tripwire' forces in Germany would have placed the burden
of nuclear escalation on NATO. The possibility of
conventional air attack therefore threatened not only to
devastate Britain but to weaken conventional deterrence. In
responding to this threat the British Government reversed the
home defence policy outlined in the Sandys White Paper.
The first official acknowledgement of an increased Soviet
threat to the UK home base came in 1977. According to the 1977
Defence Estimates the re-equipment of Soviet air forces was
noteworthy for two reasons:
The weapon loads of these aircraft are double those
of their predecessors and their greater operating
range enables the TAF (Tactical Air Force] to reach
targets much deeper into NATO territory than
hitherto, including parts of the United Kingdom.7
The weapons systems of concern to the government were Soviet
Fencer and Backfire bombers. The Fencer's range enabled it to
reach the UK flying directly from East Germany. The low state
of Britain's existing air defences made penetration likely.
The Backfire bomber was even more threatening. Its long range
would enable it to attack the UK by flying North of Scotland
and approaching from the West. Existing air defences were not
designed to meet this threat.8
In response, British air defences were augmented in
Cmnd 6735, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1977, para
122.
Second Report from the Defence Committee, 1979-80,
Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1980 (HC 571), 23 April
1980, p. viii, para 12; M.Rutherford, Financial Times (1 July
1977).
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several ways. Key steps included the planned acquisition of
Tornado aircraft in the mid-1980s for the interception role,
and 11 Nimrod aircraft in 1982 for Airborne Early Warning. In
the meantime, Phantom FGR25 were transferred to the air
defence role. 9
 The AIM 9L Sidewinder short-range air-to-air
missile was purchased to complement the Sky Flash medium range
air-to-air missile. These were deployed on Phantoms in the
first instance and transferred to Tornadoes once those entered
service.' 0
 The Labour Government also hardened airfields and
other military installations, replaced all voice links with
data links and, importantly, expanded air defence radars to
cover the southwest approaches to the Air Defence Region."
In addition, surface-to-air launch sites were increased. In
1978 four East Coast sites were capable of launching
Bloodhound missiles. The government planned to add three more
using missiles withdrawn from RAF Germany, and two more low-
level air-defence squadrons capable of firing Rapier surface-
to-air missiles.' 2
 Plans for major improvements to all three
layers of UK air defence thus preceded the General Election of
1979.
Cmnd 6735, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1977, para
221.
10 Expenditure Committee, Part of the Minutes of Evidence,
1977-78, 8 November 1977 (NC 24-i), p. 14, Q. 65.
Lee and Meacham, 'A Survey of the RAF,' p. 8.
12 'U.K. Air Defense Expanding, But Still More Wanted,'
International Defense Review (Aug 1978); See also James
Wellbeloved, Hansard (3 April 1978), col. 43.
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The incoming Conservative Government shared Labour's
concern about air defence and shortly after the election
requested that the Air Staff suggest additional
improvements.' 3
 Support for continued improvements was
strong on both sides of the House of Commons and on several
occasions the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the RAF
declared that 'improvements to our air defences are very high
on the list of priorities." Three options for closing the
gap in air defences until the arrival of Tornado aircraft in
the mid 1980s were speeding up Tornado production, leasing F-
15 fighters from the US in order to make more RAF Phantoms in
Germany available for air defence, and requesting McDonnell
Douglas to re-open the Phantom production line.' 5 A longer-
term measure under consideration was collaboration with France
on a new medium-range anti-aircraft missile.'6
While these options were still under consideration the
government took three immediate steps to improve air defences.
Fifteen Lightning aircraft were brought out of storage to form
a third squadron. Second, a decision was made to modify 85-90
Hawk trainer aircraft to carry AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air
missiles thus making them capable of defending British
13 Geoffrey Pattie, Hansard (15 June 1979), col. 879.
14 Geoffrey Pattie, Mansard (10 July 1979), col. 239.
' D.Fairhall, Guardian (28 July 1979).
16 




	Third, the capability of existing Phantom
aircraft was upgraded by an improved weapon control system.18
By early 1980 many of these plans were well underway. There
was an additional plan to introduce enough VC1O tanker
aircraft to provide greater in-flight refuelling. 19
 In April
a further decision was taken to purchase the Skyf lash Mark 2,
a new air-to-air missile expected to enter service in the mid-
1980s • 20
While the vast majority of improvements in home defence
were in the field of air defence the strengthening of coastal
defence and UK land forces was also considered. Efforts in
both these areas originated with Conservative bills introduced
to the House of Commons. In 1978 Conservative MPs tabled a
bill requiring a naval defence inquiry into 'the provision of
missile and other defence systems for installation on British
merchant ships and oil rigs.' 21
 In 1979 the Defence of the
United Kingdom (Inquiry) Act called for a committee to
consider topics such as 'the strategic concept of the
services...the local defence of specific points such as oil
rigs and pipelines...(and] the strategic food and material
17 HC 571, Defence Estimates. 1980, p. viii, para 13.
18 Geoffrey Pattie, Mansard (27 July 1979), col.
	 Q.
19 Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, Mansard, Lords, (15 Jan
1980), col. 2.
20 Geoffrey Pattie, Mansard (15 April 1980), col.
21 Naval Defence (Inquiry) Act 1978, Bill 53, 1977-78, p. 1.
120
stores for home security and defence.'22
Like air defence, UK maritime defence was to a large
extent subsumed by NATO. Britain played a vital role in
protecting the Eastern Approaches to the southeastern ports of
the English Channel. As a result,
United Kingdom naval forces come under the command
of Commander-in-Chief Fleet, who is also a major
NATO commander as the Commander-in-Chief Channel
(CINCHAN), and holds the NATO command of
Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic (CINCEASTLANT),
subordinate to the Supreme Allied Commander
Atlantic (SACLANT).
CINCFLEET was also responsible for 'mine warfare and anti-
submarine operations in the United Kingdom's waters.'24
Seaward defence of the UK home base was a slightly different
task falling to the Commander-in-Chief Naval Home Command
(CINCHOME). For his purposes the home base was defined as
'the Clyde submarine base and those naval bases and ports
which would be used for the reinforcement and resupply of
Europe. '
By 1980 significant plans were underway which would
improve maritime home defence, most broadly in the field of
mine warfare. These improvements included the introduction of
22 Defence of the United Kingdom (Inquiry) Act of 1979, Bill
59, 1979-80, P. 1.
Cmnd 7099, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1978,
(February 1978), p. 17, para 201.
24 Cmnd 7826-I, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1980, p.
36, para 344.
Cmnd 7826-I, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1980, p.
36, para 344.
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the new Hunt-class Mine Countermeasure Vessel with fiNS Brecon
and HNS Ledbury. These were to be followed by three more
ships already ordered, with additional orders in train. A new
class of minesweepers, Minesweepers Medium, had been ordered
and were expected to enter service within two to three
years. 26
 The Royal Navy was also modernising its own mines
as well as developing new types, particularly for 'defensive
and protective mining. ,27 One innovation with a variety of
possible uses was the Seabed Operations Vessel fiNS Challencer
ordered in 1979 and 'equipped to locate, inspect and recover
objects on the seabed.' 28
 The initial concept behind the
vessel was that it would enable the Royal Navy to keep vital
British harbours free from mines, which any Soviet trawler
could drop on a 'peaceful' visit. It was also recognised as
potentially useful for the recovery of ships from the bottom
of the sea floor, or even to retrieve a nuclear depth bomb or
other weapons dropped accidentally.
United Kingdom Land Forces (UKLF) also had a role in home
defence, albeit secondary to providing reinforcements for the
BAOR. The UKLF belonged to NATOs Strategic Reserve, under the
command of the SACETJR, and could be used in any part of Allied
Command Europe (ACE), as needed. In the event of a war they





would also perform a variety of home defence roles in the UK,
including protecting military bases and airfields.
However, the only improvement contemplated for these forces in
1980, expansion of the pool of uncommitted reserve manpower to
supplement reservists already earmarked for home defence, was
not central to Britain's defence.3°
John Nott inherited a burgeoning programme of
improvements in home defence, principally in the field of air
defence, though improvements in maritime home defence were not
insignificant, mainly because they were part of a much larger
naval re-equipment programme. Planned air defence
improvements represented a shift away from the tripwire
strategy in which British Forces Germany were viewed as the
trigger of British defence. In early 1981 the Minister of
State for Defence Procurement, Viscount Trenchard, stated 'the
Government share the view that we probably stuck to the
tripwire philosophy for too long and, as a result, to a degree
our air defence measures are lagging behind. But steps are
being taken. ,31 Strong emphasis on home defence within both
major parties suggests that Britain's contributions in Germany
and the East Atlantic were no longer considered sufficient for
Cmnd 7474, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1979, p. 20,
paras 210-11.
3° Cmnd 7826-I, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1980, para
349.





Changing attitudes toward UK air defence did not,
however, challenge the prevailing view that Britain's
contribution to NATO was vital, particularly as a sign of
Britain's continued political commitment. The contribution had
two main components. To the continent of Europe Britain
contributed RAF Germany and the British Army of the Rhine
(BAOR). Second, the East Atlantic and English Channel were
primarily the responsibility of the Royal Navy. Debate over
continental versus maritime strategy featured prominently in
twentieth century British defence po1icy. Nor was the
debate limited to Britain. NATO continually discussed force
size, especially the relative merits of a war-fighting posture
versus a war-sustaining posture. Key to this debate,
stimulated in large part by financial constraints on alliance
members, were assumptions about the likely duration and
intensity of a conflict.
The fundamental strategic goal of the alliance was to
deter the Soviet Union from initiating war. The critical
force-sizing debate was whether deterrence was better served
32 See Brian Bond, British Military PolicY Between the Two
World Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), esp. pp. 295-7.
See also Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment: The
Dilemma of British Defence Policy
 in Two World Wars (London:
Temple Smith, 1972).
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by maintaining large conventional forces in central Europe or
demonstrating alliance resolve to fight a protracted conflict
by stressing reinforcement and resupply. There were important
implications for the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy.
A war-sustaining posture assumed the alliance would fight a
protracted conventional war whereas a war-fighting posture
assumed an earlier resort to nuclear weapons, probably due to
insufficient conventional forces early in a war. In strict
military terms, Britain's continental-maritime dilemma could
be expressed in the following way:
If the initial stage is everything and if denying
the Warsaw Pact the hope for a successful attack
from a standing start is the key to deterrence,
the margin provided by the BAOR is critical; if
a longer war of mobilization and attrition is
envisaged, the naval contribution looms larger.33
The Continental Commitment
Due to the nature of alliance decision-making the
continental-maritime balance could not be decided solely on
strategic analysis, even if a single, authoritative strategic
view had existed. This balance was key to British policy.
East-West antagonism made central Europe the fulcrum of NATO
strategy; there forces from NATO and the Warsaw Pact
confronted one another. As a result, troop commitments along
the central front had a singular political importance for the
Laurence Martin, 'Defense of the Realm,' Washinczton
Quarterly (Autumn 1980), p. 148.
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alliance. To NATO, British forces in Germany symbolised
Britain's commitment to European security. These were
important considerations in the debate over the size and shape
of the RAF and Army and were essential to the bedrock
consensus among central staff.
Britain's continental contribution was determined by
treaty. The 1954 Paris Agreements modifying the Treaty of
Brussels enabled the Federal Republic of Germany to enter
NATO. France's willingness to allow West Germany to rearm
depended on the permanent presence of British troops on German
soil. As a result, Britain became the sole signatory to
the Brussels Treaty whose minimum force commitment to the
continent was specified. Britain was committed to maintaining
'four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force or such
other forces as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe regards as
having equivalent fighting capacity' and pledged 'not to
IIc. '.J'5J C of
withdraw these forces against/the majority of the High
Contracting Parties.' 35
 There was a let-out cause taking
account of economic considerations and, as discussed in
chapter two, Britain had reduced its troop commitment in the
late 1950g . However, these reductions had been achieved
Saki Dockrill, Britain's Policy
 for West German Rearmament.
19 50-1955 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.
134-7 and 148.
The Paris Agreements, Article VI of the Protocol on Forces
of Western European Union, 23 October 1954, in Lawrence
Freedman, (ed), EuroDe Transformed (London: Tn-Service
Press, 1990), p. 38.
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through negotiations within NATO, following West German
rearmament. In the late 1970s improving conventional forces
was a high NATO priority and allied attitudes towards
reductions in the BAOR would not be taken lightly.
The United States played a leading role in encouraging
European members of NATO to improve conventional defences and,
particularly, the pledge to increase defence spending by three
per cent annually. When the alliance agreed to significant
conventional improvements at the May 1977 London Summit US
President Jimmy Carter played an important role. He urged
Europeans to join the US in
1) taking certain high priority short term measures
to show renewed Alliance resolve;
2) designing a long term NATO programme, and
3) much closer armaments cooperation.37
The allies responded favourably and together provided a
framework for the development of new force proposals in the
form of 'Ministerial Guidance - 1977,' a document issued by
NATO defence ministers. The force improvements were a
response to Soviet enhancement of its nuclear systems, ground
forces, and maritime capabilities. According to the defence
ministers 'the Warsaw Pact ground forces (had] the capability
See President Carter's remarks to the North Atlantic
Council at Lancaster House, London, 10 May 1977, in NATO
Review (June 1977), pp. 21-24.
Robert W. Komer, 'NATO'S Long Term Defence Programme: The
Origins and Objectives,' NATO Review (June 1978), p. 10.
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to stage a major offensive in Europe without
reinforcement.' In addition to the recommendation for
annual defence budget increases 'in the region of' three per
cent were recommended short-term improvements in anti-armour
defence, war reserve stocks and readiness and reinforcement
capabilities. 39
 These became the early objectives of the
Long Term Defence Programme formally adopted in May 1978.'°
The Labour Government approached the Long-Term Defence
Programme (LTDP) seriously, including the three per cent
pledge.'1
 The 1978 Defence Estimates detailed improvements
that Britain would make in each of the areas NATO had
identified as critical in the short term. Specific British
decisions included acceleration of planned improvements, such
as returning HMS Bulwark to operational status and increasing
the number of helicopters earmarked for NATO. In addition,
the number of Milan anti-tank missiles deployed on the front
line was increased, armoured and artillery units were
expanded, reserve mobilisation was improved, and weapon stocks
'Ministerial Guidance - 1977,' NATO Review (June 1977),
para 2.
mia, pp. 25-26.
40 North Atlantic Council, Final Couununiaue, 31 May 1978, para
25, and 'The Long-Term Defence Programme--A Summary,' in NATO
Review (June 1978).
41 It later became apparent that defence budgets of the late




 These improvements depended on adherence
to the three per cent budget increases. However, according to
Deputy Under Secretary (Policy), Michael Quinlan, the three
per cent pledge was not a 'free-standing net addition to the
cost of meeting existing force commitments, and so available
to be spent on entirely new ideas.' Rather, it was 'needed
mainly for the planned and necessary improvement of the forces
we already commit to the alliance. ' Three per cent annual
increases were needed simply to maintain existing
capabilities.
Subsequent service plans were based on the assumption
that the three per cent increases would continue
indefinitely." As mentioned previously, having been pledged
by a Labour Government in an alliance context, and providing
only enough to continue planned growth on current assumptions,
there was little reason to believe that a future Conservative
Government would not also pursue at least three per cent
annual growth. Accommodating different strands of thought
among pro-defence Tories would likely require even larger
defence increases. There was a strong element within the
Conservative Party favouring withdrawal of the BAOR, a very
42 Cmnd 7099, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1978,
(February 1978), p. 11, para 132.
' Michael Quinlan, 'The LTDP from a National Viewpoint,'
NATO Review (June 1978), p. 13.
" Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
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expensive commitment to maintain.'5
 Likewise, however, the
BAOR would have been very expensive, in the short-term, to
withdraw.
The importance placed on good allied relations precluded
such a radical shift in British defence policy, but a tilt in
this direction was evident in the early policy of the Thatcher
Government. In opposition, the Conservatives criticised
Callaghan's suggestion that without further financial
assistance from Germany the BAOR might have to be
withdrawn." Once in power they resented Labour's concession
that Britain would seek no further offset agreements with
Germany.'7
 The government's first Statement on the Defence
Estimates, in 1980, stated that in the light of Callaghan's
concession maintaining the BAOR would be much more difficult:
'The absence of offset payments in the future and the rising
costs of BFG (British Forces Germany] will limit our ability
to improve the fighting effectiveness of BAOR and RAF Germany
as we would like."8
 By the expiration of the offset
agreement in March 1980 tensions had developed within the
See James Bellini and Geoffrey Pattie, A New World Role for
the Medium Power (London: RUSI, 1977); Michael Chichester and
John Wilkinson, The Uncertain All y : British Defence Policy.
1960-1990 (Aldershot: Gower, 1982); Alan Clark, letter to the
The Sunday Times (11 Jan 1981).
46 I.Aitken, Guardian (27 Oct 1976); see also Margaret
Thatcher, Hansard (26 Oct 1976), cols. 270-71.
' H.Starthope, Times (27 Nov 1979).
Cmnd 7826-I, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1980, p.
89, para 809.
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Conservative Party, not only between navalists and
continentalists, but also between those split over whether and
how far to reduce public expenditure. Financial pressures
began to dampen early expectations that defence prospects were
improving, reducing the government's willingness to increase
defence by three per cent annually. At the same time,
however, the US launched an initiative to accelerate
implementation of the LTDP.
In April 1980 Robert Komer, now US Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy, presented a plan in Brussels for NATO
allies to further strengthen their defences in the wake of the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Secretary of Defense Harold
Brown pressed the allies to adopt the plan at the meeting of
NATO Defence Ministers in May. Special emphasis was placed on
the allies being able to fight a 30-day war with the Warsaw
Pact. Existing weapons stocks made it unlikely that NATO
could hold out for longer than one week. Consequently, the
need was for larger stockpiles, pre-positioning of equipment
and increases in airborne reinforcement by US troops."
The ambiguity of Britain's policy in the face of
conflicting economic and political pressures was illustrated
by Pym's efforts to improve British Forces Germany. The BAOR
required improvement in several areas, including anti-armour,
air defence and speed of reinforcement. The RAY required
increased aircraft, weapons and training. 	 Pym took the
' R.Burt, New York Times (14 April 1980).
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opportunity of the May 1980 meeting of NATO Defence Ministers
to arrange a package of new equipment for British forces,
including a doubling of the number of 155mm guns in BAOR
artillery regiments. 5° Shortly thereafter came announcements
that in the mid 1980s Britain would purchase the Challenger
main battle tank and the MCV 80 armoured personnel carrier.5'
These improvements were directly in line with NATOs Long Term
Defence Programme. At the same time, however, Pym expressed
concern about the future of RAF Germany, in which there was a
particular need for major repairs. Cracks in the wings of over
half of the RAF's Buccaneer frames prompted Pym to declare:
Hitherto we have maintained our full Buccaneer
declaration to NATO on the basis of availability in
war. It is now clear that initially, and possibly
also in the longer term, this declaration must be
reduced. We shall be discussing with the NATO
authorities the future size of the declared
force.52
Pym declared that his priority as Secretary of State for
Defence was 'to sustain and improve (Britain's] NATO
contribution.' 53
 However, the financial pressures of 1980
threatened a number of British military capabilities,
including important elements of the NATO contribution. The
spending moratorium imposed between August and November
50 M.Hornsby and H.Stanhope, Times (15 May 1980).
Francis Pym, Hansard (14 July 1980), cols. 20-22.
52 Francis Pym, Hansard (28 July 1980), col. 	 ; see also
'RAF may cut NATO force,' Daily TelearaDh (29 July 1980).
Francis Pym, 'Britain's Defence Policy,' NATO Review
(December 1979), p. 3.
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(discussed in chapter six) severely affected all the armed
forces, including the BAOR. These problems came at a time
when NATO ministers agreed that 'the rate at which (NATO
force] improvements were being made was not commensurate with
the sustained growth in the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact
forces.' They acknowledged, moreover, 'that if deficiencies
in the alliance's defence posture were allowed to persist this
could lead to a most serious deterioration in NATO's deterrent
posture. ''
American officials were careful not to impinge on the
national decision-making processes of their allies but the
priority the US placed on maintaining and improving NATOs
conventional capabilities was clearly understood. Robert
Komer, who was prominent in NATO discussions about force
improvements, believed that faced with a choice he would 'sell
half the Royal Navy for one division of the BAOR.' 55 The
basis of the Carter Administration's concerns on the best use
of defence funds was that Britain was unable to fund all the
defences it might want. Indeed, although the government
initially accepted the three per cent pledge, when defence
budget increases began to conflict with economic policy the
pledge was fudged, first with the modification of the baseline
for measuring the increases and ultimately with the
NATO Defence Planning Committee, Final Conununiaue, M-DPC-
2(80)27, (10 December 1980), para 7.
Interview with Robert Komer, 9 January 1991.
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redefinition of what constituted a three per cent increase.
The United States Government recognised that conflicting
British priorities could necessitate a choice. The British
Government's interest in modernising the deterrent, for
instance, could impinge on other British defence capabilities:
'we considered it more important to keep up the BAOR than add
incrementally to British strategic forces. Equally,
Reagan Administration officials wanted to see Britain maintain
all of its military contributions: 'Britain's whole NATO force
is important and it is difficult to quantify whether one
contribution is greater than another...We wanted it all and
more.' 58
 Nevertheless, the need to reconsider Britain's
defence priorities meant the reopening, at least in public, of
the debate over continental versus maritime capabilities.
The Maritime Commitment
As the senior service and the principal instrument of
British Empire the Royal Navy had long played an important
role in British politics, security, and the society as a
whole. Notwithstanding the importance of the Royal Navy, its
size and shape have proven highly sensitive to strategic and
See David Greenwood, 'NATO's Three Percent Solution,'
Survival (November/December 1981) and chapter six.
" Interview with Harold Brown, 25 January 1991.
Interview with Caspar Weinberger, 9 January 1991.
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technological debates. As discussed in chapter two, with the
advent of nuclear weapons the Navy was preserved only by the
assumption in the 1952 Global Strategy Paper that 'broken-
backed warfare' -- during which conventional forces would be
essential -- would follow an initial nuclear exchange.59
Yet the role and structure of the Royal Navy continued to be
challenged ,60
Abandonment by the early 1960s of both land and air based
nuclear deterrent forces, and the 1962 decision to purchase
the Polaris missile, temporarily ended much of the speculation
about the Navy's future. Yet responsibility for an
underwater-based deterrent did not halt the shift away from
surface vessels, which began in earnest in 1966 with the
abolition of the carrier force. 61
 The shape of the Royal
Navy in the 1970s was determined by the Future Fleet Working
Party in l967. Discussions had focusd on the decision to
reduce Britain's global role and in so doing to reduce the
Navy. Seven years later, in the Mason review, the shape of
the Royal Navy had again been subject to MoD scrutiny, this
time to arrive at plans for the 1980s. In the context of
Michael Dockrill, British Defence Since 1945 (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 47.
Field Marshall Montgomery, 'A look through the window at
World War III,' RUSI Journal (November 1954); Cmnd 124,
Defence: Outline of Future Policy
 (April 1957), para 24.
61 Cmnd 2901, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1966. oart
I. The Defence Review (February 1966), p. 9, para 2.
H.Stanhope, Times (18 Sept 1974).
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successive challenges to the fundamental role of the Royal
Navy the naval force improvements which survived the Mason
review reflect the extent to which the Navy had recovered its
standing in the nuclear and post-imperial world. An important
aspect of overcoming further doubts about the future of the
surface fleet was the importance to NATO of Britain's maritime
contribution.
In 1976 Admiral Sir Terence Lewin, then Commander-in-
Chief, Naval Home Command, declared the United Kingdom to be
'undoubtedly the natural maritime leader of NATO in
Europe.' His claim, maintained by others, including the
top naval commanders in NATO, played an important role in
debates over the size and shape of the Royal Navy. The basis
of this argument was that due to geography, history and the
extent of economic dependence on the sea Britain was
quintessentially a maritime power. As such Britain was
uniquely qualified to make a maritime contribution to the
alliance. Accordingly, when hard choices about defence must
be made, the Royal Navy, the argument went, had to be
preserved for both British national interests and those of
NATO.
Following the Mason review debate over the Royal Navy
continued but until the early 1980s there appeared to be less
at stake. The Navy had done relatively well in the Mason
Admiral Sir Terence Lewin, 'The Royal Navy -- its
Contribution to National and Western Defence,' RUSI Journal
(September 1976), p. 7.
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review and the government consistently emphasised that it was
central to NATO defence. According to the 1979 Defence
Estimates (which reflected statements made in the Estimates of
1976, 1977 and 1978),
All the United Kingdom's major warships and
amphibious forces are assigned to NATO and the
Royal Navy will continue to provide the main weight
of the maritime forces immediately available to
NATO in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel area.M
Although the Mason review called for 'a progressive reduction
of one seventh in the planned numbers of destroyers, frigates
and MCM vessels,' the Wilson Government also financed the
building of three Invincible-class aircraft carriers. When in
1976 the Expenditure Committee concluded that 'any further
substantial slippage or cost escalation (in the naval
programme] could place in jeopardy some of the most important
elements on which British maritime strategy is based' it was
not the result of decisions to cut the Navy but rather the
general malaise in overall defence funding.65
Support for the Navy from the Conservative Opposition was
encouraging. In a 1978 debate on the Royal Navy, Geoffrey
Pattie, then a maverick back bencher but subsequently a
junior defence minister, made an eloquent appeal for the Royal
Navy:
We are dependent on our Navy now as ever we
64 Cmnd 7474, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1979
(February 1979), p. 18, para 201.
Second Report from the Expenditure Committee, 1975-76,
Defence (HC 155), 26 January 1976, p. xxvi, para 43.
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were...the more naval forces are weakened at the
expense of land forces, the more the naval part of
the deterrent is weakened, namely, the likelihood
of being able to reinforce and resupply
Europe...The House and the nation do not want an
increased social dividend from the Navy. What we
want is a Navy which is given more ships, more
strike aircraft, more reconnaissance aircraft,
worthwhile mining capability and proper command
communications. All these will enable the Navy to
safeguard our supplies, contest control of the seas
and put our troops ashore. The Navy
 is our first
line of defence.
The Conservative Government elected the following year seemed
predisposed toward the Navy, as the Conservative Party was
traditionally wont to be. The new Parliamentary Under
Secretary for the Navy, Keith Speed, promised in his election
address to his constituency to 'make up deficiencies in our
contribution to NATO, step up our Naval and aircraft building
and spares programmes and boost morale to prevent skilled
officers and NCOs from leaving the services in large
numbers. ,67 As discussed previously, the government did stem
the flow of skilled personnel out of the services. But the
Royal Navy nevertheless continued to feel the effects
of the outflow, which had been so great in the weeks
leading up to the 1979 General Election that five
Geoffrey Pattie, Hansard (19 June 1978) cola. 148-158,
[emphasis added].
67 Keith Speed, Sea Change: The Battle for the Falklands and
the Future of Britain's Navy
 (Bath: Ashgrove Press, 1982), p.
103; See also Keith Speed, 'The Royal Navy and the
Conservatives,' Na International (May 1980).
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frigates had to be placed in the standby squadron.
Due to financial pressures on the MoD only three warships
were ordered between May 1979 and June l980. However,
several weeks before the election the Labour Government had
placed orders for several new ships. Shipbuilders, like other
companies, felt the economic squeeze of 1980, but there was
little public indication until 1981 that financial pressures
would lead the government to re-think the role of the Royal
Navy.
As late as May 1981 the government declared that it
placed a high priority on existing roles of the Royal Navy.
According to the 1981 Defence Estimates NATO required strong
maritime forces, to which the UK made 'a major con-
tribution.' The reasons cited were traditional and primarily
geographical. Britain was 'situated at the focus of the
busiest sea-lanes in the world and also close to the main
route for Soviet warships deploying to the Atlantic.'
Consequently, Britain was 'well placed geographically to
play a major part in NATO maritime strategy.'T°
Nevertheless, within two months the government announced major
changes in Navy priorities.
See Cmnd 7474, Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1979.
Annex D, p. 72; Cinnd 7826-I, Statement on the Defence
Estimates. 1980, Annex A, p. 94.
A.E.P.Duffy, Mansard (19 June 1980), col. 1804.
TO Cmnd 8212-I, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1981
(April 1981), para 330.
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The high value placed on both continental and maritime
contributions to NATO was one reason for the fierceness of the
continental-maritime debate. NATO required adequate forces to
resist a Soviet attack across the Central Region and alliance
cohesion required that Britain make a significant
contribution. Equally, as a transatlantic alliance, NATO
depended on seaborne reinforcement. Sea power would,
moreover, be necessary in the event of a NATO or British
decision to deploy force outside of the NATO treaty area. The
importance of both land and maritime forces, comprising a wide
range of capabilities, was one reason defence funds were
overcommitted prior to the 1981 review. Defence decisions
encompass the entire spectrum of capabilities and commitments
but in light of the 1981 decisions to cut the Navy it is most
appropriate here to address the Navy's strategic role and some
of the vulnerabilities which made it the focus of defence
savings.
The Role of the Royal NavY
Unlike Britain's continental commitment the maritime
contribution was not determined by treaty. In accordance with
the Paris Agreements naval contributions to NATO commands were
'determined each year in the course of the annual review
(which takes into account the recommendations of the NATO
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military authorities).' 7' There was thus inherently greater
political flexibility to alter the size of maritime forces
committed to the alliance. Britain had long provided the bulk
of NATO'S naval forces in the East Atlantic and Channel. Its
principal role was to conduct anti-submarine operations in
these areas, for which the Royal Navy was largely designed.
Despite its importance the Navy has been vulnerable to
cost-cutting for a variety of reasons. Economically, the Navy
had repeatedly been targeted for cuts due to the high cost of
capital ships and maintenance of a large dockyard
infrastructure. Nor had governments lacked strategic
arguments for cutting the Navy. Two key Royal Navy roles were
the related but distinct tasks of anti-submarine warfare and
the protection of shipping. Since the Second World War, and
especially since the l960s, technological and strategic
developments had challenged the need and techniques for
shipping protection.
NATOs naval strategy owed much to the geostrategic
position of its members and the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union
was a classic land power, self-sufficient in strategic
minerals, foodstuffs, and raw materials. With respect to
Europe it possessed strictly land-based internal lines of
communication. NATOs dependence on the United States meant
that alliance lines of communication were transatlantic.
71 Article II of the Protocol on Forces of West European
Union, 23 October 1954, in Europe Transformed, p. 37
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Consequently,
defense of the Atlantic sea lines of communication
under various conditions of peace, tension, or var
is an integral part of the defense of Western
Europe. It is in fact as essential to NATO's land
defenses as secure internal lines of communication
are to the Soviet Union.72
Two essentials for a successful campaign against shipping are
dependence of the enemy on the sea for a high percentage of
its resources -- either foodstuffs and raw materials or
reinforcements -- and the ability to field a large anti-
shipping force.Th NATO's dependence on the sea and the
growth of the Soviet Navy through the 1970s met these
conditions. As a result, NATO had to be prepared not only to
defend West Europe but, in the process, actively to protect
Atlantic sea lines of communication (SLOCs). According to
General Goodpaster, who served as SACEUR from 1969 to 1974, in
the event of a war 'Soviet naval forces would make a strong
and sustained effort to interdict the sea lines of
communication on which we are vitally dependent.74
The likelihood and likely nature of a Soviet attack on
allied sea lines of communication would, of course, have
depended on the circumstances surrounding a conflict.
n Ambassador John G. Malstead, 'The Atlantic: The Linchpin,'
Proceedings, Sea Link Supplement 1984, p. 22.
Theodore Ropp, 'Continental Doctrines of Sea Power,' in
Earle, E.M., (ed), Makers of Modern Stratev (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1943).
' General Andrew Goodpaster, 'Sea Power and Security,'
Proceedings, Sea Link Supplement 1984, p. 17.
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Historically, Soviet military planners were less concerned
with allied SLOCs than NATO planners highly sensitive to this
vulnerability. In the 1970s, however, Soviet interest in SLOC
interdiction appeared to increase significantly. Whereas
in 1971 the Soviet Joint Military
 Encyclopedia listed
interdiction of the sea lanes as the lowest operational naval
priority, in 1976 it was second only to maintaining a sea-
based nuclear capability. 76
 Soviet naval exercises also
could be interpreted as reflecting altered priorities. In
1975 SLOC interdiction was an important part of the largest
Soviet naval exercise for five years ('OKEAN-75')J In the
second half of the decade the Soviets expanded their regular
surveillance and monitoring of NATO naval exercises to include
simulated missile and anti-submarine attacks. Th
 By 1979
Soviet aircraft were regularly simulating attacks on key
points along the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap --
NATO's first line of naval defence -- and against NATO ships
at sea.	 According to Admiral Sir James Eberle, then
See B. Makeyev, 'SLOC Under Present-Day Conditions,'
Morskov sbornik (July 1979); Bolshakov, Borisov, Viktorov,
'NATO's Plans for Maritime Transport,' Morskov sbornik (March
1982); These and other Soviet articles are discussed in Mathew
J. Wheelan, 'The Soviet Anti-SLOC Mission,' Proceedinas
(February 1979).
76 Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., 'NATO's Double Dependence on
the Atlantic,' NATO Review (October 1978), p. 5.
Bruce W. Watson, and Marguerite A. Walton, 'OKEAN-75',
Proceedinas (July 1976), p. 94.
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Peter Hill-Norton, 'NATO and the
Warsaw Pact: The Balance,' NATO Review (February 1976), p. 5.
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CINCFLEET, 'The profiles of some Soviet naval aircraft could
be interpreted as practicing long-range attacks against NATO
warships	 and	 certain	 specified	 land	 targets.'
Geographical constraints on Soviet access to the seas
facilitated NATOs ability to pursue a naval strategy of
defence in depth. Fortunately for NATO the Soviet Union had
poor access to the seas. Three of the Soviet Navy's four
fleets (the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific fleets)
had to transit narrow waters to reach their main operational
areas. The principal concern to Britain was the Northern
Fleet, based on the Kola Peninsula, and operating in the
North and East Atlantic. To enter the East Atlantic the
Northern Fleet had to transit the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap.eo
The passage of Soviet submarines through this gap, a logical
early step in any East-West conflict, provided NATO the
opportunity to destroy or at least monitor the boats before
they reached their patrol stations.
These submarines posed the single greatest threat to
NATOs sea lines of communication and to NATO strike fleets.
It is unlikely the Soviet Union would have initiated a war in
Europe without previously surging its naval forces into the
Eastern Atlantic. Even so, the distance of the East Atlantic
Eberle quoted in D.Wettern, Daily
 TelecTrarth (2 Jan 1980);
These profiles could, however, also be interpreted
differently.
80 Chapman Pincher, 'The Fierce Race for Seapower,' Sunday
Telerah Maaazine (15 Feb 1981).
144
from Soviet submarine pens on the Kola peninsula, the range of
the submarines, and the endurance of the crew ensured that the
GIUK gap remained a vital choke point. The first layer of
maritime defence was thus 'barrier ASW' along the GIUK gap.
The goal of establishing such an ASW barrier was to keep as
much of the Soviet Northern Fleet as possible confined to the
North Atlantic. Operationally, the barrier was 'primarily
executed by maritime patrol aircraft, submarines and
minefields such as the CAPTOP mine, supported by sosus ''
The second and third layers of maritime defence focussed
on locating and destroying submarines already operating in the
East Atlantic at the outbreak of a war or those successfully
entering the area once the war had begun. Destroying
submarines normally requires numerical advantage because of
the difficulty of both locating and destroying underwater
assets. The most effective way to perform ASW is with a mix
of 'shore-based aircraft, helicopters, surface ships and
submarines. ,R A key debate, therefore, was whether these
resources should concentrate on 'area ASW' to destroy
submarines at large in the East Atlantic or on 'protection
ASW' to defend convoys. Together these formed the second
and third lines of NATO'S maritime defence in depth.
A central issue in this debate was the balance between
aircraft and surface ships. The key question was where to put
Interview with Admiral Harry Train, 4 January 1991.
Admiral Sir Terence Lewin, 'The Royal Navy,' p. 5.
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ASW assets for the best results. Area ASW was conducted
primarily by maritime patrol aircraft which could rapidly
cover a wide area to locate enemy submarines. Attack
submarines remained important for the 'kill'. Alternatively,
both of these tasks could be performed, albeit more slowly, by
frigates, on which towed array sonars and helicopters could be
deployed. The ASW effort also benefited from the deployment
of SOSUS, which became operational around the early l980s.
Surface ships were also the essential resource for protection
ASW -- convoys. As the most likely target of Soviet
submarines, convoys provided a natural focal point for the
concentration of ASW assets.
By the mid-1970s the developments of satellites and
cruise missiles, coupled with the rise of the Soviet Navy,
posed a major challenge to surface navies. The growing missile
threat to surface ships raised the prospect of a shift toward
greater emphasis on ASW performed by aircraft and submarines.
Carrier-based aircraft and helicopters and frigate-based
helicopters provided the aviation portion of protection ASW.
But, as a consequence of their ability to identify and destroy
enemy aircraft, carriers and destroyers were natural targets
for Soviet forces and thus had to devote considerable time and
resources to defending themselves. The need to provide escort
ships for convoys thus not only put at risk important naval
assets, but also tied up considerable financial resources in
enabling these ships to protect themselves. The importance of
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this scenario in Royal Navy plans, the expense of preparing to
meet it, and the likelihood that a war in Europe would
actually be of short duration, raised doubts within the
ministry about the basic role of the Navy:
I think the serious question was about what the
Navy ought to be. There were serious questions
about the whole concept of convoy reinforcement
across the Atlantic: would they arrive in time,
how much stockpiling was necessary, what about the
sheer cost of providing a fleet to operate in a
transatlantic capacity and the air defence of the
fleet? It was an enormous amount. Then how
relevant was the concept that you had to spend
large amounts of money also on anti-submarine
warfare? The Soviet Union had a much larger fleet.
But I think the scenario was increasingly
questioned and that led naturally on to questioning
the role of the Royal Navy.
In a long war Britain would have borne a significant
portion of the responsibility for the protection of
transatlantic shipping. Until the early 1980s declared US
naval strategy was the 'swing strategy.' This called for
US naval assets in the Pacific to shift to the Atlantic in the
event of war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. To naval
planners, however,
the swing strategy was a non-starter. Its purpose
was political rather than military. It was
designed to encourage the Soviet Union to think the
US had greater naval assets than it had and to
encourage European members of NATO to think that
the US would contribute a greater proportion of its
naval assets to war in the Atlantic than it would.
The swinq strategy was never intended for
execution.
Interview with Sir Frank Cooper, 24 April 1991.
' Interview with Admiral Harry Train, 4 January 1991.
147
According to Admiral Train, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
(SACLANT), 'CINCPAC never expected to lose those assets and I
never expected to gain them. ,85 Consequently, the US
Government, assuming it believed NATO could fight a long war,
relied on European allies to escort convoys transitting the
sea lanes and to ensure safe passage in restricted waters and
the entrances to major ports.
Renunciation of the swing strategy beginning in 1978 thus
enhanced the role of Britain's maritime contribution to NATO,
while at the same time suggesting that the trend in US naval
strategy was away from tactical defence; a shift to which the
Royal Navy found adjustment painful. Senior US officials and
NATO commanders coordinated the shift in US policy, which
could not openly acknowledge, for political reasons, the
belief that war in Europe was unlikely to last long enough for
American forces based there to be reinforced by sea.
According to Admiral Train,
One of the projects I had (as SACLANT from 1978 to
1982] was to get the NATO ministers to let go of
that policy (the swing strategy] and admit that it
wasn't going to be executed and to get the United
States to withdraw it as a declaratory policy,
which I did before I finished my tour of duty.'
Simultaneously, Harold Brown began publicly to emphasize the
need for a 'division of labour' in protecting SLOCs. The
ostensible purpose was to enable the US to devote greater
Ibid.
86 Interview with Admiral Harry Train, 4 January 1991.
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maritime resources outside the NATO area, but one unstated
rationale was that with so few forces available to fight a
long war in Europe assets necessary to sustain one should be
redployed where they could be of greater use. Brown argued
the US was best able to send ships to the Indian Ocean and
that as a result allied navies should assume greater
responsibility in the Atlantic. 87
 By January 1981 the policy
shift was advanced enough for Train to acknowledge in the
journal of the US Naval Institute that dec/tred US policy had
served a primarily political purpose: 'we never really
expected that those ships would arrive in the Atlantic. '
Several developments made relinquishing the notion of
seaborne reinforcement considerably more difficult, however
unlikely the prospect of a long war in Europe. The
introduction of the Backfire Bomber in the late 1970s improved
Soviet capability to threaten NATO shipping. In 1980 US
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said the Backfire was
'likely soon to be a greater threat to our naval forces and
sea lines of communication than Soviet submarines; and so far
at least half the 200 Backfires completed have been delivered
to the Russian navy.' 90
 These deliveries were only a
87 Brown radio broadcast reprinted in Le Monde (13 Sept 1979).
88 Admiral Harry D. Train, II, USN, 'Preserving the Atlantic
Alliance,' Proceedings (Jan 1981), p. 27.
Cmnd 6432, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1976, p. 5,
para 19.
Brown quoted in D.Wettern, Dail y
 Te1earah 23 April 1980.
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small part of a major buildup in the Soviet Navy's offensive
capabilities. Additional Soviet maritime threats included the
attack and mining of US and European ports. 91
 The nature of
the Soviet maritime threat was not merely a function of its
specific capabilities, or even how they were expected to
deploy them, but also the way they could potentially exploit
NATO vulnerabilities. Historically, the Soviet Navy had no
tradition of attacking merchant shipping on the high seas and
the principal preoccupation of the Soviet armed forces was
land warfare. Soviet interest in allied attacks grew in the
1980s as the US Navy developed its capabilities to pursue a
forward maritime strategy. By 1983, according to Geoffrey
Till, 'although there (was] clearly a mismatch between Soviet
and Western attention to the vulnerability of Western maritime
communications across the Atlantic, Western dependence on them
(was] such that it (was] difficult to imagine the Soviet Navy
leaving them seriously uncontested. n
Soviet naval expansion stemmed from decisions taken in
the late 1950s and early 1960s to counter US naval
capabilities and enable the Soviet Union to project power
abroad.	 The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 underscored the
91 Fisher, 'Soviet SLOC Interdiction,' p. 166.
n Geoffrey Till, 'The Soviet Navy,' in Geoffrey Till, (ed),
The Future of British Sea Power (London: Macmillan, 1984), p.
90.
Pincher, 'The Fierce Race for Seapower,' p. 21; Isaac C.
Kidd, Jr., 'NATO Strategy and the New Dimension at Sea,' NATO
Review (December 1976), pp. 6-7.
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need for expanded maritime capabilities: 'the Soviet Union was
forced to back down by the United States because the Soviet
Union did not have a naval capability to support their own
ambitions in Cuba.' 9' By the 1970s growing Soviet naval
capabilities in the 1970s had increased NATOs vulnerability on
the flanks and made it more difficult to plan for the
protection of allied SLOCs. The scale of expansion exceeded
what the Soviet Union needed for defensive purposes,
especially given the lesser dependence of the Soviet Union on
sea trade. This imbalance, combined with the increasingly
offensive nature of Soviet naval exercises, raised serious
questions about Soviet intentions.	 However, even with no
change in Soviet intentions toward NATO SLOCS their
importance for reinforcement and resupply suggested to naval
planners that NATO required adequate forces to protect them.
A second concern of naval planners was the importance of
maintaining the qualitative edge through superior maritime
technologies.
Soviet naval expansion took place during a major shift in
the balance between offence and defence in maritime power;
the shift was decidedly in favour of the offence. It resulted
from combined advancement in several critical technologies:
' Admiral Harry Train interviewed by Russell Dybvik, 29
October 1980, 'Allied Maritime Efforts Limit Soviet Options,'
United States Information Agency, (13 Nov 1980), p. 2.
See 'Soviet Naval Activities, 1971-1976,' NATO Review
(December 1976).
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missiles, submarines and reconnaissance satellites. Together,
these technologies considerably increased the vulnerability of
surface vessels. One analyst wrote in 1971 that 'whether
feasible or not...the equipment to guard against submarine-
launched missiles will become one more expensive layer of
defense around ships already overburdened by a multitude of
enemies.' By the late 1970s the future of naval power
itself had become a topic of major debate in the US. Harold
Brown was 'aware of the growing vulnerability of surface ships
and believed that more emphasis should be placed on
underwater assets.' 97
 Indeed, in fiscal year 1977 Us naval
plans to build 30 ships were cut by half.N
In addition to immediate challenges posed to surface
fleets by existing technologies emerging technologies raised
the prospect of even greater vulnerability in the long-term.
In the late 1970s Us Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, William Perry, spearheaded a move to introduce
a new generation of aircraft and missiles based on stealth
technologies and precision-guided munitions. The
development of these technologies led Perry to believe
Paul Cohen, 'The Erosion of Surface Naval Power,' Foreign
Affairs (January 1971), p. 338.
' Interview with Harold Brown, 25 January 1991.
Gary Hart, 'The U.S. Senate and the Future of the Navy,'
International Security (spring 1978), p. 175.
Interview with Robert Komer, 9 January 1991; Interview with
William Perry, 1 April 1991.
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that tanks and ships were going to become so
vulnerable that they would be obsolete...These
considerations were not relevant for planning the
size of the Navy for the next year but they were
appropriate considerations given the timescale of
R&D for new ships, which takes up to ten years and
more.10°
According to Perry such developments demanded a shift not only
to an underwater Navy but away from the Navy altogether. Both
as a result of the timescales and technologies involved,
NATO's need for reinforcement and resupply required greater
emphasis on airlift and pre-positioning of equipment. The US
initiatives undertaken in these areas in the late 1970s,
already discussed, were based largely on this analysis.
Notwithstanding the strong views of some US officials
there was no consensus in NATO that the role of navies was
precarious. Nevertheless, these concerns played a role in
subsequent British decisions about the Royal Navy. One reason
why Perry's view of the future was not more widely shared was
lingering doubt about the unproven stealth technologies. Very
little information about stealth was available. The US did
not publicly acknowledge the existence of its stealth
programme until August 1980. The disclosure was justified by
leaks to the news media. Helping to show that Carter was
supporting defence, Brown declared in February 1981 that 'In
the face of those leaks, I believe it is not appropriate or
' Interview with William Perry, 1 April 1991.
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credible for us to deny the existence of this programme.'101
However, NATO officials were well aware that senior Pentagon
officials had grave doubts about the long-term role of surface
ships. Discussions on this issue took place principally in the
Council of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and, most
importantly, in executive sessions between the Armament
Directors of the four main NATO powers. Britain's Chief of
Defence Procurement, Sir Clifford Cornford, and the MoDs Chief
Scientific Advisor, Sir Ronald Mason, were both involved in
detailed discussions with Perry. 102
 Such discussions had
been common since the 1960s. Britain and the US conducted
many similar studies and frequently shared the results.103
According to Perry, British and other NATO officials were
'subjected to a bombardment of opinions' on the vulnerability
of surface ships.104
The need for surface ships had certainly not been
eliminated, as Perry acknowledged, at least in the foreseeable
future. The difficulty was in linking specific fleet
requirements to a strategy in which the role of the surface
fleet was increasingly in doubt. The inability of naval
planners to identify likely and specific threats directly
101 Brown quoted in Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, 96th Congress, second session, Leaks of
Classified National Defense Information (3 Feb 1981), p. 1.
Interview with William Perry, 1 April 1991.
Interview with Sir Frank Cooper, 24 April 1991.
104 Interview with William Perry, 1 April 1991.
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related to naval force goals, itself an indication of the
flexibility and unpredicatabi]ity of naval power, shifted the
focus of the debate onto technology. Some drew distinctions
between aircraft carriers and other surface vessels. An
important difference was that the greater cost and military
potential of aircraft carriers made them likely targets
without making them significantly less vulnerable to Soviet
missile attack. In the US, development of a Soviet anti-
carrier concept led to strong support for smaller carriers
(around 20-30,000 tons) among the defense reform movement.
Reformers believed that 'the more we concentrate our naval air
power into a small number of large, individually-capable
ships, the greater our overall vulnerability.' 105
 Naval
officers continued to argue in favor of large carriers of the
Nimitz class (90,000 tons) based on their ability to provide
tactical air capability. Harold Brown took a balanced
approach: 'I viewed the number of carriers that we needed as
smaller than the Navy did. "° But he nevertheless proceeded
with the development of two 58,000-ton carriers.101
According to Brown, surface ships continued to perform an
essential role as escorts:	 'My view was that the Royal
Navy's contribution would better be done by escort ships
105 Hart, 'The U.S. Senate and the Future of the Navy,' p.
177.
106 Interview with Harold Brown, 25 January 1991.
107 Hart, 'The U.S. Senate and the Future of the Navy,' p.
177.
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rather than carriers, but that they filled an important role
in NATO'S need for reinforcement and resupply.108
A parallel debate was underway in Britain over the
virtues of maintaining fewer highly capable ships or of
building more, less advanced (i.e. 'cheap and cheerful')
vessels)°9
 The need to keep ship numbers up stemmed from
the wide range of tasks required of the Royal Navy. Chief
among these were the peacetime role of providing 'presence'
and the wartime roles of ASW and escorting transatlantic
shipping. The incentive to build highly capable ships was to
maximize the fleet's performance in an increasingly
technological wartime environment.° Yet in a major war the
Royal Navy would operate in conjunction with allied navies,
particularly the US Navy, and emphasis on more capable ships
risked leaving inadequate numbers to perform other important
tasks requiring less sophisticated vessels.
Two key naval officers responsible for the shape of the
fleet from 1979-81 were the Commander-in-Chief-Fleet, Admiral
Sir James Eberle, and the Royal Navy Controller, Eberle's
successor as CINCFLEET, Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse. Unlike
some of their colleagues, both Eberle and Fieldhouse favoured
108 Interview with Harold Brown, 25 January 1991.
109 See, for example, John Moore, 'Both Britain and NATO have
insufficient ships,' The Listener (8 Jan 1981).
110 See Brian Longworth, 'The Role of Surface Escorts,'
Defence February 1984); Sir Terence Lewin, 'The Royal Navy:
Present Position and Future Course,' Naval Review Vol. 67, No.
4 (October 1979).
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a shift to a greater number of less capable (but still
adequate) frigates. Eberle, while acknowledging the
continuing serious Soviet threat at sea, and thus supporting
the Admiralty Board's efforts to maintain the number of ships
in the fleet, favoured shifting the quantity/qualitity balance
in a proportion of new frigates towards quantity, by designing
and building some cheaper and smaller ships. These could, in
his view, still meet the operational requirement.'11
Likewise, Admiral Fieldhouse, who as CINCFLEET in 1981 put the
smaller Type 23 frigate into the Navy programme, believed 'the
Navy required a change in philosophy to maintain the minimum
number of frigates available."2
The logic underlying the need for such a shift in
philosophy illustrated the seriousness of cost escalation for
strategic planning. The spectrum of choice for new ships ran
from the sophisticated Type 22 ASW frigate, which was then
costing some £140 million, to the low capability Offshore
Patrol Vessel at some £20 million. Eberle feared that if the
original requirement aimed at a new ship in the middle bracket
of capability costing some £80 million, then the natural
processes of cost escalation would result in a ship which cost
as much as the Type 22. At this price, the Royal Navy would
ID
not be able%afford the necessary numbers; nor would the ship
111 Interview with Admiral Sir James Eberle, 10 July 1991.
112 Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fieldhouse, 24
July 1991.
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have had any significant export potential. If, however, the
aim was for a ship at the lower end of the price bracket,
there was a good hope that one might end up with a capable
ship at the middle of the price bracket that the Royal Navy
and other navies could afford.113
Reliance on convoys in NATO naval strategy, stemming from
the proven role of convoys in both world wars, provided an
important rationale for keeping up ship nuinbers.'
According to Admiral Eberle, 'the number of escorts required
for the merchant ship protection task forces us to look for
the small, cheaper escort -- and I am convinced that such a
ship can be built.' 115
 Abandonment of the convoy concept
thus offered an opportunity rationally to reduce the surface
fleet. However, this was unlikely to occur without the
emergence of an alternative concept for reinforcement and
resupply.
The timing of the 1981 defence review corresponded
fortuitously with major changes in NATO techniques for
seaborne reinforcement. The convoy concept had been subject
to increasing debate as a result of technological advances and
113 Interview with Admiral Sir James Eberle, 10 July 1991; See
also Raymond V.B. Blackman, 'UK Cost Effective Dilemma,' Navy
International (March 1981).
114 For a detailed analysis of convoy strategy see M.B.
Wignall, 'The Convoy System: Retrospect and Prospect, parts
1,2,3,' Journal of Naval Science (February/May/August 1983).
115 Admiral Sir James Eberle, 'The Atlantic Link,' Naval
Forces Vol 4, No. 1, (1983), p. 39.
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declining escort numbers." 6
 The shift in NATO convoy plans
was not, however, a rejection of the convoy concept but rather
an attempt to compensate for inadequate numbers of escort
ships. Admiral Train, who initiated the shift, planned to
bring reinforcements across the Atlantic
along the Tropic of Cancer very far South because
of the Soviet naval aviation and as far away as
possible from Soviet naval bases on the Kola
Peninsula, making it difficult for Soviet
submarines to get the convoys and their merchant
ships and minimizing their time on station."7
Train estimated that Soviet submarines operating along the
Tropic of Cancer would have only a few days on station before
having 'to run the (allied ASW) gauntlet from there to get
home.' The plan had the added advantage of encouraging the
Soviets into basing their submarines and aircraft further
forward, 'where NATO could get at them.'118
The change in routes had several consequences. The new
route increased convoy transit time by four days. For this
116 See for example, A.W.J.W., 'Technology and Trade
Protection: Have Recent Changes in Technology Invalidated the
Convoy System?' Naval Review Vol. 67, No. 3 (July 1979); D.W.
Waters, 'The Mathematics of Convoy,' Navy
 International (May
1978); Rear Admiral J.R. Hill, 'Submarine Attacks On
Shipping,' Naval Forces Vol. III, No. III (1982); The debate
continued throughout the decade. See Admiral Wesley R.
McDonald, 'The Critical Role of Seapower in the Defence of
Europe,' NATO'S Sixteen Nations Vol. 29, No. 2 (Jan/Feb 1985);
Eric Grove, 'The Convoy Debate,' Naval Forces No. 3 (1985);
Desmond Wettern, 'The Paradox of Deci me: Are Convoys the
Only Alternative?' Sea Power (April 1989); Barry R. Posen,
'NATO'S Reinforcement Capability,' Defence Anal ysis Vol. 5,
No. 4 (December 1989).
"7 Interview with Admiral Harry Train, 4 January 1991.
118 Ibid.
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reason it took Train almost a year to convince NATO Defence
Ministers to accept the new plan, which they finally did in
late 1980. Second, in sending the ships South SACLANT would
be unable to provide escorts until the ships reached the
Massindi and Madeira islands of f Portugal. At that point
SACLANT would use all escorts at his disposal to protect the
ships for the remainder of the journey to southeastern ports
of the English Channel.' 19 Concentrated use of escort ships
enabled them to be applied to greatest effect where they would
be most useful; in areas where Soviet submarines could remain
on station for some time. The new plan maximized the ratio
of allied escorts to Soviet submarines, an important factor in
the effectiveness of convoys. The new concept of defended sea
lanes, in which Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft and attack
submarines patrolled the transit route from Portugal, was to
be applied in conjunction with escort protection along this
last leg of the journey.'20
Chapter eight analyses in detail the logic underlying
planned cuts in the Royal Navy. However, to underscore the
link between NATO and British strategic thinking it should be
stated here that the revised convoy plan offered a strategic
rationale for saving money by reducing the size of the Royal
Navy's surface fleet while reshaping Britain's force posture
119 Ibid.
Interview with Admiral Harry Train, 4 January 1991; See
also Desmond Wettern, 'Defended Lanes v Convoys,' Navy
International (December 1981).
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to reflect orthodox NATO priorities. According to Train, who
discussed the review with Nott on several occasions, Nott
seized on the shift in NATO strategic thinking to reduce the
Royal Navy.'2' Certainly, in announcing the defence review
Nott justified reductions in the surface fleet by stating that
'the concept of "convoys" as normally expressed, is not quite
the way in which it will happen next time around. ,122 As
recently as the 1981 Defence Estimates the government had
expressed confidence that 'the conventional defence of Cen-
tral Europe depends crucially on transatlantic reinforcement
and resupply.' The 1981 White Paper, on the other hand,
omitted any mention of transatlantic reinforcement and
resupply. Collapse of this priority was the rationale for
cutting the Royal Navy.124
OUT-OF-AREA CAPABILITIES
An important secondary role of the Royal Navy -- its role
outside of the NATO Treaty area -- failed to protect it from
cuts in 1981. Several out-of-area crises in late 1979 and
1980 held out the prospect of an increased role there for the
121 Interview with Admiral Harry Train, 4 January 1991.
122 John Nott, Mansard (23 June 1981), col. 212.
Cmnd 8212-I, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1981,
para 329.
124 See also James Cable, Britain's Naval Future (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1983), p. 108.
161
Navy but this failed to materialize. These crises included
the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, and the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. 1
 The most significant British
military response to any of these crises was the October 1980
decision to establish a patrol of two Royal Navy vessels in
the Strait of Hormuz. The purpose of this deployment, which
later came to be known as the Armilla Patrol, was to protect
merchant shipping on the high seas. The use of naval power in
such a traditional role early in the life of the government
encouraged those favouring a strong Royal Navy. T h e
Conservative Government aspired to reassert Britain's
prominent role in the wider world, which it believed would
enhance Britain's status in the European Community. The
policy was succinctly put by Foreign
	 Secretary Lord
Carrington in April 1981:
Britain's experience in the wider world, and the
network of contacts which our language, kinship,
commerce and history have given us with this wider
world are part of the dowry we brought to our
marriage with Europe.'26
The new approach was also conveyed by the Prime Minister in
comments on the Persian Gulf. In a major policy speech she
said
H.Stanhope, Times (21 Jan 1980); The US revealed that
there were also allied plans to protect Yugoslavia, if
necessary, due to the potential Soviet threat there following
Tito's death.'US to send 1,800 Marines to Gulf of Oman,'
Atlantic News (15 Feb 1980); Diplomatic Staff, 'Pledge to
Yugoslays,' Daily
 TelearaDh (16 Jan 1980).
' Speech by Lord Carrington at Stuttgart, 24 April 1981.
162
there was a period when we were exhausted and
interested only in our past. Whatever the reason,
that period is over now. We are making a fresh
start. We are once again active and energetic in
the Gulf."27
A focal point for discussions about events beyond the NATO
area, particularly the Gulf, was the US proposal for a Rapid
Deployment Force. President Carter announced his plan for an
RDF in a televised speech to the nation on 1 October 1979.
The force was developed in response to events in the Middle
East and South Asia and was intended to be mobile and 'capable
of responding to contingencies anywhere in the world. .128
The British Government indicated an early interest in
improving Britain's out-of-area defence capabilities,
including participation in an RDF. The events surrounding the
expression of this interest exemplify the imbalance between
expectations for defence and the obstacles to realizing
government objectives. Improving Britain's ability to operate
militarily beyond the NATO area proved impossible in a period
of financial constraint. Otherwise, out-of-area commitments
threatened to impinge on NATO-allocated resources. There was
simply no room in the defence programme for additional
commitments.
As mentioned, the Mason review significantly reduced
127 Margaret Thatcher's speech prepared for delivery to the
Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writer's Association, Prime
Minister on Foreiari Affairs, New Zealand House, 8 April 1981.
128 Congressional Budget Office, RaDid DeDlovinent Forces:
Policy and Budaetina ImDlications (Washington, DC:
Congressional Budget Office, February 1983), p. 1.
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Britain's out-of-area capability by cutting UK transport
forces by half. The Thatcher Government hoped to reverse the
trend initiated by the withdrawal from East of Suez by
improving the ability of the armed forces to operate on a
global basis:
Events in Africa since 1976 and Iran and
Afghanistan over 1979-1980...led to a reexamination
of the impact on European security of events
outside Europe, resulting in the Government's
undertaking...to consider improvements in the
Service's worldwide capability.'
The 1980 Defence Estimates included a separate chapter on
'Wider Defence Interests.' There the government declared that
although Britain's defence resources
must be concentrated on our key NATO tasks...our
defence policy should also be designed to help
protect, wherever possible, our own and more
general Western interests over an even wider area,
including those outside the NATO area.13°
The alliance was increasingly sensitive to the possibility
that interests of member countries beyond the NATO area could
lead to a diminution of alliance resources. In December
1980, NATO Defence Ministers acknowledged that 'events outside
NATO boundaries can bear directly on the security of all
member countries. .131	 They noted US plans for a Rapid
129 D.Greenwood and J.Drake, The United Kingdom's Current
Defence Proaramme and Budaet (ASIDES No. 17, spring 1980), pp.
6-7.
130 Cmnd 7826-I, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1980,
para 401.
131 Final Communique of the NATO Defence Planning Committee,
(10 Dec 1980), para 9.
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Deployment Force and agreed the alliance should prepare for a
contingency in which the US or another NATO country might
divert NATO resources to protect interests outside the NATO
area.' Nevertheless, they stopped short of endorsing the
RDF concept.
The British Government was more enthusiastic about the
development of out-of-area capabilities than the other
European members of NATO. This enthusiasm stemmed partly from
the government's broad strategic approach, and partly from the
attraction of out-of-area involvement as an alternative to
Britain's traditional 'East of Suez' role. According to Pym
the strategic frontiers of Europe lie far beyond
the NATO boundaries and...it is necessary for us
and our allies to do what we can to be able to act
in a military capacity if circumstances make that
desirable.'33
British support for the US Rapid Deployment Force was formally
extended in October 1980. Pym described it as 'a valuable
contribution to deterring further Soviet encroachment' and
announced Britain's interest in enhancing its own rapid
deployment capabilities.''
During a visit to the US following the election of
President Reagan the Prime Minister reiterated government
approval of American efforts to develop a defence policy
Ibid., para 11; for an analysis of the RDF and NATO see
Peter Foot, 'The Rapid Deployment Force and NATO', ADIU ReDort
Vol. 3, No. 2 (March/April 1981).
rn Francis Pym, Hansard (28 Oct 1980), col. 182.
Francis Pym, Hansard (28 Oct 1980), col. 181.
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beyond the Atlantic. Thatcher declared: 'As a loyal ally,
Britain will help to the very maximum of her ability."35
Discussing her US visit in the House of Commons the Prime
Minister said she had discussed the possible creation of a
rapid deployment force with President Reagan and that 'the
matter will be the subject of consultation.' Thatcher stated,
moreover, that she had
made it clear that if such a force were created the
United Kingdom would be ready to contribute to it,
in the same way as...ve have already stationed
naval units in the Gulf in response to the
situation arriving from the Iran-Iraq war.
These plans were tempered by the political response of
other states and, most importantly, the high cost of the
proposal. The most negative reaction to Britain's endorsement
of the RDF concept came from the Gulf States. For over a year
the government had sought to improve relations with the Gulf
States, for political and commercial reasons. Douglas Hurd,
then a junior Foreign Minister, summarised the outcome of this
effort in the following way: 'We are probably in closer touch
with the Gulf States than at any time since we left the area
in 1971.	 Indeed, prior to Thatcher's visit to the US
Observer reported that 'the Gulf States have more or less
135 Speech by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher on receiving
the Donovan Award at a dinner in New York, (28 Feb 1981), p.
6.
'	 Margaret Thatcher, Hansard (2 March 1981), cols. 19-20.
' Interview given by Mr. Hurd, Minister of State, FCO, to
the BBC Arabic Service, London Press Service, 3 March 1981.
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authorized Britain to speak for them in the ongoing debate
with the United States on Gulf security.
Shortly after Thatcher's endorsement of the RDF concept
British policy was 'clarified.' Anglo-American discussions
reportedly focussed on British efforts to dissuade the Reagan
Administration from seeking permanently to station US forces
in the Gulf. Instead, the British endorsed an 'over-the-
horizon' RDF capability. 139 Subsequent British statements
emphasized two points. The consultative nature of future
proposals was stressed. Foreign Secretary Carrington told the
House of Lords: 'I do not believe our neighbors and friends
in the Gulf need have any fear that any action will be taken
in their defence for which they do not ask...This is a matter
for consultation.' Hurd denied that Thatcher's endorsement of
an RDF concept was a new development:
There was no announcement. What Mrs. Thatcher said
was that an RDF had been under discussion for a
long time inside the American Administration. But
if it turned out that such a force was going to be
formed, we would consider taking part in it. But
the idea isn't confined to the Gulf -- it is to any
part of the world where there might be Soviet
aggression)'0
Consultation would thus involve local states prior to the
application of force in a given area. Moreover, British
involvement in an RDF also remained at the consultation stage.
P.Seale, Observer (27 Feb 1981).
139 P.Seale, Observer (27 Feb 1981).
140 Interview given by Mr. Hurd, Minister of State, FCO, to
the BBC Arabic Service, London Press Service, 3 March 1981.
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Second, statements clarified that troops would not be
stationed in the Middle East. This emphasis reflected the
degree of misunderstanding by many Third World states about
the RDF concept. The government faced criticism over its
endorsement of the RDF plan from India, among others. In a
four day visit to India in April Prime Minister Thatcher
openly advocated increased western attention to regional
security. She defended both the West's decision to sell arms
to Pakistan and to develop an RDF. India's concern was
largely based on the proximity of Diego Garcia, which would be
an important staging area. 141 Due to the nature of Indian
concerns about the RDF Britain's clarification had little
impact.
In the Middle East, however, the clarification dispelled
many anxieties.'42 Only the United Arab Emirates re-stated
their rejection of the RDF plan. Their concerns were not
stated publicly, however, and were not an obstacle to the
purchase of 35 Hawk trainer aircraft worth over £100
million.'43 Oman expressed no interest in having a western
force on its territory but accepted, in principle, the need
for such a capability to counter Soviet aggression. 1" Their
sensitivity to the Soviet threat was particularly acute
" C.Smith, Observer (19 April 1981).
142 R.Evans, Financial Times (21 April 1981).
143 M.Woollacott, Guardian (23 April 1981).
1 J.Wightman, Daily Telegraph (24 April 1981).
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because of their proximity to communist South Yemen. For their
part the Saudis had few problems with the clarified British
policy.145
No amount of policy refinement could avoid the fact that
participation in an RDF would be expensive, however successful
the policy in political terms. A full-scale RDF, even on a
small scale would require separate staff and headquarters --
both unaffordable expenses. As a result, it was more feasible
for Britain to modify existing forces to cope with out-of-area
contingencies.' Existing rapid d ep 1 oy]nent
capabilities were limited and their purpose had been spelled
out in general terms only. They consisted of one spearhead
battalion on 72 hours' notice at all times. The
responsibility to stay on such short notice rotated between
several battalions. Additional forces could be drawn from the
Eighth Field Force, stationed in the UK, which included a
parachute battalion, and British forces assigned to NATO's
Allied Command Europe mobile force. Logistical support for
the force would be provided by a fleet of VClOs and Hercules
aircraft with lift capability to move the battalion to 'any
necessary part of the world. ,147
145 M.Woollacott, Guardian (21 April 1981).
146 D.Fairhall, Guardian (3 March 1981); See also Keith
Hartley, 'Can the UK Afford A Rapid Deployment Force?' RUSI
Journal (March 1982).
147 John Nott, Hansard (17 March 1981), col. 187; for a brief
history and critical analysis of Britain's rapid deployment
capabilities see Bruce George and Simon Davis, 'Rapid
27e1ooyind ivc/	 v '	 CC,pvwv,,i	 ()// / f)
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According to Hurd, the 1980 Defence Estimates did not
mean that Britain would adopt another major commitment.
Rather, they meant 'we were planning to have rather greater
resources available for use outside the NATO area if need
•148 Unless these resources were increased Britain's rapid
intervention capability would remain token in comparison with
that of the US.
CONCLUS ION
The British Government showed increasing interest in
conventional defence in the years leading up to 1981.
Policies adopted in the late 1970s suggested that major
across-the-board improvements in British defence would be
forthcoming. The strategic environment justified maintaining
the full range of existing defence capabilities. To do so
required significant force improvements. Despite financial
constraints in 1978 the government appeared to have taken the
initial decision necessary to enable these improvements.
Political pressures from NATO and the US fortified the Labour
Government's commitment to defence spending increases. The
Soviet Union's ability to inflict a conventional attack on the
UK home base justified large scale improvement of UK air
defences. Although this represented a significant departure
148 Interview given by Mr. Hurd, Minister of State, FCO, to
the BBC Arabic Service, London Press Service, 3 March 1981.
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from the established UK defence posture both political parties
strongly supported it. Conservative attitudes to defence
appeared to require no fortification. The Conservative
Government's emphasis on defence was rivalled only by its
emphasis on law and order, and a strong economy. Not only did
they launch new improvements in air defence and the NATO
contribution but they also contemplated accepting an expanded
commitment beyond the NATO area.
The Thatcher Government was at first uninterested in
establishing rigid priorities between different programmes
within the defence budget, not least because it would harden
divisions within the party between navalists and
continentalists. Had across-the-board defence expansion been
economically feasible it very likely would have continued.
However, the extent of financial pressures and the resource
needs of the overfull defence programme led to the conclusion
that defence, while still a priority, had to be subject to
greater discipline. Had the pressures to cut defence not been
great it would have been tempting to engage in small-scale
cuts. Such 'salami- slicing' would have had the least
damaging effect on the individual service programmes, though
it inevitably would have reduced Britain's defence
performance. Due to the scale of savings required salami
tactics were not an option and the government accepted the
need to impose priorities on the defence programme, not unlike
those imposed on budget priorities as a whole.
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The above analysis suggests several reasons why the Royal
Navy was particularly vulnerable in the early 1980s to
determined cost-cutting efforts. Politically, it would have
been extremely difficult to cut the continental commitment to
any significant degree. Britain's increased vulnerability to
air attack also made home defence sensitive for political as
well as strategic reasons. Most importantly, the Royal Navy
was at a crossroads in a highly complex technological and
strategic environment. Advanced technology weapons and
reconnaissance satellites posed a serious threat to the
survivability of surface vessels. Reinforcement and resupply
of Europe remained a vital interest, but in realistic
scenarios of East-West war reinforcement by sea was
increasingly thought to have little role to play. US policy
and naval strategy was already changing, partly in response to
this analysis. The Royal Navy, for whom this shift was far
more momentous, faced extremely difficult decisions.
Of greatest importance to non-naval planners, due to the
military balance in Europe, was a Soviet surprise attack.
Since in a surprise attack NATO would depend most heavily on
existing forces in Europe and those arriving by transport
plane shortly after the conflict had begun, measures to boost
the number of troops and war material available on short
notice were the principal focus of NATO5 long-term military
planning. To the extent that these measures were
successfully implemented there was a declining need for
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seaborne reinforcement. ]jsufficient numbers of escort vessels
had already precipitated a major shift in NATO convoy plans;
this shift offered a rationale for further reduction in the
Royal Navy's surface fleet.
CHAPTER FIVE
Polaris Replacement: The Trident Decision, 1979-80
The nuclear deterrent was the Conservative Government's
top defence priority. Whereas a few in the Labour Government
had agonized over the decision of whether to replace the
ageing deterrent force of four submarines carrying Polaris A3
missiles, the Conservative Government decided promptly on
replacement. In July 1980 Francis Pyin announced that a
submarine force of Trident C4 missiles would be purchased
from the US for an estimated £4,500-5,000 million. Within two
years further decisions led to the purchase of the even more
advanced, and costly, Trident D5.'
Although Trident was to be purchased under highly
favourable terms, the cost and scale of this decision had a
major impact on Britain's overall defence programme. However,
it did not bring about the 1981 defence review. 2
 The
1 Ministry of Defence, The United Kinadom Trident Proaramme,
Defence Open Government Document 82/1, (DOGD 82/1), p. 6, para
27. Nott's figures were contested by David Greenwood,
Trident Programme, (ASIDES paper no. 22, 1982). See espe-
cially pp. 47-49; By June 1991 the actual cost of the
programme after ten years was 17 per cent lower than
originally forecast. Eighth Report from the Defence Committee,
1990-91, The Proaress of the Trident Proaramme (HC 286), 19
June 1991, para 4.
2 See David Boren, 'The Trident Missile and Britain's 1981
Defence Review,' in Richard Aldrich and Michael Wright, (eds),
British Security Policy
 Since 1945 (London: Frank Cass, 1992);
Lawrence Freedman, 'Britain: The First Ex-Nuclear Power?'
International Securit y
 Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1982).
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incidence of expenditure on all major defence projects
requires careful monitoring to ensure that the largest
programmes do not peak simultaneously. Planned spending on
the Trident C4 would have peaked in the late 1980s. Yet the
anticipated shortfall in defence resources which prompted the
review was expected to reach serious proportions by 1984.
Moreover, even before the review was undertaken Nott had
decided, in principle, that the Trident D5 would be a more
cost-effective purchase. Even though it cost more, in
absolute terms, than the C4, the D5 was still in development
thus pushing Trident's peak spending years into the 1990s,
even farther from the period of greatest concern to ministry
officials in 1981.
The controversial nature of the Trident decision is not
in doubt but, despite public perceptions, Trident was not
viewed as the marginal programme in the defence budget.
First, the high cost of the strategic deterrent
notwithstanding, it was the least expensive 'pillar' of
British defence to maintain.' This fact, and the priority
placed on maintaining an independent means of deterring attack
Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
The total capital cost of Polaris in September 1967 prices
was £330 million. Running costs to 1979 remained under 2 per
cent of the annual defence budget, making it an exceptionally
cost-effective pillar of British defence. 'Memorandum
submitted by the Minister of Defence', para 3-4, in Sixth
Report from the Expenditure Committee, 1978-79, The Future of
the United Kingdom's Nuclear WeaDons Policy (HC 348), 3 April
1979.
175
against the UK gave the force a top claim on defence
resources. Second, cost alone is an inadequate basis for
identifying marginal programmes. The Tornado aircraft claimed
a larger percentage of the defence budget during its peak
spending years than Trident, but no one suggested that Tornado
brought about the 1981 review. Marginal programmes can only
be determined by reference to a government's economic,
political and strategic objectives, which is the main reason
defence reviews have traditionally been fraught with tension
between departments and within the Ministry of Defence.
Nor was Trident the only, or even the main, reason why
the 1981 cuts fell on the Royal Navy. As discussed in the
previous chapter, the Royal Navy's operational concept was the
least closely tied to NATO'S Central Region, and questions
about the naval programme arose before Trident appeared in
the Navy's budget. Purchasing Trident may have increased the
scale of the naval cuts, but only because it was deemed to be
a more effective use of defence funds than spending on the
surface fleet. As will be discussed in chapter six, of far
greater immediate consequence for the budget than Trident, was
the short-term spending crisis of 1980, which the Treasury,
Defence Secretary, and Prime Minister all became convinced was
symptomatic of a serious long-term problem in financing the
defence programme. It was this analysis which prompted the
1981 review, and by reinforcing the government's determination
to establish defence priorities, empowered the central staffs
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to conduct the review. This, more than any single weapons
programme, no matter how costly or controversial, was the
decisive factor in the review's conduct.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the Trident
decision as another way of placing the 1981 review in its
political and strategic context. Close analysis of the
Trident decisions demonstrates the extent to which financial
considerations pervaded every level of decision-making for
defence. Ultimately, it was the dual preoccupation with
politics and finance which prompted the government to turn to
the central staffs for a coherent view of defence priorities.
THE TIMING OF THE DECISION
The need to consider replacing the highly cost-efficient
Polaris force was recognized by officials in the Callaghan
Government in the late l970s. In January 1978 Callaghan au-
thorized the Ministry of Defence to undertake two studies
on the issue of Polaris replacement. The first, prepared by
a working group under Sir Antony Duff, Deputy Under Secretary
at the Foreign Office, covered the political and military im-
plications of a third-generation nuclear deterrent. The
second, prepared by a technical panel under Sir Ronald Mason,
the MoD's Chief Scientific Adviser, was on potential delivery
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systems. 5
 The reports were considered by a small
Cabinet committee chaired by Prime Minister Callaghan and
composed of Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey, For-
eign Secretary David Owen, and Secretary of State for Defence
Fred Mulley. Together this committee handled defence is-
sues deemed too sensitive for the Cabinet's Overseas and
Defence Policy Committee (OD).6
The existence of these study groups and of the special
Cabinet committee was a closely guarded secret, even within
the government itself. Nuclear decision-making in Britain
had traditionally been conducted in a highly secretive manner.
Beginning in the late 1970s there was, in addition, division
over nuclear policy within the Labour Party and Cabinet. The
1974 Labour manifesto included the renunciation of 'any
intention of moving towards a new generation of strategic
nuclear weapons.' 7
 Nevertheless, Callaghan and his special
committee had found it necessary to continue with a programme,
code-named Chevaline, to improve the Polaris
	 warhead,
P.Hennessy, Times (4 Dec 1979); Lawrence Freedman, Britain
and Nuclear Weapons (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 60; Cohn
Mclnnes, Trident: The Only Option? (London: Brassey's, 1986),
p. 14.
6 P.Hennessy, Times (4 Dec 1979).
The Labour Party, 'Britain Will Win with Labour,' in The
Times Guide to the House of Commons. October 1974 (London:
Times Books, 1974), p. 311.
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making	 it	 less	 vulnerable	 to anti-ballistic
missiles 8
Strictly speaking, Chevaline did not constitute a 'new
generation of strategic nuclear weapons' since it was the
modification of an existing system. In parliament, govern-
ment spokesmen responded to questions
	 about Polaris
improvement by declaring that the government was simply
'maintaining the effectiveness' of the British deterrent.9
Government language was intended to reassure the party that
policy was consistent with electoral pledges. Labour
depended on a delicate alliance with the Liberal Party to
remain in power and sought to avoid a major political row.
Doubting whether a row would be avoidable if Michael Foot,
Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, or other left-leaning mem-
bers of Cabinet participated in nuclear deliberations, they
were excluded.10
The timing of the Polaris replacement decision depended
on the estimated 20-year lifespan of the force's Resolution-
class nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) hulls.
Unlike many other parts of submarines hulls cannot be re-
on Chevaline see Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons,
pp. 41-52; Ninth Report from the Committee on Public Ac-
counts, 1981-82, Chevaline Improvement to the Polaris Missile
System, (HC 269), 17 March 1982; and Mclnnes, Trident, pp. 4-
10.
Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Wea pons, p. 55.
10 In 1983 The Times reported that Foot had a tacit agreement
with first Harold Wilson and then James Callaghan that he
would be excluded from discussing nuclear issues. J.Barry,
Times (13 Feb 1983).
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placed, and with age the risk of metal fatigue increases to
the point that the boat must be decommissioned and
replaced. As fiNS Resolution had entered service in 1968 a
replacement was thought to be required around 1988. Decommis-
sioning one boat would in theory have left Britain's three
remaining SSBN's available to provide deterrence. However,
because the boats needed both regular maintenance and long
ref its the guarantee of at least one boat always on station
depended on a minimum force of four boats. 11
 Since a reduced
force of three boats would render the British deterrent un-
reliable, the date of retirement of the oldest SSBN was the
natural focal point for discussion of a possible Polaris suc-
cessor.12
Public discussion of Polaris replacement began in 1977,
and initially revolved around the Royal Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs, then sponsoring a project studying the future
of the British nuclear deterrent. The Institute's Deputy
Director, Ian Smart, published papers on the implications of
Polaris replacement. 13
	Smart's analysis appeared to have
'During these long re-fits the safety system is checked,
the nuclear reactor core replaced and a certain amount of
stabilising work undertaken.' The complete re-fit operation
takes 18-20 months and more as the age of a submarine in-
creases. Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, pp. 34-5.
12 Ian Smart, 'British Foreign Policy to 1985: Beyond
Polaris,' International Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 4 (October
1977), pp. 559-60.
13 Ibid, and Ian Smart, The Future of the British Nuclear
Deterrent: Technical. Economic and Strate gic Issues, (Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 1977).
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been based on thorough MOD briefings, but the government
refused direct cooperation in the project and ordered civil
servants not to participate in Smart's study group. One
important conclusion was that due to careful husbandry of
the Polaris force, wear on the boats' hulls had been
minimized and the operational life of the force could
safely be extended five years to the early l990s.
Given the time required for research, development and
construction of a major weapon system, which Smart estimated
in this case to be twelve years, a decision on Polaris
replacement would be required by 1980.
Outwardly, the Callaghan Government could not share
Smart's sense of urgency about a decision regarding Polaris
replacement. Political considerations had been behind the
decision to end official participation in the Smart study.
According to Secretary of State for Defence Fred Mulley,
in March 1978 the government believed that
the existing Polaris fleet will be effective for
many years and, that being the case, there is no
need to take a decision on whether any other ar-
rangements would have to be made.15
However, low level talks on the sale of Trident to Britain
were ongoing from early in the Carter Administration and maybe
as early as the Ford Administration: 'The Wilson Government
was exploring its options. Internally, the issue was being
14 Smart, 'Beyond Polaris,' p. 559.
15 Frederick Mulley, Hansard, vol 946, (21 Mar 1978), col.
1315.
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discussed at the lower levels of the US Government virtually
as soon as President Carter took office in 1977.116
Government military advisers had gone to Callaghan in
early 1978 to advise that due to long lead times in building
replacement system, a decision would be necessary in 1980. The
studies that Callaghan authorized had 'strict and limited'
terms of reference specifying that 'no decision on the future
of the deterrent would be needed during the lifetime of the
present Parliament.' Although the study groups were given one
year to report they submitted their analyses eight months
later, in November 1978.17
That month the Cabinet hoc committee met twice to
consider Polaris replacement. No decision was taken and
only a minimal consensus emerged: a decision would be
required in late 1981 and, following the advice of the chief
Scientific Adviser, in the event of replacement a
submarine-based system would be given top consideration.18
During Prime Minister's Question Time three months later,
Callaghan announced that a replacement decision 'would need
to be taken in the next two years."9
16 Interview with Walter Slocombe, 10 January 1991.
James Callaghan, Time and chance (London: Collins, 1987),
p. 553.
18 Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, p. 61; Mason's
Trident recommendation was popular with the Navy. His
recommendations in 1981 were to be at least equally unpopular.
19 James Callaghan, Hansard, (16 Jan 1979), col. 1500; See
also Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 553.
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The time was needed by the Labour leadership to prepare
the party for such a potentially divisive decision. The Labour
Manifesto for the 1979 election was carefully modified to ease
the political burden on a Labour Government deciding to
replace Polaris but in the event the election shifted this
burden to the Conservatives. 20
 The Conservative Party
came to power committed to maintaining the British nuclear
deterrent. 21 Prime Minister Thatcher quickly established a
secret Cabinet subcommittee of her own, MISC 7, whose top
priority was Polaris replacement.
	 The group included
Thatcher, Home Secretary William Whitelaw, Chancellor
Geoffrey Howe, Defence Secretary Francis Pym and Foreign
Secretary Lord Carrington. Amended versions of the Duff and
Mason reports were soon made available and consideration of
replacement options was rapidly underway.0
RATIONALES FOR THE DETERRENT
20 The Labour Manifesto reiterated Labour's belief that
renunciation of nuclear weapons was the 'best course,' but
also stated it was essential that a decision follow a 'full
and informed' debate. See Labour Party, 'The Labour Way is
the Better Way,' in The Times Guide to the House of Commons.
May 1979 (London: Times Books, 1979), p. 308. The Manifesto
thus held out the prospect for a change of policy; See also
Freedman, Britain and Nuclear WeaDons, p. 59.
21 Conservative Party, 'The Conservative Manifesto, 1979' in
The Times Guide to the House of Commons. May 1979, p. 293.
22 The committee also considered the issue of NATO's
long-range theatre nuclear force modernisation. See Freedman,
Britain and Nuclear Wea pons, p. 62; Mclnnes, Trident, p. 16;
and P.Hennessy, Times (4 Dec 1979).
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Although the Thatcher Government made its decision to
acquire Trident in secret, curtailing the information avail-
able even to the full Cabinet, it still had to justify its
policies in Parliament. The Government had to expound a ba-
sis for possessing the deterrent compelling enough to warrant
the large expenditures which major weapons systems inevitably
entail, but which were particularly high in the case of Tri-
dent. Historically, British thinking about nuclear weapons
has given rise to several alternative reasons for the British
nuclear deterrent: national prestige, influence with allies
(mainly the US), coverage of Soviet targets of primary in-
terest to Britain, insurance against the collapse of NATO or
unilateral termination of the US security guarantee, and as a
contribution to NATO defence. Not all of these grounds
for a deterrent are mutually exclusive, nor does a
government's public emphasis on one preclude the existence of
a 'private' rationale which the government chooses not to
discuss openly.24
The basis for Britain's nuclear deterrent was the 1962
Nassau Agreement which ended an unhappy period in Anglo-
American relations by providing for the sale of Polaris
See Peter Nailor and Jonathan Alford, The Future of Brit-
pin's Deterrent Force, International Institute for Strategic
Studies, Adeiphi Paper No. 156, (Spring 1980), pp. 6-8.
24 Lawrence Freedman, Martin Navias, Nicholas Wheeler, Di-
dependence in Concert: The British Rationale for Possessing
Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear History Prograzme
Occasional Paper 5, (University of Maryland, 1989).
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missiles to Britain. 3
 The agreement specified that the
resulting missile force would be assigned to SACEUR,
but also stipulated that Britain could use the force for
national purposes 'when supreme national interests were at
stake. ,26 Although the agreement justified representation of
Britain's deterrent force as a contribution to NATO, by pre-
serving the force's operational independence the agreement did
not preclude the existence of private rationales of
prestige, influence or insurance against an uncertain future.
Bearing in mind the existence of both private and public
reasons for the deterrent, some version of the above
rationales has informed the policy of successive British gov-
ernments since the 1950s and the Thatcher Government was no
exception.27
The Thatcher Government's public rationale for maintain-
ing the British deterrent did not initially differ from the
formula adopted by the Wilson Government in the mid-1960s and
maintained by subsequent governments. 28
 According to this
See Richard Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1970); Lord Harlech, 'Suez Snafu,
Skybolt Sabu,' Foreign Policy, No.2, Spring 1971; Peter
Nailor, The Nassau Connection, (London, HMSO, 1988); cmnd
2108, Polaris Sales A greement, 6 April 1963, Treaty Series No.
59 (1963).
Cmnd 1915, Bahamas Meetina. December 1962: Text of Joint
Communique, (London: 1*150, 1962).
27 A.J.R. Groom, 'The British Deterrent,' in John Baylis,
(ed), British Defence Policy in a Chanaina World (London:
Croom Helm, 1977).
Freedman, 'Britain: The First Ex-Nuclear Power?,' p. 92.
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formula, the British nuclear force contributed to NATO deter-
rence by making Britain a 'second-centre' of nuclear decision
making and thereby increasing the uncertainty of Soviet
military planners, who might calculate that under certain
conditions the US would not respond to the use of Soviet
force in Europe with nuclear weapons. Under the same
conditions, however, the Soviets could not be sure Britain
and France would show the same restraint. Pym stressed
that Britain's role as a second-centre was unique since its
nuclear forces were committed to NATO, unlike those of
France. He further argued that terminating this contribution,
which had been maintained for 'a third of a century,' would be
'an act of grave irresponsibility.'30
The main benefit of the second-centre formula was po-
litical: it enabled the government to argue in favour of
a nuclear deterrent with operational independence but to
refrain from explicitly expressing doubts about the US com-
mitment to NATO security. Pym did this by declaring Britain
had full confidence in the US commitment, but that Soviet
doubts about US credibility necessitated a British
second-centre. 3' Pym's Labour predecessor, Fred Mulley,
believed it 'important to consider whether it was right that
Andre Beaufre, 'Sharing Nuclear Responsibilities: A
Problem in Need of A Solution,' International Affairs Vol.
31, No. 3 (July 1965).
Francis Pym, Mansard, (24 Jan 1980), col. 680.
31 Francis Pym, Mansard (24 Jan 1980), cols. 678-9.
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France...should become the only European power with a
completely independent nuclear power. .32 Pym rejected out-
right the traditional argument that Britain required
nuclear weapons for reasons of national prestige or to
prevent France from being the
	 only	 European nuclear
power. Pym's successor, John Nott, also maintained the
second-centre argument, until he sought to justify the large
expenditure required to purchase the Trident D5. At that
time he declared that the basis for Britain's need to possess
an independent deterrent was to ensure that Britain was
capable of attacking the Soviet Union 'if the United States
backed away and Britain had no further card to play if
the Russians raised the stakes.'3'
Pym's explanation of the government's rationale for
maintaining the British nuclear deterrent came at a time of
mounting pressure on the government to debate nuclear weapons
policy, not only because of the pending Polaris replacement
decision but also because of NATO's 1979 dual-track decision
on the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in
Europe. Pym maintained in his statement of December 1979 on
NATO's theatre nuclear force modernization that the government
had not yet taken a decision about Polaris replacement and
Fred Mulley, Hansard, (24 Jan 1980), col. 702.
'There is no question of prestige or status.' Francis
Pym, Hansard (15 July 1980), col. 1249.
3' John Nott, 1{ansard (3 Mar 1981), col. 217.
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expressed his interest in a full nuclear debate. 35
 Pym's
January 1980 statement on the deterrent was a historical land-
mark: the first government-sponsored parliamentary debate on
nuclear policy in fifteen years. Negotiations with the US
over Trident were still underway and the government delayed
announcing its preferred Polaris replacement until after
signing final agreement. According to Pym, the details of
the sales agreement had not been agreed until July 1980.
REPLACEMENT OPTIONS
Replacing Polaris involved decisions about the launch
platform, the delivery vehicle, and whether the system
should be built independently or in cooperation with
France or the US.
	 The	 arguments	 for	 and against
alternative replacement systems revolved around
	 sur-
vivability, reliability and, not least, cost. The technical
Francis Pym, Hansard Vol 975 (13 Dec 1979), cols. 1548-9,
1551-2.
The previous one was on 16 and 17 December 1964 in the
context of a debate on foreign policy. See Hansard Vol. 704
especially (16 Dec 1964), cols. 415-443; According to Wilson
this debate had 'marked the end of a long chapter of sterile
argument about the so-called independent deterrent before and
since the (1964] election.' Harold Wilson, The Labour
Government. 1964-70 (Middlesex: Penguin, 1974), p. 87; see
also pp. 85-88.
Interview with Lord Francis Pym, 11 June 1991.
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difficulties and cost escalation encountered in the Polaris
Improvement Programme (Chevaline) revealed the risks of de-
veloping a strictly national system. Between 1972 and 1980
Chevaline programme costs escalated by over 300 per cent.
Once Polaris had been phased out of US service in 1981 the
need to develop production lines, hitherto only in the US,
further highlighted the expense of maintaining a system
unique to the UK. Consequently, the Ministry of Defence
placed a high priority on commonality with the US.
Launch Platforms
Choosing the launch platform was the least controversial
aspect of the replacement decision. There was wide agreement
that a sea-based deterrent was optimal. The range of
possible options included land-, air-, and sea-basing, but
Britain had effectively terminated its interest in land-based
missiles with its 1960 cancellation of the silo-based Blue
Streak missile due to its vulnerability to surprise
attack. 39
 An aircraft-based deterrent was vulnerable to
a Soviet first strike because it depended on airfields
which were well-known and easy targets for Soviet forces,
HC 296, Chevaline Improvement pf the Polaris Missile
System, pp. v-vi.
John Simpson, The Inde pendent Nuclear State: The United
States. Britain and the Military
 Atom (London: Macmillan,
1983), p. 154.
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particularly given the state of UK air defences and recent
Soviet air force improvements. Operation of a permanently
airborne deterrent was a costly means of reducing this de-
pendence.'0
 While still expensive, basing the deterrent at
sea had the dual advantage of keeping it away from
Britain's population centres and of improving the deterrent's
survivability because submarines at sea were difficult to
locate, track and destroy.
One proposed way of offsetting the expense of submarine
basing was to make the boats dual-purpose so they could
perform as hunter-killers while carrying the nuclear
deterrent force. Labour MP and former Navy Minister David
Owen supported this alternative, which was associated with the
deployment of cruise missiles as the delivery vehicle."
One disadvantage, however, was that dual capability would blur
the missions of the submarine force. Hunter/killer
submarines, as an attack force, would fulfil wartime missions
by seeking out and destroying enemy submarines and naval
forces. As discussed in relation to convoys in the previous
chapter, this increased their risk of detection and
destruction. To survive, SSBNS needed to avoid contact with
It also raised difficult strategic questions such as what
nuclear bombers should do if their airfields were destroyed,
especially if they were destroyed not with nuclear but
conventional bombs.
41 See below as it relates to Owen. On the dual-purpose of
a cruise missile force, see P.G. Johnson, 'Tomahawk: The im-
plications of a Strategic/Tactical Mix,' U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, (April 1982).
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enemy submarines by hiding in the more remote parts of the
ocean. Moreover, Soviet awareness that the British deterrent
force was 'dual capable' could have been a destabilizing
factor during crises, particularly if the Soviets detected
submarines operating in their home waters. It was on the basis
of not blurring the force's mission that the government




Obtaining a consensus over delivery vehicles was more
difficult, though the MoD leaned towards Trident from the
beginning. Nevertheless, the arguments over cruise or
ballistic missiles had to be aired. The main factors under
consideration were the warhead's ability to penetrate air
or ballistic missile defences and the cost of the system.
The concept of the cruise missile was an old one stemming
from the German V-1 'Doodlebug' missiles fired on London
during the Second World War. Both the US and Soviet Union
had been working on cruise missiles since the 1950s but
early versions were inaccurate, carried small payloads, and
consumed fuel inefficiently. Not until the early l970s did
cruise missile technologies begin to mature.
	 By 1980
42 See Ministry of Defence, The Future of the United Kinadom
Strateic Deterrent DOGD 80/23, July 1980, pp. 11,12,16.
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'advances in the design of munitions and jet engines, and in
high-energy fuel chemistry,...allow[ed) for a cruise
missile to pack an effective punch at long ranges.'43
Most important was the use of inertial navigation and Terrain
Contour Matching (TERCOM) to increase the cruise missile's
flight accuracy to 30 metres." These advances enabled
modern cruise missiles to travel 2500 kilometres at subsonic
speed, at extremely low altitudes, and to fly a circuitous
route to avoid known air defences and minimize the risk
of detection.'5
 As a result of these improvements cruise
missiles began to arouse considerable European interest as an
alternative to nuclear ballistic missiles.'6
While technological advances enhanced the capabilities of
cruise missiles their true appeal as an alternative delivery
vehicle was their relatively low cost of $1 million each.'7
As Foreign Secretary in Callaghan's government, David Owen
had worried that the MOD was
so anxious to get the best possible successor
force that it was ignoring perfectly sat-
isfactory	 and cheaper, if less impressive,
' Freedman, Britain and Nuclear WeaDons, p. 69.
R. Huisken, The Origins of the Strategic Cruise Missile,
New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 9.
' Ibid.
46 Lawrence D. Freedman, 'The European Nuclear Powers: Britain
and France,' in Richard K. Betts, (ed), Cruise Missiles:
Technology . Strategy,. Politics (Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution, 1981).
DOGD 80/23, Future of the UK Strateaic Deterrent, p. 14.
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alternatives such as cruise missiles on attack
submarines or keeping the existing force in
service longer.
The Economist later argued a similar point in an article
entitled 'Don't Forget the Cheap One.'49
Nor did the relatively low cost of cruise missiles
preclude an argument in their favour on strategic grounds.
Strategically, their advantages were accuracy and
flexibility. They possessed the capability to be used pre-
cisely; to knock out fairly small enemy installations, for
instance, rather than attacking an adversary's cities.5°
They could thus provide the option of targeting those com-
ponents of the Soviet Union's nuclear capabilities of
greatest interest to Britain. 5' Cruise missiles could also
be used to attack different cities simultaneously since each
missile could be targeted individually. But these options
were, arguably, outside the strategic purpose of Britain's
nuclear deterrent, which emphasised the ability to destroy
'key aspects of Soviet state power,' such as Moscow. 52
 The
' Freedman, Britain and Nuclear WeaDons, p. 61.
'Don't Forget the Cheap One,' The Economist, (29 Mar
1980).
50 Neville Trotter, Hansard (24 Jan 1980), col. 753.
For a critique of this role see Freedman, 'The European
Nuclear Powers,' p. 455.
52 Cmnd 8212-I, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1981,
p. 12, para 208; See also Lawrence Freedman, 'British Nuclear
Targeting,' in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, (eds),
Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1986).
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goal was to inflict 'damage which any Soviet leadership would
regard as out of all proportion to any likely gains from
aggression against us.
The MOD strongly favoured acquisition of Trident to
achieve Britain's strategic purpose and possibly also to en-
hance the prestige of Britain's deterrent. As a result, MOD
representatives argued against cruise missiles during MISC 7s
deliberations on a Polaris successor. The argument against
a cruise missile force was that it would be less survivable,
less reliable and less cost-effective than a deterrent force
composed of ballistic missiles. The cruise missile
characteristics most relevant to this critique were their
range, their speed, and the total cost of a cruise missile
force compared to an equivalent Trident force. While the
Service Chiefs favoured Trident, the Treasury and Service
staffs expressed concern over its cost, urging consideration
of less expensive alternatives. Nevertheless, cost analyses
in which cruise compared unfavourably to Trident were a
factor in persuading MISC 7 to approve Trident.55
Despite their accuracy, flexibility and low unit cost
cruise missiles had significant strategic disadvantages.
Cmnd 8212-I, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1981, p.
12, para 208.
The Mason report also included criticisms of the cruise
missile option. Freedman, Britain and Nuclear WeaDons, p. 71.
DOGD 80/23, Future of the UK Strategic Deterrent, p. 17,
para 43.
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They had a shorter range than ballistic missiles and were
vulnerable to destruction if detected. The shorter range
meant that a cruise-carrying submarine force would neces-
sarily be restricted to a much smaller area of sea operations
closer to the Soviet land mass. Consequently, the Soviet
Navy would have a smaller area in which to search for
British submarines, increasing the likelihood of detection.
Post launch detection was also a risk. Cruise missiles avoid
air defences by virtue of their small size, low altitude and
circuitous routing. However, if detected their slow speed
makes them vulnerable to destruction. There were thus
legitimate questions about the reliability of a cruise
missile force to complete its strategic mission. Firing
enough cruise missiles to saturate Soviet air defences was the
only way to improve the force's reliability.
Saturating Soviet air defences, however, raised addi-
tional operational problems. Firing large numbers of sea-
based cruise missiles could require up to two hours because
they are launched from submarine torpedo tubes requiring re-
loading. In a memorandum to the Expenditure Committee, the
International Institute of Strategic Studies estimated that
'Five (cruise missiles] must be flown to get one through.'57
' Sixth Report from the Expenditure Committee, 1978-79, The
Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear WeaDons Policy, (HC
348), 3 April 1979, p. 89; Peter Malone, The British Nuclear
Deterrent, (London: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 110.
HC 348, Future of the UK's Nuclear Wea pons Policy, p. 89.
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In addition to slowing arrival of the nuclear payload,
thereby easing the task for Soviet air defences, the
protracted launch period would have assisted Soviet efforts
to determine the origin of the missiles, further increasing
the risk to the submarine. Finally, the greater the number
of cruise missiles launched to ensure the effectiveness of
the salvo, the greater the cost of a cruise missile force.
The greater cost of building a large cruise missile
force nullified their greatest appeal. The MoD estimated that
a cruise missile force with the equivalent capabilities of
the proposed Trident force would require more than the four
submarines necessary to carry Trident missiles. Since
submarines were the most costly component of the deterrent,
this comparison made the cruise missile option appear
more expensive than Trident. The comparison may have
been misleading, however, since it lacked reference to
Britain's strategic requirements. The comparison did not
take into account that:
the size of the proposed Trident force was driven
not by the need to cover a particular set of
targets, but the fact that MIRVing came with
Trident and that a four-boat force was considered
the minimum consistent with sustaining a deterrent
threat
Trident would have been acceptable with fewer warheads, and
Lawrence Freedman, 'The Future of the British Strategic
Nuclear Deterrent,' in Geoffrey Till, (ed), The Future of
British SeaDower, (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 117.
Ibid.
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a more appropriate comparison would have been between
minimum cruise and Trident forces.60
The cruise missile option was vulnerable for at least
two other reasons: in 1979 no one knew whether the US would
build a submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) force or
whether restrictions on the range of cruise missiles would
emerge from the second round of the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT). First, if the US did not engage in a SLCM
programme then Britain's selection of this option auto-
matically ruled out joint participation with the US; Britain
would have to bear the full burden of the research and
development costs and would not have the advantage of sharing
US technological advances. 61
 Second, although cruise mis-
siles were excluded from SALT I they were the subject of a
protocol to SALT II. The protocol was in force in the
first instance until the end of 1981, when it could be ex-
tended upon US and Soviet agreement. It limited the range of
sea- and air-launched cruise missiles to 600km, making them
unable to hit the Soviet Union from any point in Europe.
Such a limited range would exacerbate the survivability
60 Ibid.
61 DOGD 80/23, Future of the UK Strateaic Deterrent, p. 16,
para 40.
See Protocol to the Treaty
 Between the United States of
America and the Soviet Socialist Reoublics on the Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms. June 18. 1979, Article II, para
1, in United States Arms Control Agency, Documents on
Disarmament. 1979 (washington, DC: GPO, 1982), p. 199.
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problem of a submarine-based deterrent by further reducing
the area in which the Soviets would have to search. The
protocol did not inhibit the transfer of cruise technologies
nor did it apply to British forces. It did, however, raise
questions about US willingness to assist or to condone
activities by Britain which would contravene the 'spirit of
SALT II.'
Although the government believed 'it would not be
impossible for British industry to develop and build ballis-
tic missiles for strategic use,' the great expense of
re-acquiring this capability led it to be quickly dismissed
as an unattractive option. 6' The closest thing to a strictly
national option was the prolongation of the existing
Polaris/Chevaline fleet. The Chevaline improvements to the
Polaris warhead were undertaken in the 1970s to improve the
capacity of Britain's deterrent to penetrate Moscow's Galosh
anti-ballistic missile defence (ABM). 65
 According to the
Committee on Public Accounts:
The Chevaline programme (was) designed to improve
the Polaris missile system by means of re-entry
vehicles hardened to resist the effects of anti-
ballistic missiles, with multiple warheads
Admiral Lord Hill-Norton, 'After Polaris,' The Economist,
(15 Sept 1979), p. 26.
64 DOGD 80/23, Future of the UK Strateaic Deterrent, p. 17,
para 44.
65 HC 269, Ministry
 of Defence Chevaline Inirroventent to the
Polaris Missile System, p. v.
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designed to confuse anti-ballistic missile radar.
Chevaline thus improved Polaris' ability to penetrate
Moscow's ABM defence without using multiple inde-
pendently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), which both
the US and Soviet Union had developed.67
One advantage of prolonging the operational life of
Chevaline was that, assuming there were no advances in
Soviet ABMs, Britain would possess an adequate deterrent
until uncertainty about the future political and strategic
environment had diminished. M
 Two aspects of the strategic
environment that would become evident with time were whether
the US would undertake a major sea-launched cruise missile
programme	 and whether	 the	 Soviet Union would
significantly expand its ABM capabilities. Although un-
certainties about the future could never be eliminated, de-
laying acquisition of a third-generation deterrent would have
provided Britain more information to calculate the future
requirements of its deterrent force, thereby reducing the
risk of acquiring a system which was either inadequate or
overly sophisticated (and therefore more costly) for Britain's
needs.
Ibid.
67 For technical descriptions of Chevaline see HC 269, p.
1; Mclnnes, Trident, p. 8; D.Fishlock, Financial Times (14
July 1981).
68 John Baylis, 'Britain and the Bomb,' in Gerald Segal,
Edwina Moreton, Lawrence Freedman and John Baylis, Nuclear
War and Nuclear Peace (London: Macmillan, 1983), p. 151.
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The main argument against prolonging Chevaline was the
financial burden of maintaining the Polaris missiles once
they were completely phased out of the US arsenal in 1981.
As mentioned, with the closure of US production lines all
Polaris work would have to be performed in Britain. It was
already possible that the missiles would need re-motoring
before a Polaris replacement became operational. If Polaris
missiles were retained in service beyond the early 1990s re-
motoring would certainly be necessary and would have to
performed on a larger scale. Replacement of the missile
propellant, with a life of five years, had previously been
performed in the United States. Britain would have to
undertake this task as well.
	 The expense of some of
the work could be defrayed by purchasing decommissioned US
Polaris missiles. These could at least provide a source of
spare parts and reduce the need for certain types of
production lines. However, in addition to regular
maintenance of the missiles Britain would face any un-
expected technical difficulties which Polaris developed alone,
and these would become increasingly likely with age. As the
cost-overruns of the Chevaline programme demonstrated,
sole responsibility for maintaining the high reliability of an
advanced missile system involved serious financial risk.
Moreover, the Chevaline missiles would also have to be placed
in new submarines, further increasing the cost of this
DOGD 80/23, Future of the UK Strategic Deterrent, p. 17.
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alternative. 70
In addition to the cost of maintaining Chevaline, the
government questioned its adequacy for the strategic environ-
ment of the late 1990s. According to the government,
Chevaline's adequacy could be assured only if Soviet ABM ad-
vances were 'unexpectedly modest • The Galosh system
around Moscow had 64 ABM launchers but under the terms of the
1972 ABM Treaty 100 launchers were allowed. Any additional
improvements to the system would require changes in the ABM
Treaty or would constitute a violation. The treaty was re-
viewed on a five year basis and the 1977 review had gone
smoothly. If the 1982 review were not as successful or if the
Soviets were in violation of the treaty, Britain could be
faced with 'a choice between keeping a force of much reduced
deterrent credibility and effectiveness, and changing our
plans on short notice.' In rejecting the prolongation of
Chevaline, the government ruled out the only viable
replacement option which could be enacted on an essentially
national basis.
There is no indication that the government considered the
possibility of constructing new submarines with missile com-
partments larger than necessary for Chevaline, but which
could be adapted to fire it, so that when a follow-on system
was purchased it could be fitted into the existing submarine
fleet. Baylis suggested this as an interim step until an-
other replacement system could be constructed. Baylis, 'Brit-
ain and the Bomb,' p. 149.
DOGD 80/23, Future of the UK Strategic Deterrent, p. 18.
72 Ibid.
201
A second alternative considered by the government 'at an
early stage' was cooperation with France. Franco-British
cooperation could have taken three forms: information
exchange, joint production of a missile, or British
purchase of a French missile, possibly the M4, which had a
4000km range and MIRV capability. 7' The main advantages,
excluding the positive political effect on Franco-British
relations, arose mainly in comparison to an independent
project since that would inevitably cost more. 7' Otherwise,
the many advantages of continuing nuclear cooperation with
the US made it difficult for France to compete as a nuclear
partner and the long history of Anglo-American nuclear co-
operation stemmed from an agreement preventing either party
from transferring technologies acquired
	 through	 this
partnership to third parties.76
Joint Franco-British cooperation thus had the potential
to raise political problems related to technology transfers.
The resulting controversy would, it appeared, inhibit the suc-
cess of a joint project. Jonathan Alford believed that 'any
such initiative is quite likely to place at risk the whole
Ibid, p. 19.
' Mclnnes, Trident, p. 193.
7' Ibid, p. 194.
The Anglo-American Bilateral Exchange of Information
Areement of 1958; see John Baylis, Analo-American Defense
Relations,. 1939-84, (London: Macmillan, 1984), Appendix 10.
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transatlantic relationship.' France's emphasis on national
independence, especially in nuclear matters, risked exac-
erbating these potential difficulties.Th Furthermore, the
economic and technological benefits of collaboration with
France would not be nearly as great as cooperation with the
US, which enjoyed the advantage of larger economies of scale
and more sophisticated nuclear technologies. On political and
economic grounds the government concluded there was 'no ad-
equate basis on which such an option could now have been pur-
sued. 179
In principle there were two main US ballistic missile
options for the British Government to consider: Poseidon
and Trident. The Trident programme actually involved two
missiles, the C4 and the D5, but the D5 was still in its
development stage and no decision had been made to produce it.
The Poseidon missile was an advanced version of Polaris. It
Nailor and Alford, The Future of Britain's Deterrent
Force, p. 29.
Ibid; Subsequent claims that Franco-American nuclear
cooperation was far greater than imagined raise doubts about
the constraints which may actually have existed on Anglo-
French nuclear collaboration. See Richard H. Ullman, 'The
Covert French Connection,' ForeiQn Polic y
 Number 75, (Summer
1989). Comments by Harold Brown also indicate that Franco-
American nuclear cooperation was not anathema within the US
defence establishment, even if high-profile cooperation was
not practical: 'The sale of Trident to France never became a
live issue because they had long before adopted the view that
they wanted their strategic forces to be completely
independent. It may have been suggested but it was never a
real issue.' Interview with Harold Brown, 25 January 1991.
DOGD 80/23, Future of the UK Stratectic Deterrent, p. 19,
para 48.
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was a MIRVed system capable of carrying up to fourteen
warheads of smaller size and yield than Polaris or Trident.
With a reduced payload Poseidon's range was around 300
nautical miles greater than that of the Polaris A3.
Acquiring Poseidon might have been done relatively
inexpensively (and certainly for less than Trident) as the
missiles were due to be phased out of US service around
1990, after which time Britain could purchase the missiles
secondhand. However, as with Chevaline, this arrangement
would have meant the absence of commonality with the US to
ease the burden of maintenance and major repair. The
difficulties of maintaining a Poseidon missile force unique
to the UK could be even greater than with Chevaline because
Britain had no prior experience with the system.
Moreover, Britain had rejected the option of purchasing
Poseidon in the early 1970s, probably because of doubts
about US willingness to transfer the sensitive MIRV
technology. 80
 This earlier rejection made Poseidon, built
from 1970s technology, a less attractive replacement option.
Although Poseidon was a MIRVed missile, compared to Trident
it was considerably less capable. 8' Such a comparison was
justified because although Poseidon's initial purchase price
would be lower than Trident's, the costs of maintaining an
80 Sir Frank Cooper in HC 269, Chevaline ImDrovement, Qs. 160,
173.
81 DOGD 80/23, Future of the UK Strateaic Deterrent, p. 19.
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ageing Poseidon system and of adapting a British warhead to
it increased the risks of long-term cost escalation.R
Acquiring the next generation of missile and the most
advanced US SLBM available had an obvious appeal. The
Trident C4 was a MIRVed missile with eight warheads and a
range of 4,000 nautical miles. It thus had the best chance
of all the options of remaining effective into the 21st
century. It also had the important advantage of
simultaneously being in service with the US Navy, with all the
concomitant benefits in terms of research and maintenance
costs. Trident's main drawback was its cost. The specific
figure was, however, dependent on the outcome of Anglo-
American negotiations. The government knew the basic cost
before these got underway, but the key question -- the
percentage of research and development costs to be paid by
Britain -- remained unresolved.
The predominant view within the US Department of Defense
was that once the British Government decided to replace
Polaris there was very little choice: 'There was no way the
British could support the infrastructure of a system which the
US wasn't producing and the US would be supporting and
producing only one system. ' Ultimately, it was this
logic, expressed in slightly less robust terms, that guided
the government's decision:
82 IbId.
Interview with Walter Slocombe, 10 January 1991.
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Given that, as with Polaris, our operational inde-
pendence can remain unimpaired, there is great
financial advantage in the maximum possible
commonality with the United States, especially in
view of their high technology, the massive scale of
their own missile procurement and our long experi-
ence of working efficiently together.M
The MoD submitted its final recommendation in favour of
Trident to MISC 7 in November 1979 with the approval of all
the Chiefs of Staff. 85
 The support of the Service Chiefs,
however, was qualified by concerns lower down in the ranks
that Trident was too costly and would result in cutbacks in
other parts of the defence budget.
TRIDENT NEGOTIATIONS, 1979-80
The attitude of new or incoming US Presidents toward
Anglo-American cooperation has been a perennial concern in
Whitehall. The 'special relationship' is seen as an important
symbol of British influence in world affairs. On a practical
level, it can expand or narrow the range of options available
in the exercise of British foreign and defence policy. The
Trident negotiations, uniting both the symbolic and practical
aspects of the relationship in a sensitive area of policy,
were vitally important. What they reveal of significance to
the 1981 defence review is both British sensitivity to US
DOGD 80/23, Future of the UK Strategic Deterrent, p. 12.
85 D.Fairhall, Guardian (1 Nov 1979).
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strategic concerns and yet the limited extent to which the US
was willing and capable of exercising influence over its
closest ally.
The Carter Administration's strong emphasis on nuclear
non-proliferation led Ian Smart to conclude in 1977 that:
'There must, in fact, be considerable doubt about the will-
ingness of such an Administration to join the imitation of
Nassau. Although such concerns were natural given the
importance to Britain of its strategic nuclear deterrent any
fears that the Carter Administration would not provide Trident
were misplaced. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 'never
considered the US decision to sell Trident (to Britain] one of
the more difficult ones to make.' 87 Likewise, Walter
Slocombe, Deput Under Secretary for Policy Planning at the
Defense Department, believed
there was no real question that the Carter
Administration was prepared to sell Trident to the
UK. The decision on that basic point was made very
early in the Carter Administration and then it was
a question of working out the nitty-gritty details.
Once the big issue of whether to sell the system
was resolved then the scene shifted and there was a
haggle over the price.
Anglo-American nuclear cooperation was the status quo.
There are usually dissenting voices within any government
considering a step as important as a major sale of strategic
Smart, The Future of the British Nuclear Deterrent, p. 16.
57 Interview with Harold Brown, 25 January 1991.
88 Interview with Walter Slocombe, 10 January 1991.
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weaponry and in 1979 and 1980 sensitive questions about the
sale of Trident to Britain were raised by the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency and the State Department. However, the
decision in principle to provide assistance to Britain in the
nuclear field had been made and codified in 1963 with the
signing of the Nassau Agreement. According to Harold Brown,
There was considerable concern about non-
clRLtjmvention within State and ACDA but since we had
provided nuclear assistance to Britain since the
1960s with the planned sale of the Skybolt missile
the question of non-circumvention never became a
sticking point.89
In the context of the late l970s a decision to terminate
Anglo-American cooperation would have represented the greater
departure in established foreign policy and thus would have
been far more controversial even than a decision to share the
most advanced nuclear technologies. The US Government had been
aware for some time that Britain was approaching the point at
which a decision on Polaris replacement would be necessary.
The Carter Administration made the decision, in principle, to
sell Trident to Britain possibly as early as 1978, but
certainly 'well before the final stages of the SALT II
talks,' which ended in June l979.
Concern about the implications for SALT II was more
likely to inspire congressional opposition to the sale. The
administration believed, as stated by Brown, that established
Interview with Harold Brown, 25 January 1991; See also
Mclnnes, Trident, p. 18.
Interview with Harold Brown, 25 January 1991.
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practice rendered SALT irrelevant to Anglo-American nuclear
cooperation: 'The US view was that the non-circumvention
clause of SALT II did not mean that continued American
cooperation with Britain on its nuclear programme entitled the
USSR to compensation in arms control talks.' 9' Likewise,
continuity in the relationship was a factor in the
administration's assessment of Congress's willingness to
provide I4IRV technologies to Britain. Some senior US
officials wanted 'to provide Trident on the same terms to the
French as we provided it to the British. .92 One reason why
the proposal was not accepted, however, was concern that
Congress would not go along. Clearly the administration
did not have similar concerns about Congressional attitudes
towards Britain.
A greater concern was whether purchasing Trident was the
best use of British defence funds. Some US officials viewed
Britain's deterrent as redundant due to the size of the US
nuclear arsenal. The US Navy opposed the Trident sale, for
instance, because they believed it was unnecessary for
deterrence and worried that the cost would compete with other
Royal Navy tasks. The Navy was not solely responsible for
the Trident design, however, as it emerged from a variety of
groupings within the Defense Department, not all of which were
91 Interview with Harold Brown, 25 January 1991.
n Interview with Robert Komer, 9 January 1991.
Interview with Robert Komer, 9 January 1991.
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under Navy contro1. 	 As a result, they had little say in
the decision of whether to share the design.'5
While key administration officials shared the view that
purchasing Trident was not the best use of British defence
funds, they also recognised that if the British Government was
determined to replace Polaris it was in the US interest to
assist. No one in the administration believed the US was in
a position, nor that it should be, to influence British
national decision-making on such a vital issue. Carter had
personally indicated a willingness to sell Trident to
Britain when Callaghan had raised the issue with him in
Guadeloupe. 9' Before the May 1979 British election the
administration reexamined the possible responses to a British
request for Trident and reaffirmed the decision to respond
favourably. 97
 However, the effect of the Trident purchase on
Britain's conventional forces played an important role in
detailed negotiations over the sales agreement.
The Thatcher Government's discussions with the Carter
Administration about the future of Britain's nuclear deter-
rent began in July 1979. One of Pym's first acts as
Secretary of State for Defence was to fly to Washington for
' On the design and development of Trident see D. Douglas
Dalgleish and Larry Schweicart, Trident (Carbondale:
Illinois, Southern Illinois University, 1984), chapter three.
'5 Interview with Robert Komer, 9 January 1991.
' Callaghan, Time and Chance, pp. 553-4.
7 Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, p. 66.
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an initial 'exchange of views' with Harold Brown. Like
Brown, Pym 'never doubted that once a strategic decision was
taken to purchase that a suitable sales agreement could be
worked out with the Americans. It was simply a question of
working out the practical details.' Accordingly, their
meeting was followed by a series of technical exchanges in
which the US responded to British requests for information
about various weapons systems. 1
	The practice on the
Trident negotiations, as these talks became, was that:
Technicians would negotiate issues and the MOD-DOD
top level would meet every six months or so to
reach agreements. It usually took more than just
one meeting each time. Over a period of a few
meetings agreements were usually reached.'°'
Thatcher reportedly hoped that she and President Carter
could finalize an agreement at their December summit meeting
in Washington. 102
 Thatcher rejected claims that the
government had already decided on a Polaris successor, but
Trident was nevertheless on the summit agenda. 103
 Despite
speculation that an agreement was close at hand the two
quoted in Mclnnes, Trident, p. 16.
Interview with Lord Francis Pym, 11 June 1991.
100 Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Wea pons, pp. 67-8.
101 Interview with Robert Komer, 9 January 1991.
D.Fairhall, Guardian (1 Nov 1979).
103 Mclnnes, Trident, p. 16; Times (27 Nov 1979); Interview
with the Secretary of State for Defence Mr Francis Pym
during BBC TV 'Panorama' Programme (10 Dec 1979).
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governments remained deeply involved in negotiations over the
price Britain would pay. Quite simply, according to Slocombe,
'we wanted them to pay as much as they could and they wanted
to pay as little as possible."°'
The focal point of the dispute was the percentage of
research and development costs the British would assume. The
British Government was disturbed that they should be required
to defray the expense for the US of a weapon system that was
being built anyway. According to Brown, 'R&D costs were a
contentious matter with the British; we felt it was important
to share these costs fully and they felt the incremental R&D
costs were the appropriate measure, and were negligible.'105
This view was echoed by Komer: 'the US wanted the British to
share in the R&D costs -- they said "you are developing it
yourself so why should we have to pay that?" 106
 Slocombe
believed that 'Anything we sold them was a bargain for us
because it absorbed some R&D costs the US had already paid.
The British recognized that it was a generous deal but not so
outrageously good that they should make great sacrifices to
get	 1107
Negotiations over the Trident sale may have been
difficult as a result of the dispute over R&D costs, but at
104 Interview with Walter Slocombe, 10 January 1991.
105 Interview with Harold Brown, 25 January 1991.
106 Interview with Robert Komer, 9 January 1991.
107 Interview with Walter Slocombe, 10 January 1991.
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the policy level 'there was never any doubt that all of the
issues would be resolved. It is very unusual for these
negotiations between friendly governments to fail when the
decision in principle has already been made.'108
Nevertheless, because of the symbolism of the Anglo-American
nuclear cooperation at the heart of the 'special
relationship,' the misunderstanding was not inconsequential.
It was important to Britain, for political as well as
financial reasons, to secure a deal as favourable as the
Polaris Sales Agreement.
United States practice on the calculation of research and
development costs for collaborative weapons projects is
determined by statute. Under the Arms Export Control Act
passed by Congress in 1976 research and development costs are
calculated as a oro rata charge based on the production
line. In effect, there was an R&D surcharge so that the
proportion of R&D costs payable related directly to the
percentage of the production line that was purchased.'° The
surcharge was calculated within the Department of Defense and
the Secretary of Defense had the authority to waive or reduce
the R&D payments requested of recipient states. Negotiators
on the US side insisted on computing the Trident R&D charge by
Interview with Walter Slocombe, 10 January 1991.
109 International Security Assistance and Arms Control Export
Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-329; 90 Statute 734).
110 Mclnnes, Trident, p. 18.
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statute. This insistence was interpreted by the British as an
attempt to charge $2 billion more than the accepted final sale
price. However, US negotiators accepted the final sales price;
they simply wanted the price to be calculated in a different
way -- according to statute.
The misunderstanding leaked to the media, among whom it
was rumoured that Pentagon bureaucrats were blocking the
Trident deal. The preliminary US offer involved ten per cent
R&D costs." 1 President Carter, under congressional
pressure to conform with standard US practice, requested that
Britain pay around $400 million (Fl 1980) for research and
development.' 12
 The content of the US offer, in addition to
the high cost of the missile itself, may have been the
cause of the 'shock' over Trident's price tag which Prime
Minister Thatcher reportedly experienced at the December Sum-
mit.113
The British maintained that they should be subject only
to a five per cent surcharge because of the precedent es-
tablished by the Polaris Sales Agreement. President Kennedy
had agreed to sell Polaris to Britain at the low R&D surcharge
of five per cent but subsequently, in 1966, the R&D charge
had been waived 'in return for communication and refuelling
111 J.Connell, Sunday Times (21 Feb 1982).
112 J.Connell, Sunday Times (21 Feb 1982); Mclnnes, Trident,
p. 18.
113 P.Calvocoressi, Sunday Times (6 April 1980).
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facilities on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean." 1' The
joint statement issued following the December summit indicated
agreement only on more fundamental matters: that Britain
should maintain a strategic deterrent force, that Anglo-
American strategic cooperation should continue, and that the
two governments 'should continue their discussions of
the most appropriate means of achieving these objectives for
the future.'5
Ultimately, the British and American negotiators reached
a compromise involving US purchase of the British Rapier air
defence system. The possibility of the US purchasing Rapier
had existed at least since the beginning of 1979 when the
Pentagon urged the US Army to purchase Rapier instead of the
Army's own Roland air defense missile." 6 But air defence
protection for US bases in Britain was first publicly
mentioned in connection with the sale of Trident after the
December summit." 7 The idea had gradually passed up the
Pentagon hierarchy to Robert Komer, prime mover on the 'Two-
114 Alan Dobson, 'The Years of Transition: Anglo-American
Relations, 1961-1967,' Review of International Studies vol.
16, No. 3 (July 1990), p. 253; Baylis, Anglo-American Defence
Relations, p. 153.
115 Joint Statement by the White House and the Prime Minis-
ter, issued in Washington on Tuesday 18th December 1979,
Verbatim Press Service 137/79, (19 Dec 1979), p. 2.
116 R.Barnard, Defense Week (7 April 1980).
117 D.A.Brown, Aviation Week & Space Technolov (21 July
1980); A.Brummer, Guardian (1 Sept 1980); Mclnnes, Trident, p.




The Two Way Street was an initiative to rationalize the
system of arms sales between the US and Europe. The basic
idea was that arms purchases should be reciprocal; the US
would purchase from Europe and vice versa. The Rapier/Trident
compromise proved to be the first memorandum of understanding
agreed as part of this initiative. Under the compromise the
US agreed that Britain would pay a five per cent R&D
surcharge, and purchased Rapier (partially to offset the
British purchase of Trident). In return Britain provided the
manpower to operate Rapier batteries surrounding US bases
in the UK. The pre-positioning of US equipment and stocks on
the British-owned island of Diego Garcia was also reportedly
connected to the Trident deal, though not explicitly in the
sales agreement.
Amid extreme secrecy on June 13 Walter Slocombe and
Ronald Mason signed the agreement finalising the wording of
the letters constituting the Trident agreement which were to
be exchanged between Thatcher and Carter and Pym and
Brown. 118
 On July 4, 1980, a decision was made to publish
the letters, but American sensitivities about announcing
the deal during West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's visit
to Moscow and while US-Soviet talks on nuclear weapons were
Mclnnes, Trident, p. 18.
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underway led the announcement to be postponed. 119 The
British Government had to delay its announcement until after
Washington informed it that the time for a formal public
request for assistance was appropriate.'20
 The agreed
date of the announcement was July 17 and MISC 7 planned to
brief the Cabinet that morning and to announce the deal in
Parliament that afternoon. 121
 However, President Carter
briefed Congressional leaders on July 14, and Senator Howard
Baker, apparently while at the Republican National Convention
leaked the story to the New York Times. 122
 Senior British
ministers learned of the leak the night of the 14th and
rather than risk that the deal would be publicised before the
Cabinet or Parliament had been informed, the decision was made
to announce the deal in Parliament the following day.
Cabinet members were contacted, mainly by telephone, for
119 Fourth Report from the Defence Committee, 1980-81,
Strategic Nuclear Weapons Policy
 (HC 36), 20 May 1981, Q. 388;
P.Hennessy, Times (20 May 1980); The need for Carter to
notify Congress of the sale thirty days in advance may also
have contributed to the postponement. D.A.Brown, AW&ST (21
July 1980). It is unclear whether Carter provided Congress
with 30 days notice or whether he first informed Congressional
leaders July 14.
120 Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, p. 68.
121 Mclnnes, Trident, p. 19.
122 Ibid; A senior Administration official declared it a
coincidence that the Trident announcement was made just as
the Republican National Convention got underway. He said the
deal had been completed one month earlier but that the
Thatcher Government had wanted to 'make sure' this was the
best option before announcing it. H.David, Dail y Telegraph
(16 July 1980).
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their approval, telegrams were sent to other NATO leaders,
the Government's White Paper was hurriedly printed, and a
Parliamentary announcement was scheduled for three p.m.'23
Unknown to the government The New York Times had spiked the
story as uninteresting.
The manner of announcing the decision was highly
controversial. The Defence and External Affairs Subcommittee
of the House Expenditure Committee had begun considering
British nuclear policy in January 1979, but as a result of the
General Election the enquiry ended in April. 124 The minutes
of evidence were printed with a mere two and one half page
committee report concluding,
Your Committee have laid before the House the
evidence taken during the inquiry in the hope that
it will be of use to both Members and the public,
and be available for consideration by a committee
of the new Parliament."25
When Pym announced the Trident decision the new Select
Committee on Defence had such a study underway, prompting the
Labour defence spokesman to declare,
There are those who will say that it could be a
contempt of the House for the Secretary of State to
123 Freedman, 'Britain: The First Ex-Nuclear Power,'p. 80,
note 2; Mclnnes, Trident, p. 19; Speed, Sea Change, p. 162.
124 on the role of the Committee System in the House of
Commons see Andrew Cox and Stephen Kirby, Congress. Parliament
and Defence (London: Macmillan, 1986); Masood Hyder,
'Parliament and Defence Affairs: The Defence Sub-Committee of
the Expenditure Committee,' Public Administration Vol. 55
(Spring 1977); Philip Norton, 'Britain's Reform Parliament,'
The Parliamentarian Vol. 67, No. 2 (April 1986).
125 HC 348, Future of the UK's Nuclear Weapons Policy, para 8.
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make an announcement of this sort before the select
committee of this House have had the opportunity to
discuss the matter.
The Labour Party had, as noted earlier, committed itself
to 'full and informed discussion' before taking a replacement
decision, but even some within the Conservative Party favoured
more consultation. When the consideration of replacement
options was clearly underway in 1979 Conservative XP Julian
Critch].ey tabled a motion calling for a consultative document,
a Green Paper, to be issued prior to a decision. 127
 Pyin
defended the government's prerogative to make policy decisions
and then defend them in the House, declaring this practice to
be 'wholly in accordance with our parliamentary and
constitutional practice.' 128
 Yet even within Cabinet the
method of decision-making was criticised, notably by John
Nott, then Secretary of State for Trade: 'When this was
announced in Cabinet I protested that this was not the way in
which business should be done.' Nott's protest, however,
was not that Parliamentary and public consultation had been
inadequate, but that members of the government, who would have
to defend the decision, should have been included:
This was a fundamental matter of national security.
126 William Rodgers, Hansard (15 July 1980), col. 1237.
127 
Bruce George and Karl Pieragostini, 'British Defence in
the 1980's: What Price Trident?' International Securit y
 Review
Vol 5, No. 4 (Winter 1980-81), p. 441.
128 Francis Pym, Hansard (15 July 1980), col. 1238.
129 Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
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The whole Cabinet should have understood that this
was being considered and I didn't think it was good
enough for a small group of ministers to come to a
decision and just inform the Cabinet that was what
they were going to do.'°
The Prime Minister, and other members of MISC 7, were
less concerned with consultation, which risked dissent, than
with promulgating a fundamental policy decision through the
announcement of what they saw as a favourable purchase. The
Trident/Rapier compromise enabled Pym to describe the Trident
deal as 'on the same lines as the 1962 Nassau Agreement.'131
Britain was to purchase the Trident C4 missile complete with
its MIRV capability and though the force would be assigned to
NATO it would remain under British operational control. Pym
explained that Britain would independently construct the four
or five submarines on which the Trident missiles would be de-
ployed in the early l990s. The final decision on the choice
between four and five boats was delayed until 1982 or 1983
when the government could more fully assess 'operational,
international and resource factors, including the defence
130 Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
131 Francis Pym, Hansard (15 July 1980), col. 1235; The U.S.
purchase of Rapier was to cost between £l65-180 million and
the costs to Britain of maintaining them would be around £5
million. L.McCain and R.Evans, Financial Times, (16 July
1980); Pym did not, however, present the cost of manning
the Rapiers as part of the cost of acquiring Trident. Also,
according to the Defence White Paper of 1981, 'A further
exchange of letters between the two governments on 30
September 1980 extended the provisions of the 1963 Polaris
Sales Agreement to cover the supply of Trident.' Cmnd.
8212-I, Statement on the Defence Estimates, p. 14, para 210.
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budget situation. ,132
The government estimated the total cost of the purchase
at £5 billion spread over a fifteen year period. The
percentage outlay during this period was expected to be be-
tween three and four per cent of the annual defence budget;
in the peak spending years of the late 198 Os the figure
would rise to five per cent of the defence budget and eight
per cent of the equipment budget.' Pym emphasized that
to compensate for the high cost of Trident, seventy per cent
of the total cost would be spent in Britain and would be 're-
flected in a substantial amount of emp1oyment."' Pym also
expressed the government's intention to 'uphold and, where
necessary, strengthen our all-round defence capability,' in-
cluding conventional forces.135
Not surprisingly, the potential impact of Trident on the
rest of Britain's defence programme had become linked to the
negotiations over its sale. At their summit Thatcher and
Carter discussed the level of NATO's conventional armament
and NATO's 1978 Long-Term Defence Programme in connection with
132 DOGD 80/23, Future of UK Strateaic Deterrent, p. 22; see
also Francis Pym, Hansard (15 July 1980), col. 1235.
133 Francis Pym, Mansard (15 July 1980), col. 1240.
' Francis Pym, Mansard (15 July 1980), cols. 1235-6.
135 Francis Pym, Mansard (15 July 1980), col. 1236.
221
the future of Britain's deterrent. 	 'In the second stage
of negotiations there was US concern that the British were
mortgaging their defence budget to maintain their nuclear
deterrent. .137
	
The US was concerned that, according to
Brown,
Britain was unable to fund all the defences it
might want: defence funds had to be divided between
conventional and strategic forces. We thought that
the US could cover the strategic needs but we
recognized that Britain also wanted a strategic
capability. We didn't want them to spend a large
proportion of defence funds on something marginal
and we considered it more important to keep up the
BAOR than add incrementally to British strategic
forces. We didn't have a major voice in how they
spent their money and were prepared to help them
anyway. But we thought the lower cost Trident I
was more suited to British needs.'
As a result of these concerns the US sought guarantees that
Trident would not detract from Britain's conventional
defences.
Conventional weapons were quite a big issue in the
negotiations. The Pentagon, especially, was
concerned about the effect of the Trident decision.
But neither the MOD nor the Thatcher Government
could say more than that the independent strategic
deterrent was not going to mortgage Britain's
conventional defence budget.'39
British negotiators responded to US concerns by indicating a
willingness to spend on Britain's conventional contribution
Joint statement by the White House and the Prime
Minister, issued in Washington on Tuesday 18th December 1979,
Verbatim Press Service 137/79 (19 Dec 1979), p. 2.
Interview with Walter Slocombe, 10 January 1991.
Interview with Harold Brown, 25 January 1991.
139 Interview with Walter Slocombe, 10 January 1991.
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to NATO whatever it saved by buying Trident. The Pentagon
recognised that this pledge was the best it could get.14°
Britain's intention to upgrade its conventional forces
was incorporated into the final agreement. The pledges were
recorded in Thatcher's formal letter to Carter requesting the
Trident missile:
The United Kingdom Government has substantially
increased its defence spending, in accordance
with NATO'S collective policy, and plans to make
further such increases in future in order to
improve the effectiveness of its all-round
contribution to Allied deterrence and defence.
In this regard the objective of the United Kingdom
Government is to take advantage of the economies
made possible by the cooperation of the United
States in making the Trident I missile system
available in order to reinforce its efforts to
upgrade its conventional forces.161
With the conduct of the Nott review the following year, these
statements of intent were not realised, but US officials
nevertheless did not believe Trident was the decisive factor
in bringing about the 1981 review.142
The single most important argument that Trident brought
about the 1981 review was that the incidence of Trident
'° Interview with Walter Slocombe, 10 January 1991.
141 Cmnd 7979, The British Strate gic Nuclear Force: Texts
of Letters Exchanged between the Prime Minister and the
President of the United States and between the Secretary of
State for Defence and the United States Secretar y
 of Defence
(July 1980), p. 1.
Interview with Walter Slocombe, 10 January 1991; Interview
with Robert Komer, 9 January 1991.
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expenditure had not been incorporated into the budget.143
When the Polaris decision was taken in 1962 it entered the
programme slot vacated by the cancelled Skybolt missile.
Hence there had been no need for a major redistribution of
funds. Due to the political problems surrounding Polaris
replacement it would have been surprising for a Labour
minister to allocate expenditure on Trident before a formal
decision had been taken. Yet officials in the MoD had been
aware of a pending decision on Polaris replacement since the
late 1970s and defence planners, forced to live within the
rigid cash limits system, had a strong incentive to place
money into forward plans for a large non-allocated item.
Absence of a political decision would not necessarily have
precluded them from taking this step on the basis of sound
defence management. The argument that Trident caused the 1981
defence review thus depends on the assumption that because
there was no evidence of Trident expenditure in the Defence
Estimates, it was not there. The expense of Chevaline,
however, went undetected for over eight years. The prevalence
of secrecy in British nuclear policy, though not complete, and
the extent to which economic logic affects defence decisions -
- both points illustrated in this chapter -- suggests that
143 See Peter Nailor in 'Polaris Successor: Report of A
Seminar,' RUSI Journal Vol. 125, No. 3 (September 1980), p.
16.
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there are good reasons for questioning the argument that
Trident caused the 1981 defence review.
CHAPTER SIX
Politics and Defence Budgeting, 1979-1981
The outstanding twin priorities of the Conservative
Government, defence and economic recovery, were an obvious
source of potential conflict. Initially, three per cent
annual increases in defence spending were thought to be
sustainable beyond the 1981-82 NATO commitment and that is why
service plans assumed they would continue. However, the
postulated economic growth failed to materialize. Recession in
1979 and 1980 raised doubts, not only within the Treasury but
within the Defence Secretariat as well, about whether the
three per cent increases were sustainable. Due to rising
equipment costs and the need to accommodate a number of new
programmes in the budget, including Trident, Long-Term
Costings suggested that within three to four years a major gap
would emerge between the existing defence programme and
available resources. Ultimately, economic priorities took
precedence over defence, with a perception of inefficiency
within the ministry contributing to the decision to undertake
a fundamental review.
DEFENCE MANAGEMENT, 1979-80
The members of Prime Minister Thatcher's first government
diverged along the lines of their economic philosophies. The
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so-called 'wets' were traditional Tories who, like Edward
Heath, favoured consensus politics and were not alarmed by a
modicum of government intervention in the economy. Secretary
of State for Defence Francis Pym, viewed by many as a natural
heir to the Conservative mantle, and an obvious political
rival of the Prime Minister, was a leading figure among
Cabinet 'wets'. The 'dry' monetarist views of Margaret
Thatcher, shared by only a handful of other ministers --
albeit in key posts -- meant that to a certain extent the
Prime Minister was isolated within her own Cabinet.'
Conflicting political and economic pressures on the defence
budget aggravated these divisions.
Following the Conservative victory in 1979 the Treasury
announced an ambitious new cash limits policy. In a budget
statement of 12 June 1979 Chancellor of the Exchequer Geoffrey
Howe stated that the goal of the policy was to 'reduce the
volume of planned expenditure by about £1 billion at 1979
survey prices. ,2 The 1979 public expenditure survey predicted
that actual defence expenditure in fiscal year 1979-80 would
be approximately £200 million less than budgeted by the
Labour Government, due mainly to industrial slippage brought
Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991; See also
Hugo Young, One of Us: A Biograohy of Maraaret Thatcher
(London: Macmillan, 1989), especially chapter eleven, 'The
Capture of Cabinet.'
2 Geoffrey Howe, Hansard (12 June 1979), col. 246.
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about by industrial action and shortages. 3 The budget agreed
by the conservatives for 1980-81 cut planned defence
spending by £220 million, but these initial decisions about
defence nevertheless represented a 3.5 per cent increase over
actual 1979-80 spending, and an increase over the previous
government's plans after 1982-83.' The government's long-
term plan was for defence spending to rise annually by three
per cent to £8.74 billion by 1983-84.
These adjustments, particularly the decision to increase
defence spending while reducing the budgets of other
ministries, reflected the government's strong commitment to
defence. However, they also demonstrated the potential
conflict between the government's economic priorities and its
commitment to defence spending. Government plans lowered the
established base line for defence budget increases. The new
base line, actual 1979-80 spending, had fallen short of a
three per cent increase from the year before. 6 Not only was
the three per cent pledge being fudged, but even if fulfilled
Cmnd 7841, The Government's ExDenditure Plans. 1980-81 to
1983-84, (March 1980), p. 23.
' In 1980 survey prices. Cmnd 8212-Il, 1980-81, Statement on
the Defence Estimates. 1981, table 2.2; Cmnd. 7841,
Expenditure Plans, p. 22; See also David Greenwood, 'Setting
Defence Priorities,' ADITJ Re port Vol • 3, No. 3 (May/June
1981).
Cmnd 7841, Eenditure Plans, table 2.1; £10,545 million in
1980 survey prices.
6 David Greenwood, 'NATO's Three Per Cent Solution,' Survival
(Nov/Dec 1981), p. 255.
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it was inadequate to do more than fund existing plans. Yet
the Conservatives had raised hopes of defence increases.
Service pay and conditions been the top priority of the new
government and, according to a Chatham House Briefing Paper on
the new government's foreign policy, 'the proposed increase in
defence allocations has not been specified but apparently it
will be beyond the 3-per-cent increase in real terms already
adopted by the Labour Government for 1979-80 and 1980-81.'
However, the Briefing Paper also noted that 'past Conservative
Government's have found it necessary to cut defence
expenditure in fraught economic circumstances. Any long-term
improvement in military capabilities depends on sustained
economic growth.'7
Pym initially believed he had adequate resources to carry
out the defence programme and had no reason to complain about
MOD funding while the budgets of other ministries declined.
Consequently, there were no disagreements between Pym and the
Prime Minister over the 1980 budget. 8
 However, government
economic forecasts on which forward plans were based proved
overoptimistic. In 1980 high inflation and a recession
prompted defence contractors 'to deliver goods with unknown
speed.' 9
	Ministry officials concluded early in the fiscal
Chatham House Briefings, Foreign Policy
 and the New
Government, No. 1 (The Royal Institute of International
Affairs, May 1979), p. 5.
8 Interview with Lord Francis Pym, 11 June 1991.
Interview with Sir Frank Cooper, 24 April 1991.
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year 'that expenditure was running ahead of the levels which
would be required to enable us to live within our cash urn-
its.
In response to the rapid outflow of defence funds, in
spring 1980 Pym authorized senior officials to develop
proposals to reduce budgetary pressures. The resulting
'mini-review' emerged from the Defence Programme Working
Party (DPWP), consisting of Sir Michael Quin]an, Deputy Under
Secretary (Policy), Air Chief Marshal Joseph Gilbert,
Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Policy), and Admiral Stephen
Berthon, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Operational
Requirements).' 1
 Working with the services, the DPWP
developed a package of interim cuts, including cancellation of
the Army's long-term tank proj ect (MBT-80), the RAF' s Jaguar
replacement programme, and the removal of £1.8 billion from
the Royal Navy budget. 12
 However, these cuts affected
forward plans more than short-term expenditure and were unable
to alleviate financial stress in the current fiscal year. Nor
was the additional £200 million made available to the MOD in
10 Desmond Bryars, Deputy Under Secretary (Finance and
Budgets) in Defence Committee Minutes of Evidence taken on 11
and 18 March 1981, 1980-81, Defence Cuts and Defence Estimates
(NC 223), Q. 34.
11 Interview with Air Chief Marshal Sir Joseph Gilbert, 6
December 1991.
12 These are the 'programme cuts' referred to by Bryars in HC
223, Defence Cuts and Defence Estimates, Q. 34; See also
Francis Pym, Hansard (14 July 1980), cols. 420-1; Aviation
Week & SDace Techno1ov (7 April 1980), p. 48.
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August adequate to enable it to remain within its cash
limits.13
The MoD and other spending departments had informed
Parliament of their dissatisfaction with the cash limits
system early in 1980. Its most disruptive aspect was the lack
of a carryover of funds from one fiscal year to the next.
Funds not spent by the beginning of the next fiscal year were
reclaimed by the Treasury, despite being intended for
programmes spanning up to ten years or more. Moreover, during
annual negotiations for increases in defence spending the
Treasury argued that actual expenditure, not planned
expenditure, should be the base line. Yet the MoD invariably
underspent in the 1970s because programme managers had to
allow a sufficient margin to ensure that they remained within
the cash limits. The result was a cumulative underfunding of
defence plans. A report from the Committee on Public Accounts
summarized the MOD view of cash limits in the following way:
The loss of resources of this magnitude to the
defence programme was in their view inconsistent
with the objectives for which the budget was
prepared and voted by Parliament.1'
In the context of departmental budgeting underspending was
inefficient rather than a source of savings because it
resulted in programmes being spread over a longer period. The
13 D.A.Brown, 'Cuts Imperil British Force Planning,' Aviation
Week & Space Technoloqy (10 Nov 1980), p. 57.
14 27th Report from the Public Accounts Committee, 1979-80,
[untitled], (HC 766), 31 July 1980, p. vi.
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more protracted the stages of development and production, the
more an item would cost in the end. Certain costs such as
overheads had to be paid regardless of the rate of progress on
a project and delays also increased the risks of inflationary
price rises.15
Even while arguing against cash limits the MOD was
obliged to remain within them. Thus, at the beginning of
August 1980 Pym was forced to impose a three-month moratorium
on defence spending. This was not a welcome decision: 'the
moratorium was a nuisance and was only imposed because it was
necessary. It upset the contractors and upset the services.
There were a lot of inconveniences." 6
 According to the
then Secretary of State for Trade John Nott, and Pym's
successor at the MoD, the moratorium was brought about only
under pressure from other members of the government: 'as
economic ministers we moved in rather as a sort of group on
the Ministry of Defence and that led to great pressure being
put on Francis to curb the programme. That led to Francis'
declaration of a moratorium.' 17
 Those in Cabinet who shared
15 One example of delays in procurement programmes raising
costs was the Type-42 destroyer ffMS Cardiff. Vickers
Shipbuilders had originally intended to deliver the vessel in
1975 for a total cost of £15 million. Due to difficulties in
recruiting labourers the ship was not completed until 1978 and
cost double the original price (over £30 million). Fourth
Report from the Committee of Public Accounts, 1976-77,
(untitled], (HC 304), April 1977, pp. xii-xiii and Q. 92.
16 Interview with Lord Francis Pym, 11 June 1991.
17 Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
232
Thatcher's economic philosophy were ascendant.
The MoDs inability to remain within its cash limits
weakened Pym's standing in budget negotiations with the
Treasury and other spending departments. Partly as a result
of a perceived inability of the MOD to keep its house in
order, the Treasury began to question the exemption of the MOD
from what were otherwise across-the-board cuts in public
spending. As a result, in late 1980 disagreements began to
emerge within Cabinet.18
Alternative views of the defence budget hinged on whether
1980-81 pressures were essentially short-term and could be
solved within a single fiscal year or required a medium- or
long-term readjustment of defence plans. Recent budgetary
trends in defence, characterised by underspending, suggested
that 1980-81 was a financial watershed. The Treasury, and
even DS1, with responsibility for the Long-Term Costing,
extrapolated from this point of the 1980-81 budget cycle that
economic underperformance was leading to a yawning gap between
plans and resources. 19
 Even after the moratorium, Sir Frank
Cooper, Permanent Secretary at the MOD, had to inform Pym that
the ministry was still likely to exceed its current budget by
'a Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991; Interview
with Lord Francis Pym, 11 June 1991.
See P.Hennessy, Times (12 March 1981); The implications of
the 1980-81 overspend may have been overgeneralised for the
long-term budget. The causes of the budget crisis were
imperfectly understood until the following year. See Ministry
of Defence, The Study
 of the Control of Expenditure, Open
Government Document 81/01 (OGD 81/01), November 1981.
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£135 million. Nevertheless, Pyni continued to see the Long Term
Costing as 'under strain but not out of balance -- not to the
point that something drastic had to be done.' 2° The key
Conservative priorities -- economic recovery and a strong
defence -- appeared to be in direct conflict.
Due to a volume of overall public expenditure one and
one-half per cent higher than budgeted, in November 1980
the Treasury called for reductions in planned expenditure for
the following fiscal year. 2' John Biffen, Chief Secretary
to the Treasury had already informed Pym that the financial
situation required that the MOD cut £400 million from its
1981-82 fiscal year budget. Subsequently the proposed cut
was raised to £500 million. 22 Acutely aware of the
difficulty of remaining within existing cash limits, much less
reduced cash limits, Pym resisted the proposed cuts.
The Prime Minister's support for a £500 million cut in
1980-81 defence expenditure accorded with the prevailing
monetarist view of economic priorities: to cut inflation by
restricting the money supply and to eliminate the inefficiency
suggested by the MOD underspend of 1979-80. There was also
constant pressure from the Treasury and from other spending
ministers who believed it was improper for the MoD to be
Interview with Lord Francis Pym, 11 June 1991.
21 Geoffrey Howe, Hansard (24 Nov 1980), col. 205.
22 M.Donne, Financial Times (24 Oct 1980); D.A.Brown, Aviation
Week & Space Technoloav (10 Nov 1980), p. 57.
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insulated from the budget cuts experienced by other
departments.
Pym regarded the proposed cuts as unwise in defence terms
and contrary to the government's electoral coinmitment. In
resisting demands for further defence cuts he criticised the
Treasury's role in the defence planning process. Pym
believed the Treasury had too strong a voice in defence
planning without having to consider defence implications:
'Their sole concern was the budget and they paid inadequate
attention to defence needs and fulfilling the government's
commitments.' 2' He argued for modification of the cash
limits system on the basis that 'in the context of defence the
strict annual cash limit system is not a sensible way of do-
ing business.' Pyin objected to Howe in the House that cash
limits did not allow adequate flexibility for a department as
large, complex, and important as the MoD. They were not, he
said, 'the most delicate or suitable instruments with which
to control our cash.'
Contrary to reports at the time Pym's resistance of
defence cuts did not include an explicit threat to resign.26
However, Pym and two of his junior ministers -- Minister of
Interview with Lord Francis Pym, 11 June 1991.
24 Interview with Lord Francis Pym, 11 June 1991.
Francis Pym, Mansard (2 Dec 1980), cols. 119-121.
26 E.Goodman, Times (29 Oct 1980); J.Langdon, Guardian (4 Nov
1980); F.Emery, Times (4 Nov 1980); Interview with Lord
Francis Pym, 11 June 1991.
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State Lord Strathcona and Navy Minister Keith Speed -- were
prepared to leave if the Prime Minister overruled his
objections. 27
 According to Speed, 'With the moratorium the
situation was serious but not critical. It is unlikely the
government would have risked the resignation of three
ministers in order to carry out defence cuts.'
Pym's defence of his ministry was impressive. The use of
cash limits in defence budgeting continued, but the Treasury
agreed to reduce the MoD's 1981-82 fiscal year cash limit by
£200 million rather than £500 million. Pym could not,
however, shift the Cabinet's focus away from economics to
political and strategic considerations. Nor were the Chiefs
of Staff able to shake the Prime Minister's determination to
cut defence by exercising their right to direct access for the
first time in four years. 3° Ultimately it became evident that
'Mrs Thatcher and her ministers were more committed to
reducing expenditure than to defence • . 31
The Prime Minister's replacement of Francis Pym as
27 Interview with Lord Francis Pym, 11 June 1991; Interview
with Lord Strathcona, 1 October 1991; Interview with Keith
Speed, 21 May 1991.
28 Interview with the Rt. Hon. Keith Speed, 21 May 1991.
Geoffrey Howe, Mansard (24 Nov 1980), col. 206; See also
J.Wightman, Daily
 Te1earah (5 Nov 1980); F.Emery, Times (6
Nov 1980).
M.White and R.Norton-Taylor, Guardian (13 Nov 1980); Times
(13 Nov 1980).
31 Interview with Lord Francis Pym, 11 June 1991.
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Secretary of State for Defence paved the way for a defence
review in 1981. Although predisposed toward strong defences,
Thatcher had come to suspect that ministers were not
controlling the services. Problems with the defence programme
in 1980 stimulated her interest in streamlining both the
ministry and its programme. According to Pym, 'after that
struggle she may have been convinced to put someone else in
who would cut the programme.'32 In January 1981 Thatcher
made Pym Leader of the House of Commons, technically a
promotion but also removing him from a powerful spending
ministry, at which he preferred to remain to oversee defence
spending and revise Britain's role in NATO. 33 Similarly, the
Prime Minister invited Lord Strathcona, who had backed Pym, to
submit his resignation.M Keith Speed, in the more junior
position of Navy Minister, escaped the purge.
The Treasury's concessions over 1981-82 spending had not
eliminated current economic pressures facing the MOD and
'stringent discipline' had to be applied to the defence
budget for the remainder of the fiscal year. 35
	Attempts
were made to limit the impact of the cuts on necessary
activities, but the effect of the budgetary stringency on
32 Interview with Lord Francis Pym, 11 June 1991.
L.Downie, International Herald Tribune (10-11 Jan 1981).
Interview with Lord Strathcona, 1 October 1991.
Memorandum submitted by the MOD, 'Winter Supplementary
Estimates, 1980-81,' HC 223, Defence Cuts and Defence
Estimates, p. 3.
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the training and readiness of the military was alarming. By
December 1980 naval fuel allocations had been reduced by
around 50 per cent, ships had to be laid-up, and the RAF
faced the possible cancellation of major equipment
programmes. In the long-term, reductions in defence con-
tracts threatened to damage	 the industries surrounding
both those services. According to Sir Frank Cooper,
'from the time of the moratorium it was crystal clear there
would have to be a review of some kind or another.'37
By conceding to Pym in late 1980 and defusing the
immediate tension over government priorities, Thatcher and her
Cabinet allies were in a stronger position in 1981 to address
defence spending on their own terms. John Nott, who as
Secretary of State for Trade was a member of both key Cabinet
committees chaired by the Prime Minister -- Overseas Defence
and the Economic Committee -- was one of the handful of
ministers 'who shared her economic views.' He was
therefore a logical choice to succeed Pym.
JOHN NOTT AND THE MOD
D.Wettern, Daily TelearaDh (15 Dec 1980) and Air Cdre G.S.
Cooper, Daily TeleraDh (15 Dec 1980); Cmnd 8212-I, Statement
on the Defence Estimates. 1981 (April 1981), para 6.
Interview with Sir Frank Cooper, 24 April 1991.
Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991; Nott was
one of the Prime Minister's closest colleagues. See John
Ranelagh, Thatcher's Peotle (London: Harper Collins, 1991),
especially pp. 213-4.
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Appointment of John Nott as Pym's successor was widely
viewed as the precursor to major defence cuts. The
significance of the appointment was noted not only by the
media and the House of Commons but also by Britain's NATO
allies. Several nights after the appointment, Keith Speed
attended a US Embassy dinner at Wynfie].d House at which he was
told 'by a very senior diplomat from a friendly NATO ally'
that Nott's remit was to 'do a hatchet man's job' on the
defence budget. 39 Speed reserved personal judgeinent because
of Nott's role in arranging for British Airlines to fly into
Hong Kong. Nott had taken a 'tough, courageous decision,'
which Speed admired.40
Undoubtedly, Nott's ability to take courageous decisions
and see them through played a role in his selection as
Secretary of State for Defence. To his new job John Nott
brought more than a reputation as a 'firm hand'. Nott had
experience as a merchant banker, strong monetarist views
and a prior affiliation with the Treasury. His background
prompted Conservative MP	 Julian Amery to remark that
Nott's appointment was 'the first time that the Treasury
team has managed to oust a Defence Minister.' 41
	Nott
denied belonging to any 'Treasury Team', but knew when he
Keith Speed, Sea Change, (Bath: Ashgrove Press, 1982), p.
89; According to Speed, 'Americans and others' held this view.
Interview with the Rt. Hon. Keith Speed, 21 May 1991.
Interview with the Rt. Hon. Keith Speed, 21 May 1991.
41 Julian Ainery, Hansard (20 Jan 1981), col. 157.
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accepted the post that he would have to make hard choices.
However, the Prime Minister never explicitly asked him to
undertake a defence review: 'There was no mandate because I
think both of us privately knew that something would have to
be done.'42
Nott had a different approach to defence management than
Pym, who was a consensus politician 'quite content to operate
the system as it existed. " Shortly after leaving the
government Pym wrote that 'the spirit of the age encourages us
to be absolutist...Margaret Thatcher is in tune with this
spirit and has perhaps done more than anyone to create it."
Pym did not share what he saw as the absolutist spirit and
prided himself on bringing others with him when making
decisions
There is nothing to suggest that Nott was in tune with an
absolutist zeitaeist but he had a background in economics and
was prepared to take difficult decisions. Nott was by all
accounts an intelligent and capable individual and, moreover,
an independent thinker. Indeed, to the 'horror' of the Prime
42 Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991; see also
John Nott, Hansard (20 Jan 1981), cols. 156-7; Thatcher
similarly denied having given Nott such a remit in her remarks
to the Conservative Back Bench Defence Committee on January
14, 1981. Financial Times (15 Jan 1981).
" Interview with Lord Francis Pym, 11 June 1991.
" Francis Pym, The Politics of Consent, (London: Hamish
Hamilton), p. 2.
' Interview with Lord Francis Pym, 11 June 1991; see also
Pym, The Politics of Consent, especially pp. 1-3.
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Minister, Nott was initially sceptical about the need to
purchase the Trident missile:
I was a sceptic about the nuclear programme. I had
been the only member of Cabinet who to the surprise
and horror of the Prime Minister had protested when
it was announced to the whole Cabinet that we were
going to replace Polaris with Trident 1.1.6
Although a member of the Cabinet Overseas and Defence
Committee and familiar with the defence policy issues which
had arisen since 1979, Nott recognised that he had inadequate
information on which to base a strong view against Trident.
Immersing himself in briefings and books about the nuclear
deterrent was thus one of his first actions as Defence
Secretary. The Deputy Under Secretary (Policy), Sir Michael
Quinlan, an acknowledged expert on nuclear deterrence, played
an important role in convincing Nott that Trident was indeed
a necessary follow-on to Polaris.'7
 According to Nott,
Not only did I clear my own scepticism about the
modernisation of the deterrent but I also made up
my mind that somehow I had to get the D5 programme
through and scrap the Trident I. It was much more
expensive initially but in my judgement it would be
far cheaper for us over the longer period.'8
In the course of considering the deterrent Nott developed a
46 Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991; See also
P.Hennessy, Times (18 June 1981).
See, for example, Sir Michael's 'Nuclear Weapons: The Basic
Issues,' The Amleforth Journal Vol XCI, part II, (Autumn
1986); and 'The Ethics of Nuclear Deterrence,' Theological
Studies Vol 48 (1987).
48 Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
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close working relationship with Quinlan.'9
Nott's immediate problem was the short-term crisis in the
defence budget: 'the moratorium had been declared but
absolutely nothing had been started to deal with the problem.
The crisis was there but no solution.' 50
 In the first few
weeks he was entirely occupied with trying to find £200
million in savings to remain within 1980-81 cash limits.
Thus, in his first statement to the House as Secretary of
Defence, Nott, who had not yet embarked on a fundamental
review, could genuinely assure back bench Conservatives that
he was robust on defence. 51
 Strong endorsement of the
nuclear deterrent as an integral part of the defence programme
rather than an adjunct to it boosted the confidence of Nott's
party colleagues. 52
 While Nott voiced approval of the cash
limits system as a method of budgetary control he strongly
denied that he had been appointed to conduct a budget cutting
exercise. 'Talk of apocalyptic choices between key defence
tasks,' he said, 'is wide of the mark...We must maintain
balanced forces, although there may be changes in emphasis
between the two (a maritime capability and the central
front).153
Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
50 Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
51 H.Noyes, Times (21 Jan 1981).
52 John Nott, Hansard (20 Jan 1981), col. 135.
John Nott, Hansard (20 Jan 1981), cole. 152, 155.
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The decision to undertake a fundamental review grew out
of Nott's attempt to cope with the short-term budget crisis:
It was at the moment of trying to find the £200
million, which we never did, that I realized the
programme was hopelessly overinflated. Very
simply, the aspirations of the military had found a
very happy ally with the expressed aspirations of
the	 Conservative	 Government	 for	 defence
expenditure. '
As a politician, Nott did not want a divisive, public defence
review:	 'What was in my interest was a quiet, internal,
urgent review of the LTC.	 However, as the minister
responsible for the defence budget, 	 Nott believed that
avoiding hard choices was unacceptable: 'I was determined we
would not have a salami-slicing exercise which is what we had
been doing all along.' 56
 Once convinced that the long-term
programme was out of line with resources Nott was prepared to
confront the problem.
With the Prime Minister's support, Nott adopted a
strategic approach to defence priorities. In deciding to
conduct a review he relied primarily on the advice of the
Permanent Under Secretary, Sir Frank Cooper, and the Deputy
Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991; In February
1981 it looked as if the MOD would exceed its 1980-81 cash
limits by over £250 million. Third Report from the Committee
of Public Accounts, 1980-81, flatters Relatina to the Ministry
of Defence (HC 125). 30 April 1981, Q. 85; see also C.Brown,
Guardian (3 Feb 1981); Financial Times (3 Feb 1981); The
overspend was ultimately reduced to £64 million. OGD 81/01,
p. 1.
Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991; See also
M.Donne, Financial Times (23 Jan 1981).
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Under Secretary (Policy) Sir Michael Quinlan. According to
Nott 'Frank and Michael were very keen to have a defence
review.' 57
 The decision, however, was taken by Nott, who
also determined the manner in which the review would be
conducted. According to Cooper, Nott's single greatest
contribution to the review was to conclude:
Let's have some degree of choice about it so we are
not totally tied and we have some room for
manoeuvrability rather than be in a situation where
we can hardly move a leg left or right without
having to go through a cathartic experience with
some other programme.'58
Nott believed the cutbacks and moratorium implemented in 198 0-
81 had caused essential activities such as training and
certain deployments to be 'held back too severely' and
sought to eliminate year end cost-cutting. 59
 Nott also
concluded that escalating equipment costs confronted the
government with a choice between the ongoing degradation
of Britain's operational capability and taking 'a fresh new
look at how we perform our tasks.'6°
Concern for consensus would surely have undermined Nott's
effort fundamentally to alter the defence programme. The
Service Chiefs, at least, would protest major cuts to their
programmes which they saw as damaging to their ability to
Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
Interview with Sir Frank Cooper, 24 April 1991.
Cmnd 8212-I, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1981, p.
1, para 6.
60 John Nott, Iansard (19 May 1981), col. 160.
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perform essential commitments or to the future of their
service. Initially, Nott expected the Chiefs of Staff
Committee to play an important role in the review and in
January he issued a directive for them to report on their
priorities. He explicitly rejected parcelling out reductions
in defence expenditure in doses of equal misery and concluded
that the objectives of the defence review required a
comprehensive look at Britain's defence commitments in the
medium and long-term.61
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: THE BALANCE OF INFLUENCE
From the outset, the review was likely to affect the
balance of influence within the MOD. Nott's decision to
conduct a fundamental review reconsidering the pillars of
British defence foreshadowed a major reallocation of resources
and the imposition of disproportionate cuts, in this case on
the Royal Navy. In establishing the assumptions on which the
review was to be based Nott asked: 'Are you going to equip
your forces to meet the Soviet threat, and provide
"deterrence," or is it for some other purpose?' 62
 Nott's
rejection of the concept of equal misery among the services
inhibited the emergence of a consensus among the Chiefs of
61 Interview with Sir Frank Cooper, 24 April 1991.
62 Nott quoted in Michael Charlton, The Little Platoon:
Diloinacv and the Falkiands Dis pute (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1989), p. 150.
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Staff and thus increased the likelihood that responsibility
for readjusting the programme would fall to the central
staffs.
Key points of contact between the services and the
central civilian staff are relationships at the highest
levels. After 1977 the principal planning forum was the
Financial Planning and Management Group established by Sir
Frank Cooper, which brought together the Chiefs of Staff, the
Chief Scientific Adviser and the Chief of Defence Procurement,
with the Permanent Under Secretary in the chair. However,
strategic and economic circumstances have a vital impact on
the operation of the ministry. In peacetime, for instance,
the ministry is resource-constrained and the PUS tends to
dominate planning exercises, whereas in wartime the ministry
is demand driven and the CDS usually gets what he requests.
The FPMG was oriented toward defence management in a normal
year and was not the appropriate forum for conducting a major
defence review. Thus, although reports prepared for the FPMG
by DS]. provided the rationale for the review it was not
conducted by the FPMG.0
Nor is the balance of civilian and military advice to the
Secretary of State limited to organisational norms or the
personal chemistry of only the most senior advisers. The
See Sir Ewen Broadbent, The Militar y and Government: From
Macmillan to Heseltine (London: Macmillan, 1988), p. 185.
Interview with Sir Frank Cooper, 24 April 1991; P.Hennessy,
Times (12 March 1981).
246
nature of the advice which he is given can be strongly
influenced by working relationships beneath the sixth floor:
Describing the Ministry in terms of formal
structure of senior appointments and the main
functional committees may give the misleading
impression that working methods are excessively
formalised and issues co-ordinated at very high
levels. In practice there is a network of contacts
at all levels within the Ministry and with other
Government Departments which brings together
representatives of the central staffs, Service
Departments, and the Procurement Executive.65
Often it is at the two-star level and below that influential
concepts and arguments enter the decision-making process.
The 1981 review process was conditioned by the mini-
review conducted in 1980 by the Defence Programme Working
Party. The DPWP represented the first time a small group in
the central staffs had assumed the foremost role in reviewing
plans. Prior to the DPWP, in 1978, a Way Ahead Study Group
(WASG) had been established within the central defence staff
by Chief of Defence Staff Neil Cameron, who had wanted to
conduct a much more fundamental review than actually
resulted. Nevertheless, the WASG's product was quite a
seminal work, looking at what the MoD should do if current
economic trends continued. The government had not taken
65 Memorandum by the Ministry of Defence (DP19 HCDC 145/1]
October 1981, paragraph 10 in Second Report from the Defence
Committee, 1981-82, Ministry
 of Defence Oraanisation and
Procurement (HC 22-Il).
Cameron later delivered a lecture entitled 'The Way Ahead,'
evidently drawing on the defence policy staff's analysis. See
Neil Cameron, In the Midst of Thin gs (London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1986), pp. 220-1.
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specific decisions on the programme so the WASG was a 'clean
piece of paper exercise.
In 1980 placing responsibility for proposals with 'the
three wise men' of the DPWP had been deemed an effective way
to develop sound alternatives. The key problem as far as Pym
was concerned was striking the right balance between service
and Central Staff input into planning. He believed, moreover,
that with the DPWP this balance was 'perfectly reasonable. '
In contrast to the WASG, the DPWP was not a clean piece
of paper exercise. The DPWP had fixed parameters and
decisions were expected to follow. The DPWP had before it
reams of figures indicating what was in service programmes and
how much needed to be saved:
The single services were consulted in the process
but we had been asked to conduct a fundamental
review. There had been masses of paper, including
from the WASG, and we had reached the point when it
was time to take a view. What we did was make our
proposals known to the services and then, after
they had presented reports on their priorities, we
would have the two-star service policy
representatives into Quinlan's office -- this was
the fix-it level.69
Thus the services participated, presenting their priorities
both in reports and oral testimony, but the DPWP drafted the
final recommendations. The main sources of service input had
' Interview with Air Chief Marshal Sir Joseph Gilbert, 6
December 1991.
Interview with Lord Francis Pym, 11 June 1991.
Interview with Air Chief Marshal Sir Joseph Gilbert, 6
December 1991.
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been the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, Derek Ref fell,
Director of Military Operations, Lt. General Derek Boorman,
and Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Policy) Air Marshal
Patrick Hine, each of whom kept his Chief of Staff well-
infornied.7°
The resulting cuts, mentioned above, were not welcoinelby
the services, nor were they viewed with alarm. The exercise
had been seen mainly as an attempt at 'getting the LTC to
bed.' 71 According to then Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral
Sir Henry Leach,
At no time in 1980 was I unduly perturbed about
possible cuts in the Navy. The cuts proposed by
the DPWP were not very painful but they convinced
Pym that the programme could not be cut any more.72
Ultimately, however, the Service Boards were dismayed by the
Drocess, since the final decisions were taken by the Secretary
of State and a group of senior advisers, excluding the Service
Chiefs. The principal people present at the final meetings
during which the main 1980 decisions were taken were Pym,
Quinlan, Cooper, Chief of Defence Procurement David Cardwell,
This was exactly the same group responsible for service
input into the 1981 review. Letter from Admiral Sir Derek
Reffell, 29 January 1992; Interview with Lt. General Sir Derek
Boorman, 8 January 1992; Interview with Air Marshal Sir
Patrick Hine, 27 November 1991.
71 Interview with Lt. General Sir Derek Boorman, 8 January
1992.
12 Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach, 1 July
1991.
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Mason, Lewin, and Gilbert) Together this group appears to
have constituted a Defence Programme Steering Group.
Thus, while the DPWP did not remove formal responsibility
for defence planning from the services, it changed who did the
ground work and most of the papers. The effect therefore,
was a shift of influence, with the working party having the
ear of the Secretary of State. According to Sir Henry Leach,
the services, including those members of the central defence
staff not on the DPWP, were allotted a reactive role:
They were faced with having to shoot down Quinlan's
working party if they disagreed rather than having
more input in the work itself. A good deal of the
initiative had been placed in Quinlan's hands!
The early decision by Nott to reconsider the pillars of
British defence did not inhibit service involvement in the
1981 review along the same lines as in 1980. However, also as
in 1980, the role of the Chiefs of Staff Committee was
negligible. Nott did not set out to exclude them. Indeed, 'The
Chiefs of Staff were offered an appropriate role in the
7' Interview with Air Chief Marshal Sir Joseph Gilbert, 6
December 1991.
Evidence on the establishment of a Defence Programme
Steering Group at this time is inconclusive. Certainly there
was a group of this name by 1985 but it was a different body;
chaired at the three-star level by the DCDS (Programmes and
Personnel), and composed of two-star Assistant Chiefs of
Defence Staff, it was responsible for preparing the LTC and
a draft FPMG note to the VCDS and the 2nd PUS. See Malcolm
McIntosh, Manaain Britain's Defences (London: Macmillan,
1990), pp. 161-2.
Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach, 1 July
1991.
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decision-making. ,76 Nott had no fewer than nine formal
meetings with the Chiefs of Staff (not including FPMG
meetings) between January and June of l98l. He also held
many informal meetings.Th
Shortly after his appointment Nott and his most senior
advisers spent an informal day in Greenwich at the house of
Chief of Defence Staff Admiral Sir Terence Lewin. According
to then Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael
Beetham, 'we spent the whole day chatting over the thing. The
Chiefs of Staff had no advisers. We also had a number of
working lunches with Nott.' As a result, 'the views of the
single-service Chiefs of Staff were fully exposed to the
Secretary of State, as were the views of the Chief of Defence
Staff. '
The Chiefs of Staff Committee potentially could have
played an important role in the review. However, in 1981 the
committee was unable to develop a consensus view, inhibited by
its structure and the budget battles of 1980, as a result of
which service priorities had become firmly established. No
76 Interview with Field Marshal Lord Bramall, 15 October 1991.
Air Historical Branch Inquiry.
78 Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin, 13 August
1991.
Interview with Marshal of the RAP Sir Michael Beetham, 21
October 1991.
Marshal of the RAP Sir Michael Beetham letter to The Times
(17 May 1984).
251
Service Chief wanted further substantial cuts in his own
service; flexibility in the early stages of a fundamental
review could easily lead to severe cuts later on. The benefit
of flexibility -- increased credibility with the Secretary of
State -- depended on cautious judgements by the services.
The Army understood the need for credibility and to the
chagrin of the some of his staff, the Chief of the General
Staff, General Sir Edwin Bramall, gave Nott the option of
cutting the BAOR to a small, mobile force in reserve. 81
 The
Director of Military Operations, Lt. General Sir Derek
Boorman, produced the idea of a two division reinforcement
shock armoured reserve as an alternative to operating on the
inter-German border. Bramall and Boorman both suspected the
government lacked the political will for such a radical change
and knew that, in the end, it would look unattractive because
creating an elite, highly trained, fully equipped armoured
force would cost money in the short-term. However, according
to Boorman, 'We appeared flexible and ready to consider
options which gave great credibility to the Army. ' Indeed,
Nott believed that 'the Army caused less problems' than the
other services.
The risks to the Royal Navy, had it demonstrated early
81 Interview with Field Marshal Lord Bramall, 15 October 1991.
Interview with Lt. General Sir Derek Boorman, 8 January
1992.
Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
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flexibility, could have been far more serious. The Army's
proposal was not without negative repercussions: 'Bramall was
seen as the one Service Chief who took the spirit of the
review to heart. He got enormous credit. (However,] it was a
critical set-up punch, much misunderstood in the Ariny.M
Although staff relations with commanders are important, for
the Navy there was even more at stake. As discussed in chapter
four, basic assumptions underlying British defence planning
favoured the Army and the RAF, who focused primarily on the
land/air battle in Europe and air defence of the UK. Unlike
the Army and Air Staffs, in 1981. the Naval Staff was fighting
for the future role of its service.
Although Nott made no formal decisions in advance about
what would be cut from the defence programme he revealed an
early inclination to cut the Royal Navy. At the gathering in
Greenwich each of Nott's senior advisors was given five to
ten minutes to speak about his service or area of
responsibility. When his turn arrived, Chief of the Naval
Staff Admiral Sir Henry Leach, began by speaking about the
Chevaline/Polaris system. He then turned to the surface fleet.
However, as soon as he mentioned the carriers and amphibious
assault ships Nott interrupted to ask 'why do we want surface
ships?' Leach remained silent and the Chief of the Defence
Staff Admiral Sir Terence Lewin filled the void, stating
' Interview with Lt. General Sir Derek Boorman, 8 January
1992.
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'Secretary of State the First Sea Lord would need a great deal
longer than five minutes to do any justice to that
question. '
	 Leach concluded early on that the Royal Navy
would bear the brunt of the 1981 defence cuts.
The threat to the Royal Navy's surface fleet did not
originate with Nott personally. As discussed in detail in the
next chapter, Nott's perspective on defence priorities was
formulated on the basis of advice that he received within the
MoD. Early government statements of defence policy and the
traditional Conservative affinity for the Royal Navy
notwithstanding, thinking within the ministry weighed heavily
against the Naval Staff.
The renewed attention to global interests pledged in the
1980 Defence Estimates implied an increased emphasis on
Britain's naval capabilities:
The token deployment of Royal Naval forces back
into the Indian Ocean in the aftermath of the
invasion of Afghanistan raise(d] the
possibility of British forces operating more
generally outside the NATO area.87
The Arinilla patrol of two ships in the Gulf of Oman further
strengthened this possibility. Economically, the Navy made a
cost-effective contribution to NATO. Providing seventy per
Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach, 1 July
1991; Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin, 13
August 1991; Interview with Sir Ronald Mason, 4 July 1991.
Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach, 1 July
1991.
Laurence Martin, 'Defence of the Realm,' Washincton
Quarterly (Autumn 1980), p. 149.
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cent of NATO forces in the East Atlantic required twenty-six
per cent of the defence budget whereas providing only ten per
cent of NATO forces on the central front required nearly forty
per cent.M In addition, Britain relied on shipping for
around ninety-five per cent of its trade. As discussed
previously, geography and history also favoured the pres-
ervation of Britain's maritime capabilities. Perhaps most
importantly, the Royal Navy had strong support within
the Conservative Party. As a result, through 1980, when
it became apparent that a defence review was likely in the
near future, public statements about government priorities
suggested that contracting the BAOR was a preferred option for
achieving defence cuts.
Counterbalancing these factors, however, were other
important considerations. Critically, cutting the BAOR would
only provide savings in the longer-term -- once it stopped
affecting the balance-of-payments -- and would even cost money
in the short-term, as re-absorbing troops and their families
would require additional spending on housing, education, and
Lord Hill-Norton, 'Return to National Strategy,' in John
Baylis, (ed), Alternative Atroaches to British Defence
Policy, (London: Macmillan, 1983), p. 133.
Michael Chichester and John Wilkinson, The Uncertain Ally:
British Defence Policy . 1960-1990 (Aldershot: Gower, 1982);
Keith Speed, 'The Royal Navy and the Conservatives,' Navy
International (May 1980).
P.Simmonds, Sunday Times (21 June 1981); B.Bloom, Financial
Times (22 May 1981); J.Critchley, Dail y
 Telearah (7 May
1981).
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medical facilities in the UK. In addition, cutting British
Forces Germany would have had serious political repercussions
in NATO. The British Government was already involved in rows
with its European allies which were construed by many to
demonstrate a weak commitment to the continent. Prime Minister
Thatcher sought an £800 million rebate over the European
Budget and had expressed concern to the Federal Republic of
Germany about BAOR foreign exchange costs. 91
 The US interest
in Britain's conventional contribution to NATO, particularly
the Central Region, had been evident throughout the Trident
negotiations:
The view of OSD (Office of the Secretary of
Defense) people in talking about priorities was
that if forced to choose, they would enhance the
BAOR because of its contribution to conventional
defence in Europe. In the context of US security,
next would have been the Royal Navy due to its role
in SLOC protection.92
There were already calls within the US Congress to withdraw US
troops from Europe. Cuts in the BAOR would have strengthened
these demands. It was thus a poor time to cut Britain's
continental commitment, although this option was studied by
the DPWP.
In considering cuts in the defence programme the DPWP
developed two proposals: one favouring the Central Region and
cutting the Royal Navy, the other favouring the Royal Navy and
cutting forces in the Central Region. The DPWP recommended
91 H. Stanhope, Times (27 Nov 1979).
n Interview with Walter Slocombe, 10 January 1991.
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the former, arguing that it was the best strategic package.
Growing emphasis on air defence and the expansion in the early
1980s of the BAOR beyond the Brussels Treaty commitment
reflected the centre's defence priorities. Cutting the Navy
may also have been seen as causing less damage to NATO than
reducing forces in the Central Region since naval cuts would
be less obvious.
Pym could not accept that there should be a trade off in
continental or maritime capabilities. As stated in the
Defence Estimates prepared under his supervision, Pym was
willing to reconsider the whole balance of NATO
responsibilities to increases Britain's out-of-area role. He
believed there were more potential threats from other areas
than from the Soviet Union along the Central Front. The only
NATO members who could perform an out-of-area role were the
UK, US and France. Pym did not formally propose the rethink
although he discussed it quite often. 	 Pym might have
pressed the issue had he remained at the MoD. He did,
however, adapt the work of the DPWP to reflect his own view:
'Continental versus maritime defence was an ongoing debate
and, moreover, it was a question of balance, not of achieving
See, for example, Second Report from the Defence Committee,
1979-80, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1980 (HC 571), 23
April 1980, Q. 423; P.Simmonds and D.Wood, Sunday
 TelegraDh
(21 Dec 1980); M.White, Guardian (22 Dec 1980); T.Geraghty,
Sunday Times (14 Jan 1981).
' Interview with Lord Francis Pym, 11 June 1991.
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one at the expense of the other. ' Accordingly, the paper
which came before OD concluded that all four pillars were
essential .
Pym's policy, a consensus view, reflected both civilian
and military advice. But the prevalent view among senior
civilian staff, and some central defence staff, was that if a
choice were necessary, cuts should fall most heavily on the
naval programme, given Britain's overall economic, political
and strategic situation. This view reflected not only the
proposals put forward by the DPWP, but also those of an
informal study group, casually referred to as 'Capabilities',
which met regularly under the auspices of the Chief Scientific
Adviser, Sir Ronald Mason.
Capabilities played the role of an in-house think tank
and participants, in addition to Mason, included Lt. General
Sir Maurice Johnston, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff
(Operational Requirements), James Barnes, Deputy Chief
Scientific Adviser (Projects), Bernard Day, Assistant Under
Secretary (Operational Requirements) and his successor Brian
Robson, J.D. Culshaw, Assistant Chief Scientific Adviser
(Studies) and Director of the Defence Operational Analysis
Establishment, and Cohn Baron, Assistant Chief Scientific
Adviser (Research). When the Capabilities meetings began in
1979 a major re-equipment programme was coming forward. One
Interview with Lord Francis Pyni, 11 June 1991.
96 Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
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purpose of the group was to help the CSA make recommendations
to the Defence Equipment Policy Committee, the last body to
consider project proposals before they entered the Long-Term
Costing.
Through the Operational Requirements Committee, formally
a subcommittee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Service
Chiefs exercised considerable influence over defence
procurement. 'The Chiefs of Staff had locked up the ORC but
could not lock up the DEPC. DEPC reports went straight to
ministers.' 97
	Many officials charged with adopting a
'purple' or overall view of defence priorities, believed that
the ORC was seriously flawed. First, there was tacit
agreement among the services that each would promote its own
projects without criticising the others. Second, because
operational requirements were initiated by individual Service
Departments they tended to be the products of tunnel-vision;
each service focused on the priority items in its
progra]nme. Even the chairman of the ORC in 1981, Lt.
General Sir Maurice Johnston, believed that it focused too
much on replacing like with like (tanks with tanks, etcetera)
rather than reassessing defence needs: 'There was too much
emphasis on the toys and not on what they were intended to
Interview with Sir Ronald Mason, 4 July 1991.
Interview with Brian Robson, 6 November 1991.
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accomplish. '
Capabilities attempted to compensate for the narrow focus
of the Operational Requirements Committee. According to Brian
Robson,
Capabilities was an important source of vision
outside a narrow service view; it was a source of a
defence view...It was a forum in which one could
actually toss around fairly wide-ranging ideas. By
the time ideas got to the ORC they were already far
along in their development. The ideas we tossed
around in Capabilities were at an earlier stage --
before the requirement had been drafted.100
The Capabilities panel relied heavily on analyses by the
Defence Operational Analysis Establishment, which played an
important part in the drafting and agreement of operational
requirements, and was no stranger to conflicts with the
services, as discussed previously.
Based on the conclusions of DOAE analyses the
Capabilities panel drafted a report which reached Pym in
December 1980. The report divided the defence programme into
8-10 capabilities, covering all of the most controversial
aspects of service planning: anti-armour, air defence, ASW,
and firepower. 10' Among the conclusions was a rejection of
the logic behind key elements in the Royal Navy's re-equipment
programme: 'The fundamental problem with this re-equipment
programme was that none of the improvements addressed the
Interview with Lt. General Sir Maurice Johnston, 16 October
1991.
100 Interview with Brian Robson, 6 November 1991.
101 Interview with Sir Ronald Mason, 4 July 1991.
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problem of missiles such as the AS4 and AS5 or emerging cruise
systems. ,102
The Royal Navy was worried about air defence, but not
particularly against standoff missiles. One major Royal Navy
programme was the upgrade of the Type 42 frigate, the guided-
missile destroyer. The Sea Dart surface-to-air missile, to be
fitted on Type 42s as part of this upgrade, was one project
that Capabilities criticised. It was to cost about £1.5
billion to improve sensors, fusing and propulsion, but like
Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles Sea Dart was essentially
for use against overflying airplanes or other large signature
weapon systems.103
After Capabilities had reported its findings to the
Secretary of State Pym held a meeting with Mason, Cooper, and
Quinlan. According to Mason, 'Pym held the paper quite
gingerly and showed polite interest.' He recognised its
implications but still sought to avoid a defence review.
Mason made it clear that he would continue to take a robust
stand and said to Pym 'there are storm clouds coining.'
Cooper, commenting on Mason's proposals, told him 'you've got
enough bloody rope to hang yourself.' Indeed, Mason was
excoriated by the Navy for his proposals, which the
Capabilities group revised and elaborated upon once Nott
102 Interview with Sir Ronald Mason, 4 July 1991.
'° Interview with Sir Ronald Mason, 4 July 1991.
261
became Secretary of State.104
Nott did not receive the revised Capabilities report
until around the end of February so it could not have been on
his mind during his meeting with the Chiefs of Staff in
Greenwich. However, he had already been briefed on the
defence programme by his top advisers and was aware of
concerns about the Royal Navy's programme: 'By the time I
went (to Greenwich]...I was aware that the naval programme was
much more overextended than the others. I knew that the naval
LTC was going to be the biggest trouble of the lot because it
was the one that had been inflated more than the others.'105
Nott's questioning of Leach may have been pointed but it
was not intended to be aggressive. Nott went to Greenwich to
initiate a dialogue with his Chiefs of Staff. He agreed to
the meeting partly to enhance his understanding of the Chiefs'
attitudes towards current strategy and partly for good
relations: 'It was important that I heard what they said and
that I demonstrated an interest in things they felt
passionately about."°6
 The timing of Nott's remarks,
however, alarmed the Chief of the Naval Staff, who was well
aware that the Royal Navy programme had been criticised by the
Chief Scientific Adviser and that the trend in thinking among
104 Interview with Sir Ronald Mason, 4 July 1991. The impact
of this report is discussed further in chapter seven.
Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
106 Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
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those on the DPWP had been toward greater emphasis on the
forces in the Central Region. Aware of these arguments against
elements of the Navy programme, arguments with which he
disagreed, Leach knew that demonstrating flexibility --
whatever the effect on his credibility -- would also make it
easier for the Royal Navy to be radically reduced.
THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
Lack of a consensus among the Chiefs of Staff was not
necessarily a problem. The fundamental decisions about the
direction of the defence programme are the responsibility of
the Secretary of State. According to Marshal of the RAF Sir
Michael Beetham, then Chief of the Air Staff, when the Chiefs
of Staff cannot agree a consensus view their individual views
should be put before the Secretary of State: 'If you are
going to open an issue up you want, in my view, to hear all
the arguments out from all the points of view. In the last
analysis the decision is the ministers' and it is healthy for
him to hear all the arguments."°T Moreover, it can be
healthy for the Chiefs of Staff to have the opportunity to put
forward the best case for their programmes. Then, if the
decision goes against them, they can more readily accept the
outcome: 'The services are apolitical in the sense that they
107 Interview with Marshal of the RAP Sir Michael Beetham, 21
October 1991.
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jump and scream until a decision is taken but once it is taken
they shut up."°8
Ministers, on the other hand, may not respond positively
to divergent views among the services since the overwhelming
impression can be one of incoherence. Nor could the Chief of
Defence Staff effectively span the gap between the
perspectives of the Service Chiefs by offering a 'purple' view
of defence priorities. The Chief of Defence Staff was primus
inter cares with respect the other Chiefs of Staff but with
limitations to his independence. He was bound to report to
the Secretary of State both the consensus views of the
committee and the dissenting arguments of any individual
Service Chiefs. 1
 'The CDS had always had the right to
submit an independent point of view, but this virtually never
happened. p110 Instead, the Chiefs tended to work out
compromises among themselves. Since compromise rarely leads
to disproportionate sacrifices 'service' priorities do not
ordinarily correspond to the 'defence' priorities of a
Secretary of State conducting a fundamental review. The
implicit assumption of cuts on the basis of equal misery is
that the balance in the defence programme remains correct at
the reduced level of spending.
	 However, at some point
108 Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Hill-Norton, 18
July 1991.
These restrictions are laid out in COS (Misc) lOO/130B.
See Johnston, 'MoD Reorganisation,' p. 10.
110 Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach, 1
July 1991.
264
incremental adjustments can prevent commitments from being
discharged properly.
Under certain conditions, the formal authority of the
Service Chiefs could redound more to the disadvantage of the
CDS than to their own advantage. The CDS had no independent
resources to study alternatives:
The central defence staffs served the CDS only as
the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff
Coinmittee...(and]...if the CDS wanted to conduct a
study he had to have the consensus agreement of the
Committee on the terms of reference which could
take up to a fortnight to achieve.111
Moreover, the central defence staffs conducting studies for
the CDS still depended on the Service Boards for promotion.
The Service Chiefs had slightly less control than they would
for a regular service promotion, but defence staff
nevertheless faced pressure to act on the priorities of the
Service Chief. The services expected their officers on the
defence staff to represent the service viewpoint rather than
adopt a 'purple' perspective reflecting an overall view of
defence priorities. Tension between service affiliation and
the defence staff was also manifest at the highest level,
though in a different way. According to Lewin, 'I was in a
very difficult position as CDS, particularly since I was an
Admiral. I had to take a defence view and couldn't give
111 Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin, 13 August
1991; see also his testimony in Third Report from the Defence
Committee, 1983-84, Ministry of Defence Reorcianisation (HC
584), 15 October 1984, especially Q. 56.
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Leach the support he deserved.
The CDS was caught in an institutionalized conflict. He
had to negotiate with the PUS and CSA on the one hand and with
the Service Chiefs, on whom he relied for information and
cooperation, on the other. With the Chiefs of Staff Committee
unable to act in concert, and the CDS constrained in his
ability to offer independent advice, there was little the
services could do but rally around their own programmes.
According to Cooper 'the Chiefs of Staff could not agree
between themselves about where they wanted to go or not to go.
Eventually it was done by the Secretary of State with the
Defence Secretariat producing it as a result.' 113
 The net
effect on the programme was not a radical departure from
previous defence plans but a rapid acceleration of current
trends, both in policy and the evolution of the ministry.
112 Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin, 13 August
1991.
113 Interview with Sir Frank Cooper, 24 April 1991.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Conduct of the 1981 Defence Review
John Nott's assessment of defence priorities reflected
the current trend toward specialisation on NATO tasks with an
emphasis on the Central Region. Planned changes following
the conduct of the 1981 defence review over a twelve week
period represented a rapid acceleration of existing policy. In
keeping with the growing emphasis on air defence Royal Air
Force funding was increased. Though there were organizational
changes and unwelcome personnel cuts the Army programme
remained intact. Consequently, large cuts fell on the Royal
Navy. The Defence Programme Working Party in 1980 further
reoriented the defence programme toward the central front, but
although its cuts fell disproportionately on the Navy they had
not been severe. Like many previous annual planning
exercises the 1980 mini-review had resulted only in interim
measures. In contrast, the 1981 review was fundamental, with
Nott accelerating the shift in resources away from the Navy.
ThE BERNUDAGRA14
John Nott's early contact with the Chiefs of Staff
convinced him that he would have to take the initiative in the
defence review. In February he received service reports on
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their roles and priorities and found them an inadequate basis
for a fundamental review. 1
 Nott was encouraged to take the
initiative by his senior civilian advisers, who told him:
'Look, time is slipping by. When we looked for the £200
million you became aware that we had a real long-term problem.
We've got to do something about it. We've got to start making
a move • , 2
 Nott agreed and decided the manner in which the
review would be conducted. Determined to conduct a
strategic review, he decided that the services should be asked
their priorities 'from the bottom up.'3
The directive launching the defence review was issued in
March after Nott returned from an inter-parliamentary
conference in Bermuda. Consequently, it was referred to by
the service staffs as the 'Bermudagram' or 'Nottgram'.
However, the directive was actually drafted by central staff,
including the Permanent Under Secretary (PUS), Sir Frank
Cooper, and the Deputy Under Secretary (Policy), Sir Michael
Quinlan, while Nott was away. According to Nott, 'I went off
to Bermuda... and they drafted the Bermudagram note while I
was away. When I came back it was extremely well-drafted --
Michael was a brilliant draftsman. ' There was, however, one
P.Hennessy, Times (18 June 1981).
2 Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991; see also
John Nott, Hansard (19 May 1991), col. 162.
Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
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major outstanding issue: where in the defence budget to place
Trident.
The choices were to spread the cost of moderriising the
deterrent across all three Services or to place it in the
Navy's budget. A common assumption, as discussed in chapter
five, has been that no money for a Polaris successor appeared
in the forward programme prior to the replacement decision.
Yet when Pym announced the decision in July 1980 it had been
pending for some time and there is reason to believe that
allowance could have been made in the forward programme. The
1980 programme was, according to Quinlan, based 'on costing
assumptions envisioned as higher than those needed before
Trident was in the programme.' 5
 Asked in 1980 if Trident
would impact on other elements of the defence programme
Quinlan said that while it was not possible in the LTC to link
unrelated programmes that go forward to those that do not, the
LTCs of the previous and current governments more than allowed
for Trident expenditure to be placed in the programme:
The total amount of money envisaged in our working
assumption as compared with the total in the
previous costing is very different, and the
difference between the two is more than equal to
the amount Trident is assessed at costing in these
years. Therefore it follows that quite apart from
the difficulties of identifying displacement and
connecting one change with another there is no
displacement for Trident from the earlier
programme. ,6
Fourth Report from the Defence Committee, 1980-81,
Strateaic Nuclear Weapons Policy
 (HC 36), 20 May 1981. Q. 533.
6 HC 36, Strategic Nuclear Weapons Policy, Q. 536.
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However, even if resources for Polaris replacement had
appeared in a non-allocated budget heading a decision to move
Trident to a service heading obviously had great significance,
and the Royal Navy knew it.
The Director of Naval Plans and others among the Naval
Staff cautioned their senior officers against accepting
Trident into the existing Navy budget on the basis that it
would distort the naval programme. 7
 However, Nott did not
consult the services over this decision:
It was the key decision and I didn't involve the
services in that decision because there was no way
I could ask the Chiefs of Staff what their view was
because I knew what they would all say. The two
other services would say itfs a naval programme,
which it is.
To avoid this conflict, Nott, with the advice of Quinlan and
Cooper, made the decision to place Trident in the Navy
programme. His rationale, and what he saw as 'the core
issue,' was that the naval programme was the most
overextended:
One of the influences on my decision about this was
that the naval programme was much the most
overextended of the three. This was even without
the modernisation of the deterrent. They had
things in their programme that we were never ever
going to be able to afford. It was a byproduct of
the three per cent growth forever syndrome.8
This decision, and the detail of proposed changes in the size
and shape of the armed forces outlined in the Bermudagram,
Admiral Sandy Woodward with Patrick Robinson, One Hundred
Days (London: Harper Collins, 1992), pp. 60-1.
a Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
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inspired considerable criticism of decision-making within the
ministry. According to Keith Speed, 'Decisions were being
made in the review without it being clear to anyone who was
making them.
On March 16 the Bermudagram was sent to the Service
Chiefs, with others on the circulation list.' 0
 In addition
to detailed proposals for the programme the Bermudagram
included a list of questions for each service to answer.1'
The answers were to be based on an accompanying set of
assumptions about expected warning time, the duration of the
conflict, the level of hostilities, and available resources.
Naturally, the assumptions were crucial to the outcome of the
review. Low warning time necessitated a higher alert status
and thus required greater resources. Combined with the
assumptions that war in Europe would be short and intense, the
logic behind	 transatlantic reinforcement was seriously
weakened.
The implications for the Royal Navy were severe. The
percentage share of the defence budget allocated to the Navy
declined several per cent. The planning totals outlined in
the Bermudagram affected the services in the following ways:
Interview with the Rt. Hon. Keith Speed, 21 May 1991.
10 The precise date is cited in Lt. General Sir Maurice
Johnston, 'MOD Reorganisation: More Power to the Centre,' RUSI
Journal Vol. 128, No. 1 (March 1983), p. 8.
Interview with Air Marshal Sir Patrick Hine, 27 November
1991.
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1. the Army budget remained essentially unchanged;
2. the RAF budget was increased;
3. the percentage going to the Royal Navy budget was
cut by 3-5 per cent from about 29 per cent to about 25
per cent of the budget.
Drawing on the analysis of the DS1 report to demonstrate that
programmes had to be adjusted in the medium term, the
Bermudagram instructed the Service Chiefs to bring their
programmes into line with the percentage figures at two future
dates in the Long-Term Costing -- 5 and 10 years. 'By this
time the Chiefs of Staff had effectively been marginalised and
never regained the initiative."2
THE INTELLECTUAL 'BEDROCK'
The ideas underlying the Bermudagram are the core of the
1981 defence review. Not only did that directive formally
launch the review but it also represented the greater part of
it. According to Admiral Leach, 'The Bermudagram was two-
thirds to three-quarters of the defence review....This formed
the bedrock of the entire defence review. Although it was
carved about the edges it was not really changed until after
the Falkiands War. .13 It is thus vitally important to
analyze the origins of the Bermudagram and the priorities it
implied before discussing service responses.
12 Interview with Air Marshal Sir Patrick Hine, 27 November
1991.
13 Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach, 1 July
1991.
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Preparation of the Bermudagram demonstrated the extent to
which 1981 was a watershed in civil-military relations: two
reports played a vital role in its preparation but neither
were drafted by Service Departments. The review thus appeared
to senior people in the ministry to have been conducted 'in a
most hoc way. It was sort of "back of an envelope" stuff,
and there was a great deal of preconception about it. '
Not only the services, but also junior ministers were given no
significant role in the review. Instead, 'Nott simply issued
x cathedra arguments to work more on this or that cut."5
There was, in fact, considerable analysis underlying the
review, but the key ideas had originated with a small group
within the central staffs and most had been developed before
Nott arrived at the ministry. The pace of the review,
however, and its fundamental character, precluded close
service involvement in the review process.
The report by Defence Secretariat 1 given to Nott when he
first became Secretary of State for Defence provided the
rationale for the review. This report, mentioned in the last
chapter, stemmed from a project to assess the feasibility of
sustaining equipment cost growth rates forecast in the 1980
' Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach quoted in Michael
Charlton, The Little Platoon, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1989), p. 148.
15 Interview with the Rt. Hon. Keith Speed, 21 May 1991.
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Long-Term Costing. 16
 In considering forward expenditure DS1
looked first at the programme and then at economic growth as
a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product. The defence
budget was recalculated as a percentage of GDP and comparison
showed a huge gap between plans and the resources likely to be
available, with the problem getting worse farther forward in
the programme. A £500 million gap was predicted for fiscal
year 1982-83, with serious trouble, a difference of billions
of pounds, coming after only 3 to 4 years.17
Nott readily accepted this analysis. It was the key
reason why, when he looked at the long-term programme, 'he
took very quickly the view that however much money was made
available the programme was not capable of being
fulfilled.' 18
 The analysis showed that rapid equipment cost
escalation meant that maintaining the existing range and level
of defence capabilities would be difficult, even with three
per cent annual increases. Ultimately this report was the
reason why Nott believed Britain had to concentrate its
16 In 1980 the FPMG established a subcommittee chaired by
Desmond Bryars, DUS (Finance and Budgets), to carry out this
task. Hennessy, Times (12 March 1981); At that time support
to the FPMG was provided by Defence Secretariat 1 (DS1) which
was then under the direction of Assistant Under Secretary
(Programmes and Budgets), (now Sir) John Bourn. Bourn
reported to Quinlan.
17 P.Hennessy, Times (12 Mar 1981); T.K. Bridge, 'UK Defence:
The Next Ten Years,' Army
 Quarterly
 (July 1981), p. 268.
18 Interview with Sir Frank Cooper, 24 April 1991.
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resources to specialise on its highest priorities.'9
Accordingly, in the 1981 Defence Estimates Nott wrote:
The complexity and cost of most equipment has
risen, and continues to rise, alarmingly.. .New ways
must be found of coping with resource pressures,
and we must re-shape our forces to meet the
developing threat...I shall be considering in the
coming months with the Chiefs of Staff, and in
consultation with our NATO allies, how
technological and other changes can help us fulfil
the same basic roles more effectively in the future
without the massive increase in real defence
expenditure which the escalation of equipment costs
might otherwise imply.2°
The detail of the Bermudagram was based on a second
report, an elaboration of the Capabilities paper given to Pym
in December 1980. It reached the same basic conclusions but
by this time 'the study had grown into a policy paper.' In
March, Cooper told Mason that the defence review had to be
completed in three months. 'The Capabilities paper was there,
Nott called for it. ,21 The paper's official status was
unusual. Its author was Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (OR)
Lt. General Sir Maurice Johnston, but the paper was not
adopted by the Chiefs of Staff. They simply 'noted' it and
deemed it to be no more than a paper by the Deputy Chief of
Defence Staff.
19 M.Donne, Financial Times (7 Mar 1981).
Cmnd 8212-I, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1981, p.1,
paras 4,7.
21 Interview with Sir Ronald Mason, 4 July 1991.
n Interview with Lt. General Sir Maurice Johnston, 16 October
1991.
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Nevertheless, it had a tremendous impact on Nott, who
described Johnston as 'the best brains on the central military
staff.' His principal arguments were that '1. we were too
mesmerized by platforms, and 2. we were not looking enough at
weapons.' On this basis, Johnston recommended major cuts in
the Royal Navy. 2' First, he argued that the Navy spent too
much on ships and too little on weapons. Second, he argued
that greater emphasis should be placed on the Navy's ASW role
in the East Atlantic rather than on providing convoy
protection for the transatlantic	 shipment of military
reinforcements. 25
 Johnston did not believe that surface
ships were obsolete; he accepted their role in providing
'presence' and therefore as a deterrent, but the prevailing
assumption that Britain had to prepare for a short war made
the Royal Navy the logical service to cut.
A second area of the naval programme targeted for savings
was the Royal Marines. Their principcJ military role in a war
in Europe would have been to reinforce Norway, if necessary by
amphibious assault. Preparing for this task also provided
them the ability to conduct amphibious operations elsewhere,
such as in the South Atlantic. Yet Britain's contribution to
Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
24 Interview with Lt. General Sir Maurice Johnston, 16 October
1991.
Interview with Sir Ronald Mason, 4 July 1991.
Interview with Lt. General Sir Maurice Johnston, 16 October
1991.
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the NATO flanks had long been subject to contraction,
particularly as specialist reinforcements were a costly and,
in some ways, distinct element of the defence programme.
Moreover, the Royal Navy tended to place a lower priority on
the Royal Marines than on the surface fleet. Indeed, they
were regarded by some as a 'regulator' of the Navy budget. One
of the economies announced by Nott in January 1981 was the
merging of No. 41 Commando with the other three commandos.27
The Royal Marines were thus vulnerable, particularly once the
concepts on which their principal role was based came under
criticism.
General Johnston questioned the scenario for reinforcing
the northern flank, whose purpose was to boost deterrence and
reassure Norway. But reinforcement requiring amphibious
assault ships, or Landing Platform Docks (LPDs), suggested it
would not take place until after the Soviets had already
invaded. Johnston concluded that boosting deterrence and
reassuring NATO did not require LPDs which, as highly capable
and specialised ships, were very expensive. Instead, soldiers
could be dropped into Norway by air, which would be quicker,
therefore likely to be completed earlier in a conflict, and
less expensive. According to Nott, 'the idea that the
Royal Marines should be placed in Norway by assault ships
27 John Nott, Hansard (20 Jan 1981), col. 152.
Interview with Lt. General Sir Maurice Johnston, 16 October
1991.
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faltered on the fact that this sort of landing would have been
virtually impossible within range of Soviet air power.' 2' As
a result, 'The Marines were under serious threat at one time.
One thing looked at was to bring all the specialist forces
together but in a reduced number. .30
As a proper 'purple analysis' of defence priorities,
Johnston's paper also attacked Army and RAF shibboleths. The
Army had relied for centuries on the fire and movement
principle -- shock tactics -- and the tank was their
battlefield weapon to achieve this shock. Johnston argued
that more effort should be put into producing the effect of
the tank, though not necessarily with the tank. He concluded
that standoff observation and mobile firepower, particularly
the Multiple Launched Rocket System, could be effective at
less cost. Similarly, the RAF could use more aerial and
satellite surveillance instead of replacing each new
generation of aircraft with another similar in nature. 31 The
impact of the report was enhanced by quantitative evidence in
support of its conclusions. It drew on both recent operational
research and detailed cost analyses conducted by DS1.
As with the arguments put forward by the DS1 report,
Nott's introduction to the 1981 Defence Estimates reflected
29 Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
3° Interview with Sir Frank cooper, 24 April 1991.
31 Interview with Lt. General Sir Maurice Johnston, 16 October
1991.
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Johnston's recommendations, which were also shared by the
Chief Scientific Adviser:
Successive budgetary pressures have meant cutbacks
on procurement, and, given the inevitable
constraints of a large investment programme already
committed, these cuts have fallen unduly on newer
programmes still at an early stage. One
consequence is that the capital stock is
unbalanced, with too much tied up in platforms --
at sea, on land, or in the air -- and not enough in
the weapons and sensors they need to carry.
The influence of these reports went beyond their direct impact
on Nott's thinking, for they impressed not only him, but also
his closest advisers. The diverse strands of activity
through which the intellectual bedrock of the Bermudagram was
'thrown up' were all linked via the Defence Secretariat, a
main source for the detailed financial and technical
information on which they depended.
Having provided the rationale for the defence review the
Defence Secretariat also costed Johnston's recommendations.
In early March 1981 DS]. calculated the planning totals which
would require the Services, especially the Royal Navy, to make
the programme adjustments outlined in the Capabilities study.
The planning totals were recalculated as percentage shares
of the defence budget and formed the financial basis of the
Bermudagram. However, the specific cuts to be made in each
Service were also spelled out in detail: 'It was quite
detailed though it dealt with broad-brush principles rather
32 Cmnd 8212-I, Defence Estimates. 1981, para 6.
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than specific equipments. 133
PRIORITIES
The priority commitments were Trident, home defence, and
British Forces Germany. These priorities were also reflected
in Nott's statement to the Procurement Executive's senior
management conference on May 6, which the Prime Minister
subsequently arranged to be published. Nott gave as examples
of options in the review:
uReorganising the Rhine Army within the framework
of our treaty obligations, to improve its military
effectiveness;
•Reviewing the balance between different ways of
carrying out anti-submarine warfare in the Eastern
Atlantic and Channel areas;
•Ways of strengthening the air defence of the
United Kingdom;
•The implications of increasing the size and
capability of the reserve forces of all three
Services;
uReviewing the requirement for staff and
headquarters jobs at all levels in MOD and command
structure.
Savings thus had to come primarily from the Royal Navy General
Purpose Programme, and support costs. Given the importance of
preserving the 'teeth' of the armed forces, Nott was
particularly interested in reducing naval support costs.
The importance of the continental-maritime balance and
political factors in defence planning suggests that the two
Letter from Admiral Sir Derek Reffell, 29 January 1991.
Text in Times (19 May 1981).
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services competing with each other most directly were the Navy
and the Army. However, comparison of programmes on the basis
of the manpower/equipment mix is probably more significant due
to the role of rising equipment costs in bringing about the
1981 review. A much greater percentage of Royal Navy and PA?
budgets were devoted to capital equipment compared to the
Army. Despite Army reliance on tanks, the proportion of its
budget devoted to manpower remained large. The Iranian
revolution of 1979 temporarily increased this proportion
because the Army took delivery of the Challenger tank ordered
by the Shah before his fall, thereby delaying the need for a
Chieftain replacement .
The Royal Navy and RAF also conflicted over two related
operational issues with important budgetary implications.
They disagreed over the vulnerability of surface ships to air
attack and over responsibility for air support of maritime
operations. The PA? was responsible for operating all
maritime patrol aircraft in ASW operations and for providing
air cover for carrier groups on NATO's northern flank. In
contrast, the US Navy had full operational control over US
maritime patrol aircraft and its carriers had organic air
cover. The Royal Navy believed for operational reasons that
it too should have full responsibility for all assets whose
These tanks had been modified for desert warfare and to the
chagrin of the Army were to be deployed in central Europe.
Ironically, with Britain's participation in the 1991 var
against Iraq the tanks were used in their intended terrain.
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role was to protect the fleet. In 1942 lack of naval air
power had enabled Japanese aircraft to sink the HNS Prince of
Wales and HNS Repulse unopposed by British aircraft,
highlighting the requirements of the Fleet Air Arm. 37 This
incident lived on in the collective memory of the Royal Navy.
It was felt particularly keenly by the Chief of the Naval
Staff, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, whose father, Captain Leach,
had commanded Prince of Wales and died in the attack.
Despite these important areas of dispute, inter-service
rivalry played a surprisingly small role in the 1981 review.
This appears to have been a direct result of Nott having taken
the initiative in the defence review, and of relying heavily
on central staff analyses of defence priorities. The services
were too busy contending with the critiques and pointed
questions originating with the central and scientific staffs
to worry about longstanding disagreements with each other.
The service and Procurement Executive reports Nott
received in April were, in general, more appropriate for his
needs. The difficulty of reaching this stage brought home to
Nott the need for the MOD to develop a view transcending the
interests of the individual services and capable of addressing
Britain's national commitment to defence as a member of NATO.
Nott considered his task a 'simple one': to maintain and
Interview with Alan Pritchard, 18 June 1991.
Geoffrey Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy. 1914-1945
(London: Jane's 1979), pp. 106-7.
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enhance Britain's front-line capabilities in the face of
'remorselessly rising costs.' In May he declared 'no amount
of special pleading' from one part of the defence es-
tablishnient would divert him and called for the formation of
'a defence view--not a single service view.'
The strategic logic behind changing naval priorities was
that new technological developments would enable ASW to be
performed more cost-effectively by expanding the role of Long
Range Maritime Patrol aircraft and of nuclear submarines.
According to Mason, towed array sonars, which could be carried
as easily by aircraft or submarines as by surface ships, would
decrease Britain's dependence on highly capable but costly
frigates. 39
 To the central staffs maintaining a large
surface fleet in the missile era appeared unreasonably
expensive, especially when lower cost alternatives existed.
As Nott later put it, 'planned forward investment in major
equipment for the air defence of warships at sea has been
about double that for the air defence of the United Kingdom
itself. .40
The fundamental assumption of a short war in Europe
essentially eliminated the requirement for ships to escort
transatlantic reinforcements. Fewer surface ships lowered the
John Nott, Hansard (19 May 1981), col. 161.
' Interview with Sir Ronald Mason, 4 July 1991.
John Nott, Harisard (25 June 1981), col. 388; for Nott's
description of the role of submarines, aircraft and surface
ships in ASW see Mansard (19 May 1981), col. 163.
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requirement for air defence of the fleet, a capability brought
increasingly into question by operational research. Aircraft
carriers were at the bottom of defence priorities. 4' Thus
the Bermudagram proposed placing one of the Royal Navy's three
aircraft carriers in reserve, even though three had to be
operational to ensure that one was always available.' 2
 In
addition, Nott wanted to eliminate amphibious assault ships.
According to Leach, at the point where the Bermudagram first
mentioned the assault ships Fearless and IntreDid Nott had
penned a comment: 'what on earth are these for?"3
Proposed cuts in the surface fleet included selling some
of the older Leander Type 22s and the Type 42 frigates. The
earliest proposals for the fleet, first mentioned by Nott at
the meeting with the Chiefs of Staff in Greenwich, were to
reduce it to the low twenties. The proposals outlined in the
Berinudagram were not quite so severe, but still prompted alarm
that the Navy was being reduced to a coastal defence fleet.
Fleet numbers were to decline from the mid-to-high sixties to
the low forties." The basis of much of the proposed savings
stemmed from the need to modernise destroyers and frigates,
Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
42 Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin, 13 August
1991.
' Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach, 1 July
1991.
" Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach, 1 July
1991.
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whose hulls were built for a 20-25 year life. Due to the pace
of technological change weapons fitted on the hull would only
be valid for 10-15 years. De-commissioning ships coming up for
mid-life modernisation was thus one way of removing a large
amount of money from forward plans.45
The basic refit cycle of most surface ships began three
years after the vessel became operational. Then it required a
minor refit taking approximately six months. After ten years
plans ordinarily called for a major refit lasting two to two
and one-half years, during which electronics and weapons would
also be updated. These mid-life modernisations could cost as
much as one-third of the initial construction. The result was
a modernised ship whose weapons would be valid for the rest of
the hulls' life. Minor ref its would begin again at fifteen
and twenty years. Virtually all of these refits were done in
Royal Dockyards because industry possessed very little re-
fitting capacity, which requires skills distinct from those
used in ship-building. Eliminating ships on the verge of
modernisation thus allowed savings in support infrastructure
since it provided a rationale for reducing the dockyards. The
dockyards were also naval bases and could repair, station or
store ships and stocks as well as conduct ref its. Devonport,
Chatham, Portsmouth and Rosyth were all both bases and
dockyards. Reducing the size of the surface fleet enabled
savings in both dockyard and base facilities, which was why,
' Interview with Alistair Jaffray, 14 June 1991.
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for instance, the complete closure of Chatham was proposed.46
Closing Royal Navy dockyards was not a novel idea; twice
within the previous ten years the closure of at least one
dockyard had been recommended. 47
 This was one means of
reducing defence expenditure without cutting back on front-
line capabilities, at least in the short-term. Closing
dockyards had not, however, been the recommendation of the
Royal Dockyards Study completed in April 1980 under the
chairmanship of Navy Minister Keith Speed.' 8
 Speed had been
given formal approval to commit the government to maintaining
all four home Royal Dockyards.' 9
 To Speed's dismay, Nott
considered the MoD's need to find savings in the defence
budget a more pressing issue than standing by the commitment
to maintain the dockyards.
Reducing the Navy's infrastructure and surface fleet
offered large savings with less obvious effects on front-
line capability than reductions in the BAOR.
	 Nott had
' Interview with Alistair Jaffray, 14 June 1991; see also
Peter Blaker, Mansard (10 Nov 1981), cols. 67-8.
The Mallabar Committee recommended it in 1971 as did the
Defence and External Affairs Subcommittee in 1975. Cmnd 4713,
Report of the Committee on Government Industrial
Establishments (July 1971); Second Report from the Expenditure
Committee, 1975-76, Defence, (MC 155), 29 January 1976. It had
been proposed as long ago as the 1950s. See DEFE 13/72 Draft
Minute to Service Ministers and Ministry of Supply, 2 August
1955.
' See Defence Committee, 1980-81, The Royal Dockvards and the
Dockvards Study
 (MC 362), 15 July 1981.
' Speed, Sea Change, p. 92.
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pledged in the House of Commons 'to sustain and improve the
front-line capability of our forces and our contribution to
the alliance. ,50 Moreover, Nott had concluded that 'NATO
would be severely damaged if we withdrew from Germany, and it
was more expensive to do anyhow, than to leave our forces
where they are already accommodated in Germany. • Instead, he
thought Britain could perform its 'maritime commitments more
cheaply by slightly changing naval priorities.'51
SERVICE RESPONSES
The services responded to the Bermudagram in two main
ways. First, reports on service priorities were drafted and
sent directly to Nott, rather than going via the Chiefs of
Staff Committee. Second, these reports were defended by
service representatives before a large group composed of both
central and service staffs, including the Service Chiefs. The
key members of the group, however, remained the rump Defence
Programme Working Party of 1980, principally Quinlan and Air
Marshal Gilbert. It was they who ultimately made
recommendations about the size and shape of the armed forces.
Consequently, 'the presentation was the military subjecting
John Nott, Mansard (20 Jan 1981), col. 152.
51 Nott on BBC-2 programme 'MoD' (9 April 1986).
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itself to the civil service.'52
Individual service responses differed due to the
disproportionate effect of the cuts. For the RAF and the Army
the review was little more disruptive than a normal financial
year whereas it was fundamental for the Royal Navy.
Nevertheless, as mentioned, service responses were not the
product of inter-service rivalry. Lack of a unified view at
the top of the military hierarchy meant that the services were
primarily concerned with protecting their own programmes
rather than criticising each other's. 'Due largely to the
time constraints imposed (by the Bermudagram] the services
circled the wagons around their individual programmes.
Lack of unity was thus less the result of direct inter-
service competition than from the schedule and character of
the review. According to Bramall,
Beetham and I agreed that there was no room for
cuts and that ships needed more defensive
equipment. But, if the assumption was to prepare
for NATO war only, we could see the logic of the
government argument and if we didn't want to see
the Royal Navy cut in that way the Army and the RAF
would have had to offer programmes of their own to
be cut. Although there was scope for some minor
cuts there was not scope for the major cuts
proposed. '
In contrast to the Royal Navy, which challenged the
52 Interview with Lt. General Sir Derek Boorman, 8 January
1992.
Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin, 13 August
1991.
Interview with Field Marshal Lord Bramall, 15 October 1992.
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assumptions underlying the review, the RAF and the Army had
little incentive to do the same. 'There was a natural
gravitation between the RAF and the Army, but when the Royal
Navy began to look really vulnerable there was an instinctive
feeling of support. This support, though not prompting
the other services to offer savings from their own budgets,
did result in the Chiefs of Staff exercising their right to
an audience with the Prime Minister.
The Royal Air Force
The Air Force Board had no warning that the RAF budget
would rise as a percentage share of the defence budget, but
they had naturally sought to bring their needs to Nott's
attention. The Air Staff had initiated the air defence
improvement programmes accepted by both the Callaghan and
Thatcher Governments described in chapter four. Despite this
success the Air Force Board never took it for granted that RAF
improvements would receive higher priority than other areas of
the defence programme. In early 1981 the Board had expected
the RAF programme to be cut at least at the margins.
Accordingly, their initial report on RAF priorities argued
against major cuts.
Interview with Lt. General Sir Derek Boorman, 8 January
1992.
% Interview with Cohn Humphrey, 13 June 1991.
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Following Nott's January minute to the Chiefs of Staff
the Air Force Board set up a subcommittee bringing together
the RAF's Finance, Operations and Policy departments. After
scouring the costings for savings it reported directly to the
Air Force Board, which concluded that the existing number of
squadrons, rate of aircraft production and current support
costs were all essential. The only cuts considered were on
the margins: training, fuel, maintenance, spare parts,
etcetera.
The basic strategic reasoning was that commitments on the
central front and increased emphasis on home defence would not
permit any substantial reduction in the RAF programme. 'At
the beginning of the review the Air Force Board unanimously
agreed that whatever cuts were made the main structure
absolutely had to remain intact.' 51 Their caution served
them well. According to Johnston, one reason why the RAF did
so well in the review was that 'the Air Staff very cleverly
drafted a paper saying that UK air defence was inadequate and
submitted it shortly before the review. It was a very clever
thing to do and no Secretary of State was going to be
unaffected. ,58
Nott and the central staffs accepted the RAF's view of
its priorities.	 Consequently, when the Air Force Board
7' Interview with Cohn Humphrey, 13 June 1991.
Interview with Lt. General Sir Maurice Johnston, 2.6 October
1991.
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received the Berinudagram indicating that the RAF's share of
the defence budget would rise, 'The RAF stood back in
silence.' 59 However, that was not all they did. Nott also
asked the RAF to justify the requested number of Tornado GR1S,
the acquisition of a new version of the Harrier (GR5) and the
presence of two air defence fighter squadrons in Germany. The
Bermudagram proposed closing at least one base in Germany and
possibly two. Initially, according to Nott, he 'considered
it the job of the Germans to provide air cover in Germany."
The RAF responses were prepared and defended by the
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Policy), Air Vice Marshal
Patrick Hine, with the assistance of the Air Staffs. Their
conclusions would have been presented to the Air Force Board
Standing Committee but due to time constraints this body did
not meet. As a result, the steering group was the Chief of
the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Beetham, Vice
Chief of the Air Staff Air Marshal Sir David Craig, Deputy
Under Secretary (Air), Cohn Humphrey, Assistant Under
Secretary (Air Staff), John Peters, and Assistant Chief of the
Air Staff (Operational Requirements), first Air Vice Marshal
Don Hall then Air Vice Marshal David Harcourt-Smith. When
relevant, the Controller (Air), Sir Douglas Lowe, was also
Interview with Cohn Humphrey, 13 June 1991.
Interview with Air Marshal Sir Patrick Hine, 27 November
1991.
61 Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
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invited. The group was not a formal one but the most logical
for working on these issues. It was this group, even the same
individuals, who had prepared the RAF report for the Defence
Programme Working Party in l98O.
With forward air defence their key priority, the RAP
defended their re-equipment programme. The RAF report argued
in favour of maintaining all the ground attack roles envisaged
for the GR1 without any reduction in numbers. It defended the
retention of two Phantom air defence squadrons at forward
bases in Germany. Although the Berinudagram proposed closing
Wildenrath air base in Germany it was providing essential all
weather air defence for the 2nd Tactical Air Force's region of
the central front. The report also highlighted Britain's
commitment to maintain a balanced tactical air force in
central Europe as part of the Brussels Treaty.'3
 Most
importantly, 'The RAF believed in forward air defence. One
suggestion was to pull air forces back to the UK. From a
political and economic point of view this was acceptable but
strategically forward deployment was crucial to defence of the
UK. The further you hurt the enemy from you the better. '
The RAP had a good military case for its programme given
Interview with Air Marshal Sir Patrick Hine, 27 November
1991.
'3 Interview with Air Marshal Sir Patrick Hine, 27 November
1991.
64 Interview with Marshal of the RAF Sir Michael Beetham, 21
October 1991.
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that the Central Region and home defence were paramount. The
planned 11 squadrons of Tornado GR1 made a vital contribution
in nuclear, conventional attack and reconnaissance roles, day
and night and in bad weather. Indeed, top-up buys were
ultimately needed. The balance of three squadrons in the UK
and eight in Germany was important because Tornado lacked the
range to operate deep into Warsaw Pact territory from the UK
without air-to-air refuelling. The RAF simply did not have
the number of tanker aircraft for that and to meet other
essential requirements for fighter refuelling. 65
 Nott was
particularly impressed with the argument that withdrawing
squadrons from Germany added 'an extra fifteen to twenty
minutes flying time, therefore the penetration of Tornado was
that much less.'
The RAF also argued that the number of frontline Nimrods
should be increased, not cut, to provide greater airborne
early warning. The number of F3 Tornado air defence squadrons
also needed to be increased, from five to seven. Buccaneer
squadrons needed to be maintained in a maritime role because
of their ability to react quickly to enemy surface ship
attack. However, 'to enable some economies the Air Staff
made concessions about numbers -- which you of course always
seek to make only in the oldest equipment. The RAF was in a
65 Interview with Air Marshal Sir Patrick Hine, 27 November
1991.
Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
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major re-equipment programme and we needed to keep those
programmes intact. ,67 Consequently, plans for the early
replacement of the Jaguar force in Germany were scrapped. In
accepting the Air Staff's arguments Nott was convinced that
the RAF required a larger percentage of the defence budget:
'The RAF was in the middle of a major modernisation programme
which was crucial.'
The Army
Like the Air Force Board, the full Army Board did not sit
down to work out service priorities. The Army was, bowever,
'very good at the exercise.' 69
 The report on Army
priorities was prepared principally by the Director of
Military Operations, Lt. General Sir Derek Boorman, with the
assistance of Military Operations 1 (MOl), the directorate
responsible for worldwide Army deployments. Boorman had
previously cut out all the hierarchy between himself and the
Chairman of MOl, Colonel Peter J. Shepherd, effectively
transforming it into the DMO's 'think tank'. This was an
important step in enabling the DM0 to cope with his dual
67 Interview with Marshal of the RAF Sir Michael Beetham, 21
October 1991.
Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991; All of the
RAF's arguments were accepted. See Cmnd 8288, The United
Kindom Defence Programme: The Way
 Forward, (June 1981), paras
12-15.
Interview with Sir Frank Cooper, 24 April 1991.
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responsibility (not shared by his counterparts) for current
operations and forward plans.10
Boorinan initiated the Army response to the Bermudagram by
asking Colonel Shepherd and the group of Majors under him to
conduct a 'warts' exercise in which the Army's strengths and
weaknesses were evaluated. The initial evaluation was
conducted in forty-eight hours and spanned less than two
sheets of paper, on specific orders from Boorman. This was
the machinery used to assess the Army programme and through
which it quickly became clear that the key concept on which to
base Army priorities was the political clout of the central
front. 'The Army conducted a "warts" exercise to judge the
pluses and minuses of the land battle case in strategic terms
and we quickly linked that to the RAF.' 7' The Chief of the
General Staff, Field Marshal Sir Edwin Bramall, and the
General Staff as a whole, accepted that 'we were going to win
or lose on resource allocation on the politics.'
The assessment of US intentions played an important role
in the General Staff's conclusion. The Army recognised that
the government would not risk bringing about any dilution of
the US commitment and that meant 1 BR Corps was safe from all
Interview with Lt. General Sir Derek Boorman, 8 January
1992.
71 Interview with Lt. General Sir Derek Boorman, 8 January
1992.
Interview with Lt. General Sir Derek Boorman, 8 January
1992.
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but administrative cuts. 7' Indeed, the Army was not asked to
reduce the BAOR below the treaty commitment of 55,000. In
response to recent NATO concerns about European defence that
number had been exceeded. Returning to the 55,000 level, as
the Bermudagram proposed, saved money but was necessary in any
case because Army recruitment could not have sustained much
more. However, the same underlying assumptions which favoured
the Army in Europe made it, along with the Royal Navy,
vulnerable elsewhere. 'The logic behind Nott's cuts was that
all we had to be concerned with was NATO and a general
war. ' Though convinced that the BAOR was safe from cuts,
Bramall and the Vice Chief of the General Staff, Lt. General
Sir John Stanier, remained worried that political pressures
for greater savings might lead to arbitrary cuts in the Army's
out-of-area forces .
Army concern for the future of its out-of-area forces
stemmed at least partly from the background of those
responsible for assessing Army priorities. Boorman and the
Director of Army Staff Duties, Lt. General Richard B. Trant,
had strong backgrounds, respectively, in counterinsurgency
warfare and rapid deployment. Boorman was a Gurkha and Trant
3 Interview with Lt. General Sir Derek Boorman, 8 January
1992; H. Stanhope, Times (17 Feb 1981).
Air Cdre G.S. Cooper, Daily
 TeleraDh (7 May 1981).
Interview with Field Marshal Lord Bramall, 15 October 1991.
76 Interview with Lt. General Sir Derek Boorman, 8 January
1992.
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had commanded the 5th Airportable Brigade, a key element of
any rapid military response force. Bramall, although a
distinguished former divisional commander in the BAOR, was
very open-minded and, as his tenure as Chief of Defence Staff
later showed, was highly sensitive to Britain's out-of-area
role. Together Bramal]. and his closest subordinates got out a
map with 72 pins in it, one for each place the Army had been
since 1945. They asked themselves who could have predicted
any of these operations. Each had been an unpredicted
contingency, yet the Army had lost men in operations during
every year since the war but one.7'7
The General Staff concluded that emphasising the
political role of the Army was the best way to prevent
arbitrary cuts in manpower. The Army's sensitivity to
political currents within the ministry had been evident in
their proposal, discussed previously, in chapter six, for a
two division shock reinforcement armoured reserve. According
to Nott, 'The Army caused less problems than the others. .78
Aware of the importance of 'walking the corridors', Boorman
spent hours with Air Marshal Gilbert talking through the
Army's case in advance of the presentation, for which he was
responsible.
7' Interview with Lt. General Sir Derek Boorman, 8 January
1992; For analyses of the largest of these operations see
Michael Carver, War Since 1945 (London: Weidenfield and
Nicholson, 1980).
7' Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
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Boorman's presentation was unique in that it was short
and did not look at the order of battle. It focused on the
politico-military arguments behind preparing for land/air
battle in the Central Region, responding to worldwide residual
commitments, and maintaining the flexibility to respond to the
unexpected, with Northern Ireland in the background. The only
substantive argument for out-of-area capabilities was to point
to postwar history and raise questions such as 'what were the
consequences of having a military presence overseas?' Boorman
highlighted low-profile operations in which British
involvement had played a particularly important role made
possible by long association with the area.
This was playing to the Mandarins, who preferred
low-profile operations. I was saying don't throw
this away. I remember standing up at one point in
what was otherwise a very low-key presentation and
saying that I couldn't put the pin in the map in
the precise place we would be needed next.
These arguments proved persuasive. The White Paper concluded
that 'Despite all the financial pressures on our defence
effort, the Government has decided that this contribution is
so important to the Alliance's military posture and its
political cohesion that it must be maintained. '°
The Army was thus protected from major reductions, but
not from some marginal cuts. One key criticism of the Army
programme had been that more could be done with advanced
Interview with Lt. General Sir Derek Boorman, 8 January
1992.
Cmnd 8288, The Wa y
 Forward, para 16.
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technology equipment, allowing for a decrease in manpower.
Army manpower was cut by 7,000 but the cuts were not effective
immediately, thus avoiding the need for redundancies. On the
other hand, the arguments for greater application of new
technologies translated into support for re-equipment of the
BAOR. The white paper announced an increase in the buy of
Milan anti-tank missiles, and improvements to the Blowpipe air
defence missile system as well as the expansion of war stocks
and ammunition. Shortages in stocks and ammunition had been
a central focus of US efforts to strengthen conventional
deterrence and had recently been highlighted in the 'haul
down' report of Britain's outgoing Vice Chief of Defence Staff
(Personnel and Logistics), General Sir Patrick Howard-
Dobson. 81
 Also significant was the adjustment in the scale
and timing of some new Army equipment projects. The Army
programme went forward, but not without slippage and
reductions.
The Royal Navy
Due to the radical nature of the proposed cuts in the
Royal Navy it attempted to do more than merely limit the
damage of the review. It challenged the assumptions, the
logic behind the proposed cuts, and sought to influence the
81 Interview with General Sir Patrick Howard-Dobson, 31
October 1991.
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outcome of the review with more than argument. The Chief of
the Naval Staff, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, was unwilling to
acquiesce in the dismantling of major naval capabilities, but
he could not effectively counter the initiative of the
Secretary of State. Leach was outspoken and protested the cuts
with vigour. Ultimately, the Navy sought to mobilise NATO,
Conservative back benchers and public opinion against radical
reductions in its programme. According to Lord Hill-Norton,
'Leach went further in resisting the cuts than many Chiefs of
Staff would. ,82
Once the Chiefs of Staff had lost the initiative the
avenues through which any Service Chief could influence the
Secretary of State narrowed. One result was that the
personalities of Nott and Leach became an important ingredient
in the review process. After the Bermudagram it was clear that
Navy cuts were unavoidable. Relations between Nott and the
Naval Staff deteriorated correspondingly. 'Henry Leach, who
obviously felt more threatened than anybody else, was pretty
forthright in saying what he thought. ' One episode shortly
after the review had been approved by Parliament, but before
it had been implemented, illustrated not only the extent to
which direct contact with the Secretary of State was the
principal avenue of influence available to individual Service
82 Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Hill-Norton, 18
July 1991
Interview with Sir Frank Cooper, 24 April 1991.
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Chiefs, but also the lengths to which Leach went in arguing
the Royal Navy's case.
Even once the review process was formally over Leach
continued to resist certain unfinalised aspects. At one point
he actually followed Nott to Cornwall to discuss the proposed
sale of the carrier Invincible to Australia. Having scheduled
a late afternoon appointment with Nott, Leach arrived to learn
that the Secretary of State was preparing to catch an evening
train to the West Country, which necessitated rescheduling
their meeting. Leach appealed to Nott to respect the original
appointment, insisting that he would otherwise follow him on
his journey. Sceptically, Nott departed only to find that
Leach had contacted his Private Secretary to find out where
Nott was staying. With the Private Secretary's assistance
Leach arranged a dinner appointment with Nott at Caerlahy's
Castle in Cornwall.
	 However, an overnight snow delayed
Leach's train and he arrived at 8 p.m. The two men
congenially discussed Invincible over after dinner drinks, but
Nott remained firm in his commitment to sell the vessel.85
While the review was still underway those principally
concerned with preparing the report on Royal Navy priorities
were the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (Policy), Admiral
Derek Ref fell, and the Director of Naval Plans, initially
84 Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach, 1 July
1991.
Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach, 1 July
1991.
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Admiral Sandy Woodward and later Admiral John Kerr. Reffell,
who delivered the Navy's presentation, worked closely with the
Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Sir William Staveley,
and, of course, Admiral Leach. Beneath Woodward was a 'knock
about group', or KNAG, which worked to produce alternative
solutions to the budget problem. This group included
representatives from Defence Secretariat 4 (DS4), the
Directorate of Naval Plans (DN Plans), the Directorate of
Naval Operational Requirements (DNOR), the Directorate of
Naval Warfare (DNW), and the Directorate of Naval Air Warfare
(DNAW) .
Far from arguing its case from a narrow Navy perspective,
the Naval Staff deployed arguments with strong resonance
within the Conservative Party and, indeed, the government. Two
main themes which the Conservatives had themselves promoted,
confidence in deterrence and the need for out-of-area
capabilities, were the centrepiece of Navy arguments. The Navy
stressed that while the greatest threat to Britain lay in the
Central Region this was the least likely area of conflict.
Defence along the central front was underpinned by strategic
and tactical nuclear weapons intended to deter war. The
stability of central Europe since the Second World War
testified to the effectiveness of deterrence, as both Pym and
Nott argued in defending the Trident decisions.
Even this line of argument did not lead the Navy to
86 Letter from Admiral Sir Derek Reffell, 29 January 1992.
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conclude that conventional forces on the central front should
be reduced, merely that Britain's capability to intervene
outside the NATO area should not be emasculated. According to
Admiral Ref fell, 'the original reductions planned in the
review would have been crippling as far as our maritime
capability was concerned, both inside NATO and out of
area.' 87 The Navy argument that one of its important roles
was to remain prepared for the unexpected was not, at this
point, as great an asset as it would become after the
Falklands War since it was an intangible with little role in
operational analyses linked to NATO scenarios. The Navy
remained the only service unable to link requirements for the
bulk of its programme to a short war scenario on the central
front.
To help argue the case for transatlantic reinforcement,
which had been weakened due to the short war assumption, Leach
saw to it early in the review that Nott was aware of itS
implications for NATO. Leach contacted the Supreme Allied
Commander Atlantic, Admiral Train, to inform him about the
progress of the review and told him 'these decisions are
going to have an impact on your ability to carry out your
responsibilities as a major NATO commander and as Supreme
Allied Commander Atlantic you should probably come talk about
it.' Subsequently, Train had three separate sessions with
Nott as a result of which he understood the trend in the
87 Letter from Admiral Sir Derek Ref fell, 29 January 1992.
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review to be that 'the Royal Navy's role should be limited to
the waters contiguous to the British Isles and the Royal Navy
should not contemplate a role in distant waters such as the
Mediterranean or the Western Atlantic. '
Train's discussions with Nott encompassed economic,
political and strategic issues. Nott argued that the only part
of the programme where he could reduce defence spending was
the Royal Navy. Nott's basic argument on the BAOR was that
'it was a political necessity to maintain a presence on the
continent.' Likewise, Nott told Train he was unable to reduce
the Trident programme or the RAF. 89
 In response, Train
focused on the effect the review would have on what he saw as
the essential characteristic of NATO:
My case was built around the fact that the
essential characteristic of NATO was its
atlanticity and by that I meant that there are two
nations not in western Europe whose territory is
not directly threatened but who pledge to come to
the aid of the West European nations whose
territory is directly threatened in the event of a
conflict.
Train pointed to history to support his case, recalling that
in World War Two we allies lost 2,828 merchant
ships carrying 14 million tons of cargo, including
2 and one half Army divisions of equipment. We
lost 30,000 men, 97 escorts, but were still
successful. But that was in a period when there
were two allied escorts for every Nazi German
submarine. At the time I was talking to Nott we
had only one allied escort for every two Soviet
Interview with Admiral Harry Train, 4 January 1991.
Interview with Admiral Harry Train, 4 January 1991.
° Interview with Admiral Harry Train, 4 January 1991.
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submarines 91
Train acknowledged that ASW had benefitted tremendously from
technological advancement since the Second World War but as
SACLANT he still concluded that the US did not have the sheer
numbers necessary for the reinforcement and resupply of
Europe. It was for this reason, discussed in chapter four,
that Train had modified NATOS convoy plans.
The exchange between Train and Nott illustrated the
effect of the assumptions about the likely nature of war.
Train believed that NATO required the ability to fight a long
war and that Britain's contribution was vital. Nott
emphasised capabilities which were of greatest importance in
a short war at the expense of cutting back on reinforcement
and resupply. The mismatch between the two men's assumptions
forced Train to conclude that 'John Nott listened but he did
not understand...He didn't alter his rudder one tenth of one
• Nevertheless, Train 'kept thinking that every
time I came in there I could make the case but I was never
able to because he didn't want the case made.'93
One aspect of the Navy response which Nott found
particularly frustrating was its proposed reduction in the
'teeth' rather than the 'tail' of the naval programme. The
Navy report cut the number of frigates to thirty, cancelled
91 Interview with Admiral Harry Train, 4 January 1991.
n Interview with Admiral Harry Train, 4 January 1991.
Interview with Admiral Harry Train, 4 January 1991.
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the carrier Ark Royal, and abandoned the Mine Counter Measures
Vessel (MCMV) programme. In addition, the Antarctic Survey
ship HNS Endurance and the royal yacht, HMS Brittania, both
high-profile politically important vessels, were placed on the
list of proposed cuts. No one on the Admiralty Board
initially thought there was much scope for a reduction in the
dockyards due to the feeling that they were vital. Such cuts
also seemed politically unacceptable due to the employment
consequences. At the root of naval thinking was the idea that
if the Royal Navy kept up its support facilities they would be
able to scratch together a fleet. 9' It can take a generation
to rebuild a Navy, but even longer without the necessary
dockyard infrastructure. According to Reffell,
The top priority was Trident. After that, we
sought to maintain the full range of capabilities,
even if reduced in size, so that no expertise
should be lost completely and the Navy should be
able to expand again if ever greater resources
became available or a strategic need was
identified.
The rationale for cutting Endurance and Brittania was that
these ships had little military value and were thus less
important to the Navy than they might be, for instance, to the
Foreign Office. The Navy had proposed cutting Endurance
previously, only to have the Foreign Office argue that the cut
was unacceptable. According to Callaghan,
every year from 1975 onwards the Defence Ministry
' Interview with Alan Pritchard, 18 June 1991.
Letter from Admiral Sir Derek Reffell, 29 January 1992.
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announced that they wished to withdraw her from
service. Every year I replied in the same manner,
namely that their proposal would have serious
consequences for our policy of sustaining the
(Falkiands] islands, and I would consent only if
she were replaced by a ship of similar or improved
capabilities .%
Nott was not pleased with the Navy's report on its
priorities and asked that it be redrafted with greater savings
coming from logistic support. He did, however, consent to the
withdrawal of Endurance, despite the protests of Foreign
Secretary Lord Carrington. 97
 Nevertheless, the Naval Staff's
sense of detachment from the review process fortified their
determination to resist the proposed reductions. Few papers
were requested from the Navy's policy section and little heed
was given to advice that, for instance, surface ships had an
important role to play in ASW. 'The Navy certainly had a
pretty free hand to submit its proposals, opinions and
criticisms in the early stages of the review. However, once
Nott produced his outline -- expanded from the Bermudagram --
very little notice was taken of any single service Navy
input. ' Shortly after the Bermudagram had been promulgated
the Navy Minister had sought a meeting of the Defence Council,
which he believed was the appropriate forum to discuss the
When the Callaghan Government left office in 1979 the MoD
had instructions to retain Endurance at least to 1981.
Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 375.
See Cmnd 8787, Falkiands Islands Review: Re port of a
Committee of Privy
 Counsellors, (The Franks Report), January
1983, paras 114-118.
Letter from Admiral Sir Derek Ref fell, 29 January 1992.
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defence review but, according to Speed, 'Nott let the idea
wither on the vine.'
Following Nott's rejection of the Navy's report the Naval
Staff worked on the review for another four weeks, after which
time the Admiralty Board met to discuss its implications.
During an eight-hour meeting on May 1 in Speed's office the
Admiralty Board drafted a paper trenchantly outlining their
views on the effect of the proposed cuts on the Navy's op-
erational capability. The Board did not believe that the
implications of the cuts had registered, either with Nott,
Parliament or the public.
Not only the Navy but defence was being cut at a
critical period of international tension.
Solidarity had been launched in Poland, the Soviets
had invaded Afghanistan, the Gulf War was on in the
Middle East, etcetera, etcetera. It was largely
for this reason that the Board drafted a report on
the consequences of the review.100
The paper concluded that front-line capability would be
seriously undermined and suggested reconsidering the proposed
reductions. Arguments to preserve the surface fleet included
Britain's dependence on shipping for trade, the need to
protect sea reinforcement of NATO, and the importance of the
fleet in out-of-area operations.10'
The Admiralty Board's report was a final effort to
Interview with the Rt. Hon. Keith Speed, 21 May 1991.
Interview with the Rt. Hon. Keith Speed, 21 May 1991.
101 D.Wettern, Daily
 Telearaph (11 May 1981); See Eric Grove,
Vanauard to Trident, p. 346, on the Admiralty Board meeting.
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protect the fleet and it antagonised Nott. 'Leach told Nott,
in effect, that there were no other options and that the Royal
Navy would tell him what he needed to know. This annoyed Nott
something silly. He turned his logical mind and all of his
cutting power on the Royal Navy. 1102 Nott subsequently
described his experience with the Navy in the following way:
'I tried and tried to get rational analytical and coherent
answers from the Royal Navy but normally failed to do so.'
The attitude which Nott saw as characterising the Navy's
responses to his proposals was 'the Royal Navy is the Royal
Navy and you're a fool if you don't understand what its for.
It isn't enough for someone who seeks to analyze these
questions, and hasn't got enough money to do everything.'103
Nott recognised that what he saw as a slight change in naval
priorities was 'a catastrophic thing for the Navy,' but he was
convinced the Royal Navy could perform its roles more
cheaply.
Nott turned to the central staffs to provide 'properly
argued pieces about the Royal Navy's attitude to how they saw
things in the Eastern Atlantic.' 105
 Having been impressed
with General Johnston's analysis of overall defence
102 Interview with Field Marshal Lord Braniall, 15 October
1991.




priorities, Nott asked him to provide a purple analysis of
ASW:
I found the central staffs absolutely
excellent. . .Their advice on all these controversial
areas was always excellent. For instance a core
paper...was the paper that I asked General Johnston
and the military staffs to do for me on anti-
submarine warfare. It took a long time...and it
was an in-depth study into anti-submarine warfare.
That paper, which was done by the military staffs,
formed a key element in the decisions we came to on
priorities for the Navy.'06
The purpose of the paper was 'to try to resolve the
differences of opinion on the part which could be played by
air power as opposed to ships, helicopters and
submarines. ,107 As part of his research Johnston flew to
Norfolk to discuss ASW with Admiral Train. Train thought it
was just like the British to send a cavalry General to discuss
maritime warfare and scheduled a very brief meeting. Before
the pleasantries were over, however, Johnston had asked Train
three highly technical questions and it was not until an hour
and three quarters had passed that Train had finished
answering.'08
The report also drew on operational analyses conducted at
DOAE. One particularly important study, DOAE 272, concluded
on the basis of research into sound propagation and magnetic
anomaly detection, that ASW could be undertaken more cost
106 Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
107 Letter from Admiral Sir Derek Reffell, 29 January 1992.
108 Interview with Lt. General Sir Maurice Johnston, 16
October 1991.
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effectively by Long Range Maritime Patrol aircraft. All ASW
techniques were assessed, including the role of sonobuoys and
towed array sonars, as well as aircraft, submarines and
frigates. According to Mason, DOAE showed that the capability
of submarines compared to surface ships was essentially the
same: they were most useful for point defence. However,
submarines did not have the same vulnerability or air defence
requirements.'09
 Based on cost effectiveness, therefore,
the submarine was a better system. Frigates compared even
less favourably to LRI4PT. 'The frigate was the least
efficient system for ASW because it lacked speed to cover
large areas quickly and because it was very expensive in money
and manpower. Long-range maritime patrol aircraft cost less
initially, to run, in personnel, had quicker reaction and
greater range.'"° Johnston's basic conclusion was that ASW
was performed with sensors and weapons that need not be on
surface ships; the role of submarines and aircraft could thus
be expanded.'11
Not surprisingly, there was considerable tension between
DOAE and the Naval Staff, who placed greater importance on
operational experience than operational analyses. Navy
analysts doubted that the outcome of complex situations could
Interview with Sir Ronald Mason, 4 July 1991.
110 Interview with Brian Robson, 6 November 1991.
111 Interview with Lt. General Sir Maurice Johnston, 16
October 1991.
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be predicted as certainly as DOAE was purported to have done.
There was a feeling that Nott was adopting a simplistic
approach in looking for clinical answers to a complex problem,
which the CSA was equally willing to 'solve'. According to
Ref fell,
We were concerned by criticism from any source of
naval roles, and that included several reports by
the operational analysts under the then CSA. Our
concern was principally that their mathematical
analyses were unrealistic, that their models were
unable to represent many of the important factors
which would affect prospective campaigns. They
admitted that it was too difficult mathematically
to take account of such factors as electronic
warfare, communications, command facilities, the
fog of war and the varying flexibility of specific
items of military hardware.112
Attempts to make the defence review as precise as possible
had, according to Rear Admiral J.R.Hill, resulted in a listing
and amalgamation of Eastern Atlantic tasks 'to form a kind of
scenario, or determinant case, on which force structures are
founded.' 113
 According to Train, who followed the review
very closely, and who was himself a systems analyst, 'the
systems analysts were leading John Nott around by the nose and
saying "if we do this this will be the result" and were using
the process or discipline of systems analysis to defend
decisions that had already been made.'114
112 Letter from Admiral Sir Derek Ref fell, 29 January 1992.
113 Rear Admiral J.R. Hill, British Sea Power in the 1980s
(London: Ian Allen, 1985), p. 18; see also D.Wettern, Daily
Telerah (23 Dec 1982).
114 Interview with Admiral Harry Train, 4 January 1991.
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In challenging the direction of the review the Navy
raised doubts about the analytical process on which Nott's
decisions rested. To illustrate the weaknesses of operational
analyses the Naval Staff posed DOAE an analytical problem.
They asked DOAE if they could predict the outcome of a
tactical situation with the following information:
.11 units on each side;




When DOAE affirmed that they could indeed determine the
outcome the Naval Staff asked them to predict the results of
the next cricket test match. Despite proving their point
about the world's complexity the Naval Staff remained unable
substantially to challenge the DOAE's specific conclusions
about ASW until Navy trials in 1982 revealed that aircraft had
to be triggered -- told where submarines were before they
could attack them. If SOSUS failed to detect a submarine the
aircraft might not be able to be triggered unless there were
adequate numbers of surface ships conducting ASW. The Navy
did not doubt the value of aircraft in ASW operations; they
merely believed the CSA ought to accept that surface ships
continued to have a role as well.'
For his part Nott dismissed the Navy's rejection of DOAE
analyses as bias: 'I discovered that the Royal Navy, for
instance, unlike the other two services, was refusing even to
listen to the views of the Defence Operational Analysis Unit
,	 WI	 £( M//,,	 r 1A //,
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at West Byfleet. Its scientific analysis and approach simply
did not accord with naval prejudices." 5
 The clash between
the Navy and the DOAE over defence analysis was, according to
Speed, illustrated in a Navy briefing for Nott on ASW given
one-third of the way through the review by Vice Chief of the
Naval Staff Vice Admiral William Staveley. 'Nott appeared
aesmerised during the briefing but the influence of the CSA
was too great.' 116
 When Nott arrived at the MOD, according
to Lewin, he 'knew nothing about defence and had a couple of
think-ins with the Chiefs of Staff, but he soon fell under the
spell of the Chief Scientific Adviser.'117
Undoubtedly the operational analyses emanating from the
DOAE played a vital role in the defence review, and Sir Ronald
Mason was convinced that surface ships were critically
vulnerable to air attack. However, it is not clear that Mason
wielded excessive influence on Nott. In response to a
newspaper report alleging that Mason was exerting
'considerable pressure' on his Secretary of State Nott told
the House:
Today I read...that my chief scientific adviser
enjoys a position that is almost unrivalled in the
Ministry and has access to me in a way that is not
enjoyed by the Chiefs of Staff. I simply do not
understand where that comes from. I estimate that
I have seen the Chiefs of Staff three or four times
115 John Nott, Times (5 Oct 1987).
116 Interview with the Rt. Hon. Keith Speed, 21 May 1991.
117 Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin, 13 August
1991.
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as often as I have seen the chief scientific
adviser. Indeed, I have hardly seen him at all. I
regret that, because he is an exceptional fellow,
but I have just not had the time to see him.'18
DOAE obviously played an important role in evaluating
alternative force structures and the appeal of their analyses,
based on sophisticated -- though not infallible -- models, is
understandable. Most importantly, however, DOAE offered an
alternative source of advice from the services, despite their
role as the 'customer' for operational research. Thus, when
the Chiefs of Staff lacked a unified view of priorities, and
when the credibility of a service's analysis was challenged,
the role of DOAE became critical. The alternative source of
advice was an essential, though uncalculated element of Nott's
decision to use the central staffs to conduct a defence
review. Of far greater importance than Mason's role as an
individual was the widespread acceptance of many of the DOAE's
conclusions by the central staff, both military and civilian.
They proved the decisive influence on Nott's thinking.
Nott remained an independent thinker, but as Defence
Secretary he had to reach judgements about the quality of
advice he was receiving. In this respect, the Navy's outright
rejection of DOAE analyses -- however understandable -- worked
to their disadvantage. According to Nott,
All the papers that had come out of the military
staffs were fortified by the West Byfleet research
about the value of different assets in ASW and when
I asked the Navy what they thought about it they
118 John Nott, Hansard (19 May 1981), col. 166.
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said "we think it is a useless waste of time..we
have our own opinions and we don't want to hear
what all these stupid civilians and scientists have
to say."9
At the heart of the conflict was the Navy's difficulty in
quantifying its contribution in a cost-benefit format.
Denis Healey, with whom Nott met informally to discuss the
review on at least two occasions, had encountered similar
problems with naval analyses.' 2' The Navy was unable to
prove through operational analysis what it honestly believed
on the basis of professional experience. According to Mason,
The Royal Navy always argued for the status .
They were not prepared to say maybe we haven't got
it right. Nott saw the intellectual inflexibility
and rumbled them. At DOAE they presented scenarios
on the basis that the assumptions could be wrong.
Nott had a full day at DOAE arguing about the
issues. The services were simply not flexible
politically or technically.'22
On the other hand, developing a force structure on the basis
of analyses as valid only as the assumptions on which they
were based risked military inflexibility. 'Operational
analysis is alright if it supports what you want to do, but it
rarely demonstrates what you truly need, which for a nation
119 Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991,
'° See Peter Nailor, 'The Utility of Maritime Power: Today
and Tomorrow,' RUSI Journal Vol. 131, No. 3 (September 1986)
p. 19
121 Denis Healey, The Time of Mv Life, (London: Michael
Joseph, 1989), p. 276; Nott believed Healey was the only other
Defence Secretary to try to conduct a 'strategic' defence
review.
122 Interview with Sir Ronald Mason, 4 July 1991.
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without aggressive intentions is the balance and flexibility
to respond to surprises.'1
Nott was not incapable of sympathy for the Navy's
inclination to base their analyses on experience, but this was
insufficient to preserve the existing role of the Royal Navy.
Following a highly successful demonstration of the assault
ship Fearless's capabilities, Nott sent Leach a note asking
'"who was so stupid as to suggest cutting these ships?'" In
a response characterising the two men's relationship Leach
sent his shortest minute ever: 'you."24
POLITICAL DEBATE
With the approach of the annual defence debate political
discussion focused increasingly on defence. The debate began
in earnest after Conservative MP Julian Critchley, former
vice-Chairman of the Conservative back bench Defence
Committee, questioned the extent of the planned Navy cuts in
The Daily Telecraph. Current proposals would, Critchley said,
'cut the British Army of the Rhine between one-third and one-
half, and reduce even more drastically the Royal Navy.'1
Critchley's column noticeably heightened Tory concern over the
123 Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin, 13 August
1991.
124 Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach, 1
July 1991.
125 J.Critchley, Daily
 Telegraph (7 Nay 1981).
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review, and media attention on defence.126
While defence was still in the headlines Navy Minister
Keith Speed told his Ashford constituency that the cuts
proposed by the MOD threatened 'irreversibly (to] run down
the Royal Navy. ,127 The statement had not been cleared by
Nott, who first learned about it in the Sunday Times.
Speed realized the risk he ran in criticising the review
underway but he judged that he was supporting Conservative
policy. The Government had been elected on a platform which
included strengthening Britain's defences. If this policy was
to be adhered to Speed had no reason to worry. If the policy
was to be abandoned Speed preferred to take a stand against
the change.
Nott discussed Speed's speech with Prime Minister
Thatcher and Deputy Prime Minister William Whitelaw. Thatcher
and Whitelaw insisted that Speed resign and Nott accepted that
it was necessary since it was unacceptable to have junior
ministers speaking out during a sensitive stage of policy
development.° Nott telephoned Speed the morning of May 18
126 See especially Conservative MP Patrick Wall's letter to
the Daily
 Telecirah (13 May 1981).
127 Guardian (16 May 1981); D.Wettern, Daily
 TeleraDh (16 May
1981).
Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
Interview with the Rt. Hon. Keith Speed, 21 May 1991; see
also A.Raphael Observer (17 May 1981); Times (18 May 1981).
130 Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
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to request his resignation, but Speed declined to offer it.
Later in the day he was telephoned again, this time by Sir
dive Whitinore, Secretary to the Cabinet, but again he refused
to resign. That evening the Prime Minister telephoned Speed,
who once more refused to resign. In a late meeting at 10
Downing Street that night Speed discussed the review with the
Prime Minister for forty-five minutes. The meeting was polite
and Speed made plain his objections to the review. To
underscore them he stated that to remove him as Navy Minister
the Prime Minister would have to dismiss him, which she
did.131
Virtually all subsequent references to this episode
mention Keith Speed's resignation. 132
 However, unlike
Christopher Mayhew, the Navy Minister who resigned in 1966
over Healey's decision to eliminate the Navy's carriers, Speed
did not resign. The nature of his protest was to stand on his
principles and force the Prime Minister to sack him. The
distinction is not insignificant because it reflects Speed's
awareness, shared by the Navy, that ministerial and service
resignations were an ineffective means of influencing policy.
131 Interview with the Rt. Hon. Keith Speed, 21 May 1991; See
also Speed, Sea Change, 107-8; J.Wightman, Daily
 Telegraph (19
May 1981); I.Aitken, Guardian (19 May 1981); R.Evans,
Financial Times (19 May 1981).
132 See, for example, Chichester and Wilkinson, The Uncertain
Ally, p. 36; Christopher Coker, A Nation in Retreat:
Britain's Defence Commitment (London: Brassey's, 1986), p. 65;
Peter Byrd, (ed), British Defence Policy : Thatcher and Beyond
(Hemel Hempstead: Philip Alan, 1991), p. 25;
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In a clear example of the extent to which MoD centralization
had been consolidated under the Secretary of State, an
Undersecretary of State had publicly to criticise the
direction of policy to have any hope of influencing it.
Speed carefully chose the timing of his speech to
maximise its impact on the outcome of the review. The timing
was influenced by several factors. First, the following week
Cabinet's Overseas and Defence Committee was scheduled to meet
to discuss the review and reach at least preliminary
decisions. Second, the annual two-day defence debate was
scheduled to open that week and Speed was expected to speak
for the government, winding up the first day'. debate. Speed
could not have spoken in defence of government policy given
his views. Not only would this have violated his conscience
but would also have made him look ridiculous to the House,
where his pro-Navy views were well known. Finally, if Speed
delayed his final effort to influence the review the momentum
of events might have precluded another opportunity to draw
public attention to the forthcoming defence decisions. Prince
Charles was due to marry Lady Diana Spencer on July 29th and
government delay in revealing the details of the review so
that they would come out shortly before the Royal Wedding, and
just prior to Parliament's summer recess, would have rendered
futile any attempt to mobilise public opinion. 1
 One major
accomplishment of Speed's departure was to incite other
Interview with the Rt. Hon. Keith Speed, 21 May 1991.
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Conservative critics, more than twenty of whom signed an early
day motion stating
the House commends the Government's intention to
implement the Armed Forces Pay Review Body
recommendations but would view with the gravest
concern any diminution in our nations defence
capability bearing in mind the increasing threat
from Warsaw Pact countries, and the terms of the
Conservative Party's election manifesto.1M
Conservative critics were also incited by a key newspaper
report purporting to reveal in detail the government's planned
reductions in the armed forces. 135
 In response to Speed's
protest, the new Chairman of the Conservative back bench
Defence Committee, Alan Clark, had declared, 'in my official
capacity I very much welcome Keith Speed's speech. 1l
 Two
days later, after learning of the report claiming that Nott's
plan included reducing the Navy to 'little more than a coastal
defence fleet' and disbanding the Royal Marines, 131
 Clark
told BBC radio it would be 'absolute madness and criminal' if
rumoured cuts to the Royal Marines went forward.
The intensity of feeling over these issues prompted the
media to devote increased attention to the defence review.
'	 Quoted in J.Wightman, Daily
 Telegraph (19 May 1981);
R.Evans, Financial Times (20 May 1981).
135 See D.Wettern, Daily
 Telerah (19 May 1981); Wettern was
in close contact with many naval officers and was known for
voicing the concerns of the Royal Navy.




 Telegraph (19 May 1981).
Clark quoted in G.Clark and R.Evans, Times (19 May 1981).
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The Daily
 Telerah rejected the need for any defence review,
believing instead that defence spending ought to be increased.
Other editors expressed opinions in favour of the Navy, even
if that meant opting against the BAOR. In the first of many
editorials on defence The Times stated 'In a choice between
cutting the Navy, and cutting back on the strength of British
Forces in Germany, it is the Rhine Army which should be
cut.' 139
 The Financial Times agreed that, 'on balance, any
major cut in the Royal Navy's role would be disturbing,' but
acknowledged the political significance of the BAOR and
concluded that it was 'of the highest importance that no
decisions be taken without a thorough review in the alliance
of the constraints facing the defence efforts of all its
members."4° Alone among the quality dailies, The Guardian
welcomed the review but criticised it as unnecessary because
it had been caused by the Trident missile.14'
Parliamentary and media pressure had an important impact
on the review, as Nott tacitly demonstrated by denouncing The
Daily
 Telegraph in the House. 142
 Of fundamental importance
139 
'The Navy Comes First,' Times (19 May 1981); The same
conclusion was drawn by the International Herald Tribune (20
May 1981).
'NATO Must Be Consulted,' Financial Times (19 May 1981).
141 
'Right cuts by the wrong lights,' Guardian (26 June 1981).
142 cannot be drawn into commenting about the quite
unbelievable things that appear in The Dail y
 Telegraph every
day...I am concerned because The Daily
 Telegraph has a wide
Tory circulation, and I am genuinely concerned that anyone
should believe what is printed.' John Nott, Hansard (19 May
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to the government's response was the Prime Minister's support
of Nott, which she clearly demonstrated in dismissing Speed.
It was evident from the beginning of the political row that
Nott was to be the sole government spokesman on defence and
that this was to be a matter of confidence on which the
government's future would depend. In defending her dismissal
of Speed, Thatcher cited the doctrine of collective
responsibility and declared that 'Ministers should fight
departmental battles within the Department and not outside
it.' 143
 In a demonstration of her own confidence in Nott to
make 'difficult defence choices' she limited her contact with
back benchers, cancelling a meeting with the influential 1922
Committee at which she would have faced pressure to defend
defence plans still under preparation. 1" Instead, she
arranged for the publication of the text of Nott's May 6
statement to the Procurement Executive explaining the
rationale for the review and the options being studied.145
Finally, to minimize the period of tension within the party,
Nott accelerated the review process. Nott later acknowledged
the political pressure he faced while completing the defence
review. He had found himself, he said,
in a public punch-up with the Conservative Party,
1981), col. 166.
143 Margaret Thatcher, Hansard (19 May 1981), col. 151.
G.Clark and R.Evans, Times (19 May 1981).
145 Times (19 May 1981).
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and with the service "lobbies"...That made the
whole thing very much more difficult....In a way, I
needed another month or so to complete the process.
But I realized that unless I got it out of the way,
I was going to lose.1'6
During the defence debate, instead of speaking for the
government Keith Speed challenged it from the back benches.
He declared that he 'was not elected by my constituents, nor
was I appointed by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, to
preside over any major cutback in the surface fleet of the
Royal Navy...I reject that option now and will fight it
through to the bitter end.' 147
 Yet the defence debate as a
whole focused less on the defence review than on Trident and
the Defence Estimates, which Sir Patrick Wall described as 'an
interim document."8
 Indeed, there was little more than
speculation on which a discussion of the review could take
place. In an effort to fill the information gap, on June 4
Speed tabled twenty-three parliamentary questions relating to
the defence review, only seven of which were answered.149
Following Speed's departure the government abolished
individual ministerial posts in order to foster the formation
of a defence view. Plans of this nature had been considered
by previous governments, but had proven difficult to
implement. The government had not been actively considering
146 Nott quoted in Charlton, The Little Platoon, p.146.
167 Keith Speed, Hansard (19 May 1981), col. 180.
148 Patrick Wall, Hansard (19 May 1981), col. 202.
149 See Hansard (4 June 1981), cols. 416-418.
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implementing these plans prior to Speed's public outburst.
The reorganisation had both long and short-term effects on the
MoD. In the long-term it was hoped that the new structure
would help promote a defence view of priorities. Ministers
were to represent the military as a whole rather than the in-
dividual services, thereby reducing the likelihood that
ministers would develop loyalties to an individual service to
the detriment of the others. The new system would still in-
clude four junior ministers under the Secretary of State, but
two would be Ministers of State, one for Defence and Pro-
curement, the other for the Armed Forces. The other two jun-
ior ministers would be Under Secretaries of State assisting
the Ministers of State.
In the short term the changes were l4.kely to weaken
service, especially naval, resistance to government policies.
The initial appointments to these posts ensured there were
no advocates for Royal Navy interests at the ministerial
level. Lord Trenchard remained Minister of State, though now
it was to be for procurement and administration. The new
Minister for the Armed Forces was to be Peter Blaker, a
former Army Minister and previously at the Foreign and Com-
monwealth Of f ice.'5° The Foreign Secretary is reported
to have urged Blaker's appointment out of concern that
Britain maintain its overseas commitments, especially the
150 
'No More Advocates,' Economist (6 June 1981), p. 58.
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BAOR. 15' The respective Under Secretarial posts were filled
by Geoffrey Pattie, previously Minister of the RAF, and
Philip Goodhart, previously Minister of the Army. For the
first time there was no one at the ministerial level with a
prior affiliation with the Navy. Most importantly, until the
new ministerial structure was in place existing service
ministers remained -- leaving the Royal Navy without a
ministerial voice. As a result, the most likely source of
dissent against the defence review remained the Service
Chiefs.
The Chiefs of Staff used every opportunity to make their
reservations about the defence review known to the Prime Min-
ister. For the second time in six months they chose to
exercise their traditional right to speak to the Prime Min-
ister; the first time since the Second World War that this
right was exercised twice within a year. 152
 To maximise the
effect of their views the Chiefs deferred their second
audience with the Prime Minister until shortly before the
final decisions about the review were due to be made.'53
There was speculation that the Prime Minister was furious
with the Chiefs whom she believed responsible for a series
151 T. D. Bridge, 'UK Defence:
	 The Next Ten Years,' Army
Quarterly
 (July 1981), p. 58.
152 H.Stanhope, Times (18 May 1981); See also Lord Hill-
Norton, Hansard (Lords), (20 July 1981), col. 21.
153 P.Hennessy, Times (22 May 1981).
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of leaks about the review designed to pressure the
government, 1 ' but when the meeting took place on June 3, it
was described as 'friendly.' It lasted about one and one-
quarter hours and was attended also by the Foreign and De-
fence Secretaries. All aspects of the review were discussed
and the Chiefs pointed out the implications that the cuts
would have on the services. 155
 The Prime Minister listened
attentively but remained non-committal.
Admiral Leach had an additional meeting with the Prime
Minister, attended also by Nott, shortly before the final
proposals were presented to the Cabinet's Defence and
Overseas Policy Committee. According to Leach, he had to
convince Nott to attend by stressing that he planned to say
some very critical things and that he did not want to say them
behind his back. Leach told the Prime Minister that the review
'was fundamentally wrong, unbalanced and unreasonable.' The
Prime Minister was not pleased but asked Leach what he would
do, whereupon he said that he would hand £l-2 billion to the
Army. Thatcher responded, '"don't you mean the Royal Navy?"'
Leach explained that the money would permit the Army to build
housing and infrastructure to enable the panoply of forces and
family and support attached to the BAOR to be withdrawn to the
UK. Without any withdrawal of frontline forces, Leach
calculated, this would result in savings of £600 million a
year. Regiments could rotate and do tours of duty away from
Sunday
 Times (24 May 1981).
155 E.Goodman, Financial Times (4 June 1981).
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their families just like RAF and Royal Navy personnel. The
Prime Minister said nothing. Nott commented that this option
had been studied and found too expensive. Leach observed that
the study must have been superficial because it had certainly
not gone through the Chiefs of Staff Committee -- as indeed it
had not -- but the Prime Minister showed no intention of
questioning Nott's decision.1
Nott was accompanied to the OD meeting by Lewin, who
argued that it was wrong for the British Government to take
such decisions without NATO consultations. Lord Carrington
agreed but said there was no time due to the need to submit
the proposals to get them into the budget. 157
 However, Nott
was determined not to consult the allies, but rather inform
them once the decision had been taken. 'I always intended and
had to go inform the Americans and NATO before we made the
announcement but I was determined that that would be done
thirty-six hours before the announcement and that they weren't
going to be consulted because if they had been consulted it
would never have happened. "
The Defence Committee decided the proposals should go on
to the full Cabinet and a meeting was scheduled for June
156 Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach, 1
July 1991.
157 Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin, 13 August
1991.
Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
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18. 159
 In accordance with general practice no service
representatives were invited to attend the Cabinet meeting.
Reservations about the review were expressed nevertheless.
Though no members of Cabinet challenged the decision to
restructure Britain's defences the Foreign Secretary, Lord
Carrington, the Employment Secretary, James Prior, and the
Leader of the House of Commons, Francis Pym, expressed
concern that the Navy was being cut too severely. 160
 Accord-
ing to one report, Nott faced two problems during the meet-
ing. The first was criticism for the short time span (twelve
weeks) in which Nott had developed his proposals. Although
the criticism may have implied the proposals were hastily
prepared and perhaps inadequately researched Nott was
untroubled by this criticism, knowing that he had the support
of the Prime Minister to move swiftly.
A second concern, echoing Lewin's position, was that
reductions in the surface fleet would be met with a negative
response in the United States and the rest of NATO.' 61
 In
May, Pentagon officials had expressed concern over the planned
reductions in the Royal Navy and said 'it would be tough,
if not impossible, for the United States to take up the
slack.'	 The only solution at this point, however, was for
159 J.Langdon, Guardian (9 June 1981).
160 R.Evans, Financial Times (19 June 1981).
161 I.Aitken, Guardian (19 June 1981).
F.Taylor, Daily Telerah (21 May 1981).
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Nott to discuss the review with the allies, as he had always
intended to do.
ALLIED RESPONSES
The process of consulting with allied governments and
NATO was brief and free of conflict. Nott travelled first
to the United States where he met with Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger. In accordance with Nott's plan the meeting
was arranged on 'very short notice.' Richard Perle recalls
Nott saying he had been 'sitting on a tractor that morning' at
his farm in Cornwall. 1
 Nott took the Concorde to
Washington to have a meeting over dinner. The meeting thus
took place in Weinberger's private dining room where both US
and British officials were present. The British delegation
included, in addition to Nott, Sir Frank Cooper, Sir Ronald
Mason, Sir Nicholas Henderson, Ambassador to the US, and John
Weston, also with the British embassy. The US was represented
by, in addition to Weinberger, Fred Ikle, Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy, Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for National Security Affairs, Lt. General Richard
Bowman, Director of European and NATO Affairs, and James
Timberlake, UK Country Director at the Pentagon. Due to the
composition of the group 'the review was discussed at a
163 Interview with Richard Perle, 30 March 1991.
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variety of levels. ,IM
The meeting was politically sensitive for Nott. He did
not want the details of the review to become known before his
discussions with Luns or Apel, or, indeed, until he had
formally announced it in Parliament. The sensitivity derived
mainly from the pressure being placed on Nott by Conservative
back benchers. 165
 One common theme in the defence debate had
been the need for adequate consultation with NATO allies. The
nature of allied responses was thus vital to the political
unity of the party and the standing of the government. 'Nott
was seeking approval from the US because he was taking up the
review with other NATO members. He didn't want to come in
with controversial proposals. It was clear he wanted our
help. 1M
 According to Sir Nicholas Henderson, 'it was a
very important meeting from Nott's perspective and from Cap
Weiriberger's as well.' 167
 To ensure information about the
review did not leak, inadvertently or otherwise, following the
meeting Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Fred Ikie put his
staff under strict orders not to talk about it.
Both Weinberger and Nott were well prepared for their
encounter. Weinberger had been comprehensively briefed on the
164 Interview with Richard Perle, 30 March 1991.
165 Interview with Caspar Weinberger, 9 January 1991.
166 Interview with Richard Perle, 30 March 1991.
167 Telephone conversation with Sir Nicholas Henderson, 23 May
1991.
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review prior to the meeting. The briefing was based on an
elaborate analysis of the review prepared in the Pentagon
which included detailed scrutiny of the British Order of
Battle. Moreover, Weinberger had consulted with US Navy
officials and was aware of their concerns about the
review. Nott was also impressively on top of his brief.
The tone of the meeting reflected the closeness of the Anglo-
American working relationship. As was usual prior to meetings
between US and British principals, the two staffs told each
other what their side would be saying. In this way more ground
could be covered and there was less likelihood either side
would be surprised by what the other said. In addition,
Weinberger was particularly sympathetic to British concerns.
Nott's presentation hinged on the argument that defence
cuts were unavoidable for budgetary reasons. According to
Weinberger, 'Nott defended the cuts' and made it clear that
this was 'a temporary, unfortunate, but necessary
reduction.' 169
 Much of the meeting was spent addressing US
concerns, which included the effect of the cuts on convoy
plans, other NATO missions, overall British defence
expenditure and the possible psychological effect on other
NATO allies.
The main strategic US concern was that the deactivation
of so many ships would reduce NATO readiness. The Royal
168 Interview with Caspar Weinberger, 9 January 1991.
' Interview with Caspar Weinberger, 9 January 1991.
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Navy's contribution was deemed by Weinberger to be 'very
important--it was a major contribution of ships that were all
there on the scene and the number of ships was close to what
we felt was needed to perform essential functions.' As a
result Weinberger believed the British 'were mothballing too
many of their Royal Navy ships.'"'° Nott argued that the
ships were being placed in 'ready reserve' and would therefore
be available on short notice, but Weinberger believed 'that we
might not have as much time as we needed (to reactivate
them]." 71
 According to Weinberger, 'Nott did not have any
major disagreement with this, but he had budgetary pressures
at home which made the cuts necessary." 72
 Nott also argued
that some of the cuts might be rescinded since 'the decisions
were being made prior to the elaboration of budgetary
plans. ,173
A second US concern was the overall level of British
defence spending. Accordingly, 'there was a lot of discussion
on the appearance versus the reality of Britain's three per
170 Caspar Weinberger, Fightin g
 the Peace: Seven Critical
Years at the Pentagon (London: Michael Joseph, 1990), pp. 147-
48.
171 Interview with Caspar Weinberger, 9 January 1991; 'Nott
always took the position that they could bring them back on
line quickly but based on our own experiences, I was not so
sure.' Weinberger, Fihtin Peace, pp. 147-48.
172 Interview with Caspar Weinberger, 9 January 1991.
173 Interview with Sir Frank Cooper, 24 April 1991.
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cent annual defence budget increases.' 17' Weinberger pointed
out that 'inflation was eating up the three per cent increase
so that there was no net increase. ,175 There was no way the
British pledge to extend the period of three per cent
increases to 1985-86 could mitigate the effect of the planned
reductions. Consequently, the psychological effect of the
cuts on other NATO countries was also worrisome.
The US did not want to see any cuts made in NATO forces.
Although Weinberger understood the British need to impose cuts
during a period of significant budgetary pressures there
remained the risk that other NATO countries would follow suit.
He worried 'that any diminution in the forces committed would
get the ball rolling and could provide a false justification
for reductions by other NATO allies."76
 Perle was more
troubled by 'the general problem of declining defence budgets
in Europe while we were trying to build up our own, not least
because we did not want the US buildup stymied by resentment
that we were building up while others were building down.'1
An attempt to address this concern was made in the statement
issued following the meeting.
Work on the statement began while the meeting was still
underway, interrupting the dinner of some officials. The work
174 Interview with Caspar Weinberger, 9 January 1991.
175 Interview with Caspar Weinberger, 9 January 1991.
176 Interview with Caspar Weinberger, 9 January 1991.
177 Interview with Richard Perle, 30 March 1991.
334
continued following the meeting, with some US and British
officials remaining behind to complete it.1Th American
willingness to help the British by not objecting to the review
was due in large part to the greater efforts of Britain in
defence spending compared to other NATO allies. The US
attitude was reflected in the final statement, which welcomed
'the decision to increase still further the total UK defence
effort." No mention was made of US concern over the cuts.
Moreover, the statement was withheld a day to synchronize its
release with Nott's arrival in Brussels for talks with NATO
Secretary General Joseph Luns.
While in the US Nott also travelled to Norfolk, Vjrginia,
to discuss the review with Admiral Train once more before
announcing it. There Nott was treated to a sharp briefing on
the consequences.	 Train believed the review was
'intellectually dishonest' because 'John Nott chose to
believe analyses that purported to show that the damage that
would result from inactivating 25 per cent of the surface
combatants in the Royal Navy would not be serious.' 180
 The
distortion identified by Train was in the way the effect on
the Royal Navy was presented:
The way that was presented to Nott was that the
base number (of ships], the base line by which the
decisions were made, included only ships in active
178 Interview with Richard Perle, 30 March 1991.
179 Quoted in Financial Times (23 June 1981).
180 Interview with Admiral Harry Train, 4 January 1991.
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commission. The subsequent base line included
ships that were in the reserve...The honest way to
do it is to take the baseline force consisting of
the reserve ships and the active ships, or, active
ships and active ships. Since all I was concerned
about was active ships, there was a twenty-five per
cent reduction. I could not penetrate John Nott's
consciousness on this point.1
Nott was well aware of the implications however, and
understood that keeping up the number of ships on paper made
his task of explaining the cuts to NATO slightly easier. 'We
had a great problem because we wanted to keep the numbers up
for NATO purposes, and indeed for political purposes, but we
simply couldn't afford to have them in the fleet...So the more
ships we put in the standby squadron the easier it was to deal
with the naval programme. ,182
Following his meeting in the US Nott travelled first to
Brussels to speak to Joseph Luns and the NATO Supreme Allied
Commander Europe General Bernard Rogers, and then to Bonn to
speak to the West German Defence Minister, Hans Apel. In
these meetings Nott emphasised that Britain's defence spend-
ing was rising in real terms,
	 but that escalating
technology costs forced cutbacks in some areas. He
expressed confidence that reducing the Navy was a more
acceptable alternative than reducing the BAOR, and that the
Navy's effectiveness would improve, even
	 with fewer
181 Interview with Admiral Harry Train, 4 January 1991.
182 Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
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ships. 1
	The overwhelming sentiment among European allies
and General Rodgers was relief that the BAOR had been
spared.l&
Following the allied discussions, on June 25 the review
process came to an end. Cabinet approved a white paper, The
Way
 Forward, outlining Nott's review. Later that day Nott
announced in the House that the review had been completed.
All that remained was for parliament to approve the white
paper and a debate was scheduled for July 7.
The other major outstanding defence decision, whether to
purchase the more advanced Trident D5 instead of the C4,
proceeded on a different timetable than the review. 1n March
Nott had begun to lay the groundwork for a shift to the D5 by
informing the House of Commons Defence Committee that Trident
costs could increase 20 per cent to £6 billion, depending on
further decisions about the force. He also told Parliament
as a whole that Trident could account for 10 per cent of total
equipment spending in the peak years.' 85
 The final decision
on Trident depended, however, on the US Trident Review Body's
recommendation, due in the summer of 1981, on whether the D5
should indeed be built.1
J.Rosen, Guardian (22 June 1981).
184 Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
185 B.Bloom, Financial Times (6 Mar 1981).
J.Connell, Sunday
 Times (28 June 1981); B.Bloom, Financial
Times (7 Sept 1981); Cohn Mclnnes, Trident: The Only
Option? (London: Brassey's, 1986), p. 24.
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The technical exchanges which precede negotiations over
such large weapons sales began before the US decision had been
made. Indeed, they were actually an outgrowth of a mission to
Washington in the summer of 1981 to explore the possibility
that the US might help Britain recover some frigates and the
assault ships cut from the naval programme. The British
delegation -- including Michael Power, Assistant Under
Secretary (Naval Staff), and Admiral Sir Derek Ref fell,
Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (Policy) -- proposed that
Britain retain the amphibious assault ships Fearless and
Intreiid in return for more favourable terms in a second
Trident Sales Agreement.' 87
 According to Richard Perle, US
Assistant Under Secretary of Defense, there was 'explicit
verbal agreement' of a tradeoff over D5 research and
development costs and the assault ships 'plus some
frigates. ,188
Following President Reagan's October announcement that
the US would proceed with the D5 as part of an $180 billion
strategic modernization programme Nott announced his support,
in principle, for a switch. Highly significant for Britain
was the US intention to close C4 production lines in 1984
and phase the missile out of service within ten years.
Several years after becoming operational Britain's Trident C4
187 Interview with Richard Perle, 30 March 1991; Previous
mention of this proposal has suggested that it originated with
the Americans. See Grove, Vanquard to Trident, p. 355.
Interview with Richard Perle, 30 March 1991.
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fleet would no longer enjoy commonality with the US, a major
reason for purchasing Trident in the first place. The final
British decision, and details of the extra cost, depended on
further negotiations with the US.1
The terms of the deal ultimately agreed were more
favourable than those for the C4 purchase, though the missile
cost more in absolute terms. Britain had to pay only a fixed
research and development charge of $116 million rather than a
five per cent surcharge on the final cost. As a 'second-
sourcing' agreement lucrative contracts were supposed to be
placed with British contractors. Nor was Britain required to
pay a levy to cover the cost of testing different missile
components, saving an additional $100 million. Moreover,
since deployment of the D5 would stretch out the procurement
period until the late 1990s it appeared that annual costs
could be kept down to around three per cent of the defence
budget. 190
 Not only was the D5 purchased under more
favourable terms, but in the short- to medium-term -- the
period during which the 1981 review cuts were to take place --
the D5 decision actually saved money.
189 H.Stanhope, The Times (20 Oct 1981); For the government's
explanation of the D5 decision see Ministry of Defence, Th
United Kingdom Trident Programme, Defence Open Government
Document 82/1, (March 1982).
190 H.Stanhope, Guardian (19 Feb 1982).
CHAPTER EIGHT
Implementing The Way Forward
Nott had to defend his review both against Conservative
back benchers advocating greater defence spending and the
Treasury, where concern about defence budget management
remained great. In the short term the review cost money and
because the planned cuts were to be phased in gradually it did
not eliminate current budgetary pressures. There was little
chance the party would openly break with its leadership on so
important an issue and within Cabinet Nott continued to enjoy
the confidence of the Prime Minister. The Opposition,
focusing largely on Trident, posed little threat to government
policy since the nuclear deterrent enjoyed overwhelming
support among the Conservative majority. However, due to the
political and strategic concerns of back bench critics and the
financial concerns of the Treasury, Nott was left with few
political allies. Even before the Falklands War it was by no
means certain that over the long-term the review would be
implemented as planned.
ThE WAY FORWARD
The reductions outlined in The Way
 Forward were not on
the scale initially feared; the Royal Navy was not reduced to
340
a coastal defence fleet nor were the Royal Marines abolished.
Nevertheless, the changes in the way the Navy performed its
roles were, as Nott described the white paper, 'radical."
Many Conservatives questioned the review's logic but severe
criticism came from a relatively small number, clue -mivly to
Nott's extension of three per cent annual increases in defence
spending to 1985-8 6 and announcement of several new equipment
wIu'I)
purchases4layed an important role in the public presentation
of the review. Extension of the three per cent pledge, in
particular, enabled Nott to present the review as a
reallocation of resources within a growing defence budget. The
Government easily commanded the votes to approve the review,
which passed the House 309 to 240. Labour's Defence
Spokesman, Brynmoor John, recognised that Nott's proposals
would not unsettle the Conservatives as much as he might have
hoped, describing Nott as a 'conjurer concealing by illusion
what is really happening to the defence effort. His statement
has been altered from the worst case that was trailed in the
Conservative newspapers over the last few weeks and has tried
to induce sighs of relief from the Conservative Benches. 2
Nott was, perhaps, less of a conjurer than Labour
supposed. The modified nature of the final white paper owed
less to sophisticated illusion than careful politics. At the
For a critical assessment see John E. Moore, 'The Way
Forward: naval considerations,' Jane's Defence Weekly Vol 2,
No. 5 (1981).
2 Brynmoor John, Hansard (25 June 1981), col. 389.
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time of Speed's departure the contours of the review had been
decided, but many specific decisions were still pending.3
'The whole review was gradually pieced together with some
pieces getting more firmly set in cement as we went along,
some pieces getting discarded and some things left in with a
degree of certainty building up progressively. ' Proposals
to abolish the Royal Marines and cut the surface fleet even
more severely may have been dropped due to the public debate.
Speed believed that 'if the debate had not taken place the
review would have proceeded more quickly and in a more
fundamental way.' 5
 Sir Peter Blaker, appointed Minister of
State for the Armed Forces in June 1981, believed Nott's plans
were on the boundary of political possibility: 'if the review
had gone more toward Ronald Mason's views about aircraft
versus surface ships then it would not have been possible to
defend the review against Conservative back berichers in the
House of Commons. ,6 Nott may also have wavered over the
decision to cut back the Royal Dockyards. According to Nott,
'Cooper's main role...was to keep me resolute. There were
some very difficult bits of it like the closure of Chatham
which is where all the Tory seats were • ' Without the debate
Keith Speed, Hansard (19 May 1981), col. 180.
Interview with Sir Frank Cooper, 24 April 1991.
Interview with the Rt. Hon. Keith Speed, 21 May 1991.
6 Interview with Sir Peter Blaker, 4 June 1991.
Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1981.
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that followed Speed's departure the review may have been even
more radical.
In the end, only six Tory MP5 voted against The Way
Forward and they all represented constituencies heavily
dependent on Chatham and Portsmouth dockyards. A small
number of vocal and influential Conservative M pg , including
Keith Speed, Julian Amery, and Sir Patrick Wall, spoke against
the review but abstained from the vote. Most critics in both
parties believed the basic assumptions of the review were too
narrow and that the resulting cuts in the surface fleet
jeopardized the Navy's ability to fulfil its responsibilities.
By expanding the role of maritime patrol aircraft and
submarines in antisubmarine warfare, Nott concluded that the
surface fleet could be cut from 59 to 'about 50' ships.
However, eight of the 50 were to be placed in the standby
squadron and therefore not immediately available. 9
 In
theory these ships would be available on 30 days notice, but
only without considering readiness levels. 10
 Nott also cut
8 I.Owen, Financial Times (8 July 1981).
The consensus was that the actual number of operational
ships would be 42. David Greenwood, Reshain Britain's
Defences (ASIDES paper no. 19, 1981), p. 43; Keith Speed,
Chance (Bath: Ashgrove Press, 1982), p. 111. Cable states that
yet another 'well-informed source' had suggested there could
be as few as 37 ships. James Cable, Britain's Naval Future
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983), p. 130.
10 Disagreements over actual numbers continued, based on
'varying assumptions about the utility of ships in reserve and
the replacement of ageing ships.' Cable, Britain's Naval
Future, p. 130; See also Hansard (7 July 1981), cols. 280-84.
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the number of planned operational aircraft carriers from three
to two. Hermes was to be decommissioned once Illustrious was
commissioned, and Invincible would be replaced by Ark Royal
when it entered service in 1985-86.'
The frigate reductions would diminish the Navy's ability
to contribute meaningfully to the protection of transatlantic
shipping. Likewise, two carriers would be inadequate for the
full range of Royal Navy responsibilities. Both were committed
to performing NATO tasks in the event of an East/West
conflict. One was to operate in the East Atlantic with 8-10
escorts protecting US troop and merchant ships. The second was
assigned to Britain's ASW Group 2, whose combat role was to
protect a US strike fleet operating out of the Norwegian
Sea. 12
 With only two carriers Britain would have none
available for out-of-area tasks. Nor would Britain have the
ability to mount an amphibious assault, in the NATO theatre or
elsewhere, once the two LPDs Intre pid and Fearless were phased
out in 1982 and 1984 respectively.' 3
 The character and
extent of the naval cuts prompted Admiral of the Fleet Lord
' Cmnd 8288, The United Kingdom Defence Programme: The Way
Forward (June 1981), para 27; Not long after the review Nott
initiated discussions with Australia leading to an agreement
to sell Invincible in late 1983, leaving Britain with only one
carrier until late 1984. The Falkands War intervened and
ultimately the transfer did not take place.
12 For a critical assessment see Desmond Wettern, '"The Way
Forward" -- Implications for NATO,' Navy
 International
(October 1981).
13 Cmnd 8288, The Way Forward, para 31.
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Hill-Norton, a former Chief of the Naval Staff and First Sea
Lord to describe the review as 'the second attempt by a Tory
Government to destroy the Royal Navy in the last 24 years.
The other highly controversial decision, reduction of
the dockyards, also had potential strategic consequences. The
naval base and dockyard at Chatham were to be closed, activity
at the Portsmouth dockyard was to be sharply reduced, and the
future of the Gibraltar dockyard was made the subject of
negotiations with the Gibraltar Goverrunent. 15
 In addition to
the very great concern over employment consequences some MP5
worried that Rosyth and Devonport dockyards would be
inadequate to service the fleet. Rosyth was to 'continue to
refit SSBNs, patrol submarines, frigates and small ships, and
Devonport the remainder of the dockyard programme. ,16
However, delays in the refitting schedules of both dockyards
suggested that relying on them posed additional risks to the
Navy.
The critical aspect of this debate was whether closing
Chatham would affect the refitting of Polaris. At Rosyth,
delays in refitting the Polaris submarines Renown and Revenge
had prompted the dockyard's 1981 annual report to conclude
' Lord Hill-Norton, Hansard (Lords) (20 July 1981), col. 20;
For a succinct but comprehensive analysis of the implications
of the review for the Royal Navy see Derek Wood, 'Stormy
Passage Ahead: the future of the Royal Navy,' International
Defense Review 12/1981.
15 Cmnd 8288, The Way
 Forward, para 40.
16 Peter Blaker, Hansard (10 Nov 1981), cols. 67-8.
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'Rosyth's reputation for refitting missile submarines has
undoubtedly suffered a setback. 	 Similarly, Devonport had
taken four years to refit the nuclear submarine (SSN) 1
Swiftsure, twice as long as the seven SSN ref its undertaken at
Chatham. 18 Devonport had not completed a single
refuelling/refit operation yet was to be made responsible for
the entire fleet of SSN5 and diesel powered submarines (SSKS)
which wec. to be built up,/from 12 to 17, 	 oi AdWJ 0c om. ,e.ryeft.
	 '1
Several important factors mitigated these concerns. At
Devonport refitting delays had been partly the result of the
three-month moratorium imposed in 1980 -- which cut back
equipment purchases and reduced the amount of overtime and
shift work -- and partly by industrial disputes. One dispute
had delayed work for more than a year. 2° Trade unions also
sought to prevent Chatham's closure, preparing bar charts and
other materials suggesting that closure would seriously affect
running and refitting of the fleet, including Polaris.21
However, the Navy disagreed. They supported the government's
decision to close Chatham, which had excessive overheads, poor
tides, and had not been an essential home port of the Navy,
17 Quoted in D.Wettern Daily Teleczraph (26 Oct 1981).
18 Hansard (10 Nov 1981), cols. 408-9.
19 Sir Frederick Burden, Hansard (15 Feb 1982), col. 21; Cmnd
8288, The Way Forward, para 26.
D.Wettern, Daily Te1egrah (26 Oct 1981).
21 Interview with Sir Peter Blaker, 4 June 1991.
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like Portsmouth, for many years. Moreover, Chatham lacked the
political pull of Rosyth, which was a vital source of jobs in
Scotland and had recently received new nuclear submarine
outfitting facilities. 22 Based largely on Royal Navy
assurances, Blaker was able to express his satisfaction with
'the capability of the yards at Devonport and Rosyth to cope
with our refitting burden.'
The Royal Navy's analysis of future refitting needs
depended on the future size and composition of the fleet.
Improvements in the cores of submarine reactors extended the
lifespan of both old and new boats, thereby reducing refitting
needs. 2' Nott's policy of abandoning mid-life modernisations
was also a key consideration since it presaged the new class
of frigate, the Type 23, first announced in June l98O. The
Type 23 was supposed to answer the Navy's quantity versus
quality dilenuna. It would provide a helicopter platform
for the Sea King or its replacement (a decision on purchasing
the EH101 was not taken), have both active and passive sonars,
and play an important support role to the more sophisticated
Interview with Sir Peter Blaker, 4 June 1991; Interview
with Alan Pritchard, 18 June 1991.
Peter Blaker, Hansard (10 Nov 1981), cols. 408-9.
24 John Nott, Hansard (7 July 1981), col. 283.
Cmnd 8288, The Way Forward, para 24.
Speed, Sea Change, p. 90; Paul Maurice, 'Type 23: a
budget-cutting frigate for the Royal Navy,' International
Defense Review 8/1981, p. 1055.
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Type 22 frigates and Type 42 guided missile destroyers. The
effectiveness of Type 22s and Type 42s, which depended on
highly sophisticated sensors, would suffer without
modernisation. Consequently, while the review announced an
order for one more Type 22 -- the seventh -- it froze the
number of Type 42s in the fleet at fourteen. 27
 A policy of
replacing ships rather than modernising them naturally meant
that Type 23$ would have to come on line rapidly to prevent
fleet numbers from falling precipitously. Consequently, Nott
accelerated the Type 23 building programme.28
Some remained sceptical, however, that Type 23 build
rates would be adequate either to keep fleet numbers up or to
provide sufficient business to British shipbuilders to enable
them to keep open their five naval yards. Only after The Way
Forward had been approved did the MoD announce that Type 23s
would not be ordered until the 'middle of the decade.'
Moreover, decisions about the Type 23 were primarily financial
and, according to Nott, it could not cost more than a certain
amount of money, even if that meant choosing between one
capability and another. 30
 This rigid financial approach to
27 Cmnd 8288, The Way
 Forward, para 30; Another Type 22 was
ordered in February 1982. Cmnd 8529-I, Defence Estimates.
1982, para 211.
John Nott, Hansard (7 July 1981), col. 280.
I.Owen, Financial Times (23 July 1981).
John Nott in Second Report from the Defence Committee,
1981-82, Ministry
 of Defence Orctanisation and Procurement (HC
22-Il), 16 June 1981, p. 34, para 47; The Type 23 was
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shipbuilding suggested that the Type 23 was perhaps not the
design on which to stake the future well-being of British
shipbuilders, whose future was jeopardized by the reduction in
domestic and international demand for their warships. 31
 Not
only might the MOD order too few Type 23s to prevent the
closure of shipping yards and job losses, but the MoD's sale
of warships cut from the programme risked soaking up existing
demand for specialised ships, especially since the prices were
relatively low. Small warships on a May 1981 list prepared by
the Defence Sales Organisation ranged from £l0-20 million and
included a slight refit for the purchaser.32
In contrast to the Royal Navy, the RAF initially
benefitted from the defence review. The improvement programme
already underway -- the introduction of a Tornado air defence
variant, Nimrod airborne early warning and modernisation of
the UK air defence ground radar and communications systems --
was to continue. Likewise, air-to-air, and surface-to-air
missile stocks were to be expanded. 33
 Two Phantom squadrons
were to be retained after the arrival of the Tornado F2
instead of being phased out. A further 36 Hawk trainer
aircraft were to be fitted with Sidewinder air-to-air
originally expected to cost £70 million each.
31 Derek Wood, 'UK Warship Building in Crisis,' International
Defense Review 9/1981, p. 1122.
International Defense Review, (8/1981), p. 975.
Cmnd 8288, The Way
 Forward, para 12.
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missiles. To extend fighter operational time and range
additional VC1O aircraft -- originally purchased from British
Airways to provide spares for the existing fleet -- were to be
modified as tankers or transport.' In the maritime area
the final three Nimrod Mark I aircraft were to be brought up
to Mark II standard, bringing the force to 34, and were to be
fitted with the Sting Ray lightweight torpedo effective
against submarines. 35
 The improvements to RAF Germany were
particularly helpful in enhancing political support for the
review. The Jaguar force based in Germany would not be
replaced early but the government planned to replace the
Harrier GR3 through collaboration with the US on the advanced
version of the Harrier AV8B (GR5) of which 60 would be
purchased. Not only would this ensure an effective
strike/attack capability but also offered the prospect of £1
billion of work for British industry.37
Another feature of the review appealing to Conservative
critics was the continued re-equipment of the BAOR. In
addition to improvements already planned there was to be an
increase in the number of Milan anti-tank weapons purchased
Cmnd 8288, The Way




Ibid., para 19; John Nott, Hansard (25 June 1981), col.
386.
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and improvements to the Blowpipe air defence missile. The
size of the BAOR was, of course, not to be cut below the
55,000 level established in the Brussels Treaty. But 2,000
administrative personnel were to be removed along with the
elimination of one of the three divisional headquarters oper-
ating in Germany. The Army did not suffer the large manpower
cuts it had feared. There were to be 7,000 Army redundancies,
compared to 8,000-10,000 in the Navy and 2,500 in the Royal
Air Force. 39
 However, two aspects of the review with which
the Army disagreed, although marginal, did relate to manpower
and training.
Expansion of the Territorial Army, a popular measure with
Conservative MPs, was seen by the Army as the result of
political pressure. 4° The issue hinged on whether to rely on
mobilisation or small, streamlined forces. The Army preferred
to maintain a regular force not overburdened by the
responsibility for training reserves. In contrast, the TA
lobby in Parliament wanted to see the TA regain an operational
role as well as establish a separate division, and this may
have been less costly as well. The Army was told to reshape
Cmnd 8288, The Way
 Forward, para 18.
An estimated 15-20,000 UK-based civilians were also to lose
their jobs due to the programming changes. Cmnd 8288, The Way
Forward, paras 38-43.
° On the political influence of the Territorial Army see
Wallace Earl Walker, Reserve Forces and the British
Territorial Army
 (London: Tn-Service Press, 1990), esp. pp.
8-9.
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the BAOR to accommodate this idea." The Army maintained a
constructive role in the decision-making process by arguing
first, that Regulars were more cost-effective, and second,
that any expanded role for the TA should focus on
reinforcement of the BAOR.' 2
 Ultimately, Army arguments
prevailed and the primary role of the expanded TA was
reinforcement. One sign of the Army's bureaucratic success
during the review was the delay of this decision for several
years.
Delay was also an important element in Army resistance to
cuts in the Individual Training Organisation. Nott endorsed
cuts in individual training, which could have been undertaken
at any time and need not have been part of a major defence
review, based on the arbitrary reduction in civil service
ceilings which had been imposed on all government departments
prior to the 1981 review. The obvious goal of the proposed
ITO cut was to get savings, but the Army argued that training
was its peacetime role and that savings in this area would be
crippling. The General Staff recognised that improvements in
organisation could be made but because morale was at stake,
preferred to wrestle with this problem in their own time.'3
The Way
 Forward provided the time necessary for this
Cmnd 8288, The Way
 Forward, para 17.
42 Interview with Lt. General Sir Derek Boorman, 8 January
1992.
Interview with Lt. General Sir Derek Boorman, 8 January
1992.
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reassessment, stating merely that 'we shall seek economies in
the organisation for training, including staff training, and
some establishments will close.'"
More significantly, the defence review was the forum in
which pending decisions about enhancements in Britain's out-
of-area capabilities were made. According to Nott the main
purpose of British military activity outside of NATO would be
'to help maintain stability primarily by the provision of
training and assistance, participation in joint exercises and
the supply of defence equipment."5
 In addition, the
government was prepared to use modest force, in conjunction
with the US or another ally, to protect regional allies or
Western strategic interests. Operating independently, the
government remained committed to reinforcing British
dependencies and to protecting British citizens overseas.'6
Yet the capabilities necessary to fulfil these commitments
were not enhanced. The Way
 Forward outlined only modest
improvements in rapid deployment capabilities. Equipment
stockpiles were expanded, airlift capabilities were increased
and the task of planning and commanding out-of-area operations
was centralised at the Headquarters of the Eighth Field
Force.'7
" Cmnd 8288, The WaY Forward, para 41.
' John Nott, Hansard (17 March 1981), col. 187.
46 John Nott, flansard (17 March 1981), col. 187.
Cmnd 8288, The Way
 Forward, para 35.
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Government policy toward out-of-area capabilities thus
revealed ambivalence. It was evident in the basic approach to
the defence review and in Nott's subsequent reversal of the
decision to eliminate the assault ships Fearless and Intrepid.
While Nott planned major cuts in the Royal Navy's surface
fleet, he also wanted the Navy to resume the practice of
deploying 'a substantial naval task group on long detachments
for visits and exercises in the Atlantic, Caribbean, Indian
Ocean or further East. This detachment, which usually
involved 8-9 ships, had been cancelled for 1981 because too
few ships could be spared.'9
 The need to resume these
detachments, according to The WaY Forward, was the same as the
government's rationale for greater out-of-area capabilities:
changes in many areas of the world, together with
growing Soviet military reach and readiness to
exploit it...make it increasingly necessary for
NATO members to look at Western security concerns
over a wider field than before. 150
The key problem in carrying out the desired improvements in
out-of-area capabilities was that out-of-area commitments
threatened to impinge on NATO-allocated resources.51
Conservative protests about the defence cuts continued
' Cmnd 8288, The Way Forward, para 34.
' D.Wettern, Daily Telegraph (31 Aug 1981).
50 Cmnd 8288, The Wa y
 Forward, para 32.
Economist Keith Hartley observed that existing financial
constraints made the proposal for a free-standing UK RDF
'simply another element in a complex choice situation.' See
Keith Hartley, 'Can the UK Afford a Rapid Deployment Force?'
RUSI Journal (March 1982), p.19.
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after the defence review had been approved. Prior to the
Falklands War the back bench challenge culminated in a defence
debate sponsored by Conservative MP Sir Frederick Burden. On
February 15, 1982, Sir Frederick proposed a motion for debate
in the House of Commons welcoming Polaris replacement but
expressing 'grave concern' at the
rigid constraints and lack of flexibility being
imposed upon the Ministry of Defence, which are
leading to a dramatic reduction in the Royal Navy's
surface fleet, a lack of capacity to refit
submarines, unacceptable shortfalls in the number
of Royal Air Force front-line aircraft, and
excessive planned reductions in the three service'
personnel and their essential civilian support, all
at a time when the threat facing the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation alliance has never been
greater.52
The ensuing debate revealed the extent of the continuing
division between Nott and a number of Conservatives, whose
speeches included calls for increased defence spending,
preserving the surface fleet and reducing the British Army of
the Rhine.53
A number of these policy differences were addressed in a
book published in March 1982 by John Wilkinson, Parliamentary
Private Secretary to Nott, and Commander Michael Chichester.
The book, The Uncertain All y--British Defence Policy . 1960-
1990, criticised many aspects of the review. The authors
52 Sir Frederick Burden, Hansard (15 Feb 1982), col. 20.
Patrick Wall, Hansard (15 Feb 1982), cols. 31-2; Alan Glyn,
Hansard (15 Feb 1982), cols. 39-40; Winston Churchill, Hansard
(15 Feb 1982), cols. 55-6; Keith Speed, Harisard (15 Feb 1982),
cols. 58-60.
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called for a 'new strategic plan for the global defence of the
West...[incorporating] an agreement to reduce the size of the
British Army of the Rhine,' and shifting resources into the
maritime and air roles also necessary for the defence of
Europe.' They argued that 'the robbing of the Royal Navy to
pay for the maintenance of British Forces in Germany has now
gone too far and cannot be carried any further.' 55
 In
addition, they wanted Britain to develop the capability to
carry out statements of intention in providing military
assistance to the US in out-of-area disputes. Before this
would be possible they believed the Prime Minister would have
to get Britain 'of f the hook of its Brussels Treaty
commitments over the level of forces in West Germany. '
By the time The Uncertain Ally appeared Nott had already
announced that two amphibious assault ships, Fearless and
Intretid would be retained. This announcement followed a
personal visit by Nott to Fearless and a second look at
projected costings. 57
 Nott had always hoped to add back to
the programme and decided at an early stage that the
amphibious assault ships should have priority. 58
 The purpose
John Wilkinson and Michael Chichester, Uncertain All y--
British Defence Policy. 1960-1980 (Gower, 1982), p. 231.
Ibid., p. 142.
Ibid., p. 116.
Eric Grove, Vanquard to Trident (Annapolis: US Naval
Institute Press, 1987), p. 355.
Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
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of retaining the ships was, according to Nott, 'to maintain
our capability to conduct operations on NATO's northern
flank...and out-of-area.' 59
 An additional reason why Nott
reprieved the ships, as part of the Trident deal, has already
been mentioned.
Ultimately, the decision to purchase the Trident D5 had
a beneficial impact on the rest of the defence budget. The D5
programme was not fully in place and whereas spending on the
C4 was scheduled to peak in the late l980s, spending on the D5
would not peak until the 1990s. While this did not affect the
need for cuts in the programme, the D5 decision taken in
principle in late 1981 but anticipated by Nott as early as
February 1981, enabled the defence review cuts to be phased in
more gradually.
Almost all the defence cuts were to be phased in slowly,
taking full effect around 1985-86. By phasing reductions
over a five-year period the reduced levels would be reached by
1990. The pace of manpower reductions, for example, was to be
determined 'so far as possible through natural wastage and
careful control of recruitment rates.'
	 Contraction of the
surface fleet was also to be gradual:
the change will be made mainly by disposing early
of older and more manpower-intensive ships, for
example among the Rothesay and Leander classes, and
timing their withdrawal so far as possible to avoid
Quoted in Grove, Vanquard to Trident, p. 355.
Cinnd 8288, The Way
 Forward, para 38.
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refit or major inodernisation.61
Even the closure of the Chatham Dockyard, a major source of
savings, was not due to take place until l984. The White
Paper did not identify the time-scale of the 'sharp reduction'
in the workload of the Portsmouth Dockyard but some time was
allowed for both yards to complete current projects.
Partly because it was gradual, the review was unable to
put an end to the financial pressures facing the MOD.
Indeed, in the short-term the review cost money, thereby
contributing to the MoD's difficulty in remaining within its
1981-82 cash limits. Nott accepted that the earliest the cuts
would have an effect was one year and that two years 'was more
realistic. 63
 As a result, he sought to find savings without
the 'end of the year cost-cutting' he had deplored in the 1981
Defence Estimates.
FINANCIAL PRESSURES
In the year following the review Nott initiated changes
in the ministry and procurement process which were to
culminate later in the decade with major organisational
change. It was under Nott that the role of defence contracts
as a mechanism for expenditure control began to be
61 Cmnd 8288, The Way
 Forward, para 29.
Ibid., para 40.
B.Bloom, Financial Times (27 June 1981).
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highlighted. Contracts subsequently became the centrepiece of
procurement reforms in the mid-1980s. Nott also formally
strengthened the role of the Chief of Defence Staff.
The nature of MoD budgetary planning prevented the
review, however radical its goals, from being implemented
overnight. Due to the early committal of funds within each
fiscal year and of the large proportion of service budgets
devoted to fixed costs money allocated to one service can only
be reallocated to another service over a period of years.6'
The graduated approach of the defence review thus did not
imply MoD confidence that its £12.274 billion allotment for
1981-82 would be adequate. The difficulty of remaining within
the cash limit was apparent early in the financial year. In
announcing the review Nott said 'Last year we suffered from
severe cash problems, and similar difficulties are already
emerging in the current year. ,65 Indeed, The Way
 Forward
cautiously stated that
A great deal of work...lies ahead in shaping the
details and planning the methods and timing of
implementing change; and modifications or further
adjustments may prove necessary.
Significantly, no detailed financial information about the
defence programme was provided either in The Wa y
 Forward or by
64 B.E Robson in MC 22-Il, MoD Oraanisation and Procurement,
Q. 269; and J.D.Bryars in Defence Committee Minutes of
Evidence, Defence Cuts and Defence Estimates, (HC 223), 11 and
18 March, Q. 5.
65 John Nott Hansard (25 June 1981), col. 385.
Cmnd 8288, The Way Forward, para 46.
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Nott in his discussion of it in Parliament.
In the broadest sense, the two main sources of savings
were administrative economies and restructuring the equipment
programme. The government had placed considerable emphasis on
efficiency since its election in 1979. At that time the MOD
employed 248,000 civilians. By June 1981 'cuts in functions
and increased efficiency (had] already reduced the figure to
some 228,000.167 The architect of these cuts was Sir Derek
Rayner. Acting as the government's efficiency advisor Rayner
mobilised 'scrutiny teams' in each government department to
identify tasks which could be performed more efficiently and
with fewer civil servants. By the end of 1982 departments
had conducted 133 scrutinies and reviews 'with the help and
advice of Sir Derek.'
Recommendations for the MoD included increasing the
responsibility of lower level officials in deciding how tasks
should be performed, thereby enabling a reduction in the
amount of staff time devoted to issuing instructions, and
emphasising efficient spending systems rather than routine
checks of expenditure. 7° Completing and implementing these
67 Cmnd 8288, The Way Forward, para 43.
Leo Pliatzky, Getting and Spending: Public Exenditure.
Emlovment and Inflation, revised edition, (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1984), p. 181.
Cmnd 8616, Efficiency
 arid Effectiveness in the Civil
Service: Government Observations on the Third Re port from the
Treasury
 and Civil Service Committee, (HC 236), p. 3, para 8.
7° R.Northedge, Daily
 Telearah (30 Sept 1981).
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studies required new organisational machinery. A small number
of central staff pursued the recommendations against a tight
timetable. 7' To coordinate implementation John Mayne, a
civil servant with experience at the Treasury, the Central
Policy Review Staff, and the Cabinet Office was appointed
Director-General of Management and Audit. The resulting
savings, though not inconsequential, were small in comparison
to the overall defence budget.
The largest source of possible savings in the budget was
the equipment programme and the MoD scrutiny teams were an
important link to Nott's long-term goal of reducing equipment
costs. In November Nott told the Defence Committee that since
the defence review the MOD had been 'engaged in reshaping the
organisation to reflect programme changes' and that to assist
in this process two reports had been commissioned from
Rayner's scrutiny teams. These were the Report on the
Control of Extenditure (The Reeves Report), and the Review of
Operational Reauirements Procedures, (the Fisher Report) •73
Together these reports recommended numerous and
fundamental changes in procurement procedures. The Fisher
report investigated the formulation of operational
Sir Ewen Broadbent, The Military
 and Government (London:
Macmillan, 1988), p. 59.
7 
Cuts in the MoDs Audit Department, for example, were
expected to save an annual £2.71 million. Broadbent,
Military
 and Government, p. 59.
Nott in HC 22-Il, MoD Organisat jon and Procurement, p. 18,Q. 2.
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requirements assessing whether the central decision-making
process on procurement could be accelerated. 7' The report
concluded there was inadequate machinery to advise the
Secretary of State on detailed aspects of resource
allocation. Th
 The Reeves Report identified three constraints
on the MoD's ability to control expenditure. First, the
annual cycle of cash limits made no provision for under or
overspends. Second, statutes required that payments could not
be postponed or advanced. As discussed previously, these
constraints meant that the only way to conform with cash
limits was to plan to underspend, an inefficient use of
available funds. 76
 Third, contracts were inadequate to
predict cash outflows since companies could deploy their
resources as they saw fit. The tendency in the 1970s for
contractors to fill contracts late had contributed to the
MoD's budgetary crisis. Shortly after becoming a factor in
budgetary planning, late completion of contracts ceased due to
the recession, which prompted contractors to complete work
early.	 This analysis gave rise to the idea of billing
profiles which could enable the MoD to plan the incidence of
" Ibid., p. 30, Q. 29.
HCDC report in Ibid., para 21.
76 Ministry of Defence, The Study
 of the Control of
Expenditure 1981, Open Government Document 81/01, (OGD 81/01),
November 1981, para 17. The Reeves Report is summarised in
this document, which was provided to the House of Commons




The Reeves Report also studied the 1980-81 overspend and
concluded that it had four main causes: i) the buildup of MOD
contracts in the preceding years; ii) 'insufficient pruning of
the programme at the stage of Estimates preparation'; iii) the
recession, which released industrial capacity and stimulated
contractors to complete defence work early; and, iv) the
inflexibility of the defence programme, which prevented
compensation for the overspend once it had been forecast.Th
The MOD accepted the report's conclusions, in general, though
it stressed that the primary cause was the recession and its
effects on industry. As a result, when early forecasts for
1981-82 spending indicated that MOD cash limits were likely to
be exceeded the MoD's first response was to slow the flow of
cash to defence contractors.
Deferring payments in 1981 was a temporary measure to
stop the rapid outflow of defence funds. The goal was to
avoid having to resort to a moratorium on spending, as Pym had
done in 1980. Early in 1981 the Prime Minister indicated her
awareness that the equipment programme might be slowed down.
On February 18 she told a group of American journalists that
as equipment had been coming forward earlier than planned:
Ibid., para 183.
78 Ibid., p. 3, para 8.
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'there will come a year when it isn't coming forward so
fast • ' In this budgetary problem lay seeds of subsequent
reforms, when fixed price contracts were introduced to shift
the financial risk to contractors rather than leaving the MOD
to shoulder it all.
The MOD had to consider the possible negative effects of
slowing equipment deliveries, including the potential
disruption to industry and the near certainty that deferred
items would ultimately cost more. The effects of a
discontinuity in production and the possible difficulty of
resuming production had to be considered in relation to each
specific programme before deferring payments. •Even if
discontinuity were a risk deferrals would not be automatically
ruled out since 'the penalties that one may have to accept to
remain within cash limits include higher ultimate unit costs
due to inflation or less efficient production.' 8° The
importance of these considerations, however, made close
cooperation between the Procurement Executive and defence
industry a key goal.81
Discussions with defence contractors about deferring
payments began in spring 1981. In March the Chief of Defence
Prime Minister's Interview with US Journalists, (18
February 1981).
J.D.Bryars, Deputy Under Secretary (Finance and Budgets),
in HC 233, Defence Cuts and Defence Estimates, Q. 19.
81 Cmnd 8529-I, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1982, para
407.
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Procurement, David Cardwell, announced a new plan to get
billing profiles from defence contractors. By enabling the
compilation of a schedule for bills in the coming fiscal year
billing profiles offered the prospect of better control of
expenditure. R
 Cardwell expressed early confidence that
industry understood the MoD's problem and told the Defence
Committee that 'the important thing (was] not to disturb the
contractual arrangements. '
	 However, when contractors
responded unfavourably to payment deferrals, Cardwell
suggested that the alternative was another moratorium.
Although payment deferrals would exacerbate industry cash flow
problems a moratorium would be far more serious, especially
for small companies. According to the Defence Manufacturers
Association,
in times of special financial stringency there is
an increased tendency for major contractors,
finding themselves with underused resources, to
undertake work in-house which previously was done
by sub-contractors. Major contractors will perform
more work in-house rather than hire a sub-
contractor. This can weaken the smaller companies
concerned or even squeeze them out of business.85
D.Cardwell, HC 233, Defence Cuts and Defence Estimates, Q.
78; Though the cash profiles could be used to help the MOD
lower its current cash outflow the idea had evolved as an
instrument to help monitor expenditure in the long-term
programme.
HC 233, Defence Cuts and Defence Estimates, Q. 78.
84 M.Smith, Guardian (31 July 1981); R.Gribben, Daily
Teleratth (12 Aug 1981).
85 Memo by the Defence Manufacturers Association (DP14)
submitted to the House of Commons Defence Committee 15 October
1981, HC 22-11, MoD Oranisation and Procurement, p. 433.
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The elimination of small contractors would be a significant
loss to the defence industry. They tend to be highly
specialised in critical areas and flexible enough to exploit
new technologies with a minimum of difficulty.8'
For the MoD the effect of payment deferrals depended on
the type of equipment deferred. Contracts for spare parts and
stores, which made up a large proportion of the budget, could
be delayed at times of economic duress and accelerated to
catch up when more money was available. Although resulting in
fewer spares and stores than desired, delaying these items had
fewer long-term effects than cutting a major equipment
programme 87
Nevertheless, due to the size of the 1981-82 budgetary
shortfall the MOD considered deferring the delivery of Tornado
aircraft, which were being jointly produced with West Germany
and Italy. The Tornado programme, in production since 1974,
had been deferred to slow defence spending on two previous
occasions, once in 1975 and again in l977. In 1981 the
German Ministry of Defence was also having difficulty funding
Memo by the Defence Manufacturers Association (DP14) in HC
22-Il, MOD Oraanlsation and Procurement, p. 433.
87 J.D. Bryars in HC 233, Defence Cuts and Defence Estimates,
Q. 70.
88 Andrew Cox and Stephen Kirby, Con gress. Parliament and
Defence (London: Macmillan, 1986), p. 225; See also Second
Report from the Expenditure Committee, 1974-75, The Defence
Review Proposals, (HC 259), 6 March 1975, para 26, and Select
Committee on Expenditure, 1976-77, The Cumulative Effect of
Cuts in Defence Expenditure, (HC 254), 10 March 1977, para 8.
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its Tornado purchases. In December Geoffrey Pattie, Minister
of State for Defence Procurement, announced that discussions
were underway between the three countries about slowing down
Tornado delivery rates. The purpose, he clearly stated, was
'to assist in relieving pressures on defence budgets.'
Attempts to cope with the MoD's budget problems led Nott
to become dissatisfied with the rigidity of the cash limits
system, which he had defended before the House in his first
statement as Secretary of State for Defence. The conclusions
of the Reeves Report encouraged this dissatisfaction by
identifying the budget cycle and cash limits as major
constraints on programme management. Nott became aware of the
system's shortcomings early on, 90 but it wasn't until the
1981 round of MOD-Treasury negotiations that he recognised the
extent of the problem and proposed specific changes to the
system.
NEGOTIATING WITh THE TREASURY
Nott faced serious political problems by early 1982,
largely due to the difficulty of negotiating with the
Treasury. Despite having been seen as a member of 'the
Treasury team' Nott had less than ideal relations with that
ministry.	 One aspect of the review which had elicited
Quoted in Daily Telearah (9 Dec 1981).
John Nott, Hansard (19 May 1981), col. 150.
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disapproval from the Treasury as well as the services was
Nott's creation of a Central Contingency Reserve. Nott saw it
as essential that about £200 million be placed under his
direct control both so that there was flexibility in the
programme and that he had greater influence. Yet non-
allocated money was anathema to both the Treasury and the
services, who both bid for it. Nott succeeded in protecting
it and in getting an increase in both 1981-82 cash limits and
the 1982-83 MoD budget, but only after recourse to the Star
Chamber, a subcommittee of Cabinet set up to resolve budget
disputes between the Treasury and spending ministers. 91
 Even
then, the difference in the inflation rate applied to the MoD
compared to other departments did not endear him to Cabinet
colleagues. There was speculation in the media that Nott had
lost standing in Cabinet as a result of his requests for
additional funding.92
As the difficulty of remaining within cash limits became
evident Nott proposed that the MOD be granted 10 per cent
flexibility in meeting its budget. 93
 Nott subsequently
sought to transfer funds from the 1983-84 fiscal year budget
91 See Simon Jenkins, 'The "Star Chamber", PESC and the
Cabinet,' Political Quarterly
 Vol. 56, NO. 2 (1985); William
Whitelaw, The Whitelaw Memoirs (London: Aurum Press, 1989),
p. 252.
n J.Langdon, Guardian (10 Feb 1982); For the economic logic
behind 'Nott's worst budgetary battles' see Greenwood,
ReshaDinci Britain's Defences, pp. 22-24; and D.Greenwood and
P.Hennessy, Times (27 Oct 1981).
John Nott, Hansard (19 May 1981), col. 150.
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to fiscal year 1982-83 to help him balance the books. These
proposals were not welcomed by the Treasury but they were
taken seriously. 9' On February 9 the Prime Minister announced
that the government 'recognised the advantages.. . of
introducing some form of end year flexibility...and my right
hon Friend the Chief Secretary is looking at this again.'
The Chancellor's March 1981 Budget Statement had stated
that public expenditure would be planned in cash rather than,
as previously, in constant prices. This decision was based on
the belief that 'levels of service (provided by the
government] must be determined in the light of the finance
available. The Way
 Forward echoed this decision by
announcing that 'Defence, like other programmes, will now be
managed in cash terms. Above all, this meant that
budgetary planning for defence would now take inflation into
consideration, which had not been possible while the budget
was managed in terms of volume (which assumed constant
prices). Taking account of inflation could be expected to
alleviate at least some of the budgetary pressure stemming
from rapid escalation of equipment costs. But this step took
effect during the Public Expenditure Survey round of 1981 and
' J.Langdon, Guardian (10 Feb 1982).
Margaret Thatcher, Hansard (9 Feb 1982), col. 856.
Cmnd 8494-I, The Government's Expenditure Plans. 1982-83
to 1984-85, para 4.
Ciund 8288, The Way Forward, p. 1, para 2.
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therefore did not a.ffect the 1981-82 fiscal year.
The annual budgetary cycle customarily involved funding
disputes between the Treasury and spending departments, but
the decision to run the MOD on cash terms expanded the room
for disagreement. The focus of the discussion between the
Treasury and MOD over the 1982-83 cash limits was on how to
determine the inflation rate which would be applied to the
defence budget to arrive at the annual increase. The MoD
argued that the applicable inflation rate was the higher level
of defence inflation, which tended to exceed consumer
inflation by 6 to 10 per cent.98
Treasury officials continued to believe that the higher
level of defence inflation was the result of poor financial
management and remained reluctant to apply a different
standard to the MoD than to other spending departments.
Weaknesses in the system of military procurement had been an
ongoing concern since the 1961 publication of the ReDort of
the Committee on Mana gement and Control of Research and
Develotinent (the Gibbs/Zuckerinan report). Problems identified
in this report included the difficulty of defining defence
priorities, the modification of equipment specifications, poor
collaboration with industry, and the need to balance
sophistication with marketability. Efforts to resolve these
problems had resulted in the creation of the Procurement
Cmnd 8529-I, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1982, para
403.
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Executive following the publication o the 1971 Rayner Report.
The formation of the Procurement Executive improved the
efficiency of the procurement process, but there were still
notable examples of inefficiency which weakened the MoD's
position in budget negotiations with the Treasury.
Damaging revelations about the MoD's management of the
costly Chevaline programme to modernise the warheads of the
Polaris nuclear missile became public in June 1981 and may
have coloured budget negotiations with the Treasury.
Initially, in 1972, the total cost of a five-year development
programme and subsequent production of the Chevaline system
was estimated at £175 million (at Autumn 1972 prices). In
1975 the decision to carry the programme to completion was
made and by March 1976 the estimated total cost had risen to
£594 million (C388 million in Autumn 1972 prices). In
spring 1981, after ten years and £1 billion the Chevaline
warhead was still not complete. As a result, the Atomic
Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE) at Aldermaston had to
turn over control of the programme to British Aerospace. This
was done amid suggestions that Chevaline had been a 'job
creation scheme' for Aldermaston to prevent atomic weapons
scientists from drifting into new jobs during the lull in work
between the completion of the Polaris missiles and the
Memorandum submitted by the NoD, 'The Development of the
Chevaline Improvement to the Polaris Missile System,' printed
in the Ninth Report from the Committee of Public Accounts,
1981-82, Ministry of Defence: Chevalirie Improvement to the
Polaris Missile System (HC 269), 17 March 1982, p. 2.
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beginning of work on a Polaris successor.1
Despite Treasury concerns over MOD inefficiency the MOD
secured Treasury agreement for inflation adjustment slightly
higher than that for other spending departments. Negotiations
between the MoD and the Treasury began in June, shortly after
the defence review was completed. The negotiating teams were
led by Desmond Bryars, Deputy Under Secretary (Finance and
Budgets) at the MOD, and John Hansford, Undersecretary for
Defence Material at the Treasury. These teams were supposed
to work out the details of an agreement before Nott or Leon
Brittan, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, became involved in
the process. Ultimately, the issue had to be resolved by
Cabinet during its October-November deliberations on the
government's 1982 public expenditure white paper.101
One key area of dispute, as mentioned above, was Nott's
creation of a Central Contingency Reserve under his control.
In addition to budgetary flexibility, the purpose was to allow
him to exercise influence at the margins of service
programmes. According to Nott,
I wanted to have some pressure at the margin. It's
a tiny sum of money in relation to the whole but
that final marginal amount of money was pretty
crucial. It was by keeping that little marginal
amount of money under my personal control -- and
that really of the civilians -- that one was able
to influence decisions quite substantially)°2
P.Hennessy, Times (30 June 1981).
101 P.Hennessy, Times (29 June 1981).
102 Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
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The Treasury, arguing that there should be no carryover of
funds, tried to soak it up, but proved unable to until after
Nott had left office.'°3
The result of the 1981 budget round was a £480 million
increase in the MoD's 1982-83 cash limits. Far from allowing
an expansion of MoD programmes, without the increase
programmes would have been cut. 10' When the Chancellor
announced the increase on 2 December 1981, he said it was
necessary 'In order to enable us to carry through the policies
set out in the June Defence White Paper.. . (including] the cost
of the 1981 Armed Forces pay award."° 5
 At 1979 constant
prices the budget was planned to increase from £9,750 million
in 1981-82 to £10,050 million in 1982-83. Adjusted for
inflation, the planned budget figure was £13,624 million.
Following the negotiations the 1982-83 budget was to be
£14,103 million.'°6
 The assumed inflation rate for the MOD
was 8 per cent, whereas for other spending departments it was
7 per cent. Assuming this inflation rate was accurate the new
budget figure represented a rise in real terms of 4 per cent
over the budget allocation for 198l_82.107
103 M.Rutherford, Financial TImes (23 June 1982).
104 M.Donne, Financial Times (3 Dec 1981).
Sir Geoffrey Howe, Hansard (2 Dec 1981), col. 240.
106 These calculations appeared in D.Fairhall, Guardian (3 Dec
1981).
107 S.Hogg, Sunday Times (14 March 1982).
372
While Nott succeeded in defending his defence plans
against Treasury cuts, pressure on his other flank, the
Conservative Party, continued. It was modified, however, by
the increase in 1981-82 spending and Nott's pledge to extend
the three per cent pledge to 1985-86. More than any other
single factor this decision enabled Nott to weather the
political storm: he could present his review as an adjustment
to the programme in the context of continued growth in defence
spending. It was a useful presentational device, though not
necessarily an indicator of the health of the programme.
Service estimates indicated that an increase of £480 million
would be inadequate and that the assumed inflation rate was
too low. The military calculated that the MOD needed a total
increase of £1,400 million to meet existing commitments.1°8
To explore service arguments the Conservative back bench
Defence Committee requested an audience with the Service
Chiefs, with whom they had met in 1980 when Pym had been
ar9uing for defence increases. Nott informed Anthony Buck,
chairman of the committee, that such a meeting would be
inappropriate. 109
 Nott's response can be attributed to the
difficulty of his political situation; to varying degrees he
had strained relations with the military, the Treasury, and
other Cabinet ministers. Denying back benchers access to the
108 £700 million for the RAF, £400 million for the RN, and
£300 million for the Army. J.Connell, Sunday Times (6 Dec
1981).
J.Larigdon, Guardian (9 Feb 1982).
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military did not help Nott's relationship with them, but
prevented further aggravation of existing problems with
Cabinet and the Treasury.
STRENGTHENING THE CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF
By the time the 1982-83 budget disputes were resolved the
structure of the MoD had been significantly altered. Not only
had the single-service ministers been replaced with functional
postings, but the Chief of Defence Staff had been considerably
strengthened, at the initiative of Admiral Lewin. Lewin
believed there had been inadequate military input into the
defence review at the crucial stages, due partly to a failure
of the central military staffs fully to understand the problem
of overall defence priorities:
John Nott was a man in a hurry, events moved at too
great a speed for the COS organisation and the
single services were fully preoccupied defending
their own positions. The Central Staff were unable
to make an effective contribution and once again we
failed to grasp the essential problem of overall
defence priorities.'10
The frustration brought about by this situation prompted Lewin
to propose strengthening the role of the Chief of Defence
Staff in the decision-making process.
Changing the structure of relationships between the
Chiefs of Staff depended on the support of both the Secretary
110 Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin, 'MOD Reorganisation: a
personal perspective,' in Captain John Moore, (ed), Jane's
Naval Review (London: Jane's, 1985), p. 111.
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of State and the Permanent Under Secretary. Furthermore, the
Service Chiefs had to be split -- a proposal for change simply
could not survive if all three were opposed. The window of
opportunity opened after the 1981 defence review. Nott
recognised the difficult position his CDS had been in during
the review and was sympathetic to change: Lewin was 'in a very
difficult position as a CDS who was a naval man to the roots
but who had to try to achieve a consensus among the Chiefs of
Staff. As a result of his experiences he wanted formally to
elevate the CDS, which I did." 11
 Also, two of the four
Chiefs of Staff, Lewin and Bramall, had both been on the staff
of Mountbatten, the greatest proponent of centralised military
authority since the Second World War.
The Service Chiefs had stopped Mountbatten before he
fully achieved his goals for the ministry, but he succeeded in
passing on his ideas to a new generation. According to Field
Marshal Lord Bramall, who had been on Mountbatten's staff at
the time of the 1964 reorganisation of the ministry: 'In 1964
we went as far as we could. Elevating the CDS in 1982 was
moving in the direction that Mountbatten had intended, but
Mountbatten had been alone among the Chiefs of Staff in
seeking a stronger defence staff.' 112
 Unlike 1964, in 1981
opinion was split.	 Lewin and Bramall believed that
111 Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
112 Interview with Field Marshal Lord Bramall, 15 October
1991.
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strengthening the CDS would reduce the difficulty of
developing a global view of defence priorities. On the other
hand, Leach and Beetham believed that when the Chiefs of
Staff were deadlocked it was adequate that the CDS could give
an independent viewpoint. They also opposed reducing the
power of the Service Chiefs on the basis that only they were
capable of exercising responsibility for their services, and
that power and responsibility should remain in the same hands.
The arguments had been aired before with little impact on
the ministry. It was hardly auspicious for change that the
Service Chiefs, who stood the least to gain, had to
participate in bringing change about. The presence of Lewin
and Bramall in positions to support change, particularly after
a bruising episode had highlighted certain weaknesses of the
Chiefs of Staff Committee, was fortuitous. When Lewin judged
that the moment was right he sent a memorandum to Nott
outlining the proposed changes. They were based on five
principles: 1. The CDS should be the government's principal
military advisor; 2. The Chiefs of Staff Committee would be
the forum in which the CDS would seek Chiefs of Staff advice,
but it would no longer have collective responsibility; 3.
Chiefs of Staff would remain the heads of their services; 4.
central military staff would be made directly responsible to
the CDS; 5. a Service Appointments Committee consisting of the
CDS and Chiefs of Staff should be formed to oversee promotion
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and appointments of senior military."3
Lewin did not submit the proposals to the Chiefs of Staff
which, technically, was unconstitutional, but would have
ensured the plan's failure. Nott accepted the proposals,
which quickly received prime ministerial approval, but treated
the issue delicately because it was not politically popular
with Parliament. Indeed, the way Nott handled Lewin's
proposals reflected their considerable political sensitivity.
Nott first publicly mentioned the possibility of
strengthening the CDS in testimony to the Defence Committee on
11 November 1981, after the changes had been approved by the
Prime Minister. 11' He said
In my relatively short time I have seen that an
across-the-board defence view is vital...we must
continue the evolutionary process that has gone on
throughout this century toward providing advice to
the Defence Minister covering defence as a whole as
well as all three services, and as part of this
process I am now working on some evolutionary
changes in the military area with the aim of giving
the Chief of Defence Staff a rather stronger voice
whilst at the same time maintaining the authority
of the single service Chiefs of Staff."5
Nott was also careful regarding the balance between the centre
and the services, the cause of Leach's and Beetham's
113 Lewin, 'MOD Reorganisation,' p. 111.
Nott in HC 22-Il, MoD OrcTanisation and Procurement, Q. 2;
Lieutenant General Sir Maurice Johnston (Deputy Chief of
Defence Staff), 'More Power to the Centre: MOD
Reorganisation,' RUSI Journal Vol. 128, No. 1 (March 1983), p.
8.




I think that we must not create a monolithic
central organisation because any big group like
ours must breathe and, to some extent, the
differences of view which are bound to exist are
healthy and desirable in arriving at the right
final judgement.'16
Despite the fact that this was one of the most important
changes in the MOD organisation for many years, Nott did not
confirm that they had been implemented until February 1982.
When he did it was in a low-key manner; a letter to the
chairman of the Defence Committee Cranley Onslow.1'T
Lewin had planned to mount further change, using his
strengthened authority as CDS, but remained unable to partly
because of the delay and partly because of the outbreak of the
Falklands War. 118
 Further organisational change was not taken
up until after Michael Heseltine became Secretary of State for
Defence in 1983 and the new structure had been tested during
the war and proved sound. The 1984 changes were, however, a
natural outgrowth of those undertaken in 1982 which were
critical to enabling further reform to be mounted. Had
Lewin's reforms not prevailed in 1982, when the inability of
the Chiefs of Staff to participate fully in a fundamental
review was still fully appreciated, it is doubtful whether
116 HC 22-Il, MoD Organisation and Procurement, para 7.
117 Broadbent, The Military
 and Government, p. 64; and
H.Stanhope, The Times (12 Feb 1982).
118 Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin, 13 August
1991.
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the evolution of the ministry in the 1980s would have
proceeded nearly as fast.
Heseltine's reforms began with adoption of a Management
Information System for Ministers and top management (MINIS)
which enabled him to scrutinise ministry activities before
undertaking further organisational change. 119
 When full-
scale reorganisation did take place it further concentrated
control in the hands of the centre at the expense of the
services. Indeed, Heseltine was considerably less sensitive
to service concerns than Nott had been. Heseltine believed
that it was no good 'trying to put a tn-service gloss on it,'
and specifically set out to reduce the authority of the
Service Chiefs.' 2° Not surprisingly the process through
which he arrived at his proposals was not an open one. The
Chiefs learned of a pending announcement of organisational
change only 24 hours in advance, a cause of considerable
tension which culminated in the establishment of a joint
civilian and military body, the Defence Organisation Steering
Group, to oversee the changes.'21
 However, even the
establishment of this group could not alter the fact that
henceforth planning and programming was formally to be carried
119 Cmnd 9227, Stateient on the Defence Estimates. 1984 (March
1984), para 210.
120 Heseltine quoted in Antony Beevor, Inside the British Army
(London: Hogarth Press, 1990), p. 142.
121 Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fieldhouse, 24
July 1991.
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out in the centre, the services executing decisions without
necessarily playing a major role in their development.
Changes in the distribution of responsibility for
strategic planning reflected the experience of the 1981
review. The Land, Sea and Air staffs of the Service Chiefs
were placed under direct control of the CDS. Heseltine's
consultative paper stated
The recent changes designed to strengthen the
position of the CDS, whilst valuable in themselves,
have served to accentuate the organisational
separation of his Central Staffs from the Naval,
General and Air Staffs in a way which I believe was
never intended by architects of the Ministry. The
time has come to recognise the inter-dependence of
the subjects with which they deal and to bring the
relevant Staffs of DCDS and the single-Service
Vice-Chiefs together.122
The Service Chiefs were left with a rump staff but lost their
Vice Chiefs, through whom considerable service authority had
been exercised; they had been directly responsible for many of
the service staffs shifted to the centre. Though no longer
under service control these staffs could still be consulted,
at the discretion of the CDS.
The relationship between the services and the centre was
completely transformed. Previously the CDS had to have
Service Chief permission to task defence staffs and now it was
the other way around. Moreover, civilian and military staffs
now co-mingled in the centre, with the central Strategy and
Policy Staff headed by a civilian with lines of responsibility
122 DOGD 84/03, Organisation for Defence, para 13.
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to both the PUS and CDS. The Second Permanent Under Secretary
was made a member of all three Service Boards which gave his
immediate superior, the PUS, a direct civilian link to service
affairs. Similarly, elements of the Defence Secretariat which
had been understood as Service-oriented -- DS4, DS7, DS9 -- no
longer reported to the service Deputy Under Secretaries but to
a central civilian, the Assistant Under Secretary (Resources).
One vital achievement of the new structure was that it
lowered the point in the hierarchy at which single-service
rivalries could be pursued through the programming process.
It was pushed down from the four-star Chiefs of Staff level to
the brigadier (one-star) level. Three brigadiers headed the
Single-Service Executive Staffs, the old service planning
hierarchy, but their boss was now in the centre at the two-
star level, the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff. Thus the
system ensured that overall defence considerations influenced
the development of plans from the two-star level of the
central planning hierarchy and above.
Organisational change is not, in itself, sufficient to
alter the character of as complex and sophisticated a ministry
as the MoD. The new institutional relationships did not
render the centre autonomous nor create an inherently hostile
centre-service relationship. The balance of influence had
shifted but cooperation between the centre and the services
remained essential. The vital difference between Lewin's
reforms and Heseltine's initiative was that the former
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primarily constituted a transfer of responsibility whereas the
latter was a wide-ranging reorganisation of the ministry. Both
initiatives, however, strengthened the centre and were
facilitated by the 1981 review.
CHAPTER NINE
The Palkiands War
The Falkiands War had a major impact on the
implementation of the 1981 defence review. 1 'Operation
Corporate' to retake the Falkiands Islands after the Argentine
invasion of April 1982 depended on the Royal Navy. It
involved sending a task force of 42 warships, 70 merchant
vessels, and 26,000 service personnel 8,000 miles to carry out
an air war and an amphibious landing. The importance of the
surface fleet in the conduct of the war fortified arguments
that it deserved a higher priority in long-term MOD plans. If
The Way
 Forward had already been implemented, Operation
Corporate would not have been possible. Many observers noted
that among the frontline ships sent to the South Atlantic 6
were to be scrapped under Nott's plans. Not surprisingly, the
war reopened debate over defence priorities and eroded the
government's plans to consolidate the defence review.
By the end of 1982 many, though not all, of the major
cuts had been rescinded.
	 In early 1983 John Nott left
politics.	 His successor, Michael Heseltine, far from
1 Many histories of the war have been written, among them,
Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, Sina1s of
War (London: Faber and Faber, 1990); Max Hastings and Peter
Jenkins, The Battle for the Falkiands (London: Michael Joseph,
1983); and David Brown, The Royal Navy
 and the Falkiands War
(London: Leo Cooper, 1987).
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reopening the debate over the defence review, concentrated
first on generating support for the planned deployment of US
cruise missiles to Britain as part of NATO's 1979 dual-track
decision, and as discussed in the last chapter, undertook a
major reorganisation of the ministry. Indeed, the Conservative
Government proved extremely reluctant to conduct any further
fundamental reviews of the defence programme, preferring
instead to rely on programming 'adjustments' rather than
seeking to realign commitments with resources.
OPERATION CORPORATE
The Falklands War transformed the defence debate because
it was precisely the type of war that the 1981 review had
assigned the lowest priority. The nearest air base to which
Britain had access -- USAF Wideawake -- was on Ascension
Island, more than 3,500 miles from the Falklands. Providing
air defence for the fleet, and for the land battle, was thus
extremely difficult. The carriers Hermes and Invincible --
both to have been removed from service earlier than their
natural lifespan required -- were vital, as were the
amphibious assault ships Fearless and Intre pid. As a result,
the Falklands War appeared to confirm many of the concerns
expressed by critics of the review.
The Royal Navy was in the forefront of the Falk].ands War
from the beginning. When intelligence reports of an imminent
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invasion arrived in London on 31 March 1982, Admiral Lewin,
whose term as CDS did not expire until late 1982, was in New
Zealand and unable to return promptly. General Sir Edwin
Bramall, Lewin's designated successor, was in Northern Ireland
and returned to London shortly after the news broke. 2 In the
meantime Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Sir Henry Leach was
acting Chief of Defence Staff.
The prevailing advice of the MoD in the months leading up
to the conflict was that sending a task force would take time,
raise the political stakes, and not guarantee success. Leach
interjected a more confident view. After receiving news of
imminent invasion Leach went in full uniform to the House of
Commons in search of Nott. There the Prime Minister invited
him into an emergency meeting of what was to become the War
Cabinet. 3 When asked by Thatcher how Britain could respond
to an invasion Leach replied confidently: 'I can put together
a Task Force of destroyers, frigates, landing craft support
vessels. It will be led by the aircraft carrier HNS Hermes
and HMS Invincible. It can be ready to leave in forty-eight
hours.
Leach's confidence was instrumental. He offered the
2 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, Sicrnals of War, p. 124.
See Cohn Seymour-Ure, 'British "War Cabinets" in Limited
Wars: Korea, Suez and the Falkiands,' Public Administration
Vol. 62 (Summer 1984).
Quoted in Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, 'Foreword,' to
Admiral Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Da ys (London: Harper
Collins, 1992), p. xi.
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Prime Minister the means to respond as both political
circumstances and her own instincts demanded. At this stage,
the political importance of the task force was paramount.5
It was an immediate reaction to be seen to be doing something.
Following the meeting with the Prime Minister Leach called
CINCFLEET, Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, and told him to
prepare to send the Task Force on Monday morning. Fieldhouse
responded that it could be done but it would mean 'just
chucking all the kit into the ships and going.' 6
 If the
departure could be delayed until Wednesday, Fieldhouse said,
the task force could depart in better order. The political
need to respond quickly was deemed vital and, as the Prime
Minister announced in the emergency debate following news of
the invasion, 'The Government have now decided that a large
task force will sail as soon as all preparations are complete.
HMS Invincible will be in the lead and will leave port on
Monday.' 7
 The landing forces needed the time they were later
given at Ascension Island to organize their equipment.8
G.M.Dillon, The Falklands. Politics and War (London:
Macmillan, 1989), pp. 91-2.
6 Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fieldhouse, 24
July 1991; for a description of the preparations see Woodward,
One Hundred Days, p. 73; and Julian Thompson, The Lifeblood of
War: Logistics in Armed Conflict (London: Brassey's, 1991),
p. 252.
Margaret Thatcher, Mansard (3 April 1982) reprinted in fl
Falkiands Cainaign: A Digest of Debates in the House of
Commons. 2 ADril 15 June 1982 (London: 10150, 1982), pp. 7-8.
8 Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fieldhouse, 24
July 1991; Thompson, Lifeblood of War, p. 254.
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In the emergency debate on 3 April, even the Opposition,
led by Michael Foot, tacitly supported a military response.
While criticising government diplomacy prior to the invasion,
Foot highlighted 'the longer-term interest to ensure that foul
and brutal aggression does not succeed in our world. If it
does, there will be a danger not merely to the Falkiands
Islands, but to people all over this dangerous planet. ' The
Royal Navy, and, in particular, the most vociferous critic of
the 1981 defence review, Admiral Leach, thus provided the
Prime Minister with the means and the confidence to respond
militarily.
The Royal Navy continued in its leading military role
once the war began. Admiral Fieldhouse took command of
Operation Corporate, reporting directly to the Chief of
Defence Staff. Into the Royal Navy's headquarters at
Northwood Fieldhouse brought a land deputy, first Major
General Sir Jeremy Moore, later General Sir Richard Trent, and
an Air Commander, Air Marshal Sir John Curtis. The other
services were thus closely involved in the operation. Indeed,
close inter-service cooperation was required for successful
conduct of the war. 10
 In addition to the Task Force and 3
Royal Marine Commando Brigades, the Army sent 2 Brigades and
2 Parachute Regiment Battalions. The RAF provided substantial
Michael Foot, Hansard (2 April 1981) in the Falkiands
Cainaign, pp. 9-10.
John Nott, 'The Falklarids Campaign,' Proceedings Vol. 109
(May 1983), p. 120.
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reconnaissance and logistic support, also placing valued
assets -- Harriers and Chinook helicopters -- on carriers and
container ships at Royal Navy disposal. Of vital importance
was RAF air-to-air refuelling capacity, which was rapidly
expanded on very short notice. 11 This extended the
operational time and range of British aircraft, enabling
optimum use of a resource in short supply so far from friendly
airfields.
Not only was Ascension island over 3,500 miles away, but
the Argentine mainland was only 400. British military
intelligence on Argentina was poor, constituting the best
information already in the public domain, Jane's 'Fighting
Shins, and an analysis of combat aircraft numbers based on
reported aircraft deliveries. 12 The sinking of the Argentine
cruiser General Belrano on 2 May effectively eliminated any
threat posed by the Argentine fleet, which subsequently
remained in port. However, this was not immediately evident
and the potential threat from Argentina's two submarines
always remained a concern.13
British commanders recognised, however, that air defence
was the key aspect of the war, on which the outcome depended.
' Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price, Air War South Atlantic
(London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1983), p. 32.
12 Woodward, One Hundred Da ys, p. 78; Ethell and Price, Air
War South Atlantic, p. 26.
13 Woodward, One Hundred Days, p. 164; Ethell and Price, Air
War South Atlantic, p. 92.
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The main Argentine threat came from its Air Force and Fleet
Air Arm, which was believed to total 247 operational fighter
and attack aircraft, though it actually totalled around
130. 14
 An obvious concern was that Argentina's superiority
in aircraft numbers and proximity to the combat zone could
prove a decisive advantage. To counter Argentine air power
Britain relied primarily on 34 carrier borne Harriers, though
not all of these could be devoted solely to air defence. In
conjunction with ship-based Sea Wolf and Sea Dart missiles,
Electronic Counter Measures, and on land Rapier missiles, the
Harriers had to protect the fleet and landing forces. In
addition, some Harriers had to conduct ground support and
bombing operations, further reducing the number available for
air defence. Due to the range and number of Argentine
aircraft the fleet remained well East of the Falklands to
maximize the difficulty for Argentine pilots. The unfortunate
consequence was to reduce the operational range of the
Harriers, particularly those operating in support of land
forces. 15
 Further complicating the air defence role was the
lack of Airborne Early Warning due to the limited range of the
Nimrods flying out of Ascension and US unwillingness to become
14 Ethell and Price, Air War South Atlantic, p. 26.
15 Julian Thompson, No Picnic: 3 Commando Briade in the South
Atlantic (Leo Cooper with Secker & Warburg, 1985), p. 69; Cmnd
8758, The Fa].klands Cainpaicrn: The Lessons (December 1982),
para 228.
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operationally involved in the conflict.16
Like British commanders, Argentine commanders were
sensitive to the air threat and thus failed successfully to
exploit their greatest advantage. Rather than risk valuable
air assets through forward basing on the Falklands Argentina
flew primarily out of the mainland. This was due in part to
the ingenuity of the RAF, which succeeded in bombing Port
Stanley airfield using a Vulcan bomber rapidly modified for
mid-air refuelling. The extent to which British forces were
operating at full reach was demonstrated by the tanker
requirements of that one plane:
It took 14 tankers airborne, 11 to refuel the
Vulcan, to reach Stanley. One Victor refueller
barely made it back itself because it gave more
than its spare fuel to the Vulcan.'7
To maximise the Vulcan's impact the RAF 'went to the
operational analysts and asked how best to attack Stanley with
one Vulcan.' They were told that going in diagonally with 21
bombs provided a 90 percent chance of one hit and a 65 percent
chance of a second. 'Twenty one bombs were dropped, with one
landing in the middle of the runway and one on the edge. We
couldn't have done any better.' 18
 Sea Harriers from Hermes
16 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, Sinals of War, p. 333.
IT Interview with Marshal of the RAF Sir Michael Beetham, 21
October 1991.
18 Interview with Marshal of the RAP' Sir Michael Beetham, 21
October 1991; See also Woodward, One Hundred Da ys, pp. 133-35;
and Rodney Burden, et. al., Falklands: The Air War (London:
Arms and Armour Press, 1986), pp. 363-7.
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followed up the Vulcan raid with low-level air attacks against
the airfield, which continued to be attacked at intervals
throughout the campaign.'9
 The second Vulcan bombing run was
less successful, with the bombs landing near the edge of the
runway. Stanley airport remained in use, but by Hercules
transport aircraft, not advanced fighter/bombers. The
Argentine Air Force -- noting the range of Britain's bombing
capability -- withdrew their Mirage 3 aircraft to the
mainland. The RAF's raid, though derided for involving only
one plane, and failing to close the runway altogether,
nevertheless reduced the air defence burden.
The British strategy of attriting Argentine air assets in
advance of the amphibious assault foundered on Argentine
caution in engaging the Harriers. By all accounts, Argentine
pilots were committed and professional, but the all-weather
Harrier, armed with AIM9L Sidewinder air-to-air missiles was
a formidable opponent. 2° Early on Argentina elected to
conserve its air assets to attack the fleet once a land
campaign got underway, a decision from which Britain
ultimately benefitted. Although important ships, material
and, of course, lives, were lost in Argentine bombing raids,
these were not the points of greatest weakness in British
19 See Woodward, One Hundred Days, p. 137; See also Brian
Hanrahan and Robert Fox, 'I Counted Them All Out and I Counted
Them All Back' (London: British Broadcasting Company, 1982)
pp. 20-21, for a contemporary news report of the Harrier
attack.
Woodward, One Hundred Days, p. 143.
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strategy. The most vulnerable aspects of Britain's war effort
were air defences and the logistics of the land campaign.21
Had Argentina attacked the Harriers rather than the assets
they were protecting more damage may have been done to
Britain's ability to continue the campaign. 'If the
Argentines had chosen a different target and gone for the
Harriers it would only have taken the loss of 15 for the whole
to be grounded and there wouldn't have been any air defence.
Instead they went for the Task Force itself. .22
Attacking the Task Force was complicated by the Sea Dart
missile system deployed on Type 42 destroyers, forcing
Argentine pilots to approach at low altitudes to avoid
detection.	 Low approaches complicate the task of bombing
a ship because the natural tendency to fly clear of point
defences interferes with the bomb's flight. Moreover, bombs
dropped at low altitudes must be retarded otherwise their
explosions destroy the plane delivering them. There are two
methods of bomb retardation: parachutes or fuses. The
Argentine Navy had parachutes. The Air Force, trained more
for high-altitude bombing, had fuses. Due to an error in
fusing fourteen of the bombs dropped on ships did not explode:
There were fourteen unexploded bombs in the hulls
of ships. What would have happened if the
Argentines had not made the disastrous error of
21 See Freedman and Ganiba-Stonehouse, Signals of War, p. 361.
u Interview C.
Woodward, One Hundred Days, pp. 175-6.
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setting the arming delay on fourteen seconds
instead of setting the fuse delay on fourteen one-
hundredths of a second?2'
Argentina had greater success with its sea-skimming
radar-homing French built Exocet missiles. The most
notable Exocet kill was the Type 42 destroyer }IXS Sheffield on
4 May. Sheffield failed to deploy its chaff, though even that
may not have saved it. 26
 A second Exocet sunk the container
ship Atlantic Conveyor and its valuable cargo, including Six
Wessex, one Lynx and three Chinook helicopters. 27
 A third
airborne Exocet attack was countered, but a subsequent ground-
launched attack seriously damaged the destroyer HMS
Glainoraan. 28
 According to Admiral Train, 'When you stop to
think that the Argentines sank three British ships with a
total inventory of five Exocet missiles it makes you
wonder. ' The sinking of Sheffield demonstrated the
vulnerability of even the most sophisticated warships to sea-
skimming missiles, and the vital importance of Airborne Early
Warning to enable destruction of the delivery platform -- the
aircraft -- rather than the weapon, which was considerably
24 Interview with Admiral Harry Train, 4 January 1991.
See Antony Preston, Sea Combat Of f the Falklands (London:
Willow Books, 1982), pp. 63-75.
Woodward, One Hundred Da ys, p. 14.
27 Freedman and Ganiba-Stonehouse, Si gnals of War, p. 361.
Nott, 'Falklands Campaign, p. 123; Freedman and Ganiba-
Stonehouse, Signals of War, p. 394.
Interview with Admiral Harry Train, 4 January 1991.
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more difficult to hit, moving too fast for even the Sea Dart
missile tracking system.3°
Providing air defence both for the Task Force and the
land forces stretched a small force thinly, becoming a source
of friction between British conunanders. 3
 General Sir Jeremy
Moore observed that 'only the land forces could win the war,
but the Navy could always lose it. ,32 Thus, despite the
high degree of inter-service cooperation during the war, it
'would never have been possible if the cuts in the Navy had
gone ahead...If the 1981 cuts had happened four years before
the Falklands operation we would not have been able to
undertake it.' 33
 Fortunately, due to the gradual nature of
the review, the Navy remained essentially at its pre-1981
capability. Even so the operation depleted Britain's maritime
contribution to NATO. According to Train, who remained
SACLANT during the war and subsequently wrote the official US
analysis, 'The British would not have been a participant at
all in a NATO-Warsaw Pact War...The Royal Navy was all gone.
30 Woodward, One Hundred Days, p. 223; Nott, 'The Falklands
Campaign,' p. 130; Preston, Sea Combat Off the Falkiands, pp.
15, 114.
31 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, Si gnals of War, pp. 323-29;
For Admiral Woodward and General Moore's joint public account
of the operation see General Sir Jeremy Moore and Rear Admiral
Sir John Woodward, 'The Falkiands Experience,' in RUSI Journal
Vol. 128, No. 1 (March 1983).
Woodward, One Hundred Days, p. 104.
Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fieldhouse, 24
July 1991.
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There wasn't anything left [in the North Atlantic].'3'
In undermining a basic assumption of the 1981 review --
that Britain would not conduct independent military operations
outside of the NATO area --
 the war logically called into
question the entire review. 'Hardly was the ink dry when the
Falklands War came along. . .Never has someone been proved wrong
by such a one-off thing on such short notice.
	 Nott was
left to argue in Parliament that 'the United Kingdom has the
ability to mount a major naval task force and to sustain it
for a period at that distance. The charge that the Royal Navy
cannot do this is flagrantly and patently untrue. ' Yet, if
his proposals had been fully implemented the capability of the
Royal Navy would have been considerably reduced. In fairness
to Nott, while debate focused on the 1981 review, the
Falklands War also posed a serious challenge to defence policy
of the previous fifteen years, during which time the Royal
Navy had increasingly been configured to fight only in a
European context.
The importance of the surface fleet to the operation was
obvious. The war also provided a clear example that surface
ships signalled political commitment in addition to providing
3' Interview with Admiral Harry Train, 4 Jan 1991; See also
Alexander N. Haig, Caveat (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson,
1984), p. 265; For Train's analysis see US Department of the
Navy, Lessons of the Falklands, (February 1983).
Interview with Field Marshal Lord Bramall, 15 October 1991.
John Nott, Hansard (2 April 1981), in The Falkiands
Cainpaicn, p. 21.
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a military capability. The planned withdrawal of the
hydrographic vessel Endurance and the decision not to replace
it were construed by the Argentine Junta as one sign of
reduced British interest in the South Atlantic. 37
 The war
immeasurably enhanced the standing of the Navy, which as a
consequence stood to benefit from a rapid assessment of its
lessons. According to David Watt, due to the emotional
climate immediately following the war the question of the
long-term strategic lessons of the campaign was rhetorical,
and the only 'simple, emphatic answer was fore-ordained:
let's have a bigger navy.
THE FALKLANDS 'LESSONS'
A fundamental question about the Falklands War was
whether it contained basic lessons relevant for defence policy
or whether the lessons were primarily technological.
Participants in the debate drew different conclusions. To the
Navy the war proved that Britain required a larger surface
fleet and underscored the maxim that the role of military
forces in peacetime is to remain prepared for the unexpected.
Finally the Navy had been provided with an example
illustrating this basic tenet of maritime strategy which:
Cmnd 8787, Falkiands Island Review: Report of a Committee
of Privy
 Counsellors (The Franks Report), January 1983, para
287.
D.Watt, Times (30 April 1982).
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(i) was not quantifiable and therefore not susceptible to
operational analysis; and,
(ii) now had to be accorded greater credibility.
Nevertheless, Nott, on the basis of interim analyses of the
war, saw little reason to change the basic trend in defence
policy, even though Britain's ability to sustain independent
operations outside of the NATO area would be severely reduced.
He viewed the Falklands War as an aberration unlikely to be
repeated again. Most of the official lessons learned were
confined to the sphere of defence equipment, many highlighting
the vulnerability of surface ships.
Not all the lessons drawn from the Falklands War favoured
the Navy. Defence analyst Peter Foot argued that the
direction of the defence review 'was surely proved right more
often than wrong. The argument that ships cost too much to
build and had therefore to be inadequately armed was proved
tragically correct.' 39
 The official analysis emphasised that
six British ships were lost in the operation and that there
had been a constant struggle to provide adequate air
defence.'0
 Few disputed that this meant Britain required at
least two aircraft carriers to provide air defence and Nott
indicated early in the debate that he was reconsidering the
Peter Foot, 'British Defence: The Falklands and After'
ADIU ReDort (July/Aug 1982), p. 2.
4° Cmnd 8758, The Falkiands Campaicrn, p. 40, Annex C; p. 20,
para 225.
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sale of Invincible. 41
 But the difficulty of air defence did
highlight the vulnerability of surface ships, contributing to
the growing concern that their deployment 'was more of a
liability than an asset."2
Strategically, the Falkiands War left an ambiguous
legacy for the Navy. The campaign demonstrated both the
Navy's prowess at conducting a difficult operation far from
Britain, and certain weaknesses in Navy capabilities. The
assessment of the war by General Sir John Hackett, former
commander of NATO's Northern Army Group, reflected this
ambiguity. General Hackett believed the war had 'enormously
increased the standing of the Navy and NATO's confidence in
transatlantic reinforcement,' but the vulnerability of surface
vessels to missile attack had been 'brutally demonstrated. '
The North Atlantic would undoubtedly have been a more
complex and technologically dangerous environment in the event
of an East/West war than the South Atlantic in spring of 1982.
Highlighting ship vulnerability, the MoD officially concluded
that the war confirmed the basic direction in defence policy.
This conclusion, based on evidence largely provided by the
Royal Navy, illustrates further the complexity of civil-
military relations with respect to strategic and operational
41 Defence Committee, 1981-82, Statement on the Defence
Estimates. 1982 (HC 428), 24 June 1982, p. 15, Q. 100.
Ian McKeogh, 'Britain's Defence Policy,' International
Relations (May 1982), p. 2077.
General Sir John Hackett, The Sunday
 Times (20 June 1982).
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analyses.
The White Paper on The Falkiands CamDaign: The Lessons
was prepared by the ministry though much of the information on
which it was based was provided by the fleet in the form of
reports by 'a Scientific Evaluation Team and the R&D
Establishments together with reports from the Commander of the
Task Force, and the three Service Departments. TM
 The Chief
Scientific Adviser had sought a prominent role for DOAE in the
analysis of the war and had sought Nott's approval to send
five civilian analysts and two service officers to the South
Atlantic during the war.'5
 Nott accepted the recommendation
only to have Admiral Fieldhouse veto the decision because 'of
pressure on limited transport space," 6
 The Director of
DOAE, J.D. Cuishaw, was furious, especially given that 30
places had been allocated to the press. According to
Fieldhouse, 'The aim was to win not to analyze. The fleet
kept adequate records but I could understand criticisms on
assessing specific weapons systems."7
 Indeed, that was the
Memorandum by the Ministry of Defence (F2, 1983-84) in
Fourth Report from the Defence Committee, 1986-87,
Implementing
 the Lessons of the Falkiands Campaign (HC 345-
II), 1 February 1984 and 6 May 1987, p. 19, Q. 1.
' Interview with Sir Ronald Mason, 4 July 1991; HC 345,
Im1ementin the Lessons, Q. 4.
Interview with Sir Ronald Mason, 4 July 1991; HC 345,
Imlementin the Lessons, Q. 4; Interview with Admiral of the
Fleet Lord Fieldhouse, 24 July 1991.
'' Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fieldhouse, 24
July 1991.
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assigned task of the scientific team, but their arrival five
days after Argentina's surrender meant that there was no real
time assessment and that final assessments were based largely
on anecdote, albeit the sources of these anecdotes were 'on-
the-spot discussions with those who had participated in the
operation while the information was still fresh. '
A great amount of effort went into preparing the
information provided and an analytical team was set up at
Northwood to coordinate and smooth over the gaps in the
information.'9
 All reports, not simply the final
assessments, were made available to the central defence staffs
to facilitate the comprehensive analysis on which the official
Falklands lessons were based. As with the 1980 Defence
Programme Working Party and again with the 1981 defence review
the services and DOAE provided essential information on which
policy decisions were based. The Deputy Chief of Defence
Staff, still Lt. General Sir Maurice Johnston -- who played a
key role in the 1981 review -- was directly responsible for
this information and drafted The Lessons. 50
 Admiral
Fieldhouse and the House Defence Committee agreed that the
information was 'capably handled and represented a fair
' Interview with Sir Ronald Mason, 4 July 1991; HC 345,
Implementing the Lessons, Q. 4.
' Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fieldhouse, 24
July 1991.
50 HC 345-I, Implementing
 the Lessons, para 18; Interview with
Lt. General Sir Maurice Johnston, 16 October 1991.
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assessment. ,51 According to Minister of State for the Armed
Forces, Sir Peter Blaker, also involved in drafting the
lessons, the analysis demonstrated that
while the war certainly had implications for
equipment it had no significant effect on changing
the government's view of defence priorities.
Nevertheless, there was a shift in practice due to
the relaxation of constraints on the Navy. One
major reason for this relaxation was the Treasury
decision to fund the war. Nott fought the MoD's
corner with the Treasury very effectively.52
While defending the direction of policy, but relaxing its
practical application, Nott paved the way for a stronger
consensus over conventional defence within the Conservative
Party, though this was not immediately apparent.
The war confirmed Nott's belief that 'the main threat to
the surface fleet in the future, assuming that land-based air
of the Soviet Union could be successfully contained, is
increasingly the submarine-launched missiles of the Soviet
Navy.' But it also eased his financial pressures,
facilitating a more flexible approach toward out-of-area
operations. 53
 Several years after the war Nott summed up the
lessons in the following way:
What the Falklands showed was that four Exocet
missiles were able to pose a major threat over two-
thirds of the Royal Navy. For the Russians have
thousands and thousands of much more sophisticated
missiles than the Exocet. And they wouldn't come
from low flying aircraft they'd largely come from
51 Interview with Lord Fieldhouse, 24 July 1991; HC 345-I,
Intpleinenting the Lessons, para 17.
52 Interview with Sir Peter Blaker, 4 June l91.
Nott in HC 428, Defence Estimates. 1982, p. 5, Q. 28.
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submarines .
However, Nott was careful not to denigrate the value of having
a 'substantial' surface navy both for the purpose of fighting
the Soviets in the Atlantic and for conducting out-of-area
operations
Senior Royal Navy officers, mainly the First Sea Lord,
sought to discredit the conclusion that the vulnerability of
surface ships meant their number could safely be reduced.
Admiral Leach was highly critical of the government's initial
assessment of the Falklands campaign. In a speech to the
Royal United Services Institute he described as 'very
unsavoury' a Conservative Party pamphlet distributed to MPs at
the height of the Falklands crisis.
By dint of selective quotation it sought to show
that the doubts increasingly being voiced were
groundless and that last year's Defence Review had
given the Navy more money and better capability and
so on. The handling of this was not without
resemblance to that of the Defence Review itself:
it was a major con-trick or, not to put too fine a
point on it, a catalogue of half truths.56
Admiral Leach called for three changes in current MoD plans.
First, he believed three ASW carriers were necessary. Second,
the effectiveness of weapon systems on destroyers should be
improved. Third, more destroyers and frigates must be retained
Nott on BBC2 MOD: Keepers of the Threat (9 April 1986).
Nott in MC 428, Defence Estimates. 1982, p. 5, Q. 28.
Admiral Sir Henry Leach, 'British Maritime Forces: The
Future,' a lecture given at RUSI 9 June 1982 and published in
RUSI Journal Vol. 127, No. 3 (Sept 1982), p. 14.
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and acquired.57
Admiral Leach became increasingly outspoken as the
government played down the implications of the war for British
defence policy. As he approached retirement on 1 December his
criticism grew increasingly harsh. Comments by Viscount
Trenchard that current defence plans would enable Britain to
repeat a Falklands-type operation in 1985 or 1990, were
described by Admiral Leach as 'a pack of lies.' In a BBC
radio interview Leach said reductions in the Navy had been
based on the 'myth that surface ships are intolerably
vulnerable...(and) have no useful role to play and we had
better do without them.' On the contrary, he argued, 'if it
had not been for surface ships we would have had very little
chance of any success whatsoever in the Falklands Islands
campaign. We wouldn't even have got there. ''
There was a nationalist strain in some arguments for
maintaining Britain's naval capabilities. Among members of
the naval lobby a prevalent view was that only the Navy could
provide the flexibility necessary to meet both Britain's
alliance commitments and national interests. Much was made
Ibid., p. 15.
Admiral Leach quoted in M.Jones and J.Connell, The Sunday
Times (5 Sept 1982).
Quoted in G.Parry, The Guardian (6 Sept 1982).
See Lord Hill-Norton, 'Return to a National Strategy' in
John Baylis, (ed), Alternative A proaches to British Defence
Policy (London: Macmillan, 1983).
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of the fact that six of the ships included in the naval task
force were among those which Nott intended to remove from
service. 61
 Nott's critics were soon demanding another review
of Britain's defences and arguing that the Falklands War was
evidence that Britain should modify its NATO contribution.
The basic argument is clearly stated by Sir James Cable:
Those predominantly naval tasks of most direct
concern to Britain and best adapted to her
resources and traditions should fall to her share;
the defence of the Central Front, for equivalent
reasons, to that of her continental allies.
One of the early salvos in the debate over the lessons of the
Falklands War was an editorial in The Times calling for
Britain to apply a new measure of self-interest in its
contribution to NATO. The war had, it claimed, confirmed the
'unwisdom' of Nott's defence policy and pointed out that there
should be a general refocussing of British capability towards
the maritime sphere and a renegotiation of the 1954 Paris
Agreement on the grounds that times had changed with Britain
no longer having conscription or numerous reserves and West
Germany being an 'economic giant.'
The Paris Agreement was seen, understandably, as a major
obstacle to Britain's ability to modify its NATO contribution.
Yet critics pointed out that it had already been modified once
61 Hansard (6 July 1982), col. 236.
James Cable, Britain's Naval Future (London: Macmillan,
1983), p. 181.
'Strategy in a Silver Sea' The Times (21 June 1982).
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and could be modified again. M
 To those countering that this
would represent a diminution of Britain's commitment (if not
contribution) Cable argued that a maritime focus for Britain's
NATO contribution would not diminish its commitment but would
enhance the perception that NATO was a defensive alliance
because
the British contribution to NATO would then be more
directly related to national defence, as the German
contribution already is, support for the Alliance
in Britain would be fortified.65
These arguments supported a reversal of the defence review,
not merely its modification, and Nott contended with serious
criticism during the remainder of his time at the MOD.
Nevertheless, without changing actual policy, Nott facilitated
a reduction in Conservative protest over naval cuts.
MODIFYING THE DEFENCE REVIEW
The war's initial effect on defence policy was to delay
publication of the 1982 Defence Estimates. They had been
drafted with consolidation of the defence review in mind and
confirmed that combined with low ship building rates the
naval cuts would result in long-term contraction of the
64 Lord Hill-Norton, 'Return to a National Strategy,' pp. 124-
5.
65 Cable, Britain's Naval Future, p. 186.
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fleet. M
 When the delay was announced on April 6 the
government insisted it would neither change the White Paper
nor modify the defence review. 67
 According to Nott, the
decision to delay publication stemmed from 'a general view in
the House that in the early stages of the crisis it would be
better to hold it back.'
Publication of the Defence Estimates became subject to
significant political dispute. There was disagreement in
Cabinet over what constituted the best forum for assessing the
war lessons. Nott stressed that drawing lessons for defence
policy required a thorough and separate analysis of the
campaign. Consequently, he advocated publishing the Defence
Estimates with only a brief addendum referring to the war.
Cabinet colleagues worried that publishing the Estimates
without changes would appear unresponsive to events and could
be seized upon by Conservative critics.
Nott's political standing was at a low ebb. According to
press reports, he was In danger of being sacked.'9
 Twice
during the war he had offered to resign due to sharp criticism
of his policies and his poor performance during the 3 April
debate on the Falklands invasion. Nott's political position
Cand 8529-I, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1982
(undated), p. 12, para 210.
67 B.Bloom, Financial Times (7 April 1982).
HC 428, Defence Estimates. 1982, Q. 24.
'9 A.Raphael, Observer (20 June 1982).
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was tenable only because on both occasions the Prime Minister
had refused to accept his resignation, expressing continued
confidence in the beleaguered Secretary of State. 7
 However,
Thatcher was believed to favour publishing a more substantial
version of the Defence Estimates in the fall, after the war
had been thoroughly studied. 71
 Nevertheless, Thatcher
ultimately accepted Nott's judgement and on June 20 informed
him that she had no plans to dismiss him.
	 The Defence
Estimates were published, unamended, shortly thereafter.
The only mention of the Falklands War was in a brief
foreword by Nott. His main argument against making an early
statement of the war was that it was an aberration 'and that
the Soviet Union remained the primary threat to British
security.
The events of recent weeks must not...obscure the
fact that the main threat to the security of the
United Kingdom is from the nuclear and conventional
forces of the Warsaw Pact allies. It was to meet
this threat that the defence programme described in
Cmnd 8288 was designed. The framework remains
appropriate.
Nott did accept, however, that there should be an analysis of
the Falklands operation 'to identify the key issues, not least
in the area of defence equipment.
	 At the press conference
N.Comfort, Daily
 Te1erah (21 June 1982).
Ibid.
72 Ibid.
Cmnd 8529-I, Defence Estimates. 1982, Foreword, para 2.
Ibid.
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announcing the White Paper's publication Nott was besieged by
questions challenging planned cuts in the Navy, prompting him
to declare: 'If we decide to change policy, we will change it.
I'm not going to hang on to every piece of current policy if
facts dictate otherwise.'
Nott's declaration that the Soviet Union remained the
primary threat did little to deflect criticism as the greatest
concern of those vigorously opposed to the review had been the
reduction in out-of-area capabilities. Many Conservative
critics accepted that the threat from the Warsaw Pact was the
most serious, but believed the more likely threat would come
from beyond NATO, where local powers or Soviet client states
could threaten the supply of vital resources and a local
conflagration could spread to become a full scale East/West
conflict. 76
 Britain still had military commitments in
Belize, Cyprus, Hong Kong and the Falkiands Islands and
depended on natural resources from strategic areas, such as
oil from the Middle East. Conservative MP Julian Ainery argued,
for example, that no one could be sure another Falklands-type
operation would not be necessary in the future because such
developments were usually unexpected, but he was 'pretty sure
that, given the way the world is developing. . .there will be a
need for a British contribution somewhere outside NATO.'
J.Feron, New York Times (23 June 1982).
76 Julian Amery, Hansard (6 July 1982), cole. 171-74.
Julian Ainery, Hansard (6 July 1982), col. 173.
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The Labour Party agreed with the many Conservative back
benchers advocating that the naval cuts should be rescinded.
Denzil Davies, Labour's new shadow defence minister, also
rejected the notion that the Falklands War was an aberration
with no relevant lessons for British policy:
The conclusion to be drawn from the Falklands
should not be that the Falklands War was an
aberration and can therefore be ignored, or that
surface ships are inherently too vulnerable, but
that those surface ships placed in that situation
were asked to perform a role that made them
vulnerable because not many of them were designed
for the role they were asked to perform. That is
the lesson to be learnt from the Falklands.78
Davies rejected the idea of basing British defence on an
assumption that war on the central front would be short since
that would lead to an early resort to nuclear weapons. As a
result, he emphasised that the strength and efficiency of
naval forces was crucial:
That means that Britain must have a modern and
well-protected surface fleet as well as an
efficient submarine fleet, with proper dockyard
facilities to support them!
Labour's interest in maintaining the surface fleet to
sustain employment was longstanding. Preserving Britain's
options for independent action represented a shift of
emphasis. 8° The shift in Labour's policy prompted former
78 Denzil Davies, Hansard (6 July 1982), cols. 169-170.
' Ibid.
Lawrence Freedman, 'British Defence Policy after the
Falklands,' in Baylis, (ed), Alternative ADProaches to British
Defence Policy, p. 65; Philip Geddes, 'Falklands: the wrong
kind of navy,' New Statesman (7 May 1982), p. 4.
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Prime Minister and long time Navy champion James Callaghan to
declare, 'When I listen to my own Front Bench, I begin to feel
that we are becoming a Navy party.' 8' John Silkin, Labour's
front bench defence spokesman, promptly interjected 'We
are.I R
 Where the Labour front bench and Conservative back
benchers differed was on the means of preserving the Navy.
Conservatives wanted to see defence expenditure increased
whereas Labour wanted to cancel Trident and to reallocate the
funds elsewhere.
Despite ambiguity over the lessons of the Falklands War
the defence review was modified in 1982. The debate over
lessons unsettled the consolidation of the review, but as it
had been brought about by financial stringency, debate alone
could not alter MoD plans. While the debate provided
rationales and political incentives for modifying the defence
review, the actual modifications were made possible only by
the increased availability of defence funds. In the end the
war provided both the rationale and the means for modifying the
review. Nott fought a fierce political battle with the
Treasury to secure their agreement to fund the war. In
winning this battle, Nott enabled many of the cuts in the
James Callaghan, Hansard (6 July 1982), col. 176.
82 John Silkin, Hansard, (6 July 1982), col. 176.
See the debate on Trident in Hansard (15 Feb 1982).
84 See Eric J. Grove, 'After the Falkiands,' Proceedings
(March 1986), p. 122.
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surface fleet to be rescinded. The reasonable health of the
Royal Navy following the Falkiands War may have been
attributable to General Galtieri, but in securing Treasury
funding for the Falkiands War, Nott personally approved the
largest naval re-equipment programme since the Second World
War.85
Replacing the lost equipment could not have been done
within the existing defence programme. But, according to
Nott,
the Treasury absolutely refused to find the money
to replace the ships. I said it must be done. I
refused to negotiate the matter with the Chief
Secretary or the Chancellor. So the only way the
matter could be resolved was in a meeting with the
Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, Geoffrey Howe
and I met and she backed me up. So the Navy got
their replacement ships. What they don't know was
that it was an extremely fierce battle -- a
political battle.&
Following this June meeting Nott announced firm agreement that
the Treasury would pay for the campaign from the government's
general contingency fund and that the three per cent annual
defence budget increase would not be affected. 87
 This was a
major success for the MoD, especially since the total cost of
the campaign had not yet been established. 0
 It was not
Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fieldhouse, 24
July 1991; Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
87 M.Rutherford. Financial Times (23 June 1982).
88 In November the cost of the Falkiands operation was
estimated at £700 million in 1982 and a further £900 million
over the next three years. These figures include maintenance
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clear for some time, however, that this arrangement would
enable the MOD to modify planned defence reductions.
Nott's position early in the debate over Falklands
lessons offered little hope that the defence review would be
modified by the official inquiry into the war. The war had
intensified the British defence di1ennna. Rising equipment
costs made replacing lost warships very costly and the
government's plan to maintain an increased presence in the
South Atlantic exacerbated the difficulty of establishing a
balance between NATO and out-of-area commitments. There was
a consensus among defence analysts that maintaining extra-
European capabilities represented a fifth commitment, in
addition to the four outlined in the defence review. But,
of course, financial constraints had placed limits on the
government's ability to develop its out-of-area capabilities;
the resources for maintaining five commitments were lacking.
The need to restore unity to the Conservative Party was
compelling. On 1 September Nott told his constituency that he
of the forces to September 1982, replacement of lost equipment
and replenishment of stocks. Garrison costs for 1983 were
estimated at £424 million. John Nott, Hansard (16 Nov 1982),
col.
Paul Kennedy, 'Now the Falklands Battle Comes Home,'
Society
 (24 June 1982), pp. 508-9.
° See Paul Kennedy, 'Now the Falkiands battle comes home,'
p. 510; David Greenwood, 'Economic Constraints and Political
Preferences' in Baylis, (ed), Alternative Aroaches to
British Defence Policy , pp. 32-2; D.Watt, Times (12 Nov 1982);
For a later view see General Sir Hugh Beach, 'British Defence
Policy and the South Atlantic,' South Atlantic Council
Occasional PaDers, No 2, (May 1986).
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would not stand at the next general election. He stated that
he was determined to remain in his post until the Falk].ands
inquiry had been completed and a statement issued by the Prime
Minister expressed her satisfaction that he would do so.91
Nott said his reason for making the announcement so far in
advance was to give his constituency adequate time to select
another candidate. Another rationale was surely so that Nott
could be seen as leaving the government of his own volition
even if his inquiry brought increased criticism. Moreover,
under those circumstances, Nott's departure could help heal
the Conservative Party. Several days later, September 4, Nott
confirmed that he was prepared to leave politics before the
next general election. The Royal Navy hoped that Nott's
departure would increase the prospects for a reprieve of the
1981 defence review, because, Despite Nott's reconsideration
of the Invincible sale and his success securing Treasury
funding for the Falklands operation he was not expected to
alter defence review plans once the official inquiry into the
war was completed.92
The first sign that there might be changes in the defence
programme was made at the Conservative Party Conference at
Brighton. Nott opened the defence debate by stating that
financial pressures had eased following the defence review:
Lately I gave instructions that because the budget
91 M.Van Hatten, Financial Times (2 Sept 1982).
92 A.Raphael, Observer (5 Sept 1982).
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is back in better shape all restrictions on
training levels and activity and on oil consumption
should be lifted.93
Nott qualified his statement by asserting that a larger stock
of combat missiles would be more valuable for British defences
than frigates, Tornado aircraft, or Challenger tanks -- the
expensive platforms 'imbalancing' the defence programme. Nott
also pointed out that one lesson of the campaign was that even
a minor conflict used up large quantities of ammunition.9'
The conclusion emerging from the Falklands inquiry appeared to
be the one that Nott propounded early on; changes in the
equipment programme were advisable, but policy remained the
same. In a speech to NATO politicians in London Nott rejected
arguments for increasing Britain's maritime contribution to
NATO. He said it was 'folly' to consider such a step when
there was an overriding need for adequate ground forces to
counter the Soviet threat.
When the White Paper on the Falkiands Campaign was
published on December 14 Nott surprised many of his critics by
announcing a number of equipment orders. The most unexpected
of these was the decision to order five frigates of the Type
22 class rather than the less expensive (though not yet
Nott quoted in A.Wood, et.al , Times (6 Oct 1982).
Ibid.
Speech by the Secretary of State for Defence John Nott to
the North Atlantic Assembly in London, 18 November 1982, in
Survey
 of Current Affairs. 1982 Vol. 12, (London: HMSO,
1982); P.Riddell, Times (19 Nov 1982).
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complete) Type 23 design. One of these orders had been in the
pipeline before the Falklands War; the remainder were ordered
as a result of it. Nott also relaxed the decision to cut
the fleet to 'about 50' and put 8 ships in the standby
squadron. Instead fleet numbers would remain at 'about 55'
until 1984 by keeping some ships which would have been
scrapped under previous plans. Plans after 1984 would,
according to Nott, 'remain under review.' 97
 The White Paper
also confirmed that Invincible would not be sold to
Australia.98
The rationale for modifying the naval cuts was to offset
the burden on the fleet bovght about by the need for thorough
patrolling of the Falklands Islands. The changes did not
affect the government's decision to close the Chatham
dockyard, but Nott did issue a consultative White Paper on the
role of the dockyard at Portsmouth. 10° The proposal was for
Portsmouth to be used as a naval base rather than a
dockyard. 101
 Nott's response also exceeded expectations,
though not necessarily hopes, with plans for armoured
reconnaissance and artillery regiments to be added to the
John Nott, Hansard (14 Dec 1982), cols. 129-30.
John Nott, Hansard (14 Dec 1982), col.
Cmnd 8758, The Falkiands Cainaign, p. 33, para 307.
Cmnd 8758, The Falkiands Campaign, para 3lle.
John Nott, Hansard (14 Dec 1982), col. 131.
101 D.Fairhall, Guardian (15 Dec 1982).
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Fifth Infantry Brigade to enhance Britain's out-of-area
capabilities. Later in the year an Army Air Corps squadron
and 'certain logistic units' were to be added. 102
 More
transport aircraft were also made available. 103
 The total
cost of new equipment purchases was £1 billion.'0'
The MoD's ability to acquire such a range of new
equipment was due to two main factors. First, the bulk of the
purchases were paid for by the Treasury, as had been agreed in
June. The extent of the equipment funded out of the general
contingency reserve was justified by its flexibility and
mobility. 105
 Equipment purchased for use in protecting the
Falklands Islands could also be used for other tasks.
In planning its expenditure on the Falkiands, the
Ministry of Defence sought to invest as little as
possible themselves, but to use as much of the
additional expenditure allowed for the garrison to
purchase equipment that could be employed for a
variety of alternative purposes.106
Second, the MOD budget situation had begun to improve, as Nott
had told the Conservative Party conference. This was due
partly to the March 1982 decision to purchase the D-5 version
of the Trident missile, which shifted major expenditure
forward in the medium term budget. The primary reason,
102 John Nott, Hansard (14 Dec 1982), col. 128.
Cmnd 8758, The Falkiands CamDai gn, para 304.
104 D.Fairhall, Guardian (15 Dec 1982).
Cmnd 8758, The Falk].ands Campaicm, p. 31, para 301.
106 Freedman, 'British Defence Policy After the Falkiands,' p.
66.
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however, was that the MoD's 2982 budget was being underspent.
This was the result of
over-zealous application of new procedures for
controlling procurement...and as a result of
defence contractors having to take on urgent
Falklands work at the expense of other MOD
107
According to Nott there was no longer any downward pressure on
the defence budget:
The pressures on me to add to the programme within
the already announced defence totals are much
greater than any pressures to reduce the programme
and cut the forward plans.'°8
Nonetheless, Nott saw no choice but to be 'ruthless in
deciding our defence priorities,' not the least because given
Britain's history it was 'only natural that our aspirations
are larger than our purse.''°9
The new equipment orders and especially the improvements
in Britain's out-of-area capabilities marginally qualified the
government's belief that the Falklands War was an aberration.
Improvements in out-of-area and intervention capabilities
suggested a visible step away from the notion that Britain was
strictly a regional power. These indicators were a source of
hope among navalists that Britain could return to a more
107 Ibid.
108 John Nott, Hansard (21 Dec 1982), col. 849.
109 John Nott, Hansard (21 Dec 1982), col. 847.
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traditional maritime strategy. 11° Despite changes in the
equipment programme, however, the Falklands War did not
change the government's view of basic defence priorities.
The Soviet Union remained the principal threat and it was,
according to Nott, 'here in Europe that we face the
overwhelming preponderance of Soviet forces.
Nott explained changes in previous defence plans, not on
the basis of a greater need for out-of-area capability, but
because the Falkiands policy made them necessary and,
primarily, because the weapons could also be used to improve
Britain's defences closer to home. 112
 One declared virtue of
home defence was its indirect enhancement of all capabilities:
The defence of the United Kingdom base is the only
part of our conventional distribution which is
relevant to every possible defence policy
option.113
Arguing for improved home defence Nott identified three
principal threats facing the UK home base, all of which
emanated from the Soviet Union: (i) Soviet supersonic aircraft
and stand-off missiles made air defence of Britain the top
priority; (ii) the risk of small groups of Soviet forces
110 George Richey, britain's Strategic Role in NATO (London:
Macmillan, 1986); Michael Chichester and John Wilkinson,
British Defence: A Bluerrint for Reform (London: Brassey's,
1987); See also Christopher Coker A Nation in Retreat?:
Britain's Defence Commitment (London: Brassey's, 1986), pp.
64-75.
John Nott, Hansard (21 Dec 1982), col. 847.
112 John Nott, Hansard (21 Dec 1982), col. 852.
113 John Nott, Hansard (21 Dec 1982), col. 850.
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targeting key points in the UK meant that the home defence
force and territorial reserves should be improved; (iii) the
ports and the Channel had to be protected from Soviet mining
and conventional submarines, which required more trawlers for
the Royal Naval Reserve, and improved mining and countermining
capability.11'
DEFENCE IN THE 1980S
Nott's successor as Secretary of State for Defence,
Michael Heseltine, confirmed the basic policy outlined in the
1981 defence review as well as the direction of the programme
following its post-Falklands modification. From early in his
tenure Heseltine did not 'see any fundamental shifts in our
national strategic priorities over the next five years.'5
He told a November 1983 conference on the future of British
sea power that:
My time in the Ministry of Defence has convinced me
that change was necessary and that the adjustments
made in 1981 were on the right lines. There have
been further changes and adjustments since, notably
as a result of the Falklands war. But the main
thrust of the policy set out in the White Paper
'The Way Forward' is that which still determines
John Nott, Hansard (21 Dec 1982), cols. 851-2.
115 Michael Heseltine, 'The United Kingdom's Strategic
Interests and Priorities,' RUSI Journal Vol. 128, No. 4
(December 1983) p. 4.
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our policy today.116
It was partly his confidence in the basic direction of defence
policy that enabled Heseltine, after confronting the Campaign
for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) over the deployment of US
nuclear cruise missiles in Britain, to focus his energies on
management, an area in which he had already established a
reputation as an innovator.
While economic factors continued to impose constraints
throughout the 19805 no further fundamental reviews were
undertaken until the end of the Cold War provided both a
strategic and political rationale for change. Government
reluctance to reassess priorities was so firm as to prompt
criticism from many who believed that marginal programme
adjustments were having a negative impact not offset by the
benefits in terms of strategic coherence that a full-scale
defence review could provide. A 1984 report by the Defence
Committee concluded: 'We are told that there is no immediate
need for a major defence review; but we fear that the
cumulative effect of managing the defence budget in the manner
endorsed in (the 1985 Defence] White Paper may result in
defence review by stealth.'	 Yet the government repeatedly
116 Michael Heseltine, 'Priorities in British Defence Policy,'
in Geoffrey Till, (ed), The Future of British Sea Power
(London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 5.
117 Third Report from the Defence Committee, 1984-85, Defence
Commitments and Resources and the Defence EstImates. 1985-86,
(HC 37-I), para 107. Emphasis added; See also David Greenwood,
'Managing the Defence Programme and Budget,' Three Banks
Review (June 1984).
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denied a review was necessary, arguing that 'progressive
adjustments' could be taken on a less formal basis.118
Calls for a review were not all motivated by a rejection
of government defence policy. While Labour remained opposed
to nuclear weapons until its policy review of 1989 opinion
within the Conservative Party converged, creating a general
consensus, though with some elements continuing to argue for
increased attention on the Navy's out-of-area role. Following
the 1981 review the Defence Committee closely monitored the
size and role of the Royal Navy's surface fleet in successive
reports. The extent to which the acrimony of 1981 had
developed into a basic consensus was reflected in the
Committee's 1987 report on Inrnlementinci the Lessons of the
Falkiands Camtaign. The Committee accepted that special
features of the campaign hindered its relevance for defence
policy, and praised the objectivity of the official government
analysis, while recommending that Britain maintain the ability
to sustain a substantial out-of-area capability."9
Calls for a review were motivated more by concern that
the defence programme was seriously imbalanoed and that
ongoing financial pressures were resulting in cuts with little
reference to defence priorities. Yet in the years leading up
to the 1990-91 Options for Change exercise, undertaken once
Cmnd 9430-I, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1985 (May
1985), p. 35.
119 HC 345-I, Implementing
 the Lessons, paras 13-18.
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the Cold War had ended and the political and military
situation in Europe was radically transformed, the closest the
government came to accepting the need for review of some sort
was Secretary of State for Defence George Younger's 1986
acknowledgement that 'difficult decisions' would have to be
made. 120
 However, the 1989 Defence Estimates three years
later argued that while budgetary plans based on improved
efficiency 'disposes of talk of the need for a defence
review...the increases ha[d) not removed the need for
decisions to be made between priorities."21
 There could
have been no clearer indication that the government was ready
to choose between defence priorities without conducting a
defence review.
CONCLUS ION
Modifying the defence review in the wake of the Falkiands
War restored as much consensus over Britain's conventional
defences as could be reasonably expected in a period of
serious economic constraint. Many proponents of naval power
were not satisfied, but neither did they remain bitterly
opposed to the review. According to Admiral Leach, 'The
Falklands War corrected the imbalance between the
120 Cmnd 9763-I, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1986,
para 503.
121 Cm 675-I, Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1989 (May
1989), paras 503-4.
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services...The Royal Navy got back about two-thirds of what
would have been cut.' 122
 In addition to the infusion of
resources from the Treasury, the RAF lost much of the
additional funding that had been outlined in the Bermudagram
and formally secured as a result of the 1981 review.
	 Nott
acknowledged that between the services 'There wasn't a
consensus. There never will be. The argument of the Navy
always would be the blue-water argument: "This is what the
Navy is for, nothing rational ever happens in this life and
the Falklands War was proof that you have to have a large
surface fleet." 2' While the services can never contentedly
watch defence resources decline in real terms over the long-
term, the short-term increase in defence spending following
the Falklands War did take the edge of f of the dispute between
Nott and Conservative back benchers.
Nevertheless, the more vocal proponents of naval power
were not satisfied nor did the Opposition warm to government
policy. A member of the British Maritime League, formed
shortly before the Falklands War to protect Navy interests,
said of the White Paper that
The Government is making good the immediate losses
and weapon deficiencies revealed in the Falklands
campaign but there is no change in strategy and no
appreciation of the needs of this country for
122 Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach, 1
July 1991.
123 Interview with Cohn Humphrey, 13 June 1991.
124 Interview with Sir John Nott, 19 November 1991.
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maritime strategy.124
The Labour Party Defence Spokesman, John Silkin, maintained
that the Trident commitment would weaken the conventional Navy
and declared 'there still seems to be no maritime out-of-area
capability in this White Paper. ,125 Significantly, however,
in the December debates on the White Paper and on the
Falklands campaign, little was heard from the more outspoken
Conservative critics of government policy. Nott had not
satisfied those Conservatives disagreeing with his assessment
of defence priorities, but in the words of Keith Speed, 'the
White Paper that was presented last week is a considerable
improvement on last year's."26
In the process of implementing the defence review Nott
had antagonised the defence industry, the Treasury,
Conservative back benchers and the military, especially the
Navy. Nott may also have lost standing with the Prime
Minister, though not so much that she would not support him.
The Falklands War made implementing the defence review
politically impossible and in its aftermath significant
modifications were made, though not to the government's
fundamental assessment of defence priorities. The war also
eased pressures on the defence budget. The influx of Treasury
124 Admiral Sir Anthony Griffith quoted in 3. Haviland, Times
(15 Dec 1982); On the British Maritime League see D.
Nicholson-Lord, Times (21 May 1982).
John Silkin, Hansard (14 Dec 1982), col. 130.
126 Keith Speed, Hansard (21 Dec 1982), col. 863.
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money and diminution of 1982 budgetary pressures on the MOD
ameliorated the defence dilemma in the short term, but
although long-term pressures remained the government refused
to undertake another fundamental review.
CHAPTER TEN
Conclusion
The political and economic imperatives underlying
British defence policy in 1981 fundamentally altered the
nature of the decision-making process. The Ministry of
Defence had been subject to gradual evolution since its
creation, but radical change, both in policy and the
structure of the ministry, had been successfully resisted
on numerous occasions. When changes affecting the balance
of civilian and military input into defence planning came
about they were the result of a process initiated with the
1963 reorganisation of the ministry. Yet the nature of
this shift was no less significant for being gradual. The
priorities translated into policy in 1981 reflected the
notion of a 'defence view' as a concept in which political
and economic factors were given at least equal
consideration as military calculations. Ultimately the
role of the Ministry of Defence as an instrument not only
of defence policy, but of economic and foreign policy as
well, necessitated changes in its structure.
Emphasis on the political content of Britain's defence
policy to maximise the benefits of diminishing military
capabilities has been a constant preoccupation in postwar
Britain. By the 1960s conflicting economic and
technological developments raised the prospect that in
attempting to maintain a broad spectrum of military
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capabilities Britain would instead become a marginal
military power. Conforming defence policy to postwar
political and economic constraints -- the underlying
motivation for defence reviews -- taxed existing
arrangements for the development of strategic concepts.
This process of adjustment threatened service priorities
while advice on the size and shape of the armed forces
remained a service responsibility. The dependence of the
military on tn-service consensus made a unified military
view of priorities virtually impossible to achieve.
The shifting balance of civil-military influence on
defence plans ultimately was the result of Britain's
painful process of adjustment to the status of a secondary
power, albeit one with unique global associations.
Embracing NATO orthodoxy, including the rationalisation of
British forces within NATO, strengthened the link between
foreign and defence policy while enabling economies. The
1981 review was thus a logical outgrowth of policies
designed to niaximise the political benefits of maintaining
armed forces. However, it also highlighted the disparity
within the ministry between formal authority and practical
influence. The political objectives of government policy
inhibited the Chiefs of Staff from exercising their
authority over strategic concepts. The discrepancy between
the central staffs' ability to articulate a defence view
specifying relative priorities and the Chiefs of Staff's
responsibility for defence plans was revealed at a critical
moment. Unable to establish defence priorities at a time
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when the Prime Minister's consolidation of authority within
her own government was synonymous with economic discipline,
the Chiefs' lost their traditional role in defence
planning.
Service staffs had long produced most of the work on
which a Chiefs of Staff Committee consensus could be
established. Analyses in which service interests received
considerable emphasis thus defined the boundaries of
consensus on defence priorities. The Chiefs' dependence on
consensus, combined with the structure of the Chiefs of
Staff Committee and divergent service interests, resulted
in a vacuum of advice at the very top of the military
hierarchy. As a result, government foreign and economic
policies were not well served by plans originating with the
Chiefs of Staff. Civilians charged with providing broader
policy advice were more capable of addressing the concerns
of ministers.
The 1970s proved a critical decade for the Chiefs of
Staff Committee, which sought unity through compromise in
the face of growing economic pressures. By 1980 practical
influence over defence plans had already shifted decisively
in favour of the central staffs just as, according to Pym,
influence on ministries had shifted decisively in favour of
the Prime Minister. 1 Changes in the ministry and their
consequences for civil-military relations must therefore be
seen in the context of the larger process of centralization
1 Francis Pym, The Politics of Consent (London: Hamish
Hamilton, 1984), p. 17.
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within government as a whole.
The key priorities at work in British government are
those held by Cabinet or its most important members.
Policy coherence at the Cabinet level is dependent to a
large extent on the degree of advance co-ordination between
ministries. Civil servants, responsible for this co-
ordination as well as for advice on the balance between
political and economic imperatives -- but not for defence
plans -- were inclined to favour NATO orthodoxy. Not only
did structuring the armed forces in the context of alliance
maximise the value of a diminishing scale of armed forces,
but NATO also constituted the core overseas commitment,
which officials in other ministries, notably the Treasury
and Foreign Office, agreed was essential. Enhanced central
input into policy formation rendered reform of the
triangular relationship between the MoD and the economic
and overseas departments unnecessary. It was also easier
to achieve as a result of the Chiefs of Staffs Committee's
loss of credibility as the forum for defence planning.
Central staffs were less constrained in their ability
to provide planning alternatives suiting government
policies. Unlike the Chiefs, central civilians could
promptly and efficiently produce a coherent view of
priorities based primarily on political and economic
considerations, the traditional civil service expertise.
The risk was that inadequate military input would diminish
the quality of plans since these would, after all, define
the range of military options. For this reason cooperation
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with the central defence staffs was essential to the
development of a 'defence view', a coherent statement of
defence priorities taking account of economic and political
as well as military objectives.
Central defence staffs, tasked with taking an overall
view of defence priorities and therefore endeavouring to
set aside service loyalties, also gravitated toward
strategic concepts in which political and economic
rationales were paramount since these provided alternative
guidance to resource allocation solely on the basis of
service priorities. Despite anomalies in the structure of
the ministry the central defence staffs were the natural
partners of the central civilians. Together, the central
staffs were the logical source for the elusive 'defence
view.'
Growing civilian influence was thus not the product of
civil service self-aggrandizement, but resulted from the
nature of the problems faced, and the structure and
prevailing distribution of responsibility within the
ministry. When the centres of corporate influence in the
MOD -- central civilians, services, scientific staffs, and
central military -- could not agree on priorities, the
civilian central staffs turned to the central defence
staffs to collaborate on the development of a defence view.
They were supported in this exercise by the scientific
staffs, whose operational analyses complemented political
and economic rationales for reducing the Navy. In 1981
cooperation in the centre -- and between the centre and
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other ministries on the one hand, arid with the services on
the other -- was the basis of defence planning more than on
any previous occasion.
Nor was the 1981 defence review the crusade of an
angry minister harbouring animus toward the Navy. Central
staffs drafted the Bermudagram. Nott knew what was in it
and approved, not out of malice, but because he accepted
widely held arguments that the fleet could be cut. The
extent to which this view was shared by key officials
reflected the potential influence of operational analyses
on the decision-making process. As the 'customer' of
operational research the services could bring analyses to
a halt, modify their assumptions, or present alternative
views. They could not, however, prevent basic conclusions
from having an impact on the thinking of key advisers.
However, the unique ability of scientific staff to
challenge service assumptions, technical and otherwise,
also rendered them highly vulnerable in the wake of the
review.
The relationship of the CSA and DOAE to the services
depended on close co-operation and had been difficult from
the beginning. While the 1981 review and 1982
reorganisation consolidated the influence of the central
staffs, the Falkiands War left the scientific staffs
exposed to serious criticism. Operational analyses can
only be as good as the assumptions on which they are based.
Consequently, they are most useful in exploring narrowly
defined problems, not in overall resource allocation. They
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are also incapable of incorporating intangibles, such as
political pressures or morale. The close association of
the CSA and DOAE with decisions to cut the surface fleet
shortly before the Falkiands campaign aroused concern that
scientific studies played a disproportionate role in
ministry decision-making. In particular, some in the
military and parliament feared that scientific analysis had
oversimplified the nature of defence planning problems,
facilitating Nott's ability to impose damaging cuts. These
concerns were not unrelated to the 1984 decision to
downgrade the authority of the CSA. Designated in 1963 as
one of the ministry's three principal advisers, along with
the PUS and CDS, in 1984 the CSA was deprived of the right
of direct access to the Secretary of State.
The decision to cut the Navy undoubtedly was viewed by
Nott as the least damaging way to achieve savings in the
defence programme. Indeed, the Royal Navy had proven
highly vulnerable in successive defence reviews. In 1952
the Navy depended on the concept of 'broken-backed'
warfare. By 1957 Duncan Sandys had concluded that the
future role of naval forces was 'somewhat uncertain.' Ten
years later Denis Healey eliminated carriers and planned
Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez. In 1974 Roy Mason
planned Britain's withdrawal from the Mediterranean. The
Nott review cut the Royal Navy further, both reducing its
infrastructure and restructuring its general purpose
equipment programme to specialise on ASW in the East
Atlantic. The Royal Navy's vulnerability to cost-cutting
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exercises was due largely to the contraction of Britain's
global interests, which by the 1970s even the Conservative
Party had accepted as inevitable. Scientific
recommendations may have been overstated, but they
nevertheless accorded with prevailing political and
economic analyses. Although the war altered the
government's Falklands policy, and made possible
modifications to the defence review, the political and
economic logic underlying the review was not changed nor
was basic defence policy.
Cutting the Navy was riot a natural or easy task for a
Conservative Government, whose interest in out-of-area
capabilities reflected its adherence to elements of
Britain's traditional national strategy. Out-of-area
operations constituted a surrogate for empire: a global
role within a NATO context. Yet the government had little
prospect of reconciling this strategy with NATO membership
as long as out-of-area involvement remained controversial
within the alliance. Financially, Britain could not
significantly enhance out-of-area capabilities while
maintaining its existing contribution to the defence of
Europe. Faced with such a choice the only realistic option
for out-of-area forces remained the residual ability
rapidly to deploy existing light ground forces by air
rather than preserving large numbers of frigates. Given
resource constraints the out-of-area role was not one
around which the Navy programme could be configured. The
inability to develop large-scale out-of-area forces was
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thus a product of Britain's acceptance of NATO orthodoxy.
Accepting NATO orthodoxy demonstrated the link between
policy reappraisals and defence organisation. It was the
Navy's natural resistance to a review imposing
disproportionate cuts on its programme that stymied the
ability of the Chiefs to act in unison. The Navy did
everything it could to resist the cuts proposed during the
review. They came up, however, against the direct
authority of the Secretary of State. Retaining the support
of the Prime Minister and the parliamentary party -- and
often the two go together -- the Secretary of State has
little difficulty imposing his will. The gradual weakening
of the Parliamentary Under Secretaries of State for the
individual services enhanced this ability. Although
continuing to enjoy Cabinet rank when the position of
Defence Minister was created along with the ministry in
1947, as centralisation continued their influence waned
along with that of the services. Keith Speed's public
protest -- unthinkable a few decades earlier -- was most
significant in demonstrating the extent to which authority
had been concentrated at the top.
The growing capabilities of the central civilian staff
offered the Secretary of State an alternative to reliance
on the advice of junior ministers or the services. Nott
exercised his authority principally through the central
staffs, in contrast to previous defence reviews. Duncan
Sandys had personally drafted The Outline of Future Policy.
The Healey White Paper circulated freely within the MOD
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before publication. The 1974 review was agreed by the
Chiefs of Staff. In the face of Nott's ability to make
hard defence choices, survive a ministerial crisis and
maintain the strong support of the Prime Minister the
Admiralty Board could do little more than mitigate the
worst effects of the review.
Suspicion that Trident had brought about the defence
review mirrored both public controversy surrounding the
Polaris replacement decision and the Navy's dissatisfaction
at its declining control over its budget. Senior naval
officers approved of the Trident purchase though they
criticised the decision to include it in the Navy budget.
Due to Trident's inclusion the extent of the surface
fleet's contraction was not fully reflected in the
reduction of the Navy's percentage share of the defence
budget. Nevertheless, this programming decision was less
significant than the political, strategic and general
economic rationales for such a contraction. Trident was a
high priority item and consumed Navy resources but the
reasoning behind the naval cuts was not elaborated merely
to obscure a trade off between the missile and the surface
fleet. Had Trident not been purchased or not been placed
in the Navy programme the Navy' s budget may have declined
even further. Most importantly, the incidence of
expenditure on Trident, particularly after the D5 decision
-- which Nott anticipated as early as 1981 even though it
was not formally made until 1982 -- peaked not in the mid-
1980s, from which period planned expenditure was reduced,
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but in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
The nature of Nott's 1981 decisions for the defence
programme were radical -- disproportionate cuts on one
service have never been the norm -- but they were also in
trend with the evolution of basic British defence policy.
Nott's strategic approach to defence priorities, in which
he related military and political requirements to elements
in the defence programme irrespective of the impact on
service interests, laid the groundwork for an outlook on
defence in which capabilities were paramount. Service
interests had to be seen in the context of overall defence
interests and defence was one element of a triad of
problems -- external relations, economic health, and
strategic requirements.
Nott's strategic approach to defence planning,
laudable in its intent if not universally welcome in
content, had significant consequences not only for the
decision-making process but for policy as well. Having
taken account primarily of international and economic
considerations during the conduct of the review, following
the Falkiands War, the government focused on domestic
political concerns for the defence effort. This did not
result in a reordering of defence priorities, which
remained as stated in the 1981 white paper and the 1982
supplement modifying it. However, the government's
experience in 1981-82 directly contributed to its
unwillingness to conduct another defence review during the
1980s, despite the continuation of financial pressures.
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Without the ability to point to problems inherited from a
previous government the risk of recrimination within the
Conservative Party appeared too great to reopen the debate
over basic defence policy. When a reassessment became
necessary due to political and strategic developments in
Europe at the end of the decade the government denied
it was conducting a review, insisting that it was an
exercise outlining the options for change.
The most enduring legacy of the 1981 defence review is
the watershed change it brought about in the balance of
civil-military influence over defence policy. The
fundamental shift in the nature of ministry decision-making
which culminated in 1981 and was consolidated in 1984 will
continue to have an important impact on defence planning
exercises unless and until the growing accountability --
financial and operational -- of ministry outstations or
military commanders reaches the point at which centralised
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